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Abstract
A-national principles as discussed in this thesis mean broadly the principles whose
origins and formation have no direct connection with any particular states by contrast
with national laws. They include general principles of law and the new lexmercatoria
together with amiable composition. Over thirty years, a-national principles have
frequently been applied in international commercial arbitration to decide the substantive
issues of the dispute, either by the choice of the parties or the decisions of arbitrators.
Such a practice is particularly welcomed by proponents of international commercial
arbitration who have sought to create a truly international system with minimum
interference by the courts at the place of arbitration or elsewhere and with awards
enforceable anywhere in the world.
Within the present framework, arbitration draws upon national laws, by reference to
which, questions as to whether and to what extent arbitration agreements and awards
will be enforced are answered. The validity of the choice of a-national principles also
has to be determined under the laws of the states connected with the arbitration. This is
evident where arbitrators have to reach their decision on the basis of a specific national
law in accordance with the laws of the countries connected with the dispute. Thus, the
parties' freedom to select the proper law may be incompatible with the provisions of
domestic laws.
The application of a-national principles is controversial. However, this thesis will not
examine the arguments for or against such an application. Its main aim is to examine
the practice of applying a-national principles and the sometimes hostile reception this
receives in national courts. Whether this can be sufficiently accommodated by the
existing theories of arbitration will also be examined.
Part One of this thesis, a background study, highlights the changes in the traditional
three-step rule on choice of law on contract in international commercial arbitration.
Part Two presents the result of study of ad hoc and ICC arbitral awards which shows
that a-national principles are increasingly applied in such arbitration. Using
comparative analysis, Part Three examines the diverse attitudes held by different
national courts which are in different regions and at different stages of development in
the area of such arbitration. Part Four examines the conflict with the existing theories
of arbitration and suggests a new approach that corresponds more closely with the
application of a-national principles and the development of arbitration in an
international commercial context.
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The foundation of this thesis is an investigation into the application of a-national
principles as the substantive law of contracts in international commercial arbitration
and the attitudes held by different national courts towards such an application. The
scope of a-national principles will concentrate in the terms of the "general principles of
law", the "new lexmercatoria" and "amiable composition". Specifically, this thesis
will examine the legal interpretation of a-national principles with a special emphasis on
a comparative study of the arbitral awards of the International Chamber of Commerce
(the ICC) and of six domestic jurisdictions (England, France, the United States, Hong
Kong, China and Taiwan). A comparison of their different approaches towards the
issue of a-national principles will be discussed. In addition, this study will investigate
the prospects for clarification of a-national principles by searching for a more
appropriate approach against a background of the present framework of international
commercial arbitration.
These issues are mainly discussed through an examination of data resulting from
inquiries into (1) the literature on the application of the general principles of law, the
new lexmercatoria and amiable composition, (2) a number of international arbitral
awards published in the Journal of InternationalLegalMaterials, (3) the ICC arbitral
awards published in the Yearbook ofCommercial Arbitration and Collection of ICC
Arbitral Awards and (4) the domestic case law and arbitration law on the subject.
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ChapterOne: Introduction
This introductory chapter comprises six sections. It will start with a general
discussion of the topic of the thesis. This will be followed by a discussion centred on
the terms used in this thesis - which includes "international commercial arbitration",
"parties", "applicable laws", and "a-national principles". A further section will focus
on the scope of the research. In addition, the object of this study will be explained.
Furthermore, the methodology used in this thesis will be given. Finally, in the last
section, a structure of this thesis will be provided.
1.1 General discussion
In the international commercial community, international commercial arbitration is
regarded as an alternative mechanism outside national courts to settle disputes arising
from international commercial transactions. The main reason behind the popularity of
this mechanism is that it provides predictable and speedy decisions and is based on the
theory of party autonomy. In principle, party autonomy allows parties to exercise
their freedom in choosing the arbitrators1, the place of arbitration, the applicable laws,
deciding how the arbitral procedures shall be carried out and the extent of the
arbitrator's powers within the arbitration framework. In other words, the ideal of this
mechanism is to leave parties with a great deal of control over matters concerning how
the decision-making process shall be conducted.
Under a valid arbitration agreement, arbitrators, whether directly or indirectly
appointed by the parties, have to discharge their duties by determining contractual
duties and obligations of the parties and then by making an arbitral award. In order to
'The term "arbitrators" also includes the tenn "arbitral tribunal" which can consist of a single
arbitrator, more than one arbitrator, or an tunpire (also referred to "arbitral tribunal"). Reference to
"arbitrator" is also to be taken to include the Scottish fonn "arbiter".
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do so, they have to determine the law governing the substantive issues arising from
the case. There are two ways for arbitrators to arrive at a decision on which law
applies to the substantive disputes. First, party autonomy is accepted and respected in
most jurisdictions, that is to say, the choice of the substantive law is first determined
by the reference to the agreement of the parties or to any rules to which the parties
have agreed. According to the choice of law rules, in the case where the parties
express their choice of law, arbitrators are obliged to apply the laws specified by the
parties. Secondly, in the case where the parties fail to agree on the proper law,
arbitrators have the powers and duty to choose the substantive law in accordance with
the so-called "implied choice" test or the "closest and most real relationship" test set
out in the choice of law rules of the place of arbitration. Traditionally, in most
arbitration cases, a national law is usually chosen to govern the substantive disputes
under these circumstances, whether expressed or implied.
However, choice of a national law as the proper law of a contract has lost its
predominant role in international commercial arbitration. A review of the international
commercial arbitration cases of the past twenty years highlights a trend of choosing a-
national principles as the substantive law in the major international commercial
contracts.2 Such a choice of a-national principles as the proper law can be made by
the parties or by the arbitrators who regard it as the most appropriate choice under the
circumstances.
Since the 1960s the application of a-national principles, such as the general principles
of law, the new lexmercatoria or the concept of amiable composition,3 as the
2Goode, "Usage and Its Reception in Transnational Commercial Arbitration", (1997) 46 I.C.L.Q. 1.
3Strictly speaking, concepts like amiable composition or deciding the case ex aequo et bono are not
applications of laws, but applications of "non-legal" principles. Although the applications can be a-
legal, they do have legal implications involved in the case of international commercial arbitration.
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substantive laws of contracts in international commercial arbitration has caused a great
deal of concern and debate which encompasses its history, nature and sources. The
most controversial issue of this application is the fear that the predictability of
international commercial arbitration may be destroyed because of the application of
such general principles of laws, the new lexmercatoria or amiable composition.
The majority of jurisdictions require the arbitrators to decide the disputes in accordance
with the law designated by the parties within the restrictions of public policy or
mandatory rules. Given the freedom in specifying the applicable laws, international
business people are willing to utilise the mechanism of international commercial
arbitration. With this important support from the international commercial community,
the individual states have offered international commercial arbitration more breathing
space. As the United States Supreme Court observed:
"Uncertainty will almost inevitably exist with respect to any contract touching
two or more countries, each with its own substantive laws and conflict of laws
rules. A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which
disputes shall be litigated and the law to be applied is, therefore, an almost
indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability
essential to any international business transaction. [Absent such agreements,
one enters] the dicey atmosphere of ... a legal no-man's land [which] would
surely damage the fabric of international commerce and trade, and imperil the
willingness and ability of businessmen to enter into international commercial
agreements."4
Nevertheless, sometimes, the ideals of predictability and efficiency that arbitration
promises can not be achieved because of the possible complicated situations caused by
choice of law issues.5 The choice of law issues may arise when the parties fail to
specify which law is to be applied by the arbitrators to decide the merits of disputes in
4Scherk v. Albert-Culver Company 417 US 506 (1974) pp. 516-517. See also the Restatement
(Second) Conflict ofLaws section 187 comment e (1971); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473, US 614 (1985).




their arbitration agreement, or the arbitrator's duty to decide the dispute according to
law is exempted by the parties' agreement, or even the choice of a-national principles
is involved. In addition, this issue frequently leads to uncertainty about the validity of
the arbitral awards. As Professor Lando pointed out:
"the freedom [that international arbitral tribunals possess in selecting the
governing law] has been useful in some cases. However, it has also led to
some unpredictability. With the growing use of international arbitration this
uncertainty has become amatter of concern to parties. They see no attraction in
unpredictable conflict of laws rules. They need some degree of certainty as to
the law applicable when drafting their contracts, when seeking a friendly
settlement of their dispute and when resorting to arbitration."6
No matter which of the situations mentioned above appear, they all provide arbitrators
some leeway to decide the disputes by applying the law they deem appropriate, or, not
according to the strict rules of law. Since 1960, international arbitral tribunals have
frequently shown their willingness to decide the disputes submitted before them on the
basis of the so-called general principles of law, the new lexmercatoria and amiable
composition, while such applications also reflect the modern trend towards "a-
national" arbitration.
For more than three decades, the concept and application of a-national principles has
caused ambiguity and controversy both in practice and theory. With respect to the
general principles of law, their application was refused on the ground that the subject
of these principles are sovereign states. Moreover, rights and obligations of private
individuals shall be governed by municipal laws.
6Lando, "Conflict of Law Rules for Arbitrators", in Festschrift Zweigert, (1981), at p. 159 .
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The new lex mercatoria is sometimes regarded as interchangeable with the lex
mercatoria, law merchant, international trade law and trade usages.7 Though there are
certain differences between these terms, most scholars agree that the new lex
mercatoria has developed from trading circumstances, largely invoked by French and
Swiss scholars. Considering the deficiencies of the national laws, especially those of
the under-developed countries, they argue that international commercial transactions
should be subject to a special set of rules existing in the commercial community.8
They further believe that the rules of the new lexmercatoria can be found in the trade
usages developed in the different areas of international trade, for example: standard
clauses, uniform laws or even the general principles of law.
However, this view is not shared by all scholars. In the case of the new lex
mercatoria, its application is resisted because of its unclear definition. Opponents of
the new lexmercatoria argue that no so-called universal lexmercatoria exists, but
merely a variety of lexmercatoria systems depending on a sector of international trade
or a specific region. Furthermore, this law has a very limited application since they
only govern a few matters and they are adopted by a limited number of countries.9
The opponents believe that such reference can cause some difficulties because "the lex
mercatoria still appears too vague, unclear and limited to offer a satisfactory guideline
for arbitrators. Anyone opting for the lexmercatoria should be anxious about the free
hand he leaves the arbitrators in the interpretation of the norms attributed to this lex
mercatoria."10
7In order to have consistency, the term "new lexmercatoria" will be used throughout this thesis.
8Medwig, 'The New LawMerchant Legal Rhetoric and Commercial Reality", L. & Pol.Intl.Bus.,
589 (1993). Also, Rivikin, "Enforceability of Arbitral Awards Based on LexMercatoria", (1994)
Arbitration International, p. 67.
9See Mustill, "Contemporary Problems in International Commercial Arbitration: A Response"
(1989) 17 Int'l Bus. Lawyer, pp. 161-164. Also, van Houtte, The Law ofInternational Trade, (1995),
at p. 399.
10van Houtte, The Law ofInternational Trade, (1995), at p. 399.
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In the case of amiable composition, the term, as well as the new lexmercatoria, is
frequently used interchangeably with making a decision ex aequo et bono or deciding
the case on the basis of equity. According to a strict legal interpretation, these three
terms slightly differ from each other. An arbitrator can make a final and binding
arbitral award if he is authorised to decide the case ex aequo et bono, whereas amiable
composition is a recommendation from an arbitrator who is not required to decide the
case following the strict rules of law. Equity is a device whereby the arbitrator or
judge may decide the case by reference to good conscience and is not obliged to follow
the strict rules or law. Nevertheless, the difference is very slight and infrequently
made in most legal literature, arbitration rules and arbitration laws. It is not the
purpose of this work to provide a clear distinction between these three terms;
therefore, while discussing the issue involving the application of equity, I will mainly
use amiable composition or ex aequo et bono in order to provide for consistency in
this thesis and accommodate the interchangeable terms used in various sources.
The same argument for and against the application of the new lexmercatoria also
appears in the debate concerning the application of amiable composition. One side of
the argument maintains that allowing arbitrators to decide cases on the basis of ex
aequo et bono or amiable composition reflects the equity and the flexibility of
international commercial arbitration, whereas the other side of the divide argues that,
lacking effective supervision of this power, it may be abused since the arbitrators do
not need to apply the strict rules of law.
Despite these theoretical arguments, in practice, the decision to resort to the general
principles of law, the new lexmercatoria or amiable composition would be challenged
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if a party's home country, or the countries where the arbitration is held or where a
party sought enforcement of an arbitral award, refuses to recognise an award
determined under either system. In other words, the autonomy of parties and
arbitrators in choosing the new lexmercatoria or amiable composition is by and large
determined by the degree of intervention and supervision exercised by the courts of the
place of arbitration and the place where enforcement is sought. In a number of states,
such as France and Switzerland, the courts are ready to recognise these applications,
whereas some national courts, such as those in Thailand, have displayed a readiness to
interfere with the process of choosing the new lexmercatoria or amiable composition
as the proper law of the contract.
Though quite a number of arbitral awards have been decided on the basis of a-national
principles, different national courts have shown different levels of acceptance towards
such an application. Due to these different attitudes, the validity of the awards made
on such a basis is uncertain. It is the purpose of this thesis to examine the application
of a-national principles as the proper law of a contract by international arbitral tribunals
and the different levels of tolerance shown towards such applications by different
national courts. In addition, the development and application of a-national principles
in international commercial arbitration will also be discussed. In the interests of the
focus of this thesis, the scope of it will be limited to the issues concerning the
application of a-national principles as the proper law to decide the disputes arising
from the main contract between the parties in international commercial arbitration.
Furthermore, the validity of the awards made on such a basis brought before the
national courts of England, France, the United States, Hong Kong, China and Taiwan
will be discussed as well as the possibility of the evolution of world-wide a-national




1.2.1 International commercial arbitration
The discussion in this thesis is limited to international commercial arbitration. Since
different definitions have been suggested for the terms "international" and
"commercial", we will examine these two terms individually.
International
The term "international" is used to differentiate from domestic arbitration which has
only one single national element involved and is conducted within national boundaries.
Generally speaking, international commercial arbitration involves the arbitration which
has one or more foreign elements. This distinction is important both in practice and
theory since most countries adopt the dual system for commercial arbitration: that is,
states have different sets of rules regulating international commercial arbitration and
domestic arbitration. Generally speaking, unlike domestic arbitration, international
commercial arbitration enjoys less judicial interference from national courts.
Distinguishing international arbitral awards from domestic ones is particularly
important at the stage of recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.
Two main methods are frequently used in determining whether an arbitration is
international. One is the test of "identity of the parties"; the other one is the "nature of
the dispute" test. According to the first test, an arbitration will be characterised as
international providing, in the case of individuals, their nationality or habitual place of
residence, or in the case of corporate entities, their place of incorporation or the seats
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of their management and control, are situated in different countries.11 As far as the
"nature of the dispute" test is concerned, it analyses the elements involved in the
arbitration and an arbitration will be regarded as international providing any interests
of international trade are involved.12 This test can frequently be seen in institutional
arbitration rules and the arbitration laws of the countries which have more liberal
attitudes towards arbitration, such as the ICC13 and the French Code of Civil
Procedure.14
Since both tests have their supporters, a universally agreed definition has never been
reached. In this work, the term international will be defined according to a combined
test developed by the draftsmen of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which gives
"international" a wider definition. Viewed from the rapid development of international
commercial arbitration, the UNCITRAL Model Law not only embraces both the
"identity of the parties" and the "nature of the dispute" tests but also two other tests:
the "situs test" ( satisfied where the situs of the arbitration proceedings is outside the
place of business of one of the parties) and the "opt-in test" ( satisfied where the
parties expressly agree that the subject matter of the arbitration agreement relates to
1 'The approach of "identity of the parties" is adopted in the European Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration. Article l(l)(a) of the Convention stipulates that the scope of the application
covers the "arbitration agreement concluded for the purpose of settling disputes arising from
international trade between physical and legal persons having, when concluding the agreement, their
habitual place of residence or their seat in different Contracting States". Also see Article 176(1) of the
Swiss Private International Law Act which provides that an arbitration is international if the seat of
arbitration is situated in Switzerland and, at the time the arbitration agreement was concluded, at least
one of the parties had neither its domicile nor its habitual residence in Switzerland." A similar
approach is also adopted in England.
12Redfern & Hunter, International Commercial Arbitration, (2nd ed. 1991), at p. 15 (hereinafter
Redfern & Hunter (1991)).
13Article 1.1 of the ICC Rules provides that "The function of the Court is to provide for the
settlement by arbitration of business disputes of an international character in accordance with these
rules."
14Article 1496 of the French Code of Civil Procedure stipulates "Arbitration is international if it
implicates international commercial interests."
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more than one country). This combined approach is a compromise between different
arbitral jurisdictions.
In accordance with the combined definition adopted in the UNCITRAL Model Law,
an arbitration is in the first place an international one if "the parties to an arbitration
agreement have, at the time of the conclusion of that agreement, their places of
business in different States."15 Secondly, following the test of the nature of the
dispute, it provides that an arbitration is international if the place of arbitration16 or any
place where a substantial part of the obligations of the commercial relationship are to
be performed or the place with which the subject-matter of the dispute is most closely
connected17 is situated outside the State in which the parties have their place of
business. Finally, an arbitration is international if the parties have expressly agreed
that the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement relates to more than one country.18
Commercial
To distinguish international commercial arbitration from international arbitration, one
point which has to be stressed is that international commercial arbitration only governs
disputes arising from international commercial transactions, rather than those arising
from international political disputes between States, such as war or boundary disputes.
Therefore, international arbitration which involves the public interests of states is
excluded from the discussion in this work.
15Article l(3)(a) of the Model Law.
16Article l(3)(b)(i) of the Model Law.
17Article l(3)(b)(ii) of the Model Law.
18Article l(3)(c) of the Model Law.
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The definition of "commercial" differs from country to country. Some countries
interpret the term "commercial" as widely as possible whereas others adopt a more
narrow definition. In this thesis, a wider interpretation of "commercial" will be
adopted in order to covermatters arising from all relationships of a commercial nature.
In the opinion of the writer, the footnote to Article 1(1) of the Model Law can be a
very sophisticated statement for the interpretation of "commercial" used in this thesis.
It states:
"The term 'commercial' should be given a wide interpretation so as to cover
matters arising from all relationships of a commercial nature, whether
contractual or not. Relationships of a commercial nature include, but are not
limited to, the following transactions: any trade transaction for the supply or
exchange of goods or services; distribution agreement; commercial
representation or agency; factoring; leasing; construction of works; consulting;
engineering; licensing; investment; financing; banking; insurance; exploitation
agreement or concession; joint venture and other forms of industrial or
business co-operation; carriage of goods or passengers by air, sea, rail or
road."
1.2.2 Parties
Issues Concerning States or State Entities
In this thesis, the expression "parties" means private parties, both individuals and
coiporate entities, conducting international commercial activities. The term "parties"
used here also includes state entities and states which are involved in international
commerce. Following the development of the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity, states or state entities can no longer claim immunity in an arbitration case
which has commercial interests involved. Consequently, states or state entities which
conduct international commercial activities are included in the category of private
parties in international commercial arbitration.
12
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Characterising states and state entities which are involved in international commerce as
private parties in international commercial arbitration caused a great deal of
controversy until the emergence of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.
Before the appearance of the restrictive theory, the absolute theory had a dominant role
on the issue of sovereign immunity. The absolute theory invokes that a state can claim
sovereign immunity over any actions carried out in the name of the state which not
only cover the public or political activities but also the commercial activities carried out
through its state agents.19
However, with the increasing engagement in the trade activities and contractual
obligations by the sovereign states, the application of the principle of absolute
sovereign immunity created obstacles to international trade conducted between states
and private parties because private businessmen were forced into a disadvantageous
position when a state or its state entity could avoid responsibility by claiming absolute
sovereign immunity. Furthermore, it was clear that justice would not be guaranteed to
private businessmen under the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity.
Under these circumstances, the proponents of the restrictive theory have argued that
the sovereign immunity should only be exercised within a reasonable scope.
Accordingly, sovereign immunity can only be invoked if the action was done for a
public purpose. In other words, no immunity can be claimed if a commercial purpose
1 r>rhc idea of the absoluteness of sovereignty was developed a long time ago. Following this theory,
the immunity enjoyed by a state is absolute. The immunity does not only cover the public or
political activities done by a state, but also the commercial activities done by any state entities. The
sovereign immunity issue was first expressed in the case of The Schooner Exchange v. MaFadden and
others 7 Cranch 116 (1812) and was firmly established by the leading case of the Pisaro 255 US 216
(1921) in the United States. In England, see ThePrins Frederik case 2 Dods. 451 (1820), Duke of




or interest is behind the action. Being influenced by this theory, states, especially in
Europe, started to move away from the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity.
Throughout the development, both national courts20 and the international institutions
have changed their opinion about "absolute sovereign immunity". For instance, The
Permanent Court of International Justice gave a judgment on the case of Socobel v.
The Greek State21 on this issue. In this case, the Court dismissed the Greek
Government's plea of sovereign immunity for its actions. The Court did not agree that
the economic activities conducted by the Greek government entitled it to be immune
from the execution.
Considering the changes in national courts and taking the United States as an example,
the attitude held by the American courts favouring absolute sovereign immunity was
challenged in the case of United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat 22 In this case, a
French corporation owned and controlled by the French Government was charged by
the United States Government. The court held that the governmental activity was
primarily commercial in character, therefore, the party should not enjoy immunity.
Meanwhile, the American courts began to decide the sovereign immunity issue on their
own initiative, rather than solely relying on the suggestions passed on from the
20This changes can be seen in the discussion of the Austrian Supreme Court in the case of Dralle v.
Rep. of Czechoslovakia (1950) 17 I.L.R. 155. The Supreme Court of Austria first illustrated the
development of the theory of sovereign immunity as follows:
"The classic doctrine of immunity arose at a time when all the commercial activities of states
in foreign countries was connected with their political activities..."
However,
"states not only engage in commercial activities nowadays, but also compete with their own
nationals and foreigners. Therefore, the classical doctrine of immunity has lost its meaning
and, ratione cessante, can not be recognised as a rule of international law."
In England, the Philippine Admiral case [1976] 2 WLR 214, brought to an end the rule of absolute
sovereign immunity. Also see Alcorn v. Republic of Columbia [1982] 2 All ER 74.
2^Socobel v. The Greek State [1951] 18 I.L.R. 3 (Tribual Civ. Brussels).
22United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat (1929) D.C. 31 F. 2d. 199.
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executive branch. Although it took longer for the American courts to move away from
the idea of absolute sovereign immunity than the courts of other countries, the Tate
Letter23 issued by the Legal Advisor of the United States in 1952 confirmed an
approach which favoured the theory of restrictive sovereign immunity. It said:
"... the Department feels that the widespread and increasing practice on the
part of governments of engaging in commercial activities makes necessary a
practice which will enable persons doing business with them to have their
rights determined in the courts. For these reasons, it will hereafter be the
Department's policy to follow the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity
in the consideration of the requests of foreign governments for a grant of
sovereign immunity."
In 1964, sometime after the Tate Letter, the cases of Banco National de Cuba v.
Sabbatino24 and Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y
Transportes25 confirmed that the American courts had finally accepted the theory of
restrictive sovereign immunity.26
1.2.3 Applicable laws
In international commercial arbitration, the expression "applicable laws" indicates four
possible choice of laws which govern the different aspects of arbitration. They are: (a)
the substantive law governing the merits of the parties' main contract and any related
claim;27 (b) the substantive law governing the parties' arbitration agreement; (c) the
2326 Department of State Bulletin, 984 (1952).
24376 US 398 (1964); 35 I.L.R. 2.
2535 I.L.R. 110.
26In the former case, the United States Supreme Court first indicated that the concept of immunity
was related to international constitutional balances. Then the Court declared that "the judicial branch
would not examine the validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign
govenunent, irrespective of the legality in international law of that action". In the latter case, without
the "suggestions" from the State Department, jurisdiction was exercised by the court over a branch of
the Spanish Ministry of Commerce, since the chartering of a ship to transport wheat was not stricdy
a political or public act.
27For instance, the law governing the capacity of the parties, for example, domicile or natural person
or non-natural person, for example, state entities are not allowed to go to arbitration.
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law applicable to the arbitration proceedings (often called the curial law or the lex
arbitri) and, finally, (d) the conflict of law rules applicable to select each of these laws
mentioned above.
The term "procedural law", used in this thesis, means the law regulating the arbitration
proceedings and includes arbitrability, the validity of the arbitration agreement, the
jurisdiction, appointment, removal, replacement and challenge of the arbitrators, time
limits, rules of discovery, interim measures, form of arbitral awards and so on.
Procedural law is also called the lex arbitri, the law governing the arbitration
procedures. For the sake of consistency, the term "procedural law" will be used
throughout this work.
In this thesis, "choice of law rules" refers to the rules providing judges or arbitrators
with guidance to determine the law governing the substantive issues. This branch of
the law can be referred to as "international private law", "private international law" or
"conflict of law rules". However, in this work, unless stated otherwise, the term
"choice of law rules" will be used to refer to these rules.
In addition, in this work, the expression "proper law" will only be applied to the law
governing the substantive issues arising from the main contract between the parties.
In contrast, the issues concerning the substantive law governing the parties' arbitration
agreement will not be included. The term "proper law" is sometimes referred to as the
law applicable to the substantive issues, or the substantive law, or the governing law,
or the applicable law of the contract. Unless stated otherwise, the term "proper law"
will be used to represent the law governing the substantive issues, which include the
16
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interpretation and validity of the main contract, the rights and obligations of the
parties, the mode of performance and the consequences of breach of the contract.28
1.2.4 A-national principles
In this thesis, the expression of "a-national principles" includes the general principles
of law, the new lexmercatoria and amiable composition
The generalprinciples of law
In international commercial arbitration, "general principles of law" are often chosen as
the proper law of a state contract. These principles are defined in Article 38(l)(c) of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice29 as part of international law and which
are recognised by civilised nations.
The new lexmercatoria
The expression the "new lexmercatoria", in this work, will be used to represent a
system of law which is based on trade usages to regulate international commercial
transactions. Various terms have been used to represent the same idea. They include
the law merchant, the lexmercatoria, transnational law, the international law of
contracts, international lexmercatoria and international trade law. However, in this
work, unless quoted or stated otherwise, the term "new lexmercatoria" will be used in
order to avoid confusion with the lexmercatoria developed during the medieval times.
Amiable composition or ex aequo et bono
28Lord Radcliffe in Kahler v. MidlandBank Ltd. [1950] AC 24, 56. It is also discussed in Redfern &
Hunter, (1991), at p. 96.
29It will be referred to as the "ICJ" in this thesis.
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Instead of applying law, arbitrators sometimes are required to decide the merits of the
dispute on the basis of equity and fairness. Such an equity clause appears in the
choice of law clause in different ways, such as directing the arbitrators to decide the
case "according to equity or good conscience", or "as amiable compositeurs", or "ex
aequo et bono". These terms represent different meanings; nevertheless, the
difference is very slight. As mentioned above, the difference is infrequently made in
most legal literature, arbitration rules and arbitration laws. In legal materials, these
terms are generally used interchangeably. Under these circumstances, in this work,
mainly the term "amiable composition" will be use to represent the idea of arbitrator's
power to decide the issues in equity, rather than in law.
1.3 The scope of the research
First of all, this study is limited to the scope of international commercial arbitration as
defined in the previous section. Secondly, among the vast number of issues that could
be considered in a study on international commercial arbitration, this thesis
concentrates on the issue of the application of a-national principles as the proper law of
the contract and its influence on arbitral tribunals and national courts and on the
contradiction between practice and theory on this subject. Many other important
aspects on choice of law have had to be left out: for example, the procedural laws, and
the substantive law governing the arbitration agreement.
Finally, this thesis proceeds on the arbitrator's decision based on a-national principles
against national practices. With so many countries in the world, the study will be
confined to six countries across different continents, namely, France, the United
States, England, Hong Kong, China and Taiwan, in order to study the influence of the
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application of a-national principles over countries situated in the different regions of
the globe.
1.4 The object of this study
The object of this study is to show the different attitudes towards the application of a-
national principles in international commercial arbitration held by arbitrators and
national courts in different countries, and the contradictions between practice and
theory. This thesis will examine the relationship between arbitration and national
courts on the subject of the application of a-national principles as the proper law of the
contract, and the control exercised by national courts over the awards made on the
basis of a-national principles.
The research will also bring together sources from a variety of jurisdictions that will
aid the understanding of the complex relationship between the arbitration industry and
the domestic legal systems in different regions. In addition, the choice of England,
France, the United States, Hong Kong, China, and Taiwan, as the domestic
jurisdictions to be reviewed has been made on the basis of their different levels of
development on this subject.
After presenting the conflicts between arbitration practice and national courts, there
will be an examination of whether the existing theories of arbitration, namely, the
jurisdictional, contractual, hybrid and autonomous theories, can justify the application
of a-national principles. If not, efforts will be made to find a more logical approach to
illustrate the present arbitration framework. The new approach may enable us to place
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the topic of a-national principles in the wider framework of international commercial
arbitration that is becoming increasingly accepted.
1.5 The methodology
The research on this thesis has been conducted on the basis of a combination of
comparative studies and regional studies. First of all, the study of primary sources
involved the examination of arbitral awards, particularly the ICC awards, and the
domestic case law and arbitration laws of different jurisdictions. The contradictions
between the practice of arbitration and the different approaches of national courts will
be given. Furthermore, a comparative study was conducted on a regional basis. That
is, a comparison was made of the approaches of the countries which have a more
advanced arbitration system to those of the countries which are less familiar with
arbitration. In addition, focus will also be brought to the issue of whether the
European borne a-national principles have received a universal acceptance in other
continents. Finally, a comparatively logical approach for the present arbitration
framework will be developed through the examination of the existing theoretical
structure of international commercial arbitration.
1.6 The structure of the thesis
This thesis is divided into four parts containing twelve chapters. The first part will
discuss both traditional and modern choice of the proper law rules and the influence of
the delocalisation theory on the development of the choice of a-national principles. In
the second part, based on some ad hoc and ICC arbitral awards, the examination will
focus on the wide application of a-national principles as the proper law of the contracts
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in international commercial arbitration. Recognising the wide application of a-national
principles in international arbitral awards, the third part of this study will investigate
the attitudes of English, French, the United States, Hong Kong, Chinese and
Taiwanese courts towards the application of a-national principles in arbitration. After
examining the contradictions of the practice of arbitration and the national courts, the
final part will investigate whether a more logical approach to illustrate the issue of a-
national principles in the present arbitration framework can be discovered.
The research carried out in this thesis is arranged in twelve chapters. They are as
follows:
ChapterOne Introduction
PART ONE The traditional and modern trends in choice of the
proper law rules
Chapter Two The choice of the proper law rules
Chapter Three The modern trend in the choice of the proper law
PART TWO The application of a-national principles as the
proper law of contracts in international commercial
arbitration
ChapterFour The application of the general principles of law as the proper
law of the contract in international commercial arbitration
Chapter Five The application of the new lexmercatoria as the proper law of




The application of amiable composition as the proper law of the
contract in international commercial arbitration
PART THREE The Attitudes of national courts towards the arbitral
awards made on the basis of a-national principles - a
study on the decisions of the English, French,
American, Hong Kong, Chinese and Taiwanese
courts
Chapter Seven Whether the English courts accept the application of a-
national principles in international commercial arbitral awards
ChapterEight Whether the French courts accept the application of a-
national principles in international commercial arbitral awards
ChapterNine Whether the United States courts accept the application of a-
national principles in international commercial arbitral awards
Chapter Ten Whether the Hong Kong, Chinese and Taiwanese courts accept
the application of a-national principles in international
commercial arbitral awards
PART FOUR Finding a more appropriate approach to interpret the
application of a-national principles
Chapter Eleven A study of the nature of international commercial arbitration
and an evaluation of the theories
Chapter Twelve Summary and development
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The Traditional and Modern Trends in Choice of
the Proper Law
Introduction to Part One
Introduction to Part One
Before examining the application of a-national principles in international commercial
arbitration and the levels of acceptance of such practice in different jurisdictions, it is
necessary to provide a background study concerning both the traditional and modern
trends in choice of the proper law of the contracts. Part One contains two chapters.
Chapter Two provides a general picture of the choice of law rules traditionally applied
by international arbitrators in deciding the proper law of the contracts, in which the
rise and fall of three-step choice of law procedure will be discussed. With the change
in the traditional choice of law rules emerges a trend in choosing a-national principles
as the proper law. This change will be outlined in Chapter Three by means of a
discussion about the interactions between the application of a-national principles and
the delocalisation theory in the context of international commercial arbitration.
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Chapter Two: Choice ofthe Proper Law
Choice of the proper law rules
This chapter contains a discussion of the choice of law rules conventionally used by
arbitrators to decide which law is the proper law of the contract. A three-step
procedure of this choice of law process will be discussed. The first part of the
discussion will concentrate on the subject of party autonomy in choice of the proper
law. Later, the cases where the parties failed to specify the proper law will be
investigated in the second and third parts of the discussion. In these two parts, the
relationship between the "implied choice" test (the "subjective test") and the "closest
and most real relationship" test (the "objective test") will be discussed. Finally, the
issue of whether the choice of law rules provide the arbitrators with a clear guideline in
the decision-making process will be addressed.
2.1 Background study: the importance of choice of the
proper law in international commercial arbitration
Before examining the issues arising from choosing the proper law of the contract in
international commercial arbitration, it is necessary to stress the significance of the
choice of the proper law procedures. The importance of this issue can be analysed
from three aspects: the advantages of international commercial arbitration; the
expectations of the parties; and the arbitrator's point of view.
Firstly, the importance of the choice of proper law will be discussed from the aspect of
the advantages of international commercial arbitration. As most authors1 have agreed,
compared to national court proceedings, international commercial arbitration is a more
1 For example, Rowland, Arbitration LawandPractice, (1988), at pp. 16, 19.
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flexible and speedy way to resolve international commercial disputes. To safeguard its
reputation of speed and flexibility, this mechanism offers the parties quite a large
degree of freedom in deciding how the arbitration procedures shall be conducted.
Although flexibility and speed are the main advantages of international commercial
arbitration, it does not mean that the arbitrator can decide the rights and obligations of
the parties without following any rules. Similar to judges in the national courts, the
arbitrators decide the merits of the disputes according to the rules of law, either
specified by the parties or decided by the arbitrators themselves. However, in the
cases where no proper law of the contract is expressed by the parties or the choice is
invalid, the arbitrators have to spend some extra time choosing the proper law from an
examination of a large number of factors, such as the nationalities of the parties, the
subject matter of the contract, the place of performance, the place of contracting, the
form of the contract, the language used and the terms of the arbitration agreement.
Apart from the fact that arbitrators have to spend extra time to decide the proper law,
the arbitration procedures can be delayed to a great extent if the parties object to the
choice made by the arbitrators and resort to court proceedings. As a result, the aim of
providing a speedy service through international commercial arbitration may not be
achieved under such circumstances.
Secondly, the parties' expectations can be another indication to illustrate the
importance of the issue of the choice of the proper law. Apart from expecting to settle
the disputes as soon as possible, the parties may also want to predict the outcome of
the arbitration. Such expectations may be more easily achieved if a valid choice of the
proper law has been made by the parties themselves. In particular, by doing this the
parties will have the advantage of knowing where they stand and what rights and
obligations they have by choosing the proper law of the contract themselves.
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Finally, the choice of the proper law has a critical importance at the stage of
recognition or enforcement of the arbitral awards. An award made by arbitrators who
failed to observe or respect the parties' express choice of law not only can be
successfully challenged by the losing party but also most national courts will refuse to
enforce such an award. As provided by Article V(l)(d) of the New York Convention,
recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused if "The composition of the
arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of
the parties." Therefore, unless contradicted by other mandatory provisions or public
policy, an award made on the basis of the proper law chosen by the parties will be
enforced in most national courts. However, in the case where no proper law is chosen
by the parties, the losing party may challenge the arbitrator's decisions on the choice
of the proper law. This may possibly result in a further delay of the recognition or
enforcement of arbitral awards, or, moreover, doubts in the validity of the awards if
the court believes that the arbitrator's decision on the choice of proper law cannot be
justified.
To sum up, no matter whether the proper law is specified by the parties or decided by
the arbitrators, the proper law has a great deal of importance in relation to the
arbitration procedures and the validity of arbitral awards. Only by ascertaining the
proper law of the contract can the disputes be properly decided and the award be
properly carried into effect.
2.2 Choice of the proper law of the contract in international
commercial arbitration
As agreed by most commentators, when compared with proceedings conducted in the
national courts the most significant feature of international commercial arbitration is
that a great deal of autonomy is enjoyed by the parties. In accordance with such
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autonomy, the parties are free to have their disputes governed by any law they desire.
However, from time to time, parties fail to exercise such powers properly. As a
result, this is frequently where the controversy starts.
After disputes are submitted to the arbitrators, it is the arbitrator's duty to find the
proper law of the contract in order to settle the disputes. Nevertheless, during the
arbitral procedures, choosing the proper law of the contract is not as easy a task as it
appears to be. Traditionally, a three-step procedure has been introduced to resolve this
problem. Firstly, arbitrators have to check on the choice of law clause in order to find
out whether a valid choice of the proper law has been expressly set out in the contract
or the arbitration agreement. If it is, in accordance with the doctrine of party
autonomy, the arbitrators are obliged to apply the expressed choice of the proper law
to resolve the disputes referred to them.
Usually, the parties to an arbitration do specify the proper law in the contract or the
arbitration agreement (which might be a specific national law, the incorporation of
some provisions of any national system of law, or even the a-national principles).
Nevertheless, sometimes, such choice is invalid by reference to the mandatory rules or
public policy; alternatively, no such choice might be expressed in the contract or the
arbitration agreement. This may be because the importance of choice of law has been
ignored by the parties or no agreement has been reached between the parties. Under
these circumstances, traditionally, the arbitrators will have to follow the second step -
the implied choice of law test - to find an implied proper law of the contract from the
relevant circumstances of the case. In some complicated cases, it is possible that
arbitrators fail to find the proper law under the first and second steps. If this is the
case, at this stage, arbitrators will have to apply the closest and most real relationship
test to choose the proper law of the contract they deem appropriate from the objective
circumstances.
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In the second section of this chapter, the three-step procedures concerning the choice
of the proper law will be discussed. Firstly, the development of party autonomy as it
relates to the choice of the proper law of the contract and the power enjoyed by the
parties to specify the proper law of the contract will be examined. Secondly, in the
absence of an express choice of the proper law from the parties, both the "implied
choice" test (the inferred choice test) and the "closest and most real relationship" test
which provide arbitrators with a guideline in determining the proper law of the contract
will be illustrated.
2.2.1 The proper law expressly chosen by the parties
The parties' freedom to have their disputes governed by the law they desire is based
on the theory of party autonomy. In fact, most international commercial contracts do
contain an express choice of the proper law in order to avoid the application of a law
unfavourable to the party (or the parties) since "The determination of the proper law of
the contract will not involve any difficulty if the parties have been wise enough to
record expressly which legal system is to apply to their agreement."2 After the
arbitration being initiated, in accordance with the first step of the choice of law rules,
arbitrators have to look to the choice of law clause to find the proper law of the
contract in order to decide the merits of the disputes.
Party autonomy in choice of law - freedom ofcontract
Within certain limitations, the parties' freedom in choosing the proper law of the
contract is well recognised in international commercial arbitration cases. As Rabel
states: "The practice of allowing parties to determine the law applicable to their
contractual relations ... for centuries has been applied by courts throughout the world
2Schmitthoff, The English Conflict ofLaws, at p. 109.
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with slight dissent."3 Once their intention is found, it is compulsory for the arbitrators
to apply this choice of law in order to decide the substantive issues arising from the
main contract between the parties. This freedom is based on the doctrine of party
autonomy, which is originated from the idea of 'freedom of contract' (it is also called
the "classical contract theory" or the "will theory").
Freedom of contract, in the United Kingdom, originated in the eighteenth century. At
that time, the individual was granted the maximum freedom to pursue his objectives
and an inalienable right to enter into contracts for his own benefit. Later on, in the
early nineteenth century, the philosophy of laissez-faire, that is, the doctrine invoking
unrestricted freedom in commerce, flourished and similarly indicated that the law
should interfere with people as little as possible.4 As Cohen observes in The Basis of
Contract5:
"Contractualism in the law, that is, the view that in an ideally desirable system
of law all obligation would arise only out of the will of the individual
contracting freely, rests not only on the will theory of contract but also on the
political doctrine that all restraint is evil and that the government is best which
governs least."6
Following this idea, considering the nature of contracts, the will of the parties is
regarded as the most significant concept in the classical contract theory. Rights and
obligations can only arise from the fact of an agreement or an exchange of promises or
wills between the parties. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the classical
contract theory had taken root in English law through the acceptance that an obligation
was created by a communication of wills.7
3Rabel, Comparative Conflicts, Vol. I (2nd ed. 1958), at p. 90. Also see Lew, The Applicable Law
in International Commercial Arbitration, (1978) at p. 71 (hereinafter Lew, Applicable Law).
4Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law ofContract, (3rd ed. 1989), at p. 7.
5Cohen, "The Basis of Contract" 46 Harv.L.R. (1933) at p. 553.
6Ibid. at p. 558.
7Atiyah, The Rise and Fall ofFreedom ofContract, (1979), at p. 407.
29
Chapter Two: Choice ofthe Proper Law
Nevertheless, the absolute freedom of contract enjoyed by the parties throughout the
eighteenth and part of the nineteenth centuries suffered a setback by the end of
nineteenth century. In addition, the classical principle of laissez-faire was challenged
because of the changes in the social and economic environments. Professor Atiyah
regarded the classical contract theory as a failure, and argued that"... in the modern
world, where many people see the functions of Government and Parliament as
virtually limitless, it is absurd to think of society as regulated by freedom of contract
subject only to limited instances of State 'interference'."8
Following the economic and social changes since the nineteenth century, the classical
contract theory no longer accords with the modern world in many respects. For
instance, the classical concept of freedom of contract takes little account of social and
economic pressures which might virtually force a man to enter into a contract which is
obviously unfair to him. In addition, the classical concept of freedom of contract
ignores the possible inequalities of the bargaining powers between the contracting
parties. Literally, the classical contract theory can only be supported if the bargaining
powers of both contracting parties are equal; however, this is not always the case in
reality. Considering the criticisms mentioned above and the possible involvement of
third parties, the issues of monopolies, restrictive agreements, consumer protection,
and compensation for the workmen, freedom of contract is more restricted than it was
previously claimed to be.
Party autonomy in choosing the proper law in international commercial arbitration9
8Ibid, at p. 693.
9One point which needs to be stressed is the inapplicability of the Convention on the Law Applicable
to Contractual Obligations (The Rome Convention) to the issue of the choice of the law in
international commercial arbitration. In 1990, the United Kingdom Government ratified the
Convention dated June 19, 1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (The Rome
Convention), which has been incorporated in the law of the United Kingdom by the Contracts
(Applicable Law) Act 1990. (This incorporation is subject to two reservations. One is Art. 7(1) in
relation to die provision of mandatory rules. The other one is Art. 10(l)(e) in relation to the
consequences of nullity of the contract.) The Rome Convention is designed to provide clear rules to
determine the applicable law of the contract. Since then, most parts of die common law rules
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The theory of the freedom of contract also has some effect on the mechanism of
international commercial arbitration. Based on the idea of freedom of contract, the
theory of party autonomy is invoked as the basis of international commercial
arbitration. Based on such autonomy, the parties have a cardinal right to choose the
proper law to govern the main contract. This theory is not only recognised in the
academic studies, but also contained in the international conventions, the institutional
arbitration rules and the different national arbitration statutes.
For instance, in Article 33(1) of the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law of 1976 (the "UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules"), the arbitral tribunal is required to apply "the law designated by the parties as
applicable to the substance of the dispute."10 More directly than the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules, The International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Conciliation and
Arbitration of 1988 (the "ICC Rules") explicitly offer the parties the freedom "to
determine the law to be applied by the arbitrator to the merits of the dispute."11 A
similar stipulation also appears in the Rules of the London Court of International
Arbitration ("LCIA").12 A similar arbitration rule also appears in another continent:
the International Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA")
has the stipulation which demands that "the tribunal shall apply the substantive law or
laws designated by the parties as applicable to the dispute."13
concerning choice of the proper law have been superseded by the Rome Convention. The question is
whether the arbitration agreement also falls into the scope of this Act. As far as the scope of
application of the Rome Convention is concerned, Art 1(2),(3) and (4) provide that the Convention
does not apply to a significant number of designated contractual obligations, for example, those
relating to wills, succession and matrimonial property. (Article 2 (b) of the Rome Convention) Also,
some matters which were not regarded as "contractual obligations", such as arbitration agreements,
agreements on the choice of court (Article l(2)(d)) and certain obligations arising from negotiable
instruments (Article 1 (2)(c)) are excluded from the convention. Generally, matters which are not
contractual, though they arise in a contractual context, are not covered by this convention. (Article
l(2)(a)-(h)] However, as far as the proper law of the contract in arbitration is concerned, if the main
contract belongs to the category of contractual obligations, the arbitral tribunal has to apply tire rules
in the Rome Convention to decide the applicable law of die main contract.
1 °Article 33( 1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, which were adopted on April 28, 1976.
1 Article 13(3) of the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce.
12Article 13(l)(a) of the Rules of the London Court of International Arbitration.
13Article 29 of the International Arbitration Rules of American Arbitration Association.
31
Chapter Two: Choice of the Proper Law
As discussed above, most legal systems recognise the parties' freedom to express their
intention that the law of a given country shall govern the contract. This intention will
direct the arbitrators to apply the chosen law to settle the dispute between the parties.
Taking England14 and Scotland15 as examples, freedom of contract has been applied
in the various cases concerning the issue of the choice of the proper law. For
instance, the case of R v. International Trustee for the Protection ofBondholders,16
pointed out that the proper law of the contract is the law which the parties intended to
apply. Moreover, the choice "will be ascertained by the intention expressed in the
contract if any, which will be conclusive."17 This autonomy again is confirmed by a
leading case.18 In the case of Vila Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. Ltd.,
the court upheld the parties' express choice of law and indicated that "It is now well
settled that by English law the proper law of contract "is the law" which the parties
intended to apply. The intention to apply a specific national law as the proper law is
objectively ascertained."19
Several decades later, the parties' freedom in choosing the proper law of the contract
was again upheld in the case of Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd. v. James
MillerandPartners20 In this case, Lord Reid set out that:
"The general principle is not in doubt. Parties are entitled to agree what is to be
the proper law of the contract, and if they do not make any such agreement
then the law will determine what is the proper law. There have been from time
14Collins, (ed.) Dicey andMorris on the Conflict ofLaws, (12th ed. 1993) at p. 1211 (hereinafter
Dicey andMorris), hi England and Scodand, in relation to the choice of the proper law, the uniform
rules of Articles 3 and 4 of the Rome Convention will replace the common law rules in cases where
the Convention applies. Accordingly, the general conclusion of these articles is strikingly similar in
effect to the position reached by the common law, therefore, the choice of proper law rules discussed
in this chapter will be conducted in general terms to illustrate the underlying issues: first, on the basis
of the common law rules, secondly, from the viewpoint of the Rome Convention.
15Anton, Private International Law- A Treatise from the Standpoint ofScots Law, (2nd ed. 1990) at
p. 263 (hereinafter Anton, Private International Law).
16[1937] AC 500.
17Ibid, at p. 529.
1 ^Vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. Ltd. [1939] AC 277.
1 9Ibid, at p. 289.
20[1970] AC 583.
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to time suggestions that parties ought not to be so entitled, but in my view
there is no doubt that they are entitled to make such an agreement, and I see no
good reason why, subject it may be to some limitations, they should not be so
entitled. But it must be a contractual agreement. It need not be in express
words. Like any other agreement it may be inferred from reading their contract
as a whole in light of relevant circumstances known to both parties when they
made their contract."21
Party autonomy is widely accepted by most jurisdictions; for instance, arbitrators are
required to decide the dispute according to the rules of law chosen by the parties under
the French Code of Civil Procedure.22 This freedom in choosing the proper law is
also upheld in § 1-105(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."). Similar
provisions can be observed in section 46(1) of the English Arbitration Act 1996,23
Article 145 of the Chinese Civil Code24 and Article 5 of the Chinese Foreign
Economic Contract Law.25
Nevertheless, the issue of whether it is proper to offer the parties such freedom to
choose the proper law was raised.26 In England, a negative attitude towards total
freedom was held by a group of scholars and judges. Lord Denning was a member of
this school of thought. He stated that the choice made by the parties did not have an
absolute effect on the arbitrators. Furthermore, he indicated that: "parties are free to
stipulate by what law the validity of the contract is to be determined. Their intention is
only one of the factors to be taken into account."27
Nevertheless, this decision was reversed by Lord Denning himself in Tzortzis case
where he contended that the parties' express choice would be "conclusive" in absence
2 11hid. at p. 603.
22Article 1496 (1) of the French Code ofCivil Procedure.
23Seclion46(l) provides diat: "The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with the
law chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute."
24It provides: "Except where the law provides otherwise, the parties to a contract involving foreign
interests may choose the law applicable to the resolution of their contractual disputes."
25It provides: "The parties to a contract may choose the law to be applied to the setdement of the
dispute arising from the contract."
26whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd. v. James Miller andPartners Ltd. [1970] AC 583, 603.
27Boissevain v. Weil [1949] 1 KB 482, 490-491.
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of some public policy to the contrary.28 More support was shown in the later case of
Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd. v. JamesMiller and Partners Ltd..29
Is connection necessary?
While the idea of the absoluteness of the freedom in choice of the proper law was
challenged, the main issue behind this debate was whether the parties have a right to
choose a law which does not have any connection with the case. In some
jurisdictions,30 the conflict of law rules require that the substantive law chosen by the
parties must bear some "reasonable relationship" to their transaction. This is to
prevent the parties from taking advantage of the freedom by choosing a law which
does not have any connection with the case, in order to evade a possible
disadvantageous situation which would have arisen by choosing a law bearing a
reasonable relationship to the transaction.
In fact, some important factors may have been ignored in the suggestion that evasion
of the mandatory rules or disadvantageous situations is the only reason why the parties
choose a law bearing no connection to the transaction. Such an inference may reflect
part of the truth; however it is not always the case. The reason for the parties
choosing a law bearing no connection to the transaction may be caused by the fact that
the parties or their legal advisors know this legal system better than others;
alternatively, the arbitrator's background may lead the parties to choose the national
law which he appreciates most. More often, choosing a law having a good reputation
in a certain legal field can also be another valid justification for the parties' choice. For
instance, London has been famous as a centre for the maritime industry for some time;
2^Tzortz.is v. Monark Line AJB [1968] 1 WLR 406, 411.
29Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd. v. JamesMiller andPartners Ltd. [1970] AC 583, 603.
30Under section 187 of the Restatement (Second) Conflict ofLaws, the parties' chosen law must be
applied unless, among other things, "the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or
the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice "section 1-105 (1) of the
UCC imposes the same sort of "reasonable relation" requirement. At common law, some New York
courts applied a reasonable relationship requirement fairly strictly; see A.S. Rampell, Inc. v. Hyster
Co. 165 N.Y. 2d 475 (1957).
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therefore, English law might be chosen as the proper law of the contract even though
so many commercial transactions have nothing to do with England.31
Moreover, neutrality may be another reason for such a choice. In practice, it is very
common for the parties to state contracts to choose a law which has no connection
with the transaction, since neither party wants to have the contract governed by the
national law of the other party's country. From the viewpoint of a state or a state
entity, unfamiliarity with foreign laws and the dignity of the states themselves
frequently deter them from having the contracts subjected to the law of other
countries.32 On the other hand, with the fear of potential bias or injustice in the
national courts of both parties, the parties to this kind of contract not only prefer to
submit the disputes to international commercial arbitration in a neutral country, but
also choose a neutral law to be the governing law of the contract.
As the English courts stated: "Connection with English law is not as a matter of
principle essential,"33 therefore, it does not seem to be appropriate to deny the parties'
freedom to choose a law unconnected to the transaction. This statement is supported
by Lord Wright34 and Lord Diplock in Amin Rasheed case35 where he said:
"It is apparent from the terms of the contract itself that the parties intended it to
be interpreted by reference to a particular system of law, their intention will
prevail and the latter questions as to the system of law with which, in the view
of the court, the transaction to which the contract relates would, but for such
intention of the parties, have had the closest and most real connection, does not
arise."36
3 1Vila Food Products v. Unus Shipping Company [1939] AC 277, per Lord Wright at p. 290.
3 2For instance, the Indian and Pakistan governments will not offer contracts to foreign contractors
unless they agree that the substantive law of the contract is the law of India or Pakistan.
33Vita Food Products v. Unus Shipping Company [1939] AC 277, per Lord Wright at p. 290.
3 41hid. at p. 290.
3 ^Amin Rasheed Shipping Corporation; AI Watah, The v. Kuwait Insurance Co. [1984] AC 50.
36Ibid. at p. 61.
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While some states37 still require that the choice of the proper law must have reasonable
connections with the transaction38, in the state of New York the courts have
abandoned the reasonable relationship test - during the 1980s, a choice of law statute
designed to eliminate such a requirement was enacted in the state of New York.
According to this statute, no connection was required when the parties selected New
York law as the proper law.39
This is also recognised in some of the ICC Awards. In one, a dispute arose from a
contract for the sale of potatoes between a Mozambique purchaser and a Dutch
seller.40 In the contract, the parties were required to submit the dispute to an
arbitration which would be conducted in accordance with the arbitration rules of
International Chamber of Commerce. The law applicable was stated to be "that known
in England". The parties disputed the meaning and effect of the above quoted clause.
The arbitrator41 decided that the proper law was English law, even though it did not
have any connection with the case; he said:
"The parties had valid reasons to refer to the substantive law known in
England. English law is neutral; its provisions are adapted to the needs of
international commerce; it is fairly well accessible and known to lawyers of
other countries, such as Switzerland, Mozambique and the Netherlands; ...
Although somewhat unusual, the expression "the law known in England" is
not ambiguous. It is wide enough to include, as appropriate, international rules
and usages recognised in England."42
Accordingly, in international commercial arbitration, the parties to state contracts or
major international contracts often prefer to choose a law which has no connection
with the transaction or the parties themselves. Amongst the different laws applied in
3^Re Helbert Wagg & Co. Ltd. [1956] Ch. 323,341. (The Court will not necessarily enforce a
choice of law clause selecting a law which has no connection to the transaction); also, Vita Food
Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. Ltd. [1939] AC 277.
38See footnote 26 about the section 187 of the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws.
39New York General Obligations Law section 5-1401.
40ICC case no. 5505 (1987) XIII Y.B.C.A. 110 (1988), at p. 116.
41Mr. G. Muller was the arbitrator in this case.
42ICC case no. 5505 (1987) XIII Y.B.C.A. 110 (1988), at p. 118.
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international arbitral awards, it should be stated that not only national laws having no
connection with the case are chosen, but also a-national principles43 are frequently
chosen as the proper law to govern the substantive issues arising from international
commercial contracts.
Limitations on the parties' expressed choice of the proper law
As is widely accepted, neither the freedom of the parties44 nor the arbitrators'
discretion in deciding the proper law is unlimited.45 The limitations imposed on the
autonomy vary from country to country. Generally speaking, in relation to the choice
of proper law, party autonomy is subject to the scrutiny of public policy and the
mandatory rules of the relevant laws: the law governing the arbitration agreement, the
law of the arbitral situs46 or of the state where recognition or enforcement are
sought.47
Almost every national conflict of law rules recognise that the claim of public policy can
override the parties' decision on the choice of law. While some cases have been
categorised as public policy exceptions which are capable of invalidating the proper
law chosen by the parties, such as discrimination prohibitions48, usury restrictions49,
fair competition protections,50 constitutional guarantees51, and protections for
43Thc application of a-national principles in international commercial arbitration will be discussed in
latter chapters.
44According to Dr. Lew, the freedom in choosing the law applicable to the contract that is recognised
in most, if not all, national systems of law, no matter whether common law, civil law or socialist
legal systems. Lew, Applicable Law, (1978), at p. 75.
45For example, the mandatory rules and public policy of the forum under Art. 7 and Art. 16 of the
Rome Convention.
46Article V(l)(d) of the New York Convention 1958.
47Article V(l)(b) of the New York Convention 1958.
48Muschany v. United States 324 US 49 (1945).
49Whitaker v. Spiegel Inc., 623 P. 2d 1147 (Wash 1981).
59Davis v. Jointless Fire Brick Co. 300 F. 2d. 1 (9th Cir 1924); Blalock v. Perfect Subscription Co.
458 F. Supp. 123 (S.D. Ala., 1978).
51Bachvhan v. India Abroad Pub., Inc. 1992 WL 110403 (NY S.Ct. April 13 1992) cited in Born,
International CommercialArbitration in the United States, (1994), at p. 138.
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economically inferior parties,52 it is still impossible to provide a complete list of public
policy rules without detailed comparative research.
In addition, apart from public policy being a possible ground for invalidating the
parties' choice of law, the application of mandatory rules of the otherwise applicable
laws can be another way to derogate from the parties' choice.53 In other words, the
arbitrators are not obliged to apply the provisions of a particular foreign law chosen by
the parties as the proper law when these provisions contradict the mandatory rules or
public policy of the states which have a close connection with the transaction. This is
stated in Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention,54 which provides: "When applying
under this Convention the law of a country, effect may be given to the mandatory rules
of the law of another country with which the situation has a close connection, if and in
so far as, under the law of the latter country, those rules must be applied whatever the
law applicable to the contract."55
As well as in international conventions, the exceptions of public policy and mandatory
rules can be seen in most national laws. For instance, the English case law
pronounces that the validity of the choice of a foreign law may be affected by the
public policy and the mandatory rules of the forum.56 In a leading case, Lord Wright
stated that, unless the ground of public policy had been successfully avoided, the
parties' express choice of the proper law would not be effective.57 Lord McNair
upheld this idea and stated that public policy is one of the restrictions on party
autonomy in relation to the choice of proper law, while he said: "It is often said that
5^New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens 178 US 389 (1900).
53See Article 3(3) of the Rome Convention.
54Articles 3 and 7 of the Rome Convention.
55Despite the non-application of Article 7(1) of the Convention, it is suggested that the English court
could still apply this rule, eidier as a mandatory rule of die forum under Article 7(2) or as a rale of
English public policy by virtue of Article 16. See the commentary on Article 7(1) in the Current Law
Statutes of the Contract (Applicable Law) Act 1990, at p. 36-30.
56Collins, Dicey andMorris on the Conflict ofLaws, (12th ed. 1993), at pp. 1239-1248.
^7Vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. Ltd. [1939] AC 277.
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the parties to a contract make their own law, and it is, of course, true that, subject to
the rules of public policy and ordre public, the parties are free to agree upon such
terms as they may choose."58
A similar provision can also be seen in both the United States statutes59 and court
decisions. As the Restatement (2d) ofConflict ofLaws (the "Restatement") illustrates:
"The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights
and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties
could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to
that issue, unless ... the application of the law of the chosen state would be
contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater
interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and
which, under the rule of section 188, would be the state of the applicable law
in the absence of an effective choice-of-law by the parties."60
However, the restrictions which may be imposed by the mandatory rules of the lex
fori have been strongly criticised by the proponents of the "delocalisation theory"
which proposes a complete detachment between the lex fori and arbitration
proceedings. The debate concerning how the delocalisation theory affects the choice
of the proper law will be discussed in Chapter Three.
In relation to the restrictions of public policy on the parties' freedom in choosing the
proper law of the contract, they have also caused concerns in international commercial
arbitration. Some commentators have expressed their worries on this aspect on the
ground that "public policy is an unruly horse that carries one to unforeseen
destinations."61 They claim that domestic public policy should not restrict party
autonomy on the choice of law in international commercial arbitration. They maintain
that international commercial arbitration should be subject to public policy applied
58Lord McNair, "The General Principles of Laws Recognised by Civilised Nations", (1957) 33
Brit.Yrbk.lntl.L., at p. 278.
59Section 187 of The Restatement (Second) Conflict ofLaws (1971).
60Section 187(2)(b) of The Restatement (Second) Conflict ofLaws (1971).
6 ^atzenbach, "Conflicts on An Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims andTolerances in Interstate and
International Law", 65 Yale L.R. 1087 (1956).
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universally, that is, international public policy. However, critics react differently
towards this idea. While some states are sceptical about the role and scope of
international public policy, some major international trade states, such as France and
Belgium, have gone a step further and adopted international public policy. The same
movement also influences the United States courts and they have adopted a more
liberal and modern view on the issue of public policy.62 Due to the different criteria
applied in different jurisdictions, the role that public policy or international public
policy has played in international commercial arbitration is still controversial. To
avoid exceeding the scope of this chapter, a detailed study will be carried out in later
chapters.63
2.2.2 The second step -- The implied choice of law test
Although the parties' freedom of choice of the proper law is widely accepted, for a
number of reasons mentioned above, the parties may fail to exercise this power. In
the absence of an expressed choice of law, the arbitrators have the same duty as those
of the judges in a national court to choose a proper law for the parties. Failing to find
the parties' express choice, the arbitrators have to decide the proper law of the contract
by inferring it from the terms and nature of the contract and the general circumstances
of the case.
The implied choice of law test was upheld in the case of Rossano v. Manufacturers
Life Insurance Co.,64 where the court provided guidance on inferring the proper law
of the contract when no expressed choice was made by the parties in their contract.
62Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc. 473 US 614 (1985); ShearsonJAmerican
Express, Inc. v. McMahon 482 US 220 (1987); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc., 490 US 477 (1989); National R.P. Passenger Corp. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 892 F. 2d.
1066 (D.C. Cir. 1990); In theMatter ofthe Arbitration Between Trade & Transport, In/ v. Valero
Refining Co., (1990) 5, Int'l Arb.Rep.
63See Part Three for a detailed discussion.
64[1962] 2 All ER 214.
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Accepting the implied choice of law test set out in the cases of Re United Railways of
the Havana and Regla Warehouses Ltd.65 and Bonython v. Commonwealth of
Australia 66 the courts indicated: "The parties not having expressly chosen the proper
law or stated their intention in terms the court must act on the evidence before it and fix
the presumed intentions of the parties as best it can."67 A more specific explanation
was provided in Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd. v. James Miller,68 in
which Lord Reid said:
"Two slightly different tests have been formulated: "the system of law by
reference to which the contract was made or that with which the transaction has
its closest and most real connextion (Bonython Case [1951] AC 201, 209) and
"with what country has the transaction the closest and most real connection."
(In Re United Railway ofHavana [1961] AC 1007; 1068). It has become
common merely to refer to the system of law but I think that the two tests must
be combined for all are agreed that the place of performance is a relevant and
may be the decisive factor, and it is only in a loose sense that the place of
performance can be equated to the system of law prevailing there."69
Indicationsfor the implied choice of law test
Place ofperformance
With the implied choice of law test, different criteria have been applied in different
cases. Among these different criteria, the law of the place of performance (lex loci
solutionis) has attracted a great deal of attention as the basis for inferring the proper
law of the contract.70 In the nineteenth century, the place of performance was
regarded as a strong indication for a judge or an arbitrator to infer the proper law of the
contract from the terms and nature of the contract and the general circumstances of the
case.71
65[1960] Ch. 52, 94.
66[1951] AC 201.
67[1962] 2 All ER 214, 219.
68[1970] AC 583.
69/£>t4. at pp. 603-604.
7 077?<? Assunzione [1954] AC 224, 240.
7^-Fergussoti v. Fyffe (1841) 2 Robinson 267; Williamson v. Taylor (1845) 8 D 156. See also
Scottish Provident Institution v. Cohen & Co. (1888) 16 R 112.
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The significance of the place of performance may be based on the fact that it would be
easier for the arbitrators and the judges to inspect the performance of the work from
which the dispute arises. This idea is supported by a number of cases which conclude
that the place of performance is a good indication to infer the proper law the parties
intended. With respect to the cases where more than one place of performance is
involved, the "primary place test" is applied. For instance, in the case of Re United
Railways of Havana,12 the judge decided that, where there are several places of
performance, the law chosen is that of the country which the court finds to be the
"primary" place.
Nevertheless, the predominance of the place of performance test was questioned by
some judges. For instance, Bowen L.J. argued that the court will not normally be
able to attach much significance to the place of performance if the parties have to
perform their obligations in different countries, especially when the same quality and
quantity of the construction works are carried out in the individual different
countries.73 Furthermore, the strength of the lex loci solutionis is not absolute, and
must "give way to any inference that can legitimately be drawn from the character of
the contract and the nature of the transaction."74 The reason why the place of
performance has lost its importance in determining the proper law of the contract75
may be the fast development of the modern facilities for travelling and
communications, and the realisation that disputes may arise from any part of the
contract, not just from the performance.
Other indications
12Re United Railways ofHavana, etc., [1961] AC 1007.
73Jacobs v. Credit Lyonnais (1884) 112 QBD 589 (CA), 600.
1Albid.
15N.V. Kwik Hoo Tong Handel Maatscliappij v. James Finlay and Company Limited [1927] AC
604.
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Apart from the place of performance, the currency of a given country mentioned in the
contract76, the use of a particular language77 or a specific legal term78 and so on, may
also give guidance to arbitrators inferring the proper law from the relevant
circumstances of the case. Whereas, the use of a particular language in the contract
has been rejected as a strong indication of choice of the proper law of the contract.79
This has been illustrated in a number of cases where the language of English was used
in the contracts. It was suggested that the parties, perhaps, would not mean to have
their contract governed by English law simply because English was the language of
the contract. The use of English language may simply be due to the fact that English is
an international language which has been commonly used in international contracts.
Therefore, in England, the courts will not regard the use of English in the contract as a
strong indication of the proper law unless there is further connection with England.80
In relation to whether the use of a marine policy which is held in a particular country
constitutes an implied choice of the proper law, a positive answer was offered by the
English Court of Appeal. In Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp. v. Kuwait Insurance
Co.,81 the court was unanimous in reaching the conclusion that using a policy
governed by the Marine Insurance Act 1906 implies English law as the governing law
of the contract. The court believed that the interpretation of the policy would not be
comprehensible without reference to the Marine Insurance Act 1906 and that
constituted a strong indication of the implied proper law of the contract.
767Yie Assunzione [1954] P 150 (CA); Re UnitedRailways ofHavana and Regla Warehouses Ltd.,
[1961] AC 1007; Re Helbert Wagg & Co. Ltd. [1956] Ch. 323; N.V. Handel Maatschappij J. Smits
v. English Exports (London) Ltd. [1955] 2 LI Rep 69, 72; 317, 323 (CA).
77The Industrie [1894] 58; The Adriatic [1931] 241; The Njegos [1936] 90, 101.
78/?. v. International Trustee etc. [1937] AC 500.
797he Metamorphosis [1953] 1 WLR 543, 549.; Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation S.A. v.
Compagnie d'Armement Maritime S.A. [1971] AC 572, 583, 594.
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Furthermore, in this case, Lord Diplock firmly stated the importance of the localisation
of the proper law of the contract. If you wish to ascertain the proper law of the
contract you have "to identify a particular system of law as being that in accordance
with which the parties to it intended a contact to be interpreted,"82 or you have "to see
whether the parties have by its express terms or by necessary implication from the
language evinced a common intention as to the system of law by reference to which
their mutual rights and obligations are to be ascertained."83 As he said,
"the purpose of entering into a contract being to create legal rights and
obligations between the parties to it, interpretations of the contract involves
determining what are the legal rights and obligations to which the words used
in it give rise. This is not possible except by reference to the system of law by
which the legal consequences that follow from the use of those words is to be
ascertained;84
In addition,
"contracts are incapable of existing in a legal vacuum. They are mere pieces of
paper devoid of all legal effect unless they were made by reference to some
system of private law which the obligations assumed by the parties to the
contract by their use of particular forms of words and prescribes the remedies
enforceable in a court of justice for failure to perform any of those
obligations."85
Nevertheless, today, no single factor or element of the contract is conclusive for the
judges or the arbitrators to infer the proper law of the contract. In other words, every
factor must be evaluated together in order to decide the implied choice of the proper
law.86
2.2.3 The third step - the closest and most real relationship test
^Amin Rasheed Shipping Corporation v. Kuwait Insurance Co. [1984] AC 50,61; [1983]3 WLR
241 (HL) at 245.
83Ibid. at p. 62.
84Ibid. at p. 60.
85Ibid. at p. 65.
86Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation S.A. v. Compagnie d'Armement Maritime S.A. [1971] AC
572.
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In international commercial arbitration, the choice of law issue can be more
complicated than the parties might have expected, especially when no expressed choice
of law is found in the arbitration agreement, or the arbitrators experience difficulties in
inferring the implied choice of law. In most international commercial arbitrations, the
parties have different nationalities or have offices situated in different countries, and
where the contractual obligations are performed in different countries. For instance, a
typical international arbitration case might be as follows: a German national signed a
construction contract with a company whose head office is in Japan; the construction
was carried out in Egypt; the contract was made in Paris and the payment was in
American dollars. Under these circumstances, if no express choice of law is made by
the parties, to infer the parties' implied choice of law can be a very difficult task since
no clear indications can be drawn from the contract.
Traditionally, in this kind of situation, arbitrators are expected to refer this issue to the
conflict of laws rules of the arbitral situs; in most jurisdictions, the closest and most
real relationship test will be applied. An objective scrutiny of every term of the
contract, every detail affecting its formation and performance, and every fact of the
case will be conducted in order to ascertain the proper law. This approach in
arbitration has been adopted by some international conventions or treaties.87 For
instance, Article 4(1) of The European Convention on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations (the Rome Convention)88 provides: "To the extent that the law
87Born stated in International Commercial Arbitration in the United States, (1994), at p. 101 that:
"In practice, however, the New York Convention and most other multilateral agreements,
seldom address the conflict of laws rules applicable to the substantive law governing
arbitrable disputes.
One exception to this is the 1961 European Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration, which provides in article VII that the parties "shall be free to determine, by
agreement, the law to be applied by the arbitrators to the substance of the dispute," and
failing any agreement, that the dispute will be governed by the proper law under the rules of
conflict that the arbitrators deem applicable."
Another exception is die International Convention for the Setdement of Disputes, Article 42 of which
provides for the application of international law and the law of the host state.
881981 Official Journal of the European Communities no. L266/1. The Rome Convention
specifically excludes "arbitration agreements" from its coverage. Article 1 (2)(d) of die Convention
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applicable to the contract has not been chosen in accordance with Article 3, the contract
shall be governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely
connected."89 Similar provisions also appear in the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods90, Article 33 of the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules, Article 13(3) of the ICC Rules and Article 29 of the AAA
International Rules.
In accordance with the closest and most real relationship test, in international
commercial arbitration the law of the place of arbitration used to be regarded as a
significant indication for both the procedural law and the proper law of the contract.
In relation to the proper law of contract, the significance of the place of arbitration was
illustrated in a number of cases. For instance, in Hamlyn v. Talisker Distillery,91 the
proper law of the contract was held to be the law of the place of the arbitral situs, since
the parties agreed that the arbitration should take place in this given country. Later, the
case of Tzortzis v. Monark Line A/B92 went further than Hamlyn. In this case,
Sweden was the country where the contract for the sale of a ship by Swedish sellers to
Greek buyers was made. The court decided that the proper law of the contract was
English law, even though there was no connection with England at all. The only
reason for this choice was that the City of London was the place of arbitration. In
addition, in the case of Norske Atlas Co. Ltd. v. London General Insurance Co.
Ltd.,93 where a dispute arose from a reinsurance contract between the parties,
MacKinnon J. said that the proper law of the contract was Norwegian law since
arbitration was to be held in Norway.94
does apply, however, to the underlying contractual dispute that is the subject of the arbitration
agreement.
89See ICC case no. 6379 (1990). However the Rome Convention imposes certain limitations on this
issue.
90See ICC case no. 2930 (1982).
91 [1894] AC 202.
92[1968] 1 WLR 406 (CA).
93[1927] 2 LI Rep 104.
94The reason for the application of Norwegian law was also to be found in the fact that the arbitrators'
meeting place was Christiania.
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Similar to England, the United States courts also supported the idea that the parties'
choice of the place of arbitration was a strong indication for the arbitrators to apply the
substantive law of the arbitral situs to settle the disputes.95 As Ehrenzweig states "It is
widely held that the parties who have chosen a place of arbitration have thus impliedly
agreed on the applicability of both the procedural and substantive law of that place"96
This idea is also stated in the Restatement:97
"Provision by the parties in a contract that arbitration shall take place in a
certain state may provide some evidence of an intention on their part that the
local law of this state should govern the contract as a whole. This is true not
only because the provision shows that the parties had this particular state in
mind, it is also true because the parties must presumably have recognised that
arbitrators sitting in that state would have a natural tendency to apply its local
law."
Moreover, in the case of Scherk v. Albert-Culver Co.,98 the plaintiff, an American
Corporation, purchased three interrelated business enterprises from the German
defendant. As far as the issue of the proper law was concerned, Mr. Justice Stewart
said: "Under some circumstances, the designation of arbitration in a certain place
might also be viewed as implicitly selecting the law of that place to apply to that
transaction."99
Nevertheless, the traditional idea that supports the application of the arbitral situs's
substantive rules has been under a serious attack in recent years. It has been criticised
by some commentators100 who believe that this idea is outdated. For instance, Dr.
95Section 218 comment b of the Restatement (Second) Conflict ofLaws (1971).
96Ehrenzweig, Conflict ofLaws, (1962) at p. 540.
97Section 218 comment b of the Restatement (Second) Conflict ofLaws (1971).
98417 US 506 (1974) 519, n. 13.
"Splosna Plovba ofPiran v. Agrelak Steamship Corp. 381 F. Supp. 1368, 1370 (SDNY 1974); In
re Application ofDoughboy Indus. Inc. 233 NYS 2d 488 (1962); and, Konkar Indomitable Corp. v.
Fritzen Schiffsagentur undBereederungs GmbH 80 Civ. 3230 (SDNY) (1981), where "Selection of an
arbitration forum may also be viewed as but one factor in determining a contract's 'centre of gravity'
for choice of law purposes."
100e.g., Collins, "Arbitration Clauses and Forum Selection Clauses in the Conflict of Laws: Some
Recent Developments in England", [1971] 2 J.Mar.L. & Com. 363; Kopelmanas, "The Settlement of
Disputes in International Trade", 51 Colum.L.R. 384 [1961]; Lew, Applicable Law, (1978), at p.
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Lew explains that of course it may be that "the parties will choose the arbitration forum
and intend its law to apply; but then again that intention might equally not exist."101
Other commentators even argue that the changes have been an almost total
abandonment of the rules of the arbitral situs.102 They also believe that it is a fallacy
to compare a seat of an arbitration with a judicial forum, because "an arbitrator does
not exercise public or constitutional power in the name of the State."103
The movement has been seen in the major international trade countries, such as the US
and England. In England, the compulsory application of the substantive law of the
place of arbitration was rejected by the House of Lords in the case of Compagnie
Tunisienne de Navigation S.A. v. Compagnie d'Armement Maritime S.A..104 In this
case, London was expressed as the place of arbitration in the arbitration clause.
Rejecting the older case law, the House of Lords decided that French law was the
proper law of the contract since the contract had no connection with any other system
of law other than French law. In addition, Lord Wilberforce said: "An arbitration
clause must be treated as an indication, to be considered together with the rest of the
contract and relevant surrounding facts."105
Since April 1, 1990, in the United Kingdom the common law rules concerning choice
of law in contract have, to a large extent, been replaced by the rules in the EEC
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (the Rome Convention).
The Rome Convention has been incorporated into the laws of the United Kingdom by
190, 204; Rubino-Sammartino, InternationalArbitration Law, (1990), at p. 256; Dicey andMorris,
(12th ed. 1993) at p. 1183. and Born, International Commercial Arbitration in the United States -
Commentary & Materials, (1994), at p. 111.
101Lew, Applicable Law, (1978), at p. 190, 204.
102Goldman, "La LexMercatoria dans les Contrats et L'arbitrage International", Neth.Int'l.L.Rev.
220 (1956) at p. 226; cited from Bom, International Commercial Arbitration in the United States -
Commentary & Materials, (1994), at p. 104.
103Craig, Park and Paulsson, International Chamber ofCommerce Arbitration, (2d ed. 1990), at p.
285.
104Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation S.A. v. Compagnie d'Armement Maritime S.A. [1971] AC
572, 589, 597-598, 605-607.
105/A4. at p. 600.
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the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990.106 Although Article l(2)(d) of the Rome
Convention expressly excludes "arbitration agreements and agreements on the choice
of courts" from its scope of application, the Convention still governs the choice of law
in relation to the main contract. As Anton clearly points out:
"... the arbitration agreement is excluded from the operation of the Convention
and remains subject to the common law rules. ... This does not mean that an
arbiter (or judge) is not bound to apply the rules of the Convention to the
substantive issues of choice of law which may arise in the course of the
arbitration or litigation. It merely means that issues relating to the validity,
interpretation, and effect of the arbitration or choice of court agreement are not
governed by the choice of law rules established by the Convention."107
In respect of the choice of law rules, the Rome Convention provides new rules to be
followed by the judges and the arbitrators sitting in the United Kingdom. Article 3(1)
confirms the principle of party autonomy and stipulates: "A contract shall be governed
by the law chosen by the parties." The Rome Convention also allows the choice of a
foreign law, as Article 3(3) provides that a choice of a foreign law, subject to the
mandatory rules108 and public policy,109 must be accommodated by the courts of the
Contracting States even if all the relevant elements are connected with one country
only. This provision is further illustrated:
"The law chosen need not in principle have any geographical or physical
connection with the contract. This approach is in accord with the views
expressed by the U.K. negotiators and reflects the practice of the common
law. It also appears to be the case that the rules of the Convention are brought
into play if the only foreign element in the case is the choice of foreign law to
apply to what is otherwise an entirely domestic transaction."110
The implied choice of law test is also incorporated into the Rome Convention. As
Article 3(1) provides: "The choice must be express or demonstrated with reasonable
certainty by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case." This provision
106The text of the Convention is set out in Schedule 1 to the Act.
107Anton, Private International Law, (2nd ed. 1990), at p. 360.
108Articles 3(3), 5(2), 6(1) and 7(2).
109Article 16.
110Scottish Current Law Statues, Chapter 36, at p. 19.
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allows judges and arbitrators, taking all the facts into consideration, to decide that the
parties have made a choice of law even if this is not expressly stated in the contract.111
In addition, judges will follow the rules - the closest and most real relationship test, set
out in Article 4 to determine the applicable law in cases where a choice of law has not
been made, expressly or implicitly, in the contract itself within the meaning of Article
3 of the Rome Convention.112
2.3 Difficulties in distinguishing the test of implied choice
and the closest and most real connection test
This chapter will be concluded by asking whether the choice of law rules provide
arbitrators a clear guideline in the choice of law process? As far as the three steps of
the choice of law rules are concerned, subject to the exceptions of public policy and
mandatory rules, the first step to search for the parties' express choice of law is clearer
than the other two steps. In the absence of the parties' express choice of law, the
second and third steps of the conflict of laws rules are meant to provide the arbitrators
with a basic guideline to decide the proper law of the contract. Nevertheless, in the
opinion of the present writer, it is difficult to draw a line between the implied choice
test and the closest and most real connection test.
Accordingly, under the implied choice of law test, the proper law of the contract can
only be decided if this implied choice can be demonstrated with reasonable certainty
from the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case. Arbitrators, by putting
themselves in the position of the parties, are required to look at this issue from the
standings of the parties and try to infer which law the parties intended. As to the
closest and most real relationship test, it claims to be a more objective test which
11 ' (iiuliano-J .agardc Report at p. 17.
112As set out in Article 4.
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requires the arbitrators to "impute an intention or to determine for the parties what is
the proper law, which, as just and reasonable persons, they ought to or would have
intended if they had thought about the question when they made the contract."113
Contrary to the implied choice of law test attempting to ascertain the intention of the
parties, the arbitrators are meant to put themselves in the position of 'reasonable men'
and determine the objective proper law of the contract.
However, while the outcome of the application of these twin tests are frequently the
same, a question that has to be asked is whether "putting arbitrators into the parties'
position", as required by the implied choice test, can be clearly distinguished from
"putting arbitrators in the place of reasonable men", as required by the closest and
most real relationship test?
In the Whitworth case,114 Viscount Dilhorne expressly points out that the implied
choice test and the most real and closest test are, in fact, two distinct stages by
referring to the judgment ofWidgery L.J. in the Court of Appeal115 that:
"To solve a problem such as arises in this case one looks first at the express
terms of the contract to see whether that intention is there to be found. If it is
not, then in my judgment the next step is to consider the conduct of the parties
to see whether that conduct shows that a decision in regard to the proper law of
the contract can be inferred from it. ... Finally, if one fails in this inquiry also
and is driven to the conclusion that the parties never applied their minds to the
question at all, then one has to go to the third stage and see what is the proper
law of the contract by considering what system of law is the one with which
the transaction has its closest and most real connection."116
Based on the observation of the present writer, nevertheless, the standings of the
parties and a reasonable man are very similar since no matter which stand the
arbitrators take, the selection of the applicable law must be decided on a reasonable
113Mount Albert Borough Council [1938] AC 224, (PC) 240.
114[1970] AC 583.
115Whitworth Street Estates Ltd. v. James Miller [1969] 1 WLR 377 (CA).
116 Widegery L.J. in Whitworth Street Estates Ltd. v. James Miller [1969] 1 WLR 377 (CA), at p.
383, (CA); also quoted by Viscount Dilhorne in [1970] AC 583 (HL) at p. 611.
Chapter Two: Choice ofthe Proper Law
basis. Furthermore, under the implied choice test, the arbitrator's job is to ascertain
the parties' intention; however this artificial certainty is also based on the nature of the
case and general circumstances of the case, which is similar to the closest and most
real relationship test. Therefore, the present writer would suggest that the rules for the
arbitrators to find the proper law of the contract under these two tests are similar to
each other. In other words, in certain aspects, they overlap.
If the implied choice of law test does overlap with the closest and most real
relationship test, the question is whether it is essential for the arbitrators to follow
these three stages to decide the proper law of the contract. If the answer is negative,
the next question is whether it would be more sensible to apply the more objective test-
the closest and real relationship test - to determine the proper law? Furthermore, it
might be asked whether the implied choice of law test should be removed from the
existing choice of law rules in international commercial arbitration?
In the opinion of the present writer, instead of guessing the parties' intention, the
proper law should be determined in accordance with a more objective test which
considers the relevant factors of the case and connections the contract has with a
particular system of law. In this respect, the closest and most real relationship test is a
better and more convincing method to select the proper law when no express choice of
law has been made by the parties. In fact, in a number of arbitral awards, it is
significant that the implied choice of law test has frequently been skipped by the
arbitrators. Instead of following the three-step rule to find the proper law of the
contract, after failing to find the parties' express choice the arbitrators simply resort to
the closest and most real relationship test to decide the proper law of the contract.
Furthermore, the distinction between the implied choice test and the most real and
closest test made by Viscount Dilhorne has had little influence on the development of
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the choice of law in international commercial arbitration.117 In fact, some countries
and arbitration institutions have replaced the traditional three-step choice of law rule
with a two-step rule. For instance, in Sweden, party autonomy is still the primary
principle of conflict of law rules in relation to contracts; however, in the absence of an
express choice, Swedish courts are ready to apply the 'centre of gravity test', which
allows the judges and arbitrators "to apply the law with which the contract in question
has its closest connection, or where its centre of gravity lies."118 This test was
established in a landmark case of Forsakringsaktiebolaget Skandia v.
Riksgdldskontoret,119 handed down by the Swedish Supreme Court in 1937. Hober
pointed out that the centre of gravity test replaced the implied choice test, and stated:
"The Skandia case was a landmark case in that it replaced the previously
existing theory of the hypothetical will of the parties. The underlying
philosophy of this theory was the attempt to establish the will of the parties, as
if they had thought of the question of applicable when they entered into the
contract. The search for the hypothetical will of the parties was thus a
subjective method. By contrast, the centre of gravity test represents a move
away from the subjective approach and introduces an objective approach, in
that it prescribes the weighing of all objective elements of a legal relationship
with a view to finding the law of the country with which the relationship has
its closest connection."120
Apart from Sweden, a similar change can also be found in the French Code of Civil
Procedure 1981,121 the Netherlands Arbitration Act 1986122 and the Swiss Private
International Law Act 1987,123 which provides that, "The arbitrator shall decide the
dispute according to the rule of law chosen by the parties; in the absence of such a
choice, he shall decide according to the rule he deems appropriate."
117Whitworth Street Estates Ltd. v. James Miller [1970] AC 583.
1 18Hober, Kaj. "In Search for the Centre of Gravity - Applicable Law in International Arbitration in
Sweden", Swedish and International Arbitration, (1994) pp. 7-43, at p. 8.
119Ibid. andNJA 1937 p. 1.
120Ibid, at p. 9. While Hober distinguishes these two tests, however, he stresses that the difference
between them should not be exaggerated as far as the result is concerned, since the hypothetical will of
the parties would typically, in most cases, coincide with the law of the country with which the
contract has its closest connection.
121Article 1496 of the French Code of Civil Procedure 1981.
122Article 1054 (2) of the Netherlands Arbitration Act 1986.
123Article 187 (1) of the Swiss Private International Law Act 1987.
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While the implied choice of law test is criticised for creating a kind of "artificial
subjective intention" which may not represent the real intention of the parties, this test
has gradually lost its importance in the choice of laws process in international
commercial arbitration. In accordance with the new arbitration legislation of some
jurisdictions, there appears to be a new trend to adopt the two-stage choice of law rule
to decide the proper law of the contract.
While "arbitrators in international commercial arbitrations have shown a growing
desire to throw off the shackles of private international law and to avoid dependence,
or exclusive dependence, on any particular national law,"124 another trend in the
choice of law is the application of a-national principles as the proper law of the
contract in international commercial arbitration. A study of recent arbitral awards
showed that arbitrators have frequently moved away from the traditional choice of law
rules and chosen the proper law of the contract from the category of a-national
principles, such as the new lexrnercatoria, amiable composition and the general
principles of law, to govern the main contract. This new trend will be discussed in the
next few chapters.
124Goode, "Usage and Its Reception in Transnational Commercial", (1997) 461.C.L.Q. 1, at p. 6.
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The modern trend in the choice of the proper law
- the interaction between the delocalisation
theory and the choice of a-national principles
In this chapter, an examination of the modern approach in choosing a-national
principles as the proper laws of the contract in international commercial arbitration will
be carried out. In parallel with the delocalisation theory which invokes the idea that
international commercial arbitration should not be bound to any national legal system,
the choice of the proper law has also gone beyond the scope of national laws.
Studying the international arbitral awards made during the past twenty years, a trend in
choosing a-national principles governing the substantive disputes of the contract can
be observed. Such a choice can be made by the parties themselves or by arbitrators.
The parties' decision in choosing a-national principles may be caused by lack of
satisfaction or little confidence in national legal systems. In relation to the arbitrator's
decision on this subject, a-national principles have become an alternative choice
outside national laws in international arbitration, especially when no express choice of
the proper law is found in the arbitration agreement.
The so-called a-national principles applied in international commercial arbitration
include the general principles of law, the new lexmercatoria and amiable composition.
Although the application of a-national principles is not accepted universally, a more
relaxed attitude towards such an application has been shown in a number of judgments
and legislation. In this chapter, the discussion will focus on the background to this
change. The first section of this chapter will focus on a general discussion of the
delocalisation theory and the different opinions on this theory. In the second section
of this chapter, the different attitudes of French and English courts towards the
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delocalisation theory will be briefly reviewed. This chapter will conclude by pointing
out the interaction between the choice of a-national principles and the delocalisation
theory.
3.1 The general picture of the delocalisation theory
The delocalisation theory is an idea seeking to detach international commercial
arbitrations from controls imposed by the law of the place of arbitration (the lex fori).1
Proponents of the delocalisation theory maintain that international commercial
arbitration should not be subject to legal controls which vary from country to country.
Particularly, the controls may not suit the fast development and practice of
international commercial arbitration. With an intention to eliminate the compulsory
controls of the lexfori, they maintain that controls mechanism should be exercised by
the country where the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards is sought.
Influenced by the idea of detaching international commercial arbitration from the
restraints of the lex fori, some jurists have dismissed a compulsory application of the
choice of law rules of the lexfori to determine the substantive law governing the main
contract.2
The close link between the proper law of the contract and the lex fori reflects the
potential restrictions of the lex fori which can be imposed on the parties' freedom3 in
Accordingly, the delocalisation theory can be applied at two stages of the arbitration procedures. One
is delocalising the arbitral procedures from the controls of the lex fori. The other one is delocalising
arbitral awards. Delocalising the arbitral procedures refers to removing the supervisory authority of
the lexfori and the local courts where the arbitration is held. As far as delocalised arbitral awards is
concerned, it means removing the power of the courts at the place of arbitration to make an
internationally effective declaration of the award's nullity. See Paulsson, "The Extent of Independence
of International Arbitration from the Law of the Situs", in Lew, Contemporary Problems in
InternationalArbitration, (1986) at p. 141 (hereinafter Lew, Contemporary Problems).
2For example, Professor Jan Paulsson.
3The idea of party autonomy is adopted by some conventions, such as: Art. VII (1) of the European
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, 1961; Art. 42(1) of the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 1965; Art. 33(1) of
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 1976; Art. 33(1) of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal Consolidated
Tribunal Rules of Procedure 1983 (Amended in 7 March, 1984). Also, some institutional arbitration
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choosing the proper law of the contract. In accordance with the traditional choice of
laws rules, the parties' or arbitrator's choice of law is under scrutiny of the public
policy and choice of law rules of the place of arbitration. Failing to carry out a detailed
investigation into the relevant restrictions of the lexfori on the subject of choice of the
proper law can result in invalidating such a choice. In other words, the choice of the
proper law made by the parties or the arbitrator in excess of the scope allowed by the
lex fori can be pronounced invalid on the ground that the choice is in conflict with the
mandatory rules or public policy of the country where the arbitration is held. For
instance, a choice of a-national principles or a law bearing no substantial connection
with the case will be pronounced invalid if the choice of law rules of a country
explicitly prohibit such choices.
Nonetheless, the restrictions of the lex fori on the choice of proper law vary from
country to country. Some countries have a more relaxed attitude towards the
arbitration held in their territories, whereas others may hold a more hostile attitude
towards it. As a result, the delocalisation theory which invokes a detachment of the
arbitration procedures from the lex fori, has been invoked by a group of jurists since
1960s4 to avoid a potential invalidation of the chosen laws caused by the compulsory
application of the lexfori .
They believe that the development of international commercial arbitration may be
impeded because of the different restraints imposed on the arbitration procedures by
the different national courts since arbitrators not only have to be aware of more than
rules adopt it, such as Art. 13 (1) of the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International
Chamber ofCommerce.
4Paulsson, "Arbitration Unbound: Award Detached from the Law of Its Country of Origin", (1981) 30
I.C.L.Q. 358. "Delocalisation of International Commercial Arbitration: When andWhy It Matters?",
(1983) 32 I.C.L.Q. 53. Bernini, "The Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards by National
Judiciaries: A Trail of the New York Convention's Ambit andWorkability", in The Art ofArbitration
(Liber Amicorum for Pieter Sanders) (1982), 50 at p. 58. Lalive, "Les Regies de Conflict de Lois
Appliquees au Fond Litige par L'arbitre International Siegeant en Suisse", Rev.Arb. (1976), 155 at
159. Discussed in Paulsson, "Arbitration Unbound: Award Detached from the Law of Its Country of
Origin", (1981) 30 I.C.L.Q. 358.
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one national law, but also have to juggle with the different restraints imposed by
different laws.5 To eliminate these potential obstacles, in their opinion, the best way
is to free the arbitration procedures from the national court's control. Thus, they argue
that the arbitration procedures should be 'delocalised' and completely freed from the
mandatory rules and public policy of the place of arbitration. In accordance with this
theory, the arbitrators do not need to look over their shoulders at the different national
mandatory rules and public policy imposed by the laws of the place of arbitration, the
place making the contract, the place of performance, or the place of enforcement, and
so on. Accordingly, the arbitrators are not only allowed to disregard the lex fori, but
may also apply any procedural law they regard as appropriate.
3.1.1 Opinions against the delocalisation theory
Not surprisingly, the delocalisation theory is not shared by some traditionalists. The
scholars who are in favour of the traditional theory argue that there would be potential
risks that arbitrators may abuse their power and the most fundamental due process
requirement may not be safeguarded if a complete disregard of the lex fori was
introduced. As a result of this, the justice the parties are seeking through arbitration
will not be guaranteed due to the breakdown of the control mechanism exercised by
the national courts.
This school of thought recognises the arbitrators' freedom in choosing the applicable
law in the case where no expressed choice is made by the parties. However, the
extent of this freedom is only limited to the substantive law of the contract, rather than
the procedural law. Therefore, without a procedural law being specified, it would be
compulsory for the arbitrators to refer to the lex fori to decide the appropriate
5Park, "National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural Integrity in International
Arbitration", 63 Tul.L.R. 647 (1989), at p. 667.
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procedures they should follow. In the absence of an express choice of the proper law
made by the parties, the law governing the substantive disputes of the contract will be
determined in accordance with the choice of law rules of the lex fori.
For instance, a dispute concerning whether the goods delivered were defective or not
was submitted to an arbitral tribunal sitting in London. No applicable law was
mentioned in the arbitration agreement. According to the traditional approach, first of
all, the arbitral tribunal has to refer to the relevant English Arbitration Acts to examine
the questions of jurisdiction of the tribunal and the validity of the arbitration
agreement, and so on. Secondly, if the submission is valid, the arbitration procedures
will be governed by the English law. Thirdly, the tribunal is required to apply the
English conflict of laws rules to decide the substantive law of the contract. Failing any
clear indications of the choice of law, either express or implied, the one which has the
most real and closest connection with the case will be chosen by the tribunal. Failing
to do so, the validity of the award can be in doubt and challenged in the country where
the award is made, that is, England, and where the recognition or enforcement of the
award is sought.
The basis of their argument is the denial of the existence of "international" commercial
arbitration. Among this group of scholars, Dr. Mann was the most enthusiastic
proponent. Dr. Mann argued that every arbitration is a national one because private
international law serving as the jurisprudence of arbitration is, in fact, a system of
national law after all.6 Therefore, any international commercial arbitration should be
subject to a specific system of national law. As far as the specific national law is
concerned, the law of the country of the seat of arbitration is considered as the most
suitable one to regulate the arbitration procedures since it can provide the most
complete and effective control.
6Mann, "Lex Facit Arhitrum", in Liber Amicorum for Martin Domke (Nijhoff 1967), 157 at p. 160.
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Furthermore, Dr. Mann insisted that it is essential for the procedures of international
commercial arbitration to be conducted on the basis of a given national law. To
emphasize his point, he stated:
"The problem of international arbitration cannot be discussed except against the
background of a given lex arbitrv, the legal systems of the world differ so
considerably that no general rule can, or is intended to, be put forward. It
follows that, in principle and always subject to such freedom of choice as it
may allow, the lexarbitri governs the validity and effect of the submission; the
constitution of the tribunal; the procedure; the law applicable by the arbitrators;
the making, publications, interpretation, annulment and revision of the
award."7
3.1.2 Opinions favouring the delocalisation theory
Nevertheless, the traditional approach is challenged by the proponents of the
delocalisation theory. In their opinion, the application of the delocalisation theory can
successfully avoid the uncertainty caused by the mandatory rules and public policy
exceptions of the relevant laws. One of their arguments is based on the difference
between arbitrators and judges sitting in national courts. Observing the different
nature of a national court's judge from a private arbitrator, they claim that arbitrators
are under no duty to apply the lex fori to the arbitration. As Professor Paulsson said:
"The international arbitrator is in a fundamentally different position. Whatever
one might think of the contractual source of an arbitral tribunal's authority as a
purely internal matter, it is difficult to consider the international arbitrator as a
manifestation of the power of a State. His mission, conferred by the parties'
consent, is one of a private nature, and it would be a rather artificial
interpretation to deem his power to be derived, and very indirectly at that, from
a tolerance of the State of the place of arbitration."8
Following the suggestion that arbitrators do not have to follow the lex fori, it is
therefore unnecessary for them to consider the mandatory rules of the lex fori when
7Mann, "State Contracts and International Arbitration", (1967) XLII Brit.Yrbk.lntl. L. 1 at p. 6.
8Paulsson, Arbitration Unbound: Award Detached from the Law ofIts Country ofOrigin, (1981) 30
I.C.L.Q. 358, at p. 362.
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they deal with an international commercial dispute. As a result, they recommend that
the supervisory powers should only be exercised by the courts where the recognition
or enforcement is sought. Nevertheless, to avoid misunderstanding, he points out that
the purpose of this theory is not to try to escape from the national court's control, but
rather to promote the acceptance of delocalised arbitral awards. As he states: "To seek
completely to avoid national jurisdictions would be misguided. Indeed, the
international arbitral system would ultimately break down if no national jurisdiction
could be called upon to recognise and enforce awards."9 Furthermore, "... the
delocalised award is not thought to be independent of any legal order. Rather, the
point is that a delocalised award may be accepted by the legal order of an enforcement
jurisdiction although it is independent from the legal order of its country of origin."10
Apart from this academic support, in practice, ICC awards also have made
contributions towards the development of delocalisation theory. Within the ICC
framework, the practitioners try to create an autonomous atmosphere with the aim of
making a country attractive as a location for holding international commercial
arbitration by marrying the laissez-faire theory and the commercial motive behind the
trend in modern arbitration law. The ICC does not want the results of the ICC
arbitration to depend on the situs;11 therefore, they try to promote the delocalisation
theory by saying: "... the courts of the place of arbitration should assume a role in
international commercial arbitration as one designed to control the bona fide of the
award on an international, rather than a national, level and they accordingly should
function:12
only as an instrument for the control of the conformity of the award to
transnational minimum standards such as those embodied in the major
international conventions. Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the judge
9Paulsson, "Delocalisation of International Commercial Arbitration: When andWhy It Matters?",
(1983) 321.C.L.Q. 53 at p. 54.
I ()Ihid. at p. 57.
IICraig, Park, and Paulsson, International Chamber ofCommerceArbitration, (2d ed. 1990), at p. 11
(hereinafter Craig, Park, and Paulsson, ICCArbitration).
12 Ibid, at p. 11-12.
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at the place of arbitration has no mission or capacity to apply his own national
criteria to the award.""13
They also criticise the idea of a compulsory application of the lex fori to international
commercial arbitration when no express procedural choice of law is made by the
parties. First, they stress that, in practice, the place of arbitration is often chosen by
the ICC, therefore, the compulsory application of the lex fori to the arbitration
procedures does not reflect the parties' minds. Secondly, they emphasise that the
parties' legitimate expectations may not be fully reflected by applying the lex fori if
neutrality is the main consideration of the choice. As Mr. Delaume stated:
"Except in those situations in which compliance with mandatory rules is
required, the parties are generally free to choose by way of express stipulation
the law applicable to their relationship. In the overwhelming majority of cases,
the law stipulated applicable is the domestic law of a specific country to which
the contract bears some connection or the law of a 'third' country selected for
reason of expertise (such as English law in regard to maritime matters) or of
'neutrality' (such as Swedish, Swiss or French law)..."14
While making an effort to free the parties from the restraints imposed by the relevant
municipal procedural laws, the ICC also supports Professor Paulsson's arguments
concerning the difference between the judges and arbitrators.15 In an ICC arbitration
case, the arbitrator said: "The rules determining the applicable law vary from one
country to the next. State judges derive them from their own national legislation, the
lex fori. But an arbitral tribunal has no lex fori in the strictest sense of the word,
particularly when the arbitration case is of an international nature."16
The ICC encourages its arbitrators to conduct an arbitration in conformity with the
ICC Rules which are consistent with the delocalisation theory. As Article 11 of the
13Paulsson, "Arbitration Unbound", (1981) 30 I.C.L.Q. 358.
14Passage from Delaume, TransnationalArbitration, Part II, Chapter VII at p. 2 also quoted in W.
Craig, Park, and Paulsson, ICC Arbitration, (2d ed. 1990) at p. 123.
15 Mann, "State Contracts and International Arbitration", (1967) XLII Brit.Yrbk.Intl.L. 1 at p. 6.
16ICC case no. 1689; Craig, "International Ambition and National Restraints in ICC Arbitration",
(1985) 1(1) Arbitration Int. 49-81, at p. 65.
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ICC Rules,17 which grants the arbitrators more powers in conducting the arbitration
procedures, stipulates:
"The rules governing the proceedings before the arbitrator shall be those
resulting from these Rules and, where these Rules are silent, any rules which
the parties (or, failing them, the arbitrator) may settle, and whether or not
reference is thereby made to a municipal procedural law to be applied to the
arbitration."
In accordance with Article 11, in the absence of parties' express choice, the duty to
determine which law is applied to the arbitration procedures is transferred to the
arbitrators; moreover, the application of the mandatory rules and public policy of the
lexfori is no longer required.
The SEEE arbitration,18 which was under the supervision of the ICC, can be a
suitable example to illustrate the delocalisation theory. The SEEE arbitration involved
a dispute arising from a railway construction project in the former Yugoslavia between
Yugoslavia and a French company, later replaced by SEEE. The SEEE claimed that
they did not receive full payment due to the devaluation of the French franc. An
arbitral tribunal composed of two arbitrators acted as amiable compositeurs and
rendered an award in favour of the SEEE in Lausanne in 1956 and ordered Yugoslavia
to pay SEEE 62 million French francs.
Yugoslavia tried to set aside this award in the cantonal Court of Appeal in Vaud by
claiming the arbitral tribunal was composed of an even number of arbitrators which
violated the Vaud cantonal law. Nonetheless, the Swiss court refused to hear the case
on the grounds that it was without jurisdiction because the parties had not intended to
subject themselves to the law of Canton of Vaud. Furthermore, the arbitral award was
returned to the party having filed it (the SEEE) since it did not constitute an arbitral
17 Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, 1988.
1 8Socitete Europeane cTEtudes et dEnterprise (S.E.E.E.) v. Yugoslavia (1959) J.D.I. 1074; a detailed
discussion is contained in Paulsson, The Extent of Independence of International Arbitration from the
Law of the Situs, in Lew, Contemporary Problems, (1986), 141-163, at pp. 142-146.
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decision as understood by Article 516 of the Code of Procedure of Vaud. SEEE's
further appeal to the Swiss Federal tribunal was also rejected. Later, in 1975, SEEE's
attempts to enforce the award in Holland also ended in failure on the grounds that the
judgment delivered by the Vaud Cantonal Tribunal had the same effect as an
annulment.
Despite the fact that the award was detached from its country of origin in 1977, SEEE
made another attempt to enforce this award in the Court of Appeal in Rouen which
became successful. The court accepted the award despite its absence of connection
with the place of the arbitration. The Court of Appeal in Rouen held:
"-that the Swiss decisions did not have the effect of setting the award aside,
nor eliminating its legal existence; and that they only set forth that the award
escapes the judicial sovereign of Vaud.
-that the law of the place of arbitration does not always and necessarily govern
the arbitral proceedings
-that the 'procedural law' that governs the arbitration may equally be another
national law or the agreement of the parties;
-that in this case the arbitration clause excludes the application of national laws
of procedure since it defines its own procedure;
that the arbitration clause provides that the arbitrators are exempt from any
formality, that they may decide as amiable compositeur, and that their
decisions, or as the case may be those of the umpire, are final and binding on
both parties."19
Finally, the award was enforced in France by the application of the New York
Convention. This case is regarded as a victory for the delocalisation theory since it
illustrated that a foreign award might be enforced even though this award was
detached from its country of origin.20
Although it has failed to receive sufficient support from most states, the idea of the
delocalisation theory has interacted with the choice of a-national principles in a
particular way. Accordingly, instead of following the strict choice of law rules,
1 translation cited from Paulsson, "The Extent of Independence of International Arbitration from the
Law of the Situs", in Lew, Contemporary Problems, (1986), 141-163, at p. 145.
20Despite the decision of the Court of Appeal in Rouen,the recognition of the award was rejected by
the Dutch Supreme Court on other grounds in 1975 at a later stage. The Dutch Supreme Court
regarded the Swiss refusal to hear the case as equivalent to setting aside the award.
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arbitrators are granted more discretion to choose the proper law. Also, the choice of
the proper law has also gone beyond the national law regimes while the emergence of
a-national principles has attracted the attention of the theorists and practitioners. The
proponents, who are in favour of the application of a-national principles in
international arbitration, argue that the existing national laws are insufficient to cope
with complicated international commercial disputes. Furthermore, the disputes arising
from international commerce should be governed by a-national principles which have
been developed for such purpose.
The change which has resulted from the interaction between the delocalisation theory
and the application of a-national principles has also been noted in a number of new
arbitration statutes, international conventions and the rules of some arbitration
institutions. For instance, Article VII (1) of the European Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration, 1961 stipulates:
"The parties shall be free to determine, by agreement, the law to be applied by
the arbitrators to the substance of the dispute. Failing any indication by the
parties as to the applicable law, the arbitrators shall apply the proper law under
the rule of conflict that the arbitrators deem applicable."
A similar provision can also be seen in Article 33(1) of the Arbitration Rules of the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 1976 (the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules) and Art. 33(1) of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal Consolidated
Tribunal Rules of Procedure 1983 (Amended in 7 March, 1984) (Iran-US Tribunal
Rules). Also, it is adopted in Art. 13(3) of the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC Arbitration Rules).
3.2 Attitudes held by the different national courts towards
the delocalisation theory - France and England
3.2.1 France
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To some extent, the delocalisation theory has received support in jurisdictions, such as
France, Switzerland and Belgium. Taking France as an example, French courts have
always had a very friendly attitude towards international commercial arbitration
conducted within its territory. A number of French jurists regard an international
contract as a contract detaching from the national laws, both substantive and
procedural aspects.21 Following this idea, it is widely supported by the French
scholars that the parties have the rights and freedom to design or facilitate the arbitral
procedures in accordance with their own wishes and expectations. Influenced by this
idea and combined with the intention to make France a more attractive venue for
international commercial arbitration, the delocalisation theory which involves
detaching the arbitral procedures from the lex fori, has became an attractive notion
among the French jurists.
Believing that lifting the restraints of the lex fori would promote the development of
international commercial arbitration, France decided to incorporate the notion of the
delocalisation theory22 into its legal system. As a result, French courts have given
international commercial arbitration a special status by limiting their judicial powers.
The French courts try to interfere with the arbitration procedures as little as possible
and set limited grounds for reviewing international arbitral awards.
The most significant change is the enactment of The Decree of May 12, 1981, (the
"1981 Decree") which is incorporated into the New Code of Civil Procedure, 1981.
With the intention of making France the most attractive venue for international
commercial arbitration, the 1981 Decree tries to create an environment friendly to
international commercial arbitration conducted in France.23 This Decree represents the
21See Fouchard, L'arbitrage Commercial International (1965); discussed in Sanders, "Trends in the
Field of International Commercial Arbitration", (1975) 145II Rec.dec Cours 20.
22Craig, Park and Paulsson, (1981). "French Codification of a Legal Framework for International
Commercial Arbitration: The Decree ofMay 12, 1981", (1981) 13 Law & Pol.Int.B. 728.
23Carbonneau, "The Elaboration of a French Court of International Commercial Arbitration : A
Study in Liberal Judicial Creativity", 55 Tul.L.Rev. 1 (1981) at pp. 15-16.
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absoluteness of the French laissez-faire approach applied to international commercial
arbitration, and reveals a reluctance to exercise its judicial control over the integrity of
arbitral proceedings conducted in France. The spirit of the new Decree was shown in
two famous cases decided by the Court of Appeal of Paris in the 1980s. One is
GeneralNational Maritime Transport Company v. Gotaverken Arendal A.B.,24 the
other is the Norsolor case.25
In the case of General NationalMaritime Transport Company v. Gotaverken Arendal
A.B., the French Court of Appeal held that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the
challenge because the award was not French. The dispute which arose in relation to a
set of substantially identical contracts whereby Gotaverken undertook to construct
three tankers for Libyan Maritime Co. However, Libyan Maritime Co. refused to take
delivery of the vessels after having previously paid three fourths of the total purchase
price after the performance. The dispute was submitted to ICC in Paris for arbitration
according to the contracts. The arbitral tribunal made an award by a majority
decision26 dated April 5, 1978, which rejected Libyan Maritime Co.'s defence and
made an award in favour of Gotaverken. Libyan Maritime Co. tried to bring an action
to set aside the award in the Court of Appeal in Paris. Meanwhile, in Sweden, the
winning party tried to attach the vessels and sought recognition of the award.
Gotaverken raised the issue whether the French courts had jurisdiction to control
international arbitral proceedings on the sole grounds that France had happened to
provide geographically neutral grounds for the arbitration. Furthermore, Gotaverken
argued that there was no need for the arbitral proceedings to be attached to any national
legal system. The reason is that under the New York Convention, the law of the place
24Decision of Feb. 21, 1980, Court of Appeal, Paris, 107 (1980) J.D.I. 660, [1980] Rev.Arb. 524,
reprinted in 20 l.L.M. 883 (1981).
25 AKSA v. Norsolor, Judgement of 9 December 1980, Cour d'Appeal, Paris (1980) published in
[1981] Rev.Arb. 306. An English translation published in (1981) 20 l.L.M. 883, at p. 888. Report
of the Supreme Court of Vienna, Nov. 18, 1982 was reprinted in [1984] IX Y.B.C.A. 159.
26 The Libyan arbitrator refused to sign the award.
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of arbitration only has control over the proceedings in the absence of a specific choice
made by the parties. In the opinion of the Court of Appeal in Paris, the agreement was
presented by reference to the ICC Rules. In accordance with these Rules, Article 11
authorises the detachment of arbitral proceedings from the local law.
The Court of Appeal in Paris refused to exercise jurisdiction over Libyan Maritime
Co's actions against the arbitral award rendered in Paris. It confirmed that the parties
had the freedom to choose any law they wished to govern the procedural issues arising
from the arbitration on the ground that the ICC Arbitration Rules 1975 was selected.
Considering the facts of this case, neither of the parties nor their transaction had a
connection with France, neither they nor the arbitrators had chosen to declare French
law to apply to the proceedings, and finally as the ICC Rules no longer mandated the
application of the law of the seat of arbitration in the absence of a choice by the parties,
the Court of Appeal concluded that French law was not applicable to the arbitration
and it did not have jurisdiction to hear the challenge since the case was not subject to
the French legal order nor was the award French in nationality.27 Furthermore, the
Court confirmed that the parties to international commercial arbitration are free to select
the legal order to which they wish to govern the proceedings, and this freedom
extends to the exclusion of any national system of law.
As far as the action brought in Sweden is concerned, one of Libyan Maritime Co.'s
main defences against the actions was that the award was not binding anywhere and it
was pending a challenge brought before the courts in the country where it was
rendered, that is, France. However, the Swedish Supreme Court declared the award
27 The Swedish courts deemed the award to have been "binding" - in the sense of the New York
Convention. - as of the moment it was rendered. This was because in accepting to arbitrate under ICC
Rules, the parties had waived the right to appeal. It is significant to note that the Swedish courts did
not inquire whether the award was binding under French law, but as a function of the parties'
contractual stipulation, recognised and given effect by the Swedish legal system. The English
translation was published in 21 Virginia J.Intl.L. 244 (1981).
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immediately enforceable irrespective of the existence of an action in France to set it
aside.
Ten months later, a similar issue was submitted to the Court of Appeal in Paris. In the
case of ASKA v. Norsolor28 the successful party was a French company (Norsolor).
ASKA, a Turkish textile company, sought a judicial review on an ICC award which
denied their claim for restitution of part of the purchase price of materials ordered by
Norsolor. Similar to the Gotaverken case, the contract between the parties included an
arbitration clause which conferred jurisdiction on the ICC without specifying any
procedural law to be applied to the arbitration procedures. Following the decision
made in the Gotaverken case, and regardless of the fact that France was the place of
arbitration and the defendant was a French company, the Court of Appeal held that the
case concerned a non-French award which was subject to the remedies available for
foreign awards and dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
These two decisions made by the Court of Appeal in Paris deliver a clear message
concerning the acceptance of the phenomenon of the delocalisation theory by French
courts. In addition, the Court of Appeal also denied the suggestion that the national
courts of the place of arbitration should have an overwhelming authority to rule on the
validity of the proceedings since, as stressed by the Court of Appeal of Paris,
sometimes the place of arbitration was chosen only in the interest of geographical
neutrality and that should not be considered an implicit expression of the parties'
intention to subject themselves to the procedural law of France. This idea is reflected
in Professor Paulsson's article, as he emphasises:
"The message seems clear: one is authorised to concluded that the binding
force of an international award may be derived from the contractual
commitment to arbitrate in and of itself, that is to say without a specific
national legal system serving as its foundation. In this sense, an arbitral award
28AKSA v. Norsolor, Judgment of 9 December 1980, Cour d'Appeal, Paris (1980) published in
[1981] Rev.Arb. 306. An English translation is published in (1981) 20 l.L.M. 883 at p. 888.
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may indeed "drift", but of course it is ultimately subject to the post facto
control of the execution jurisdiction(s)."29
Eventually, the influence of these two cases can be observed in the 1981 Decree which
has an intention to free the arbitral procedures from the restraints of the lexfori .
3.2.2 England
Compared with the French legal system, English courts have given the lex fori greater
significance. Traditionally, if no choice of law is expressed by the parties, the English
courts have tended to take it for granted that the arbitrators are bound to apply the
English procedural law to the arbitration which is held in England. Even in the case
where the parties express their choice of the applicable laws, the mandatory rules and
public policy of English law still override the choice of law. The courts believe that
the principles applied to arbitration should be the same as those apply to the court
proceedings which are governed by the lex fori.
This approach has been adopted at least since Lord Brougham's judgment in Don v.
Lippmann.30 Lord Mustill was the most notable proponent who fought for this
traditional approach. He stated that, as far as the arbitral procedures of international
commercial arbitration are concerned, it cannot "exist without an internal procedural
law."31 This unfavourable attitude towards the theory of delocalisation was observed
by some foreign commentators. For instance, in a comparison study between English
and Swedish arbitration, Dr. G. Wetter reported this trend of resistance and stated:
"London is the locale of the greatest number of international arbitrations in the
world, yet the vast majority of these are viewed by the arbitrators, counsel and
29Paulsson, "Arbitration Unbound: Award Detached from the Law of Its Country of Origin", (1981)
30 I.C.L.Q. 358, at p. 368.
305 CI. & F. 1.
3 ^ustill, "Transnational Arbitration in English Law", (1984) 37 Curr.L.Pr. 133 at p. 142.
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the parties as wholly domestic in character in the sense that the proceedings are
indistinguishable from those which take place between two English parties." 32
As far as the case law is concerned, this traditional approach is upheld by a series of
cases. The case of Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd. v. James Miller,33 is
one of them. Although the House of Lords held that the law governing the arbitral
procedures can be different from the one applied to the substantive dispute, the arbitral
procedures still had to follow the rules of the lex fori. Therefore, in this case, the
arbitral procedures should be governed by the law of the place of arbitration, that is
Scotland, even though the substantive disputes arising from the contract were
governed by English law.
This same approach was also adopted by Lord Denning M.R. in the case of
International Tank and Pipe S.A.K. v. Kuwait Aviation Fuelling Co. K.S.C.34 where
the dispute arose from a civil engineering contract between the parties. He explained:
"The contract itself is to be construed by English law. .. But the arbitration is
to be governed by the law of Kuwait or some other country. I say this because
the arbitration is governed by the rules of the International Chamber of
Commerce. ... And the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce say in
article 16 that the arbitration is governed by the rules:
"of the law of procedure chosen by the parties or, failing such choice,
those of the law of the country in which the arbitrator holds the
proceedings."
Thus, the parties may choose that the arbitration procedure is to be governed
by the law of some country other than England. If they do not so choose, the
procedure will be governed by the law where the arbitrator sits. That may be in
Kuwait."35
32Wetter, "Choice of Law in International Arbitration Proceedings in Sweden", (1986) 2 Arbitration
Int. 294, at p. 298. It was discussed in a comparison between the English and Swedish arbitrations.
As far as the Swedish arbitrations are concerned, he said: "In Sweden, to the contrary, arbitrations in
which at least one party is non-Swedish are treated as being multi-dimensional, in recognition of the
particular requirements and problems inherent in transnational disputes."
33[1970] AC 583 (HL).
34[1975] 1 QB 224.
35Ibid, at p. 232.
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The hostile attitude towards the delocalisation theory was also shown in the case of
Bank MeHat v. Helliniki Techniki SA.36 Supporting the supervisory and controlling
role of national courts37, Kerr J. said:
"The fundamental principle in this connection is that under our rules of private
international law, in the absence of any contractual provision to the contrary,
the procedural (or curial) law governing arbitrations is that of the forum of the
arbitration, whether this be England, Scotland or some foreign country, since
this is the system of law with which the agreement to arbitrate in the particular
forum will have its closest connections. ... Despite suggestions to the contrary
by some learned writers under other systems, our jurisprudence does not
recognise the concept of arbitral procedures floating in the transnational
firmament, unconnected with any municipal system of law."38
Again, in the case of President of India v. La Pintada Compania Navigation S.A.,39
the House of Lords regarded the parties' submission to arbitration held in England as
an indication that their arbitration procedures should be governed by English law. As
the court stated: "They impliedly agree that the arbitration is to be considered in
accordance in all respects with the law of England, unless, which seldom occurs, the
agreement of reference provides otherwise."40
Again, the delocalisation theory was rejected by the Court of Appeal in the case of
Naviera Amazonica Peruana SA v. Compania International de Seguros del Peru.41
The court stressed: "English law does not recognise the concept of a 'delocalised'
arbitration or of 'arbitral procedures floating in the transnational firmament,
unconnected with any municipal system of law'. Accordingly, every arbitration must
have a 'seat' or locus arbitri of forum which subjects its procedural rules to the
municipal law which is there in force."
36[1984] QB 291.
3'!Ibid. at p. 301., however, such a supervisory role discussed by Kerr J. in relation to section 12 (6)
of the Arbitration Act, has been significantly curtailed by the Arbitration Acts 1979 and 1996.
3 s[ 1984] QB 291, 301. Also see Dr. Mann, "Lex FacitArbitruin", in Liber Amicorum for Martin
Domke, 157 (Nijhoff 1967), at p. 167.
39[1985] 1 AC 104.
40lbid. at p. 119.
41Court of Appeal, 10 November 1987; Unpublished case. Reprinted in (1988) XIII Y.B.C.A. 156-
164, at pp. 159-160.
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Saville J. expressed the difficulties in applying the delocalisation theory in the case of
Union ofIndia v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation,42 He said:
"It is clear from the authorities cited above that English law does admit of at
least the theoretical possibility that the parties are free to choose to hold their
arbitration in one country but subject to the procedural laws of another, but
again this is the undoubted fact that such an agreement is calculated to give rise
to great difficulties and complexities,... it seems to me that the jurisdiction of
the English Court under the Arbitration Acts over an arbitration in this country
cannot be excluded by an agreement between the parties to apply the laws of
another country, or indeed by any other means unless such is sanctioned by
those Acts themselves."43
Finally, in a minority judgment in the case of Coppee Lavalin v. Ken-Ren,44 in 1994,
Lord Mustill rejected the delocalisation theory once again. He denied any possibility
of the development of the delocalisation and harmonisation theories by saying:
""Transnationalism" is a theoretical ideal which posits that international
arbitration, at least as regards certain types of contractual disputes conducted
under the auspices of an arbitral institution arbitration, is a self-contained
juridical system, by its very nature separate from national systems of law, and
indeed antithetical to them. If the ideal is fully realised national courts will not
feature in the law and practice of international arbitration at all and difference
between national laws will become irrelevant.
I doubt whether in its purest sense the doctrine now commands widespread
support: as witness the recognition of court-imposed interim measures in,
among others, art 9 of the UNCITRAL Model Law and art 8(5) of the ICC
rules. At all events it cannot be the law of England, for otherwise this House
would have dismissed at the very outset the attempt in Channel Tunnel Group
Ltd. v. Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd.45 to procure an interim injunction
during the currency of an ICC Arbitration."46
3.3 Interaction between the choice of a-national principles
and the delocalisation theory
42[1993] 2 LI Rep 48.
43Ibid, at pp. 50-51.
44[1994] 2 WLR 631 (HL).
45[1993] AC 384.
46[1994] 2 WLR 631 (HL), at p. 640.
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Although the delocalisation theory fails to attract support from most jurisdictions,
unexpectedly, the idea of detaching arbitration from the national laws has had an effect
on the subject of the choice of the proper law. Since the 1960s, parallel with the
development of the delocalisation theory, the traditional choice of national laws as the
proper laws of the contract by means of choice of law rules has been re-addressed. A
new change in the method of selecting the proper law of the contract has developed.
Claiming the deficiency of national laws, some jurists invoke the application of a-
national principles to resolve the complicated international commercial disputes
The application of a-national principles to international arbitral awards, thereby
departing from the national law regime and the traditional choice of law rules, in the
opinion of the writer, results from the interactions between the delocalisation theory in
the procedural aspects and the demands for a truly international trade law to govern the
substantive disputes submitted to international commercial arbitration. Being applied
in some major international commercial arbitration cases, gradually, a-national
principles appear to be an alternative choice of law away from the choice of purely
national laws as the proper law of the contract.
For the past three decades, international arbitrators have been inclined to escape the
restraints imposed by the local conflict of law rules when they face difficulties in
choosing the proper law of the contract. Instead of following the conventional choice
of law rules to choose the proper law, arbitrators sometimes decide to 'skip' the so-
called three stages in the choice of law rules and select a-national principles to govern
the substantive disputes of the contract. In fact, during the past thirty years, a
substantial number of international arbitral awards have been made on the basis of a-
national principles, such as the general principles of law, the new lexmercatoria, and
amiable composition.
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This movement has led to changes in domestic legislation, such as the French New
Code of Civil Procedure, the Netherlands Arbitration Acts 1986,47 the Swiss Private
International Law Act 1987,48 the English Arbitration Act 1996,49 and so on. For
instance, this kind of interaction can be observed in Article 1496 of the French New
Code of Civil Procedure which has expressly departed from the traditional conflict of
laws. This Article grants the parties the freedom to choose the substantive law
applicable to the merits of the dispute. Secondly, failing to make such a choice
between the parties, the arbitrators shall decide the case in accordance with the rules of
law they consider appropriate, provided that they shall always take into account trade
usages. Accordingly, the arbitral tribunal is no longer under an obligation to look into
the local choice of law rules but is allowed to choose directly the substantive law
which it deems as the most suitable one to settle the dispute between the parties.
Moreover, the arbitrators are allowed to apply the new lexmercatoria or, with parties
authorisation, to decide the case as amiable compositeurs.50
The same movement has also flourished in the United States. Historically, a hostile
attitude towards international commercial arbitration has been held by the American
courts. The courts, both federal and state, have declined to enforce a clause which had
the effect of ousting the jurisdiction of the court.51 The hostile attitude was strongly
shown in the leading case, Wilko v. Swan.52 A ruling that arbitrators were bound to
follow the law even though the arbitration agreement does not specifically so provide
was handed down. In this case, the plaintiff, a purchaser of securities, sued the seller
47Article 1054 (2) of the Netherlands Arbitration Acts 1986.
48Article 187 of the Swiss Private International Law Act 1987 has abandoned the traditional three-
step choice of laws procedures. As it provides: "The arbitral tribunal shall decide the case according to
the rules of law chosen by the parties or, in the absence of such a choice, according to the rules of law
with which the case has the closest connection."
49Section 46.
50Articles 1496 and 1497 of the French New Code of Civil Procedure.
5 'See Nute v. Hamilton Mutual Ins. Co. 72 Mass (6 Gray) 174 (1856), Nashua River Paper Co. v.
Hamrnermill Paper Co. 223 Mass. 8, 111 NE 678 (1916) and Benson v. Eastern Bldg. & Loan Assn.,
174 NY 83, 66 NE 627 (1903).
52346 US 427, 98 L. Ed. 168, 74 S Ct. 182.
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to recover damages under Article 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 for false
representations made in concluding the sale. An arbitration agreement was contained
in the contract. Nonetheless, the court decided that an agreement to arbitrate could not
preclude a buyer of a security from seeking a judicial remedy under the Securities Act
of 1933. Again, the court observed:
"Arbitrators may not disregard the law. Specially they are, as Chief Judge
Swan pointed out, "bound to decide in accordance with the provisions of
section 12(2)," ... It is suggested, however, that there is no effective way of
assuring obedience by the arbitrators to the governing law. But since their
failure to observe this law "would constitute grounds for vacating the award
pursuant to section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act," ... Appropriate means
for judicial scrutiny must be implied, in the form of some record or opinion,
however informal, whereby such compliance will appear or want of it will
upset the award."53
Therefore, following this rule, it could be possible for the courts to vacate awards for
a type of excess of authority on the basis of manifest disregard of the law.
However, the centuries of judicial hostility towards arbitration were reversed by the
enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act 1925. Observing the fact that the compulsory
application of the lex fori may lead to an undesirable result, the concept of
delocalisation has been advanced as providing an appropriate escape from undue state-
law limitations in the American system. The freedom of selection of forum and choice
of governing law by the parties to an international contract was confirmed in the case
of M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Sliore Co.54 in 1972, where the earlier judicial
resistance to being denied of jurisdiction in international commercial disputes was
reversed. Also, the forum selection clause is recognised as valid and enforceable,
where the court said:
"For at least two decades we have witnessed an expression of overseas
commercial activities by business enterprises based in the United States. The
barrier of distance that once tended to confine a business concern to a modest
territory no longer does so. ... The expansion of American business and
industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we
53Ibid, at p. 440.
54407 US 1, 32 L. Ed. 2d. 513, 92 S.Ct. 1907.
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insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws
and in our court."55
Moreover, this new approach was described as "substantially that followed in other
common-law countries including England. ... It accords with ancient concept of
freedom of contract and reflects an appreciation of the expanding horizons of
American contractors who seek business in all parts of the world."56 Influenced by
this liberal attitude, a victory has been claimed over the arbitrability of some anti-trust
disputes.57 Furthermore, the application of a-national principles to decide the
substantive disputes of the contract has also been confirmed in a number of cases.58
55/£>id. at pp. 519-520.
56A1so see, National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 US 311, 11 L.Ed. 2d. 354, 84 S.Ct.
411 (1964).
57Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 US 506 (1974), 41 L. Ed. 2d. 270, 94 S.Ct. 249, at p. 279 and
at pp. 280-281.
58A detailed discussion will be carried out in Chapter Nine.
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Summary of Part One
As highlighted in the discussion carried out in Part One of this thesis, it can be
observed that international arbitrators not only simplify the traditional choice of law
rules into a modern two-step procedure but also expand the scope of applicable proper
law. While increasing numbers of international commercial arbitration cases are
conducted on a global scale and lack of confidence in national law regimes among
international business people, arbitrators no longer confine themselves within the
scope of national laws. Frequently, with or without parties' express consent,
arbitrators search the proper law outside of national law regime and apply a-national
principles to resolve disputes. Such an application of a-national principles in
international commercial arbitration will be examined in Part Two of this thesis.
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The Application of A-National Principles As the
Proper Law of Contracts in International
Commercial Arbitration
Introduction to Part Two
Introduction to Part Two
It has been said:
"it is artificial to force all arbitrations into the two categories of national and
foreign arbitration. By the nature of things another distinction has to be made
between arbitration of disputes involving domestic trade and of those involving
international trade. The first is, quite normally, subject to some national law,
the second calls for the application of international law."1
While the proponents of the delocalisation theory still fight to get support from
different national jurisdictions, a-national principles have frequently been chosen as
the proper law to be applied in a number of international arbitral awards. This part of
the thesis examines the application of a-national principles in international commercial
arbitration. As previously outlined the term "a-national principles" includes the
general principles of law, the new lexmercatoria, and amiable composition . This part
of the thesis is composed of three chapters. First, Chapter Four will discuss cases
where the application of the general principles of law have been applied to decide the
substantive disputes of the contract in international commercial arbitration. The
examination will mainly be based on the awards made in ad hoc arbitrations and a
limited number of awards made by the Iran-United States Arbitral Claims Tribunal and
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID arbitration").
Secondly, Chapter Five will highlight the application of the new lexmercatoria in
international commercial disputes. ICC arbitral awards will be the primary basis of
this study. Finally, arbitral awards which are made on the basis of amiable
composition will be examined and analysed in Chapter Six.
1David, InternationalTrade Law, (1985), at p. 136.
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The application of the general principles of law
as the proper law of the contract in international
commercial arbitration
4.1 Background
The application of the general principles of law has found acceptance first in
international arbitral awards. Instead of determining under which national law ought
to be applied, international arbitrators, in some cases, deliberately leave this question
unanswered or simply apply the general principles of law and claim that by doing so
they are acting in accordance with the will of the parties. Influenced by the idea that
such practice is well-suited to the particular needs of international trade, some national
courts1 have shown a relaxed attitude towards it, occasionally setting aside some of
their rules (the lex fori) in order to correspond with such practice.
From a number of ad hoc arbitrations reported, it can be seen that the general
principles of law have often been chosen to govern state contracts. With respect to the
source of the general principles of law, Article 38 of the International Court of Justice
Statutes has provided some clues as follows:
"1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply;
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognised by the contracting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Art. 59 (concerning the relative effects of
judgments), judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law.
1 Such as France, see the new French Civil Code of Procedure 1981.
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2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex
aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto."
After World War II, in the sunset of the colonial era, many new countries were
founded. In order to build up the political and economic strength of these countries, a
number of opportunities to enter into contracts of investment, concession or economic
development with the state governments were offered to western businessmen. This
type of contract, which involved both a state or state enterprise and a private party, is
termed a "state contract". Due to the special nature of state contracts, such as
instability of the governments, unequal bargaining power between the parties, frequent
change of legislation of the host country, and so on, it is not surprising that disputes
arise from time to time. Among the different dispute settlement mechanisms,
arbitration is regarded as the most suitable choice to resolve disputes arising from a
state contract.
While arbitration has frequently dealt with disputes arising from a state contract, as far
as the choice of the proper law in state contracts is concerned, national laws are
seldom chosen by the parties. Due to the distrust and hostility towards the other
party's judicial system, the parties to a state contract are reluctant to have the disputes
governed by it. Under these circumstances, a law which has a neutral character
appears to be more desirable. As a result, the choice of a-national principles or a
complex amalgam of national and a-national principles is often selected to be the
proper law of the contract by the parties or the arbitrators. In fact, arbitrators do, at
times, decide to apply the general principles of law rather than any specific national
law. A number of international arbitral awards have been decided on the basis of the
general principles of law, especially those arising from major international state
contracts, for example, oil concession or mining agreements.
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In this chapter the discussion will initially focus on the cases and comments that are
against the application of the general principles of law in private international
commercial arbitration. The second section of this chapter, which examines ad hoc,
ICSID and Iran-US arbitrations, will discuss the awards made on the basis of the
general principles of law, despite the objections against such practice.
4.2 The opinions against the application of international law
as the proper law of a contract
Not every jurist or practitioner is in favour of the application of the general principles
of law as the proper law of the contract. In fact, the application of the general
principles of law in international commercial arbitration has been criticised by two
schools of thought and from different angles.
Following the traditional idea that the subject of international law is a state, one school
of thought argues that international law cannot be the governing law of a contract
between two individuals, even though one of them is a sovereign state. They insist
that international law is solely designed to govern the relationship between states.
Moreover, private individuals should not fall into the ambit of international law.2 This
opinion is upheld in the Serbian Loans case,3 where the court first rejected the idea of
elevating a foreign investment transaction to the status of a treaty.4 Secondly, the
court decided that it was inappropriate to apply international law to govern disputes
arising from a foreign investment contract between a sovereign state and a private
party. Finally, they ruled that this type of relationship can only be governed by the
municipal legal systems.
2Sornarajah, "The Climate of International Arbitration", (1991) 8(2) J.LA. 47, at p. 53.
3(1929) PC1J Series A, no. 14, P. 5, 11 W.C. 340 (1929).
4The idea of elevating a foreign investment transaction to a treaty was applied in the Wimbledon case,
[1926] PCIJ Series A, no. 1, p. 25.
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This group also questions whether a foreign or multinational corporation as a party to
a state contract has sufficient personality to enjoy the protection provided by
international law. They argue that it is very difficult to establish a logical basis for
such a situation. The same question is raised in the Draft Code of Conduct for
Multinational Corporations, whose purpose is to provide guidelines for amultinational
corporation conducting business in a host state, rather than providing an argument for
conferring a special personality on such kind of corporations.5 The committee
suggested that there was a lack of consideration of the interest of the host states and
they criticised the arbitral awards which were made in favour of the application of
international law by only considering the interests of the foreign investors. In their
opinion, these arbitrators only looked at the possibility that the law of the host state
would cause bias against the investors; however, they ignored the fact that an
investment contract does not always bring good things to the host state (for instance,
the influx of capital may damage the economy of the host state under an investment
contract).
Another group of commentators found their argument on the basis of wavier of
sovereign immunity. They maintain that a contract, regardless of whether it is
between two private parties or a private party and a sovereign state, should only be
governed by private laws. They believe that the sovereign immunity of the state
involved in a state contract has been waived when the state agrees to refer the dispute
to arbitration. This idea is strongly invoked by Mr. Luzzatto. He maintains that a
contract between a state party and a private party should be regarded as a contract
between two private parties, and the dispute arising from this kind of contract should
be governed by private laws. He explains:
5Sornarajali, "The Climate of International Arbitration", (1991) 8(2) J.LA. 47, at p. 55.
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"In principle, there can be little doubt, if any, that international arbitrations
arising from a dispute between States and foreign subjects, under a contractual
relationship between the parties, should be put on the same level as arbitrations
between two private parties, and not as arbitrations between States which are
governed as such by public international law.6
The reasons behind this theory are twofold. First, from a theoretical point of view, it
is a fallacy to assume that, through a state contract, a foreign private party can enjoy
the same rights and obligations under international law as a state. Based on the same
argument, it is similarly fallacious to presume that the international responsibilities of a
state can be imposed upon a foreign corporation or an individual private investor.
Secondly, from a practical viewpoint, they argue that the content of international law is
not comprehensive enough to cope with complicated international commercial
disputes. This is because international law does not contain rules that are applicable to
private contractual relationships. As explained by Mr. Sornarajah in a recent article:
"The idea that international law could apply to such a contract would have
sounded odd as a proposition simply because international law did not contain
and does not contain any rules which give validity to such contracts and did
not contain any rules of substantive law relating such contracts."7
In fact, international law has not been provided with an opportunity to develop a set of
detailed contractual rules to govern commercial disputes, such as breach or frustration
of the contract.8 Furthermore, in their opinion, such rules simply do not exist in
international law at all.9 As a scholar commented: "Public international law neither
6Luzzatto, "International Commercial Arbitration and the Municipal Law of States", (1977) 157
Rec.des Cour, 87.
7Sornarajah, "The Climate of International Arbitration", (1991) 8(2) J.LA. 47, at p. 53.
8Lipstein, "International Arbitration between Individuals and Governments and Conflict of Laws", in
Cheng and Brown (eds). Contemporary Problems ofInternational Law: Essays in Honour ofGeorge
Schwarzenberger on his Eightieth Birthday, (1988), 180, at p. 183. and Lew, Applicable Law in
InternationalCommercialArbitration, (1986) at p. 403 (hereinafter Lew, Applicable Law), and
Amerasinghe, "State Breaches of Contracts With Alien and International Law", 2 Am.J.Int.Law 58
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aims nor is equipped to regulate the commercial relations and activities of private
individuals and organisations in the international arena."10
Despite these objections, in a number of major international commercial arbitrations,
the general principles of law have been chosen as the proper law. This practice has
attracted a great deal of attention and controversy after a series of arbitral awards were
made to settle the disputes arising from oil concession agreements, especially the cases
where the Libyan government was involved during the period 1971-1973.
4.3 The application of the general principles of law in ad
hoc arbitration
4.3.1 Sapphire case
The award made in the Sapphire case was the first award to give full support to the
application of international law and exclude the municipal law of the host country. In
this case, a dispute arose from an oil concession agreement between Sapphire and the
National Iranian Oil Company, which was a state agent of the Iranian Government.
There was no express choice of law clause in the contract. However, a choice of law
clause was found in the similar concession agreements previously made by the
National Iranian Oil Company as follows:
"it [the agreement] shall be governed by and interpreted and applied in
accordance with the principles of law common to Iran and the several nations
in which the other parties to this Agreement are incorporated, and in the
absence of such common principles then by and in accordance with principles
of law recognised by civilised nations in general, including such of those
principles as may have been applied by international tribunals."11
The arbitrator, Mr. Cavin, decided that the substantive law applicable to the
interpretation and performance of the concession agreement was the principles of law
1 °Lew, Applicable Law, (1986), at p. 403.
11Sapphire International Petroleums Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Company, Arbitral Award made on
March 15, 1963, 35 I.L.R. 136-192.
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generally recognised by civilised nations. First, he denied that the parties had an
intention to apply Iranian law to the agreement. Secondly, he stated that the parties
could not be presumed to have agreed upon the choice of law by their common choice
of the forum of the arbitration. As he said:
"... in the view of some eminent specialists in Private International Law, since
the arbitrator has been invested with his powers as a result of the common
intention of the parties he is not bound by the rules of conflict in force at the
forum of the arbitration. Contrary to a State judge , who is bound to conform
to the conflict law rules of the State in whose name he metes out justice, the
arbitrator is not bound by such rules. He must look for the common intention
of the parties, use the connecting factors generally used in doctrine and in case
law and must disregard national peculiarities. This consideration carries
particular weight in the present case ... 1,12
Because the agreements offered Sapphire the rights of possession and, to a certain
extent, control of the territory, the contract in dispute was regarded as one with a
particular character, which partly existed in public law and partly in private law.13
Thirdly, considering the decision in the Lena Goldjield Arbitration,14 Mr. Cavin
agreed that it would be more appropriate to call for the application of the general
principles of law based upon reason and upon the common practice of civilised
countries to decide the case. This has been expressly recognised in other cases.15 As
he observed:
"..., a reference to rules of good faith, together with the absence of any
reference to a national system of law, leads the judge to determine, according
to the spirit of the agreement, what meaning he can reasonably give to a
provision of the agreement which is in dispute. It is therefore perfectly
legitimate to find in such a clause evidence of the intention of the parties not to
apply the strict rules of a particular system but, rather, to rely upon the rules of
law, based upon reason, which are common to civilised nations."16
12Ibid. at p. 170.
13/A'<i. at p. 171.
1 ^Discussed in Cornell L.Q. 36 (1950 - 51); 31, at pp. 36-37.
15Such as Petroleum Developments Limited v. Ruler ofAbu Dhabi, (1951) 18 I.L.R. 141. and Ruler
ofQatar v. International Marine Oil Company Limited, (1953) 20 I.L.R. 534.
16Sapphire International Petroleums Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Company, Arbitral Award March
15, 1963, (1968) 35 I.L.R. 136, at p. 173.
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Finally, with reference to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
Mr. Cavin decided that the application of the general principles of law to the contract
was justified in this case where a State organ and a foreign company were involved.17
4.3.2 ARAMCO case
In the ARAMCO case, a dispute between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the
Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) was submitted to an ad hoc arbitration held
in Geneva in 1955. The facts of the case are as follows: in 1933, the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia granted an oil concession agreement, which gave Aramco an exclusive
right to transport the oil extracted from the concession area. Nevertheless, in 1954,
the Government of Saudi Arabia granted Mr. Onassis and his company, Saudi Arabian
Maritime Tankers Ltd., the rights to transport Saudi Arabian oil for thirty years. The
latter agreement was in conflict with the agreement which granted Aramco the right to
transport the oil extracted from the concession area.
The arbitral tribunal decided that the choice of the applicable principles would be made
by resorting to the world-wide custom and practice in the oil business and industry;
failing such custom and practice, the Tribunal will be influenced by the world case-law
and doctrine and by pure jurisprudence.18 The tribunal addressed the issue of the
proper law in the following terms:
"public international law should be applied to the effects of the Concession,
when objective reasons lead it to be concluded that certain matters cannot be
governed by any rule of the municipal law of any State, as is the case in all
matters relating to transport by sea, to the sovereignty of the State on its
territorial waters and to the responsibility of States for the violation of its
international obligations."19
17Ibid, at p. 175.
18Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company, (1960) 27 I.L.R. 117, at p. 171.
19Ibid. at p. 172.
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4.3.3 British Petroleum (Libya) Ltd. v. The Government of the Libyan
Arab Republic
British Petroleum Company Ltd. v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic20
was a case where the dispute arose from a nationalisation ordered by the Libyan
Government. On December 18, 1957, Libya granted in a Deed of Concession,
designated as Concession 65, to Mr. Hunt (a citizen of the United States) an exclusive
right for 50 years to search for and extract petroleum within a designated area in the
Sarir Desert of Libya. By an agreement dated June 24, 1960, Mr. Hunt assigned to
BP an undivided one-half interest in Concession 65 and this was approved by the
Libyan Government. Nevertheless, on December 7, 1970, Libya passed the
Nationalisation Law (Law No. 115), which nationalised the operations of BP in
Concession 65. On December 11, 1971, BP instituted arbitration against Libya.
A choice of proper law clause was found in Paragraph 7 of Clause 28 of the
Concession, which provided:
"This Concession shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the
principles of law of Libya common to the principles of international law and in
the absence of such common principles then by and in accordance with the
general principles of law, including such of those principles as may have been
applied by international tribunals."
In accordance with the clause, the arbitrator decided that "the provision generates
practical difficulties in its implementation, it offers guidance in a negative sense by
excluding the relevance of any single municipal legal system as such."21 Therefore,
the Tribunal should apply the clause according to its clear and apparent meaning to the
extent possible.
2®British Petroleum Company Ltd. v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, (1979) 46
I.L.R. 297, also reprinted in (1980) V Y.B.C.A. 143.
21 Ibid, at p. 327.
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Meanwhile, BP made two submissions that the Concession should be governed by
international law alone. First, BP maintained that the acceptance of a general principle
must be supported by both Libyan and international law if they were to apply to the
Concession. Therefore, if the conduct of a party to the Concession could not be
justified by the principles of both Libyan law and international law, it was not
justifiable under the Concession. In other words, the conduct was justifiable only
when the principles of both systems of law - Libyan and international - supported it.
Secondly, BP argued that, in this case, public international law should be the only
system of law left since the parties had expressly excluded the direct and the sole
application of Libyan law, and had made reference to the general principles of law.22
Nevertheless, both arguments were rejected by the arbitrator. In relation to BP's first
submission, the arbitrator commented:
"... since it entirely leaves out of the picture the direction which follows from
paragraph 7 of Clause 28 that conduct etc. in the last analysis should be tested
by reference to the general principles of law. It is not correct to say that "a
principle must be supported by both Libyan law and international law in order
to be justifiable under the concession" and that conduct "is justifiable only if
principles of both systems of law - Libyan and international - support it". The
principle may still be acceptable, and the conduct justifiable, if supported by
the general principles of law."23
"... If a particular action by a party amounts to breach of contract under one
system but not under the other, the issue is one which can only be decided by
reference to the general principles of law. Thus, the first part of the Claimant's
argument must be rejected. It is not sufficient for the Claimant to show that the
conduct of the Respondent is a breach of international law as a basis for
maintaining a claim based on breach of contract. In the event that international
law and Libyan law conflict on that issue, the question is to be resolved by the
application of the general principles of law."24
In relation to the second submission, the arbitrator stated:





"The Tribunal cannot accept the submission that public international law
applies for paragraph 7 of Clause 28 does not so stipulate. Nor does the BP
Concession itself constitute the sole source of law controlling the relationship
between the Parties. The governing system of law is what that clause
expressly provides, viz. in the absence of principles of law, including such of
those principles as may have been applied by international tribunals."25
The arbitrator interpreted the choice of law clause as follows: (1) the law of Libya was
the proper law of the concession, but only to the extent that it was consistent with the
principles of international law; and (2) in the event of inconsistency between these two
legal systems, the general principles of law would prevail. Nevertheless, the arbitrator
stated that he was unable to find any principles of the Libyan law common to
principles of international law pursuant to which the BP Concession would be valid
and subsisting and the remedy of restitution available to the Claimant. Hence, in
accordance with paragraph? of Clause 28, the Tribunal decided to consider the issue
in the light of the general principles of law. Finally, the arbitrator decided that a
nationalisation in breach of the concession agreement amounted to an illegality and,
similar to a treaty, the foreign investment agreement should act as a fetter on the
sovereignty of the host state while it was valid.
4.3.4 TEXACO case
As with other nationalisation disputes arising between the Libyan Government and
foreign companies, the TEXACO arbitration dealt with another oil concession
agreement. In this case26, during the period between 1955 and 1968, fourteen Deeds
of Concession were concluded between the Libyan Government and two American
companies, the Texas Overseas Petroleum Company and the California Asiatic Oil
Company. Similar to what had happened in the BP case, despite the concession
25Ibid, at p. 329.
26Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. / California Asiatic Co. v. Government of the Libyan Arab
Republic, 17 l.L.M. 3 (1978). (Award on the merits, Jan. 19, 1977; R. Depury was the sole
arbitrator).
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agreements, Libya unilaterally ordered nationalisation on September 1, 1974. After
the dispute arose, the companies notified the Libyan Government that recourse had
been made to arbitration in accordance with clause 28 of the Deeds of Concession.
After deciding that the arbitration procedures should be governed by public
international law,27 the arbitrator went on to discuss the issue of the proper law of the
contract. On the issue concerning the proper law of the contract, the arbitrator referred
to Clause 28. It reads :
"This concession shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the
principles of the law of Libya common to the principles of international law
and in the absence of such common principles then by and in accordance with
the general principles of law, including such of those principles as may have
been applied by international tribunals."
This choice of law clause was interpreted as a 'two-tier system' by the arbitrator. He
explained that, in accordance with this clause, the principles of Libyan law were
applicable to the extent that such principles were common to the principles of
international law, and, in the absence of such conformity, reference was made to
general principles of law.28
Following such a conclusion, the arbitrator said that under a new concept, contracts
between States and foreign private persons could be 'internationalised' in the sense of
27As far as the dispute about the law governing the arbitration is concerned, the arbitrator found
sufficient reasons to adopt the solution used in the Aramco-case: as the arbitration was to take place
outside the host country, the parties had intended to secure the guarantee of a neutral judge. Moreover,
the jurisdictional immunity of States excludes the possibility, for the judicial authorities of the
country of the seat, of exercising their right of supervision and interference in arbitral proceedings.
Under the principle of jurisdictional immunity of foreign States the arbitrator was unable to hold that
one State could be subject to the law of another State. The arbitrator still had other reasons for
holding international law to govern the arbitration. One of these was the provision in clause 28 to the
effect that, failing agreement of the parties, the President of the ICJ should appoint the arbitrator.
Furthermore, the Rules of Procedure, adopted by the arbitrator in the first hearing on February 24,
1975, declared in Art. 1, para. 2, after having fixed in para. 1 Geneva as the seat of the arbitral
tribunal, that "the arbitration shall be governed by these Rules of Procedure to the exclusion of local
law."
28Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v. the Government of
the Libyan Arab Republic, 17 l.L.M. 3 (1978), at p. 11. Reprinted in (1979) IX Y.B.C.A. 111.
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being subjected to public international law. Therefore, under certain conditions, the
arbitrator could regard contracts between States and private individuals as coming
within the ambit of a particular and new branch of international law - the international
law of contracts.29
Accordingly, the arbitrators not only chose international law as the proper law but also
referred to international law as a means of empowering them to choose this two-tier
system. Particularly, the application of the principles of Libyan law did not rule out
the application of the principles of international law. In fact, it was a combination of
these two laws in verifying the conformity of the Libyan law with international law.
As he explained in the following terms:
"In the present dispute, general principles of law have a subsidiary role in the
governing law clause and apply in the case of lack of conformity between the
principles of Libyan law and the principles of international law; ... Now,
these principles of international law must, in the present case, be the standard
for the application of Libyan law since it is only if Libyan law is in conformity
with international law that it should be applied. Therefore, the reference that is
made mainly to the principles of international law and secondarily, to the
general principles of law must have as a consequence the application of
international law to the legal relations between the parties."30
Finally, after consulting the principles of international law and the nature of the
contract, the arbitrator stated that the contract involved was internationalised and
governed by the general principles of law.
4.3,5 LIAMCO case
The third case involving a dispute arising from an oil concession agreement between
the Libyan Government and a foreign investor is Libyan American Oil Company
(LIAMCO) v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic?1 On September 1, 1969,
29Ibid, at p. 13.
30Ibid, at p. 15.
3 1Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, (1982)
62 I.L.R. 140. Also reprinted in (1981) VI Y.B.C.A. 89.
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the Libyan Government nationalised 51% of the concession rights of a number of
companies including LIAMCO. Later, the remaining 49% of the LIAMCO concession
was also nationalised. After the second nationalisation, LIAMCO referred the dispute
to arbitration.
A choice of law clause was found in Clause 28 para 7 of the concession agreement,
which read: "This concession shall be governed and interpreted in accordance with the
principles of law of Libya common to the principles of international law, and in the
absence of such common principles then by and in accordance with the general
principles of law as may have been applied by international tribunals."
In the arbitral award, the arbitrator considered the choice of law contained in Clause
28, para 7 of the LIAMCO Concession Agreement valid and stated that "it is an
accepted universal principle of both domestic and international laws that the parties to a
mixed public and private contract are free to select in their contract the law to govern
their contractual relationship." Furthermore, the arbitrator analysed the choice of law
clause by stating:
"The proper law governing LIAMCO's concession agreement as set forth in
the amended version of said Clause 28, para 7, is in the first place the law of
Libya when consistent with international law, and subsidiarily the general
principles of law. Hence, the principal proper law of the contract in said
Concessions is Libyan domestic law. But it is specified in the Agreements that
this covers only "the principles of law of Libya common to the principles of
international law." Thus, it excludes any part of Libyan law that is in conflict
with the principles of international law."32
In relation to the argument that the application of international law might contradict
Libyan law, the arbitrator commented:
"It is relevant to note that the other subsidiary legal sources mentioned in said
Art. 1 of the Libyan Civil Code, namely custom and natural law and equity,
are also in harmony with the Islamic legal system itself. As a matter of fact, in
3 ^Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, (1982)
62 I.L.R. 140, at p. 173.
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the absence of contrary legal text based on the Holy Koran or the Traditions of
the Prophet, Islamic law considers custom as a source of law and as
complementary to and explanatory of the contents of contracts, especially in
commercial transactions."33
Moreover,
"It is very relevant in this connection to point out that Islamic law treats
international law as an imperative compendium forming part of the general
positive law, and that the principles of that part are very similar to those
adopted by modern international legal theory.
Thus it has been pointed out that Libyan law in general and Islamic law in
particular have common rules and principles with international law, and
provide for the application of custom and equity as subsidiary sources."
These general principles are usually embodied in most recognised legal
systems, and particularly in Libyan legislation, including its modern codes and
Islamic law. They are applied by municipal courts and are mainly referred to
international and arbitral case-law."34
Finally, the arbitrator concluded that the Concession agreements were governed by, in
the first place, the law of Libya when consistent with international law, and
subsequently, the general principles of law.
4.3.6 AMINOIL case35
This case involved a dispute arising from a concession agreement between Aminoil
and the Kuwaiti government. Aminoil was granted a Concession by the Rulers of
Kuwait for the exploration of petroleum and natural gas in the Kuwait "Neutral Zone"
in 1948. However, on September 19, 1977, the Government of Kuwait issued
Decree Law No. 124 to terminate the concession agreement between the parties. All
assets and interests of the Company were nationalised by Kuwait. Article III of the
concession agreement contained a choice of law clause. As far as the substantive law
was concerned, Article III (2) of the agreement provided:
33Ibid. at p. 174. Reprinted in (1981) VI Y.B.C.A. 89, at pp. 93-94.
34Ibid. at p. 175; and (1981) VI Y.B.C.A. at p. 94.
3 -'The American Independent Oil Company Inc. (AMINOIL) v. The Government of the State of
Kuwait International, 21 I.L.M. 976 (1982). Reprinted in (1984) IX Y.B.C.A. 71.
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"The law governing the substantive issues between the parties shall be
determined by the Tribunal, having regard to the quality of the Parties, the
transnational character of their relations and the principles of law and practice
prevailing in the modern world."
The arbitrator commented on the choice of law clause and stated that Article III (2):
"makes it clear that Kuwait is a sovereign state entrusted with the interests of a
national community, the law of which constitutes an essential part of intra-
community relations with the state. At the same time, by referring to the
transnational character of relations with the concessionaire, and to the general
principles of law, this Article brings out the wealth and fertility of the set of
legal rules that the Tribunal is called upon to apply."36
The arbitrator also stressed that the different sources of law to be applied in this case
were not contradictory with each other; he said:
"The different sources of the law thus to be applied are not - at least in the
present case - in contradiction with one another. Indeed if, as recalled above,
international law constitutes an integral part of the law of Kuwait, the general
principles of law correspondingly recognise the rights of the State in its
capacity of supreme protector the general interest. If the different legal
elements involved do not always and everywhere blend as successfully as in
the present case, it is nevertheless on taking advantage of their resources, and
encouraging their trend towards unification, that the future of a truly
international economic order in the investment field will depend."37
4.3.7 SPP case38
This case involved a dispute arising from a construction agreement in relation to a
tourist village made between SPP, the Ministry of Tourism of Egypt and EGOTH.
This agreement was followed by a second agreement on December 12, 1974, between
EGOTH and SPP. The words of "approved, agreed and ratified by the Minister of
Tourism" and the signature of the Minister appeared on the agreement. However, the
project was objected to by the People's Assembly at a later stage. The project was
36/tol at p. 1001.
37Ibid. Reprinted in (1984) IX Y.B.C.A. 71, at pp. 72.
38SPP (Middle East) Ltd., Hong Kong and Southern Pacific Properties Ltd., Hong Kong v. Arab
Republic ofEgypt and The Egyptian General Company for Tourism and Hotels, ICC case no. 3493,
made on February 16, 1983; the facts and the award were published in 22 I.L.M. 752 (1983). The
challenge was published in 231.L.M. 1048(1984). Reprinted in (1984) IX Y.B.C.A. Ill, at pp.
116-118.
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eventually cancelled by several Decrees issued by the Government. An arbitration
clause was found in the second agreement. In accordance with the arbitration clause,
SPP initiated the arbitration in ICC. With respect to the issue of the proper law, the
arbitral tribunal stated:
"The Agreements do not provide specially for the law which is to govern the
contract. The parties have fully debated this issue coming to conclusions
which only partially diverge. They both agree that in view of the
circumstances of the case the relevant domestic law is that of Egypt. The
Claimants, however, contend that no rules and/or principles drawn from the
body of domestic Egyptian law should be allowed to override the principles of
international law applicable to international investment projects of this kind."
The arbitral tribunal affirmed the idea that a state and a private person to a state contract
can be removed, to a certain extent, from the jurisdiction of the domestic law and be
subject to international rules.39 Regarding the issue of the proper law, the tribunal
decided that the Egyptian law was the governing law but within the scope of the
general principles of international law. After considering the opinions of some
Egyptian law specialists, the tribunal found that the Egyptian law must be construed so
as to include such principles of international law as may be applicable. Moreover, the
national laws of Egypt can be relied upon only in as much as they do not contravene
the principles of international law. While being required to take the provisions of the
contract and the relevant trade usages into account, the tribunal stated:
"International Law Principles such as 'Pacta Sunt Servanda' and 'Just
compensation for expropriatory measures' can be deemed as part of Egyptian
Law. The adherence to the ICSID Convention should then be treated as
conclusive evidence of Egypt's declared intent to abide by these principles,
which indeed represent the basic philosophy adopted by the Convention's
drafters."40
4.4 The application of the general principles of law in the
ICSID and the Iran-United States Arbitral Claims Tribunal
39Ibid. 22 I.L.M. 752 (1983) at p. 769.
40Ibid. at p. 771.
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It is not only ad hoc arbitrations but also some international arbitration institutions
reveal a positive attitude towards the application of the general principles of law to
govern the substantive disputes arising from international investment contracts. In this
section of the chapter, there will be a discussion of the application of the general
principles of law in the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) and the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.
4.4.1 The ICSID Arbitration
ICSID was established by the Washington Convention of 1965 to settle the investment
disputes arising from investment contracts between a contracting state and a national of
another contracting state. In relation to procedural law, an ICSID arbitration is
governed by international law. With respect to the choice of the proper law,
influenced by the view that international law derived from Article 38 of the Statute of
International Court of Justice41 is sufficiently complete to provide a legal answer to
every dispute,42 ICSID has a positive attitude towards the application of the general
principles of law to the substantive issues. In the field of international investment, the
issue of the choice of proper law has been expressly dealt with in the second sentence
of Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention, which reads as follows:
"The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as
may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal
shall apply the law of the Contracting State party of the dispute (including its
rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be
applicable."43
41 Accordingly, the sources of international law include international conventions, international
custom, general principles of law and judicial decisions and teachings of international law experts.
42Shihata and Parra, "Applicable Substantive Law in Disputes between States and Private Foreign
Parties: The Case of Arbitration under the ICSID Convention" 9 ICSID Rev. 183 (1994), at p. 194.
43Although it is argued that the specific proviso of Art. 42 should only apply to investment
agreements and disputes that arise thereunder. However, some commentators have a more relaxed
attitude to it. For instance, Delaume, in "State Contracts and Transnational Arbitration",
Am.J.Int.Law 786 (1981), said: "in the world today, there is no reason why this solution should be
limited to a particular category of state contracts. In other words, the rule formulated in Art. 42 can be
considered as illustrative of a principle of wider application."
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Under the ICSID Convention, arbitrators are required to apply the law of the State
party to the dispute or the law of other country as the State party's conflict of laws so
indicate, in combination with international law. The rules of international law are
mainly applied in two ways. In some cases, the application of national law of the host
state is chosen and supplemented by any principles of international law,44 whereas in
other cases, parties agreed on the application of international law rules, with the law of
host state playing a supplementary role.45 Accordingly, examples of application of
host State law together with international law to resolve the disputes arising from
investment agreement could be seen in a number of cases brought to ICSID.46
For instance, in Amco Asia case,47 a dispute arose from a Lease of Management
agreement concluded between Amco Asia, a US corporation, and PT Wisma (a state
agent of the Indonesian Government) in 1968. According to this Lease, Amco Asia
was supposed to complete the construction of the Kartika Plaza Hotel in Indonesia.
Later, Amco Asia applied to the Government of Indonesia to establish PT Amco, a
subsidiary established under Indonesian law. However, disputes arose between PT
Amco and PT Wisma, particularly concerning the amounts due to the respective parties
under the Profit-Sharing Agreement. Eventually, on 31 March and 1 April 1980, the
hotel was allegedly seized in an armed military exercise and the management was
effectively taken over by PT Wisma. On 15 January 1981, Amco filed a request for
arbitration with ICSID.
44Such as AG1P S.p.A. v. Government ofPeople's Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No.
ARB/77/1; 1 ICSID Rep. 306 (1993), at pp. 313, 318.
45Such as Asian Agricultural Products Limited v. Democratic Socialist Republic ofSri Lanka,
ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3; 6 ICSID Rev. 526, 533-34 (1991).
46Such as Kaiser Bauxite Company v. Government ofJamaica, ICSID Case No. ARB/74/3; 1 ICSID
Rep. 296,301 (1993) where the law of Jamaica and such rules of international law were applicable to
the dispute. For the cases decided ex aequo et bono, see Atlantic Triton Company Limited v. People's
Revolutionary Republic ofGuinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/1; Tescro Petroleum Corporationv.
GovernmentofTrinidad and Tobago, ICSID Case No. CONC/83/1; 1 ICSID Rev. 340, 344 (1986).
47'Amco Asia Corporation, Pan American Development Limited and P.T. Amco Indonesia v.
Republic ofIndonesia, adhoc Committee Decision of May 16, 1986, 1 ICSID Rep 509 (1993) and
25 I.L.M. 1441 (1986). Reprinted in (1992) XVII Y.B.C.A. 13.
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In relation to the law applicable to the substance of the dispute, the parties failed to
agree on any laws to govern their relations. The ad hoc Committee considered Art. 42
of the Convention as an indication of the proper law and regarded itself as being
authorised by the parties "to apply rules of international law only to fill up lacunae in
the applicable domestic law and to ensure precedence to international law norms. "48
Furthermore, the tribunal stressed the supplemental and corrective role of international
law under Article 42(1) of the Convention, by stating:
"If there are no relevant national laws, they must be checked against
international laws, which will prevail in case of conflict. Thus international
law is fully applicable and to classify its role as 'only' 'supplementary and
corrective' seems a distinction without a difference. In any event, the Tribunal
believes that its task is to test every claim of law in this case first against
Indonesian law, and then against international law."49
A similar attitude could also be seen in the case of Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. (RJA)
v. Overseas Investment Corps (OPIC).50 In this case, the investment was made
according to an agreement between the Government of Jamaica and RJA, dated March
10, 1967. The agreement provided, inter alia, that it would remain in force for 25
years and that no further taxes or levies, except as stated, would be imposed upon
RJA. Also, no obligation would be placed on RJA that would derogate from its right
to own and operate the property held in connection with the project. Despite this
provision, the Government of Jamaica later imposed a 'bauxite levy' on RJA's
production and significantly increased the rate of royalties payable by RJA. RJA
decided to submit the dispute to arbitration.
The majority of the tribunal decided the case in Revere's favour. As far as the proper
law of the contract was concerned, they decided that the law of Jamaica was not the
4*Ibid. at p. 76.
49Ibid.
5017 I.L.M. 1321 (1978), also see Joy, "Arbitration Economic Development Agreement: the Impact
of Revere v. OPIC," 20 Virginia J.Intl.L. 861 (1980).
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only law to be taken into account, even though the agreement was silent on the issue
of applicable law. As the tribunal stated:
"Although the Agreement was silent as to the applicable law, we accept
Jamaican law for all ordinary purposes of the Agreement, but we do not
consider that its applicability for some purposes precludes the responsibility of
States for injuries to aliens."51
On the issue of breach of long term investment agreement, it was the tribunal's
opinion that it was not subject to a municipal law, but had to be determined in the light
of international law:
"In such cases, the question of breach is not left to the determination of
municipal courts applying municipal law. The reason for this is that such
contracts, while not made between governments and therefore wholly
international, are basically international in that they are entered into as part of a
contemporary international process of economic development, particularly in
the less developed countries.
Therefore,
"A majority of the Panel has concluded that the 1967 Agreement falls within
this category of a long term economic development agreement and the
principles of public international law apply to it insofar as the government
party is concerned and therefore that the question of breach by such party
cannot be determined solely by municipal law."
4.4.2. Iran-United States Arbitral Claims Tribunal
Apart from the ICSID, the Iran-United States Arbitral Claims Tribunal52 is another
arbitration institution which frequently applies international law as the proper law to
state contracts in the absence of the choice made by the parties. The Tribunal was
established in return for the release of Iranian assets frozen in the United States by
court orders after arrangements were made to release the American hostages held in
Iran in January 1981.53
5117 l.L.M. 1321 (1978), at 1331.
52Tliis Tribunal was established under the arrangementmade between the United States and Iran
concerning the release of American hostages held in Iran in return for Iranian assets frozen in die
United State by court orders.
53The Algiers Declarations of January 19, 1981 is reprinted in (1982) VII Y.B.C.A. 256.
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Corresponding with Article V of the Claims Settlement Declaration, paragraph 1 of
Article 33 of Iran-US Claims Tribunal Consolidated Tribunal Rules of Procedures
establishes a range of possibilities to determine the governing law of the contract. In
accordance with Article V, while taking the relevant usages of the trade, contract
provisions and changed circumstances into account, the tribunal is required to apply
"such choice of law rules and principles of commercial and international law as the
Tribunal determines to be applicable,"54 to determine the proper law of the contract.
According to this provision, it is not compulsory for the Tribunal to apply the conflict
of laws rules of the place of arbitration to decide the proper law. Because of the
particularities of the disputes submitted to the Tribunal, arbitrators prefer to apply the
general principles of law to decide the disputes, rather than refer to the national
systems of law.
In an ad hoc arbitration, ElfAquitciine Iran v. National Iranian Oil Company,55 where
a dispute arose from an oil exploration and production contract between National
Iranian Oil Company (NIECE) and Elf Aquitaine Iran, a choice of law clause was
found in the arbitration clause incorporated in Art. 41 of the agreement of 1966. It
stated:
"the Arbitration Board or the sole arbitrator in arriving at the award, shall in no
way be restricted by any specific rule of law, but shall have the power to base
his award on considerations of equity and generally recognised principles of
law and in particular International Law."
The arbitrator affirmed the theory of party autonomy which gave the parties the power
to choose the proper law they desired by saying:
"The choice of law clause in the agreement between NIOC and ELF cannot be
criticised on the ground that it deviated from the law indicated by general rules
on conflicts of laws without good reason. The law chosen in the agreement as
the competent law coincides with the law that, in the absence of the choice of
law clause, would have been the proper law of the agreement."
54Paragraph 1 of Article 33 of Iran-US Claims Tribunal Consolidated Tribunal Rules of Procedure.
55Ad hoc award made on January 14, 1982; Reprinted in (1986) XI Y.B.C.A. 97,. at p. 99-101.
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Moreover, following the trend, the arbitrator agreed that there was a "need for placing
international contracts under an autonomous legal system founded on international law
and independent of the national laws of the parties."56 Finally, the arbitrator
concluded that the substantive law governing the agreement and the rights and
obligations of the parties was the law chosen by the parties, that is, the general
principles of law recognised by civilised nations.57
The general principles of law has also been applied in Oil Field ofTexas case,58 which
rejected the Iranian Government's arguments about the necessity of applying the
Iranian law to determine the issue, the Tribunal emphasised the needs to apply the
general principles of law or the principles of international law to this case by stating
that "The controlling rules have therefore to be derived from principles of international
law applicable in analogous circumstances or from general principles of law. The
development of international law has always been a process of applying such
established legal principles to circumstances not previously encountered."59
56For example, McNair, 'The General Principles of Law Recognised by Civilised Nations", (1957) 1
Brit.Yrbk.Intl.L. 1 and Bourquin, "Arbitration and Development Agreements" Bus.Law. 860 (1960).
57In addition, according to the recognised principles of international law, the arbitrator disagreed that
the state party had the freedom to change the lexcontractus by subsequent legislation. Ad hoc award
made on January 14, 1982; reprinted in (1986) XI Y.B.C.A. 97, at p. 99-101.
586W Field of Texas Inc., v. The Government of Iran, award no. ITL 10-43-FT, 1 Iran-US CTR 347,
(Dec. 9, 1982). Also see Esphahanian v. BankofTejarat.2 Iran-US CTR 157 (1983 I), summarised
in 77 Am.J.Int.Law 646 (1983).
59Ibid. at pp. 361-362. Once again, the general principles of law was applied in the case of
Esphahanian v. BankofTejarat 2 Iran-US CTR 157 (1983 I) , summarised in 77 Am.J .Int.Law 646
(1983), where the Tribunal applied the "dominant and effective nationality" test, stipulated in Article
31 (3) (c) of the Vienna Convention, to decide the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
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Chapter Five: The New LexMercatoria
The application of the new lex mercatoria as the
proper law of the contract in international
commercial arbitration
The term the "new lexmercatoria" was first used by Professor Schmitthoff. He
suggested that the sources of this body of principles can be found in (a) international
rules of commerce; (b) applicable state law; and (c) trade usages in each branch of
commerce.1 Influenced by this invocation, the new lexmercatoria has frequently been
chosen to be the proper law governing the substantive disputes between parties,
particularly in the European Continent.
Analysis of arbitral awards made during the past twenty years shows that a substantial
number were made on the basis of the new lexmercatoria. The choice of the new lex
mercatoria can be made in two ways: either by the parties' express choice provided in
the choice of law clause in the arbitration agreement or in the contract, or by the
arbitrator's decision in the absence of express choice from the parties.
With increasing international commercial activities conducted between parties from
different countries, the need for fair and suitable norms has increased. Under these
circumstances, the practice of applying the new lex mercatoria has been invoked by
1Schmitthoff, "The Unification of the Law of International Trade", in Schmitthoff s Select Essays on
International TradeLaw, at p. 170. (Cheng ed. 1988).
2According to Mr. Lando, the arbitrators from Europe more frequently apply the lexmercatoria
to the dispute arising from international contracts than those from other countries, especially,
the disputes arising from contracts between a government or government enterprise and a private
company. With the fear of potential bias, the private party will not wish to have the dispute
governed by the laws of the foreign government, and vice versa. Besides the state contracts, this
application is also very popular among the private enterprises engaged in international trade.
The application of the lexmercatoria in an international contract as the proper law has been
generally accepted in Austria and France.
3~
Randall, and Norris, "A New Paradigm for International Business Transactions", 71
Wash.U.L.Q. 599 (1993), at pp. 607-608.
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some scholars. They have suggested that the national law regimes and the
conventional choice of law rules to find the proper law of the contractwithin the scope
of national laws should be modified.
In their opinion, in the absence of an express choice of law, the traditional choice of
law rules appear to be inadequate to provide certainty for international business people
to predict which law will govern the disputes between them. As a result of this, after
the choice of law has been decided, the business people may be forced to have their
contract governed by a law they never expected, or they may be disadvantaged by
their lack of language skills or difficulty in discovering the relevant regulations of the
applicable laws. As a writer commented: "It is sometimes suggested, however, that
this search for the proper law is out of touch with the realities of international trade;
and that what is needed is not a particular national system of law, but a modern law
merchant."4
Secondly, the proponents of the new lexmercatoria point out the inadequacy of
municipal laws in coping with the complexities of disputes arising from international
commerce. They maintain that municipal laws are inadequate for the needs of
international trade because the legislative mechanism of states has demonstrated slow
progress in amending the laws to cope with the fast development of international
commerce. Even if a state is capable of catching up with the fast changes of
commerce, the question is how far and how fast a society can afford to change its
domestic legislation in order to cope with the rapidly expanding development of
economic life.5
4Redfern and Hunter, International CommercialArbitration, (2nd ed. 1991), at p. 117.
5Goldstajn, "The New Law Merchant Reconsidered", in Schmitthoff, (ed.) Commercial Law in a
Changing Economic Climate, (1981), at p. 175.
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Recognising that keeping the commercial laws up-to-date and developing unified
international rules can be beneficial to the development of international commercial
arbitration, some jurists and merchants believe that it would be desirable to develop a
set of universal rules to be applied to all international commercial activities world¬
wide. Responding to these demands, the concept of the new lexmercatoria has been
invoked and has attracted a great deal of attention because it is regarded as a device
which meets the real needs of the international commercial communities.
This chapter is an investigation of the application of the new lexmercatoria as the
proper law of international contracts in international commercial arbitration. The
chapter contains four sections. The first section will explore the history of the new lex
mercatoria, with a special emphasis on the difference between the lexmercatoria and
the new lexmercatoria (as used in this work). It will be followed in the second
section by a discussion of the various definitions of the term the "new lexmercatoria".
The third section of this chapter will present the opinions for and against the
application of the new lexmercatoria in international commercial arbitration. Finally,
this chapter will conclude with an examination of the adoption of the new lex
mercatoria in international convention and international arbitral awards.
5.1 The history of the new lex mercatoria
In Europe, it is commonly agreed that the history of the new lexmercatoria is not a
continuous one but composed of three individual periods; namely the Roman ius
gentium, the medieval lexmercatoria and the new lexmercatoria. The origin of the
new lexmercatoria can be traced back to as early as 300 BC and the Sea Laws of
Rhodes.6 They were adopted by the Greeks and later the Romans. It was
6Berman and Kaufmann, "The Law of International Commercial Transactions", Harv.Intl.L.J.
221 (1978), at p. 224.
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incorporated into the Roman ius gentium. However, this ancient customary
mercantile law was referred to as the lexmercatoria at that time. Following the demise
of the Roman Empire, only a few rules of the mercantile law remained. In the ninth
century AD, the lexmercatoria was again developed by Eastern Emperor Basil I, in
the Island of Rhodes. Later, between the eleventh and the twelfth centuries, the
famous Rolls of Oleron were produced by the Court of Oleron. Then, the Wisby9
laws gained authority in the Baltic Sea after being enacted around 1350. At the same
time, the Consolato del Mare10 became accepted in the commercial centres in the
Mediterranean.11
Parallel with this development, a large body of laws governing trade conducted across
the different markets and ports involved in the Middle Ages. This body of maritime
law developed for maritime trade emerged mainly along the major trading routes
between northern Italy, the Champaigne, Flanders and the southern part of England.
At this time, the lexmercatoria based on the notion of good faith was widely accepted
among the merchants. Accordingly, the merchants had their own laws and legal
system which were distinct from the laws applicable in their respective states.
The commercial usages, the lexmercatoria, that had developed since 300 BC were
confirmed by the mercantile courts composed of the merchant class. As far as the
merchants were concerned, these courts satisfied their needs. Moreover, the local
rulers were not against the application of the lexmercatoria, despite the fact that it was
detached from the local legal systems. From the jurist's point of view, the lex
7
The remaining rules from the Roman period primarily appeared in Lombard and Venetian law in the
eleventh and twelfth century.
8In the middle of the 12th century the Rolls of Oleron were produced in the Oleron which is an island
off the French Atlantic coast.
9In some materials, it is referred to as Visby Rules.
1 °It is a collection of maritime customs laid down in the Consular Court of Barcelona.
1 ''farkinaim, "The Evolution of the Law Merchant", 12 J.Mar.L. & Com. 1 (1980/81), at p.
4., and, Stoecker, "The LexMercatoria: To What Extent Does It Exist?", (1990) 7(1) J.LA. 101
at p. 102.
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mercatoria was a body of truly international customary rules governing the
cosmopolitan community of international merchants while the philosophy of laissez-
faire provided the basis for it. After all, the lexmercatoria was widely applied among
the merchants in Europe at that time.
From the seventeenth century onwards, with the universal acceptance of the idea of
national sovereignty, the lexmercatoria once again disappeared from the international
merchant community. However, this time, the lexmercatoria did not disappear into
12
history, but was absorbed into most European municipal legal systems. This
development could be seen both in England, where Lord Mansfield started to
13
amalgamate the rules of the lexmercatoria with those of the common law and the
civil law countries where a broad codification incorporating the lexmercatoria took
place.14
Through the nineteenth century, and particularly after World War II, due to the
enormous rise of global trade and the strong demands for a unified business law, the
lexmercatoria made another appearance in the history. However, some commentators
call it the "new lexmercatoria" to avoid confusion with the lexmercatoria which
prevailed during the Roman period and the Middle Ages. As illustrated by Professor
Schmitthoff:
"the modern law of international trade is different in character from the
mediaeval law merchant because the mediaeval law merchant was essentially
the universally accepted practice and usage... of the merchants; ... the modern
law of international trade ... is not international law in the sense in which that
term is used in the law of nations ..., it is applied in the municipal jurisdiction
12
Ibid. See also Stoecker, at p. 103.
1 3Discussed in Burdick, "What is the Law Merchant"? 2 Colum.L.R. 470 (1902), at p. 482; H.
Berman, Law and Revolution, the Formation ofthe Western Legal Tradition, (1983), 241; Sack,
Conflicts ofLaws in the History of the English Law in Law, A Century ofProgress, 1835-1935 III,
at pp. 342, 376-377 (1937).
14von Caemmereer in Schmitthoff (ed.) Sources ofthe Law ofInternational Trade, 71 (1964).
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by authority of the national sovereign but its sources are of international
character."15
Although such an autonomous view is not shared by all jurists, it has influenced the
general view that the new lexmercatoria is a distinct norm from the lexmercatoria
applied during the medieval time. Furthermore, following the supports of
international concept of commercial law, the emergence of the new lexmercatoria
tends to develop into an autonomous international business law, that is, a law with a
universal character that attempts to shed the national peculiarities of municipal laws.16
5.2 Definition of the new lex mercatoria
Since no codified rules are provided, different definitions have been suggested in legal
17
literature on this subject. Primarily, these various definitions can be categorised as
two different types. One is autonomism which regards the new lexmercatoria as an
autonomous body of law which is self-contained and independent from any national
legal system. The other group supports the idea of positivism that the new lex
mercatoria is supplementary to the national law and the conflict of laws rules.
As far as autonomism is concerned, Professors Berman, Goldman and Fouchard are
the scholars often associated with the idea that the new lexmercatoria is a self-
contained autonomous body of law. Professor Berman believes that the new lex
mercatoria is completely disconnected to any municipal legal system. In his opinion,
the new lexmercatoria is a body of autonomous law for international commercial
15Schmitthoff, "The Unification of the Law of International Trade", (1968) J.Bus.L. at pp. 108-
109.
16Goldstajn, "International Conventions and Standard Contracts as Means of Escaping from the
Application of Municipal Law -1", in Schmitthoff (ed.), The Sources of the Law of
International Trade-with special reference to East-West Trade, (1964), p. 106.
17Stoecker, "The LexMercatoria: to What Extent Does It Exist?", (1990) 7(1) J.LA. 101, at
pp. 105-106.
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transactions based upon the rule-creating power of the mercantile community. In
addition, the new lexmercatoria is a principal source of the law governing export and
import transactions which is founded on the universal practice of international
business and on the common sense of business people in all parts of the globe;
18
therefore, it should be regarded as binding upon national courts.
Apart from Professor Berman, a number of jurists also share the same view. For
instance, according to Professor Goldman, the new lex mercatoria is a collection of
19
general principles and customary legal rules, which are spontaneously created by the
merchant community within the framework of international trade; furthermore, the
new lexmercatoria can fulfil the functions of a legal system or even serve alternative
20 21
choice-of-law theory without reference to a particular national system of law.
Again, other jurists define the new lexmercatoria as:
"An international body of law, founded on commercial understandings and
contract practices of an international community composed principally of
22
mercantile, shipping, insurance and banking enterprises of all countries."
"The body of rules governing commercial relationships of a private law nature
23
involving different countries."
"The customs of the business community may combine all general principles
of law to create a principle of commercial self-determination."
18
Berman, Law and Revolution, the Formation ofthe Western Legal Tradition, (1983) at p. 302.
19
Goldman, LexMercatoria (Forum Internationale 1983) at p. 6. Also see Berger, International
Economic Arbitration, Vol. 9, (1993), at pp. 526-527.
20
Goldman and Fouchard believe that this choice of law theory allows the application of the new lex
mercatoria as a legal system, as a result, the national laws are excluded.
21
Goldman, "The Applicable Law: General Principles of the Law - the LexMercatoria", in Lew
(ed.) Contemporary Problems in InternationalArbitration, (1986), at p. 116.
22
Berman and Kaufmann, "The Law of International Commercial Transactions", Harv.Int'l.LJ.
221 (1978), at p. 273.
23
Goldstajn, "The New Law Merchant", in Festschrift fuer Clive Schmitthoff, (1973), at p.
171.
24
Craig, Park, and Paulsson, International Chamber ofCommerceArbitration, (1986), para.
35.02.
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This autonomous definition caused controversy and a group of positivists have taken a
different view on this issue. This group of scholars deny the idea that the new lex
mercatoria is a self-contained system. They believe that the new lexmercatoria plays a
supplementary role to the national law and the conflict of laws rules. It is only valid
25
as far as it is expressly adopted by the individual state. Professor Schmitthoff is
one of the jurists associated with this view. According to him, the new lexmercatoria
is a group of "Common principles in the law relating to international commercial
26 27
transactions" and "uniform rules accepted in all countries", furthermore, the
sources of the new lexmercatoria are the international legislation and international
customs which are formulated by an international agency and adopted by the parties to
the contract.
Another supporter of the positivism of the new lex mercatoria is Professor
Lowenfield, who said:
"My concept of lex mercatoria, is not that of a self-contained system covering
all aspects of international commercial law to the exclusion of national law, but
rather as a source of law made up of custom, practice, convention, precedent,
and many national laws. Thus lexmercatoria as I see it can furnish an
alternative to a conflict of laws search which is often artificial and
inconclusive, and a way out of applying rules that are inconsistent with the
needs and usages of international commerce and that were adopted by
individual states with internal, not international, transactions in mind."28
In addition, Professor Lando is another advocate for the supplementary role of
the new lexmercatoria. He defines the new lex mercatoria as the "Rules of
law which are common to all or most of the States engaged in international
trade or to those States that are connected with the dispute, and if not
Schmitthoff, "The Unification of the Law of International Trade", in Cheng ed. (1988)
Schmitthoffs Select Essays on International Trade Law, (1964) 170, at pp. 171-172; also
Schmitthoff, "Nature and Evolution of the Transnational Law of Commercial Transactions" in The
Transnational Law ofInternational Commercial Transactions 19, at pp. 23-24 (Horn & Schmitthoff,
ed. 1982).
2 6
Schmitthoff, "Nature and Evolution of the Transnational Law of Commercial Transactions",
in Schmitthiff and Horn (ed.) The Transnational Law ofInternational Commercial Transactions,
(1982), at p. 19.
27
Schmitthoff, Commercial Law in A Changing Economic Climate, (2nd 1981), at p. 20.
28
Lowenfield, "LexMercatoria: An Arbitrator's View", (1990) 6(2) Arbitration Int. 145.
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ascertainable, then the rules which appear to be the most appropriate and
? Q
equitable,"
This view is also held by Mr. Langen, who suggests that the new lexmercatoria is
3 0
"The rules of the game of international trade," and the collection of all these rules are
stipulated "in the same or a similar way for a given concrete legal situation in two or
3 1
more spheres of national jurisdiction."
Additionally, Professor Goldstajn proposes a rather broad definition of the new lex
mercatoria, which includes custom and other rules that do not necessarily reflect
business conduct, as he explained:
"Usages of trade constitute the most important part of the lexmercatoria.
National laws and multilateral conventions explicitly emphasised usages of
trade. This, however, does not exhaust the content of lexmercatoria. Along
with usages of trade, all other phenomenal forms of business practice must be
taken into account,... commercial practices in international trade in general,
and, in particular, general conditions, standard clauses, standard contracts as
well as general principles of law and codes of conduct which have recently
been drafted with the intention of contributing to the formation of fair-play
rules."32
Despite all the different suggestions concerning the definition of the new lex
mercatoria, unfortunately no one definition is recognised and accepted universally.
Under these circumstances, the reality of the new lexmercatoria can be seen in one of
Professor Uando's speeches, as he said:
"An arbitrator applying the lexmercatoria will act as an inventor more often
than one who applies national law. Faced with the restricted legal material
which the law merchant offers, he must often seek guidance elsewhere. His
main source is the various legal systems. Applying the lex mercatoria,
arbitrators may take advantage of their freedom to select the better rule of law
which courts sometimes miss."33
29
Laiido, "The LexMercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration", (1985) I.C.L.Q. 747
at p. 747.
30
Langen, Transnational Commercial Law, (1973) at p. 21.
3 ^Ibid, at p. 33.
3 2
Goldstain, Usaees ofTrade and OtherAutonomous Rules ofInternational Trade According to the
UN, (1980), pp. 71-72.
33Lando, "The LexMercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration", (1985) I.C.L.Q. 747.
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Because of its ambiguous nature, the new lex mercatoria has been debated over a few
decades. In the next section of the study, opinions for and against the application of
the new lexmercatoria will be highlighted.
5.3 The opinions for and against the application of the new
lex mercatoria
While a definition of the new lexmercatoria has been discussed, a group of
34 35 36 37
international practitioners, such as Mann, Mustill, Delaume, and Boyd, have
expressed some doubts as to the practical usefulness of the new lexmercatoria.38
They oppose the concept of the new lexmercatoria for its lack of precision and
predictability, failing to meet the requirement of law and lacking in precedent.
First, in their opinion, the new lexmercatoria is not comprehensive enough to resolve
the complicated disputes arising from international commercial transactions. Although
the sources and the rules of the new lexmercatoria have been suggested by some
jurists, there has been no consistent and systematic research allowing the practitioners
Mann, "England Rejects 'Delocalised' Contracts and Arbitration", (1984) 33 I.C.L.Q. 193, at pp.
196-197; "Private Arbitration and Public Policy", (1985) 4 Civil Just.Q. 257, at p. 264; "LexFacit
Arbitrum", in Liber Amicorumfor Martin Domke, 157 (1967); "Introduction I in LexMercatoria and
Arbitration XV", (Carbonneau ed. 1990).
35
Mustill, "The New LexMercatoria-. The First 25 Years", in Liber Amicorum for the Right
Honourable LordWilberforce, (1987); "Contemporary Problems in International Commercial
Arbitration: A Response", (1989) 17 Int'l.Bus.L. 161.
36Delaume, "State Contracts and Transnational Arbitration", 75 Am.J.Int.Law 784 (1981).
37
Mustill and Boyd, The Law and Practice ofCommercial Arbitration in England, (2d ed. 1989) at p.
81.
38The French authorities opposing the application of the new lexmercatoria include Rogers, Kassis,
Lagarde and Khan. For reservations against the practicability of the lexmercatoria concept, see
Sornarajah, International Commercial Arbitration, at p. 116 et seq.; van den Berg, New York
Convention, 1984, at 200; Samuel, (1991), at pp. 27,45; Spickhoff, Rabels 1992, at p. 124
(highlighting the considerable problems in finding the law); Delaume, ICSID Rev. 1988, at pp. 79,
105; andToope, Mixed InternationalArbitration, (1990) at p. 95.
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3 9
to understand the rules of the new lex tnercatoria. Lack of a clear definition and
detailed rules is the main deficiency criticised by this school of thought. They are
convinced that without clear indications of the scope of the new lexmercatoria, the
results of arbitration will be unpredictable.
They also believe that the lack of precise rules may lead the arbitrators to render an
award of what they deem fair and reasonable even though the parties never authorised
them to decide the case ex aequo et bono. As a result, through the application of the
new lexmercatoria, the parties will not have any control over the choice of law
proceedings since the lex mercatoria gives the arbitrator a practically unbridled
discretion. Eventually, they argue, the application of the new lexmercatoria will
distort the purpose of the choice of laws rules in international business contracts.40
Secondly, they do not regard the new lexmercatoria as a legitimate source of law
because it does not meet the definition of "law". In their opinion, law is a system of
written rules that a state develops over time and enacted by the legislature in order to
deal with business agreements, social relationships, crime and other aspects of
people's daily life. Such a description does not correspond with the new lex
mercatoria, which draws its source from unwritten practices and trade usages common
to business transactions. Consequently, any awards made on such a basis may not
provide a solid basis for a national jurisdiction to recognise or enforce them.41
39
Gertz, "The Selection of Choice of Law Provisions in International Commercial Arbitration:
A Case for Contractual Depesage", 12 Northwest.J.Int'l.L. & Bus. 163 (1991), at p. 176.
40Ibid, at p. 177.
41
Dclaume, "Comparative Analysis as a Basis of Law in State Contracts: The Myth of the Lex
Mercatoria", 63 Tul.L.Rev. 575 (1989).
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The final point of attack by this group of jurists is the lack of a source of precedent
within the new lexmercatoria. Without any precedents, the level of predictability of
the result can be seriously affected. As Messrs Randall and Norris commented:
"even if arbitral decisions were made public, their value is slight because
lengthy explications of the ruling are not required and the decisions analyse
few written rules. So the lexmercatoria again is not positivistic, but rather
more akin to customary international law. More precise precedent would be far
more helpful in this context, particularly where unique or complex deals are
involved."42
Lord Mustill also strongly opposed the notion of the new lex mercatoria. He
dismissed the argument that the new lexmercatoria can fill a gap left by the municipal
laws on the ground that the new lexmercatoria is nowhere to be found in an explicit
form. It must be culled by the individual arbitrator from whatever sources he may
find to be fruitful: such as, the writings of scholars and the common features of
various systems of municipal law. Moreover, since no codified rules are provided,
the parties will be left in an uncertain position until the arbitrators render the awards.43
Lord Mustill has further indicated that, it is not a simple task to codify these common
trade usages:44
"The proponents of the lexmercatoria claim it to be the law of the international
business community, which must mean the law unanimously adopted by all
countries engaged upon two centuries ago. But the international business
community is now immeasurably enlarged. What principles of trade law,
apart from those which are so general as to be useless, are common to the legal
systems of the members of such a community? How could the arbitrators
amass the necessary materials on the laws of, say, Brazil, China, the Soviet
Union, Australia, Nigeria, and Iraq?"45
After a serious debate about the new lexmercatoria among the international
practitioners, the opinion in favour of the application of the new lexmercatoria has
42
Randall and Norris, "A New Paradigm for International Business Transactions", 71
Wash.U.L.Q. 599 (1993), at p. 611.
43
Mustill, "Transnational Arbitration in English Law", (1984) 33 Curr.L.Pr. 133, at p. 150.
44
Mustill, "The New LexMercatoria", (1988) 4 InternationalArbitration, 86.
457bid. at pp. 89, 92-93.
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prevailed. The proponents of the new lexmercatoria include Lando,46 Goldman,47,
Lew,48Schmitthoff,49 Lowenfeld50 Carbonneau,51 Berman,52 and Dasser.53 They
maintain that the new lexmercatoria is a kind of independent legal order, being
separated from any national laws, and suitable to settle the disputes arising from the
international merchant community.
The proponents also argue that, from the parties' viewpoint, the new lexmercatoria
provides business people with an alternative choice to free themselves from the strict
application of national laws and subject themselves to a more flexible legal system.
They also argue that business people frequently wish their disputes to be given a
solution other than that which would be given by national laws.54 On the other hand,
from the arbitrator's point of view, the flexibility of the new lex mercatoria will enable
arbitrators to meet the legitimate expectations of parties and apply the most up to date
rules and reasoning to resolve any kind of dispute arising from international
commercial transactions.
Lando, "The, LexMercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration", (1985) 34 I.C.L.Q. 747;
Conflict ofLaw Rules for Arbitrators in Festschriftfiir Konard Zweigert (1981). The French
authorities include Fouchard, Francescakis, Oppetit, and Robert.
47
Goldman, "The Applicable Law; General Principles of Law - The LexMercatoria", in Lew (ed.)
Contemporary Problems in InternationalArbitration, (1986) 113 (hereinafter Lew, Contemporary
Problems)-, "Introduction I in LexMercatoria and ArbitrationXV", (Carbonneau ed. 1990).
48
Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration, (1978) at pp. 436-437 para. 343
(hereinafter Lew, Applicable Law), and Lew, Contemporary Problems, (1986).
49
Schmitthoff, "The Law of International Trade, Its Growth, Formulation Operation", in Sources of
the Law ofInternational Trade, at p. 3 (1964); Commercial Law in a Changing Economic Climate,
(2nd ed. 1981); ExportTrade, at pp. 655-656 (5th ed. 1990).
50Lowenfeld, "LexMercatoria: An Arbitrator's View", (1990) 6(2) Arbitration Int. 133; and
InternationalLitigation andArbitration, (1993).
51
Carbonneau (ed.), 'The Remaking of Arbitration : Design and Destiny", in LexMercatoriaand
Arbitration, (1990) at p. 1; and Alternative Dispute Resolution, (1989) pp. 59-104.
52
Berman, Law and Revolution, the Formation ofthe Western Legal Tradition, 339-340 (1983).
53
"The 'New' Law Merchant and the 'Old' Source, Content and Legitimacy", in LexMercatoriaand
Arbitration, at p. 21 (Carbonneau ed. 1990).
54David, Arbitration in International Trade, (1985), at p. 16.
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The supporters of the new lexmercatoria also believe that international business
people with common interests should be able to organise a community with its own
legal system that does not derive its authority from any municipal laws. Within this
community, arbitrators play a similar role to the judges from national courts.
Consequently, with the freedom to find better rules of law which the national judges
may not be able to apply, arbitrators should be regarded as the inventors when they
apply the new lexmercatoria as the substantive law of the contract.55
Furthermore, they maintain that the popularity of the new lex mercatoria within the
international commercial community is caused by the fact that the new lexmercatoria
can provide equity which may be ignored by applying national laws. An example of
late delivery of goods is used by Professor Lando to illustrate this point. Professor
Lando uses Danish law as an example. In the case of the late delivery of goods,
buyers are required to send an immediate notice to the seller under the Danish law.
Nonetheless, some doubts would arise as to whether it is more reasonable for the
Danish courts to reduce the demands put on buyers who are foreign subjects and who
failed to send an immediate notice to the seller when goods were delivered late as
required under the Danish law. He argues:
"By choosing the lexmercatoria the parties oust the technicalities of national
legal systems and they avoid rules which are unfit for international contracts.
Thus they escape peculiar formalities, brief cut-off periods, and some of the
difficulties created by domestic laws which are unknown in other countries
such as the common law rules on consideration and privity of contract.
Furthermore, those involved in the proceedings - parties, counsel and
arbitrators - plead and argue on an equal footing; nobody has the handicap of
seeing it governed by a foreign law. "56
Moreover,
"...the binding force of the lexmercatoria does not depend on the fact that it is
made and promulgated by State authorities but that it is recognised as an
55Lando, "The LexMercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration", (1985) 34 l.C.L.Q.
747, at p. 754.
56Ibid, at p. 748.
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autonomous norm system by the business community and by State
authorities."57
The same opinion is expressed by Professor Thomas, who agrees that, in terms of the
parties' intention, an award made under the new lexmercatoria may be different from
a judgment made by the court which can only apply national laws to decide the
disputes. His point is expressed in the following terms:
"When the issue is looked at reasonably and practically to release commercial
arbitrators from the obligations to apply the law is to enable arbitrators to act in
a manner the parties to the agreement wish them to act, and in a manner in
which commercial judges frequently wish they themselves could act.
Thereunder it would be open to arbitrators to construe commercial agreements
according to the prevailing commercial understanding of their effect; give
effect to invalid agreements when it is clear that the parties intended to be in
honour bound by such an agreement; take a liberal view of the effect of
illegality on contracts; adopt an approach to the categorisation of contractual
terms which would foster certainty; apply a commercial understanding of the
doctrine of frustration; ignore technical defences which are unworthy and
shamefaced; and so on. All these decisions would entail the arbitral forum
arriving at a decision different from that of a court of law faced with similar
facts. This difference does not however, inevitably lead to a qualitative
difference. Justice according to law is but one manifestation of justice; justice
according to an arbitral scheme established by parties in dispute is another, the
error of the prevailing policy, as Lord Devlin has so perceptively observed, is
its adherence to the belief that beyond justice according to law there is nothing
other than injustice."58
While the debates over the new lexmercatoria continue, in practice, the new lex
mercatoria has frequently been applied to decide the disputes in international
commercial contracts. The issue may be what Professor Delaume describes as no
longer being whether transnational contract fitted well within the framework of the
national private laws but which law can provide answers to the parties' disputes. He
states:
"Today, a number of contractual relationships involve both subjects of private
and public international law, and, with increasing frequency, a plurality of
parties whose combined efforts are required for the carrying out of a single
51
Ibid, at p. 752.
58
Thomas, "Commercial Arbitration - Justice According to Law", (1983) 2 Civil Just.Q. 166,
at p. 182.
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venture. Neither traditional domestic law rules nor, to the extent that they can
be identified with sufficient precision, international law norms necessarily
provide adequate answers to problems that they were not designed to meet in
the first place."59
5.4 The adoption of the new lex mercatoria in international
conventions, arbitration rules and international commercial
arbitration cases
5.4.1 International conventions and international arbitration rules
Although no conclusive agreement has been reached as to the definition and
applicability of the new lex mercatoria, this concept is adopted by some international
conventions and the international arbitration rules. In relation to international
conventions, Article VII (1) of the European Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration provides:
"the parties shall be free to determine, by agreement, the law to be applied by
the arbitrators to the substance of the dispute. Failing any indication by the
parties as the applicable law, the arbitrator shall apply the proper law under the
rule of conflict that the arbitrators deem applicable. In both cases the
arbitrators shall take account of the terms of the contract and trade usage."
In accordance with this article, first, parties are allowed to choose the new lex
mercatoria to govern the substantive disputes of the contract. Secondly, in the case
where the choice of the proper law is referred to a national law, arbitrators are still
required to pay attention to the relevant trade usage.
Nevertheless, the question is whether the 'trade usage' mentioned in Article VII (1)
means the new lex mercatoria discussed in this work. Primarily, trade usage is one
of the sources of the new lex mercatoria. Nonetheless, from the previous sections of
this chapter, it should be noted that the jurists do not strictly distinguish trade usage
from the new lex mercatoria. At times, they are interchangeable. This situation is
59Delaume, "State Contracts and Transnational Arbitration", 75 Am.J.Int.Law 784 (1981). Also see
Berger, International EconomicArbitration, Vol. 9 (1993) at p. 532.
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evident, for instance, when Lord Mustill used trade usages when he pointed out the
difficulties in codifying the new lex mercatoria,60 In the present writer's opinions,
trade usage as used in Article VII (1) is, in fact, a reference to the new lex
mercatoriadiscussed in this thesis.
Apart from international conventions, arbitrators are offered a greater power than
those of judges to apply the law he regards appropriate.61 Instead of explicitly
mentioning the new lex mercatoria, the words "take into account the usage of the
trade" or "take account of ... the relevant trade usages" has been mentioned in various
arbitration rules, such as Article 28(4) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 33(3)
of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Article 33(1) of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal,
and Article 13(5) of the ICC Rules. While international conventions and international
arbitration rules have adopted the notion of the new lex mercatoria, the most
important legal materials illustrating the acceptance of the new lex mercatoria in
practice are arbitral awards. The following study will highlight the practice of
applying the new lex mercatoria in arbitration.
62
5.4.2 International arbitral awards
The new lexmercatoria has been applied in a number of arbitral awards, both ad hoc
and institutional arbitration. In a case of an ad hoc arbitration where an English
company and a Belgian company were involved, the dispute arose from a concession
agreement which included an exclusive distributorship contract. The parties did not
60Mustill, "The New LexMercatoria", (1988) 4 InternationalArbitration, 86.
6 Article 28 (2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 33 (1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,
and Article 13 (3) of the ICC Rules.
62Due to a difficulty in obtaining arbitral awards, this part of the study will primarily be based on the
ICC awards and those published in the Yearbook ofCommercial Arbitration.
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specify the substantive law; however, an arbitration clause contained in the concession
63
contract empowered the arbitrators to decide the case as amiable compositeurs.
The arbitrators firstly allocated the dispute under a national law framework. In
accordance with the Belgian choice of law rules, English law would be the proper law
of the contract by applying the objective test. However, they found that the English
law did not agree with the notion of amiable composition under its legal system.
Under these circumstances, the arbitrators tried to confirm the real intention of the
parties on the issue of the choice of law. Then, they decided that the parties indeed
sought to give amiable composition an extremely comprehensive meaning and sought
to help possible litigations escape from any national law.
After ascertaining the parties' intention, the arbitrators exercised the power of amiable
composition to choose the new lex mercatoria as the proper law of the contract on the
ground that arbitrators are not necessarily obliged to determine a national law
applicable to the substance. As they held,
"Having established that the character of the contract, and the place where it
has its effect, necessarily exclude an obligatory application of either Belgian or
English law, it is for the above-mentioned reasons that the arbitrators will
abide by the 'lex mercatoria' in the exercise of their power as amiable
compositeurs. "64
The new lex mercatoria is not an unfamiliar phenomenon in ICC arbitration. In fact,
it has been applied in a large number of cases. For instance, the new lexmercatoria
was applied in a case where the dispute arose from a construction contract involving a
project in USSR between a French enterprise and a Yugoslav subcontractor.65 The
dispute was referred to the ICC in accordance with the arbitration clause in which no
63
This award was enforced in Belgium by a decision of the Court of First instance of Brussels,
December 12, 1978., and confirmed by the Court of Appeal of Brussels on October 14, 1980.
64
Mechema Ltd. v. S.A. Mines, Minerais et Metaux, Ad hoc Arbitration, Award of November
3. 1977, Reprinted in (1982) VII Y.B.C.A. 77, at p. 79.
65ICC case no. 3540, October 3, 1980, reprinted in Collection of ICC Awards 1974-1985, 105-115.
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proper law was expressed. The arbitration was held in Geneva, the procedure was
subject to the law of Canton of Geneva, that is, the Swiss Concordat on Arbitration,
subsidarily to the law of the Canton of Geneva for all matters not regulated in the
Arbitration Rules of the ICC. In accordance with Article 13(4) of the ICC Arbitration
Rules, the arbitrators were to decide the case as amiable compositeurs.
After agreeing to decide as amiable compositeurs, the arbitrators tried to decide the
proper law of the contract according to the choice of laws rules. The arbitrators
regarded Yugoslav law - the law of the habitual residence of the builder - as the proper
law in accordance with the choice of laws of the lex fori, that is, Swiss private
international law. However, this choice was dismissed because neither party had
invoked the application of the Yugoslav law. Later, Russian law, the law of the place
of performance, was considered as the proper law in accordance with French private
international law. However, this possibility was also dismissed on the same ground.
The arbitrators decided to avoid the choice of laws rules on the ground that "in this
field the most recent and authoritative doctrine as well as the jurisprudence of
arbitrators, especially that of the ICC, acknowledge that in determining the substantive
law arbitrators may avoid the rules of conflict of the forum if they have the power of
amiable compositeurs."66 Finally, the arbitrators decided to apply the "direct
approach" and base their decision uniquely on the contract and the general and
common legal principles. According to these principles, the new lexmercatoria was
chosen as the proper law of the contract.
The second award made on the basis of the new lexmercatoria was PabalkTicaret
67
Limited Sirketi v. Norsolor. In this case, a dispute arose from an agency contract
66Ibid. at p. 109.
6 7
ICC case no. 3131, October 26, 1979, reprinted in Collection of ICC Awards 1974-1985, pp. 122-
124.
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between Pabalk and Ugilor, which later became Norsolor. In accordance with the
agreement, Pabalk was to receive commissions for the delivery of a certain product to
a Turkish company Aska. However, later, Ugilor terminated the agreement with
Pabalk. Pabalk, submitted the dispute to ICC and claimed unpaid commissions and
damages.
However, no proper law was mentioned in the agreement. In the absence of any
reference to a given law and clear indication to reveal the common intention of the
parties, the arbitrators decided the substantive disputes should be governed by the new
lex mercatoria. As they explained:
"Faced with the difficulty of choosing a national law the application of which
is sufficiently compelling, the Tribunal considered that it was appropriate,
given the international nature of the agreement, to leave aside any compelling
reference to a specific legislation, be it Turkish or French, and to apply the
international lex mercatoria. "68
Furthermore, based on the principle of good faith which inspires the new lex
mercatoria, the tribunal made an award in Pabalk's favour and confirmed that the
breach of the agency had caused damage to Pabalk; therefore equity would hence
require to be remedied.69
In another case, the dispute arose from a construction contract between a Mexican
construction company and a Belgian company.70 According to the contract, the
arbitrators were offered the powers to act as amiable compositeurs', however, no
choice of proper law was made. One of the issues examined by the arbitrators was
which law should be the law governing the substantive law. Because no choice of
law was made in the arbitration agreement and no intention of applying any particular
national law was expressed by the parties, the arbitrators decided to apply the new lex
68Ibid, at p. 123-124.
69Ibid, at p. 124.
70Final award of case no. 3267, 28 March 1984 reprinted in Collection of the ICC Arbitral Awards
1986-1990, 43-52.
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merccitoria to resolve the disputes between the parties. The arbitrators tried to justify
their choice by stating:
"In the first award, the arbitral tribunal decided to determine the issue under
generally accepted legal principles governing international commercial
relations, without specific reference to a particular system of law, which was
qualified by a learned commentator71 as a reference to lexmercatoria. In the
second phase of this arbitration neither of the parties did require the application
of any particular system of law, nor did they rely on any specific provision of
any municipal system. The arbitral tribunal sees no reason therefore, to depart
from the view expressed in its first award on this aspect of the cases. Indeed,
as it will appear later, all legal issues in this arbitration depend on the
construction and system of the contractual documents."72
In this case, the other issue connected with the application of the general principles of
international commercial law or the new lex mercatoriawas the question of the nature
and extent of the powers of arbitrators acting as amiable compositeurs. In other
words, in addition to the new lexmercatoria, whether the power to act as amiable
compositeurs entitled the arbitrators to modify or disregard the provisions of the
contract? The arbitrators were convinced that this question should be answered case
by case. As they explained:
"As a matter of principle, the arbitral tribunal does not reject the view that an
amiable compositeur may go beyond certain solutions deriving from the
normally applicable legal rules, be they those of a municipal legal system or
those of lexmercatoria. The question however is how far he can go,
especially when faced with specific provisions of a contract. A further
question is whether the individual situation and circumstances justify his
making use of such power. These two questions shall be dealt with when
examining the specific claims in connection therewith."73
Another dispute arising from two construction contracts for two individual office
buildings in two Saudi Arabian cities was submitted to the ICC.74 The plaintiff was a
Lebanese construction company while the defendant was a company in Saudi Arabia.
71Yves Derains, "Chronique des sentences arbitrales", (1980) J.D.I. 961, at p. 966-969.
72Final award of case no. 3267, 28 March 1984, reprinted in Collection of the ICC Arbitral Awards
1986-1990, 43-52, at p. 45.
73/fef. at pp. 45-46.
74ICC case no. 4840 (1986), reprinted in Collection of the ICC Arbitral Awards 1986-1990, pp. 465-
476.
123
Chapter Five: The New Lex Mercatoria
An arbitration clause was found in the arbitration clause which read; "All disputes or
differences in respect of which the decision (if any) of the Consultant has not become
final and binding as aforesaid shall be finally settled under the Rules of Conciliation
and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce by one or more arbitrators
appointed in accordance with the said Rules." However, no choice of law was made.
As far as the choice of law was concerned, on the one hand, the defendant contended
that Saudi law should be the proper law, and on the other hand, the plaintiff objected
to the defendants' request to apply Saudi law and claimed that no specific law was
referred to since the parties adopted an international form for their contracts.
Being convinced that the contracts had an international character, the arbitrators
rejected the defendant's claim for the application of the Saudi law. The arbitrators
stated that, according to the F.I.D.I.C. form used by the parties, it was clear that the
parties did not wish to subject their contract to the Saudi law.75 Furthermore, as the
arbitrators said:
"due to the fact that the contracts under dispute are of an international nature,
the Arbitral Tribunal believes that it should respond to the clear indication
given by the parties at the date of signature of contracts not to apply a national
system to the said contracts."
Therefore, in the light of the foregoing, the Tribunal rules that it will give
precedence in this dispute to the rules the parties have established for their
relationship i.e. the terms of their contracts supplemented by the relevant trade
usage applicable to the matter and, for issues directly related to the object of
the contractual relationship that may arise in the course of this arbitration and
which are not provided for in the contract, the Tribunal would supplement by
the Saudi law in the first place."76
The new lex mercatoria has also been applied in conjunction with a municipal law by
the ICC arbitrators. A dispute between Italian and Libyan parties was referred to the
ICC.77 The dispute arose out of a contract for building and civil engineering works in
75Ibid, at p. 471.
76Ibid. at p. 472.
77ICC case no. 4761 (1987) reprinted in Collection of the ICC Arbitral Awards 1986-1990, 519-525.
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Libya. In the partial award made with the parties' consent, the arbitral tribunal held
that the Libyan law was the primarily applicable law. Recognising that, in principle,
the Libyan law was the proper law, the tribunal also added that the Libyan law would
be supplemented by the new lex mercatoria and the general principles of law where
Libyan law was not proved or was incomplete.78
Furthermore, another dispute in connection with the content and characteristics of a
letter of credit opened by the claimant was referred to ICC arbitration. The defendant
suggested that the Turkish law was the proper law since Turkey was the place of
performance. The claimant did not object to it, but pointed out that the tribunal should
not restrict its choice to the legal provisions of a single country and should also take
into account international usages and practice.
Considering the arguments presented by both parties, the arbitral tribunal decided to
take both Turkish law and the provisions of the contract and of the relevant trade
usages into consideration. It said:
"In accordance with the classical doctrine on conflicts of law, Art 13(3) of the
ICC arbitration Rules should be determined by the law in force at the place of
arbitration {lex fori). However, this doctrine has been widely criticised, mainly
in consideration of the fact that the arbitrator, differently out of the national
judges, has no lex fori. Therefore, the arbitral tribunal considers it more
appropriate to apply the general principles of international private law as stated
in international conventions, particular those in the field of the sale of movable
goods."
Moreover,
"The Contract has been concluded and signed in Turkey and the seller had in
Turkey its place of business at the time the Contract was signed. Therefore,
the law applicable to the present dispute is the Turkish law. However, in
conformity with Art. 13(5) of the ICC Rules of Arbitration, the arbitral
tribunal shall take account also of the provisions of the Contract and of the
relevant trade usages."79
78Ibid, at p. 521.
79
ICC case no. 6527 (1991), reprinted in (1993) XVIII Y.B.C.A. 44 at pp. 45-46.
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Compared with other arbitration institutions, ICC is regarded as the institution which
most frequently applies the new lex mercatoria to international commercial disputes.
As Article 13(5) of the ICC Rules provides that "in all cases the arbitrator shall take
account of the provisions of the contract and the relevant trade usages," in some ICC
arbitrations international trade usage is treated as a complementary source of authority
which must be considered together with national law if the parties specify the proper
law or the arbitrators decide it on the parties' behalf. In other words, under the ICC
Rules, the arbitrators are required to pay consideration to international commercial law
if the contract so requires.
Although trade usage is often employed as a supplement to a specific national
substantive law to help with the interpretation of a contract, it could be a short-cut for
the arbitrators to decide the substantive disputes of the case. Sometimes, as being
80
seen in the Norsolor v. Pabalk Ticaret case, where parties have not made an express
choice of law, arbitrators can exercise the freedom offered by Article 13(5) and apply
international commercial law principles, or the new lex mercatoria, as the governing
law of the arbitration, without reference to any governing national law.
However, not every ICC arbitrator feels completely comfortable with the application
of the new lex mercatoria. For instance, in a 1986 ICC case, the tribunal had been
given broad discretion concerning the issue of choice of law, even to the extent that
the arbitrators were allowed to act as amiable compositeurs. The three members of the
tribunal, implicitly rejecting any resort to a delocalised law merchant, chose to apply
national choice of law rules to determine the substantive law from national law
regimes. This case is evidence that the concept of the new lex mercatoria is not
shared by all arbitrators in practice.
80(1980) V Y.B.C.A. 484. Report of the Supreme Court of Vienna, Nov. 18, 1982, reprinted in
(1984) IX Y.B.C.A. 159.
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Also, in another case concerning a dispute between a Syrian enterprise and a Ghanaian
enterprise, the arbitrator refused to apply the lex mercatoria as the substantive law. In
81
relation to the issue of the proper law, he stated :
"It is argued in literature that international arbitrators should, to the extent
possible, apply the lex mercatoria. Leaving aside that its contents are not easy
to determine, neither party has argued that a lex mercatoria should be applied.
Rather, each party strenuously argued on the basis of a national law, i.e.,
Syrian and Ghanaian/English law respectively. Accordingly, the Arbitrator
shall follow the implied desire of the parties to apply national law ... Ghanaian
law would in principle be applicable."82
81
Malmberg, Lock, J. was the arbitrator.
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Chapter Six: Amiable Composition
The application of amiable composition as the
proper law of the contract in international
commercial arbitration
Historically, amiable composition1 was a concept which developed widely in France
and other civil law countries.2 The notion of amiable composition was first developed
in the Code Napoleon and the French Code of Civil Procedure of 1806,3 with the
intention of restoring harmony between the parties and to work out a new kind of legal
relationship between them.4 Today, the notion and function of amiable composition
remains the same. The purpose of this chapter is to show that the notion of amiable
composition has been widely used in international arbitration rules and arbitral awards;
nevertheless this practice has been rejected in some countries which require arbitrators
to apply strict rules of law.
The term "principles of law and equity" can also be found in international law.
According to Lammasch, a decision based on the "principles of law and equity" is one
decided on the "basis of respect for law" in the sense of the Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes, signed at the Hague on October, 18, 1907.5 This
formula allows a judge to "correct positive law in basing his decision on
considerations of equity."6 Lammasch also agrees with the jurists who contend that a
judge can and should fill gaps left by the positive laws, by means of equity in
Sometimes, it is written as amicable, for example, Redfern, & Hunter, International Commercial
Arbitration, (2nded. 1991).
2Bom, International Commercial Arbitration in the United States, (1994), at p. 135.
3Craig, Park and Paulsson, International Chamber ofCommerceArbitration, (1990), at p. 310,
footnote. 1.
4David, Arbitration in hiternational Trade, (1985), at pp. 334-35.
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accordance with the spirit of the law.7 Such power to decide disputes on the basis of
equity and fairness has been explicitly provided in Article 38, para. 2, of the Statutes
of the International Court of Justice.8 In accordance with this provision, arbitrators
can be empowered to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree.
In international commercial arbitration, from the parties' point of view, the application
of rules of law to determine the dispute cannot completely satisfy their particular
needs. Under these circumstances, international arbitrators are frequently empowered
to act as amiable compositeurs to determine the dispute on the basis of equity. Such
power, which enables arbitrators to deviate from the application of law and decide the
case on the basis of what is fair and reasonable according to their personal sense of
equity, is commonly conferred by the so-called "equity clause".9
Under the power given in an equity clause, arbitrators can deviate from not only the
application of national laws but also strict legal interpretation. Accordingly, the notion
of amiable composition allows arbitrators to "depart from the strict application of rules
of law,"10 apply "equity and good conscience"11 and "decide [the dispute] according
to justice and fairness,"12 when it is necessary. In other words, trying to reflect the
reality of commercial activities, the arbitrators are empowered to disregard the strict
legal rules and arrive at a solution on the basis of equity. In some cases,
notwithstanding that a national law has been chosen to govern the substantive
disputes, the parties can still empower the arbitrators to act as amiable compositeurs.13
7Ibid.
8For the text, see Chapter Five.
9Although amiable composition is included in the types of equity clause listed by Sir Michael Kerr,
he states that the English meaning of amiable composition is far from clear. See Kerr, M., "Equity
Arbitration in England," 2(4) The American Review ofInternational Arbitration, 377 (1993).
10Jarvin, "The Sources and Limits of the Arbitrator's Powers", in Lew (ed.) Contemporary Problems
in InternationalArbitration, (1986) 50, at p. 70 (hereinafter Lew, Contemporary Problems).
1 lIbid.
12Peter, Arbitration andRenegotiation ofInternational InvestmentAgreements, (1986), at p. 172.
13Jarvin, "The Sources and Limits of the Arbitrator's Powers", in Lew, Contemporary Problems, at
p. 71.
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Being regarded as a substitution of a national law regime, amiable composition has
been called a "negative" choice of law clause.14 Among the legal materials on this
subject, different expressions have been used in the arbitration agreement to represent
such a power; for instance, arbitrators have been empowered to decide the case ex
aequo et bono, or, to "act as amiable compositeurs". Nonetheless, for uniformity, the
term "amiable composition" will be used throughout this work.
6.1 The difference between the new lex mercatoria and
amiable composition
Although the content of the new lex mercatoria and amiable composition remains
uncertain, the distinction between the two can easily be drawn. Amiable composition
refers to the structure of an arbitration, whereas the new lex mercatoria refers a body
of rules that can be applied in an arbitration. Fundamentally, amiable composition
does not require arbitrators to determine the case according to law, but rather
according to their sense of equity, whereas the new lex mercatoria is a set of
principles of equity developed throughout the centuries, not rooted in any particular
national legal system.15 In addition, it is not necessary to empower arbitrators to act
as amiable compositeurs, in order to apply the rules of the new lex mercatoria,16
though an amiable composition clause is, from time to time, regarded as an implied
licence to apply the new lex mercatoria.11 As an arbitral tribunal held: "As a matter of
principle, the arbitral tribunal does not reject the view that an amiable compositeur may
l4Ibid.
15Carbonneau, (ed.) Resolving Transnational Disputes Through InternationalArbitration, (1984), p.
134.
16De Ly, International Business Law and the LexMercatoria, (1992), at p. 222.
17Goldman, "The Applicable Law: General Principles of Law - the LexMercatoria", in Lew,
Contemporary Problems, at p. 113.
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go beyond certain solutions deriving from the normally applicable legal rules, be they
those of a municipal legal system or those of the new lex tnercatoria. "18
6.2 The difference between amiable composition and
deciding the case ex aequo et bono
The concepts "ex aequo et bono", "equity" and "amiable compositeur" are similar and
can easily be confused. As a number of commentators have said: "most authorities
appear not to distinguish between the concepts of ex aequo et bono and amiable
compositeur, although different legal systems may attach varying meanings to
each."19 The term "ex aequo et bono" refers to certain moral and legal standards or to
a higher sphere of justice. Therefore, the power to decide the case ex aequo et bono
enables arbitrators to have more freedom to decide the dispute based on their own
notions of justice. With respect to equity, though arbitrators are bound to apply law to
decide disputes, by applying the concept of equity they may ignore any rules which
appear to operate harshly. An amiable compositeur is subject to the rules of "natural
justice and must observe the fundamental rules governing judicial procedure and
material law."20 Furthermore, as long as it does not contradict public policy, an
amiable compositeur can alter the terms of the contract if it appears to be appropriate.21
In sum, the common idea among these three terms is that arbitrators are not obliged to
decide the disputes in accordance with strict rules of law. Instead, arbitrators are
required to decide the dispute in light of general notions of fairness, equity, and
justice. However, the present writer does not intend to over-emphasise the difference
in this study since the terms have been used interchangeably in legal literature;
18ICC case no. 3267, March 28, 1984, reprinted in The Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 1986-
1990, 43-52, at p. 45.
19Craig, Park, and Paulsson, International Chamber ofCommerceArbitration, (2nd ed. 1990), at p.
310; Brown, & Marriott, ADR Principles and Practice, (1993) at p. 63.
20Mustill & Boyd, Commercial Arbitration, (2nd. ed. 1989), at p. 77.
2 Zanders, International Commercial Arbitration, (1962), at p. 19.
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furthermore, it is not the purpose of this study to provide a clear distinction between
them.
Although the concept of amiable composition is not accepted in every jurisdiction, the
arbitral awards made on such a basis can be seen in a number of cases. Lord Devlin
observed that an equity clause has been used as one of the various devices designed to
get justice enmeshed in the legal systems. He spoke of this concept of justice in the
following terms:
"It is a common enough feeling to desire the end and to dislike the means. The
public desires order and dislikes law, though without law there would be no
order. The judicial qualities which the public singles out for praise are
common sense and humanity; devotion to the law is less admired than a
willingness to strain it. It is not surprising therefore that from the earlier times
English legal system has accommodated various devices designed to enmesh
the legal system with the justice of the case."22
6.3 The opinions for and against of the application of
amiable composition
There is a fear that the arbitrator's power may be open to abuse by means of amiable
composition. In common with the new lex mercatoria, the concept of amiable
composition is also not shared by all jurisdictions, especially those which insist on the
application of strict rules of law to determine the substantive issues. If the awards fail
to comply this requirement, they may be challenged on the grounds of mandatory rules
and public policy.
Objections to amiable composition are especially notable among English lawyers. Due
to unfamiliarity with the concept of amiable composition, English lawyers tend to treat
it as an unknown object and dismiss any possible use in arbitration. In their opinion,
arbitrators, empowered as amiable compositeurs, are analogous only to conciliators or
22Lord Devlin, The Judge, (1979), at p. 92.
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mediators who guide the parties towards a compromise settlement of their dispute.
Such function is, they argue, contradictory to that of arbitrators whose decision is to
have the force of law. As Sir Michael Kerr argues:
"If the function of an amiable compositeur is merely to mediate and conciliate,
then he is not an arbitrator. If his function includes the powers to impose a
compromise settlement upon the parties as a binding decision which disregards
the legal position, then he would equally not be acting as an arbitrator
according to law, and his 'award' would risk being set aside."23
He concludes that a reference to amiable composition is a sequential actions, "whereby
mediation /conciliation are tried first and are followed by an arbitration if they fail. In
effect, therefore, the reference to arbitration would then not operate as an equity clause
at all."24
Although there is a dispute over the concept of amiable composition, the opinion in
favour of its application prevails in practice. Jurists who are in favour of the notion of
amiable composition are divided into two camps. One group of jurists contend that an
arbitrator's power to decide the dispute as an amiable compositeur should be accessory
to law, or, to be precise, such power should supplement the deficiency in the
particular rule of law. In accordance with their opinion, while exercising the power of
amiable composition, arbitrators should not only consider the international law but
also the municipal laws which are relevant to the case. Furthermore, the municipal
laws should only be disregarded if they are contrary to the general principles of law.
Nevertheless, the other faction within the jurists uphold a more liberal attitude towards
the notion of amiable composition. This group of jurists argues that, in the case where
the law is contrary to the principles of justice, arbitrators only have to consider the
principles of international justice when they are empowered to decide the case ex
aequo et bono or act as amiable compositeurs. One commentator has said: "in the
23 Kerr, "Equity Arbitration in England," 2(4) The American Review ofInternational Arbitration, 377
(1993), at pp. 383-384.
24Ibid. at p. 384.
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most extreme sense, an arbitrator is under no obligation to observe the rules of law."25
This group of jurists believes that the power to decide a matter ex aequo et bono
allows an international arbitrator to base his decision exclusively on considerations of
equity in the sense of general justice and to disregard the rights and obligations in
force in so far as their application would lead to an inequitable solution.26 Moreover,
they maintain that "considerations of equity are applied in an ex aequo et bono decision
not only to supplement the law, but also to overrule it, if the application of the law
would cause an inequitable result."27
After extensive debate on this subject, the group which is in favour of the idea that
both international law and municipal law may be ignored if they are in conflict with the
general principles of justice and amiable composition has prevailed. This idea was
applied in a decision made by an American-Norwegian Arbitral Tribunal in 1922. As
the tribunal decided that: "The Tribunal cannot ignore the municipal law of the Parties,
unless that law is contrary to ... the principles of justice."28 According to this
judgment, the formula "principles of law and equity" permits the arbitrators to
disregard the relevant positive law if it is contrary to the general principles of justice.
Following this idea, it is clear that the power of amiable composition or deciding ex
aequo et bono enables the arbitrators to have more freedom to detach their decision
from municipal laws and decide the case according to their own notions of justice.
Nevertheless, such a clause does not confer an unlimited freedom upon them. To a
certain extent, such a clause may allow arbitrators to escape from the restraints of the
national laws; however, they are still bound by the general principles of justice and by
generally recognised standards of international relations. In other words, a clause of
25Mustill & Boyd, Commercial Arbitration, (2nd. ed. 1989), at p. 77.
26Habicht, The Power of the International Judge to Give A Decision "Ex Aequo Et Bono", (1935), at
p. 2.
27Ibid.
28A decision made by the American - Norwegian Tribunal 1922.
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amiable composition does not give arbitrators a "blank cheque" or unfettered
discretionary power. After all, a decision made by amiable compositeurs is still an
arbitral decision pronounced with binding force, and it must, by definition, follow
general principles and standards.
6.4 The adoption of the notion of amiable composition in
international conventions, arbitration rules and domestic
laws
The notion of amiable composition has been adopted by various international
conventions, arbitration rules and some domestic laws. In the case of international
conventions, the concept of amiable composition can be seen in Article VII (2) of the
European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, which states that "The
arbitrators shall act as amiables compositeurs if the parties so decide and they may do
so under the law applicable to the arbitration."29 A similar passage is also found in
Article 55(2) of ICSID Facility; Schedule C: Arbitration, Article 42(3) of the ICSID
Convention, Article 30 of the Permanent Court of Arbitration Rules of Arbitration and
Conciliation for Settlement of International Disputes between Two Parties of Which
Only One Is A State.
Although different opinions are held towards the application of amiable composition in
international commercial arbitration, such power has also been adopted in various
international arbitration rules. The concept of amiable composition has been adopted
by the major international arbitration rules. For instance, the phrase "the arbitrators
shall assume the powers of an amiable compositeur if the parties are agreed to give
him such powers," has been incorporated in Article 13(4) of the ICC Arbitration
29The term amiable compositeurs is used in this Article.
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Rules,30 Article 29(3) of the American Arbitration Association International Rules,
Article 33(2) the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules31 and Art. 33(2) of the Iran-US
Claims Tribunal Rules.
Apart from international conventions and arbitration rules, in order to keep up with the
trend in international commercial arbitration, some jurisdictions also incorporate the
concept of amiable composition into their domestic legislation. For instance, Article
1497 of the French Code of Civil Procedure allows arbitrators to be empowered as
amiable compositeurs, as it is provided: "The arbitrator shall decide as amiable
compositeur if the parties' agreement conferred this authority upon him." An identical
provision can also be seen in Article 1054(3) of the Netherlands Arbitration Act 1986.
Although using the term "ex aequo et bono", Article 187(2) of the Swiss Private
International Law Act 1987 upholds such an application by saying that "The parties
may authorise the arbitral tribunal to decide ex aequo et bono."
6.5 The application of amiable composition in international
arbitral awards
Despite all the objections, amiable composition has frequently been applied to decide
the dispute between the parties in a number of international arbitral awards. It is
especially the case in ICC arbitration whose rules expressly permit such practice. For
instance, in an ICC arbitration, a dispute concerning non-payment by one of the
parties arose from a construction contract for a sugar plant. The arbitration was held
in Zurich. The arbitral tribunal decided that the legal problems arising from this
contract should be settled in accordance with the rules of Swiss law, which gave the
30The term amiable compositeurs is also used in this Article.
3 ' i he provision is as follows: "The arbitral tribunal shall decide as amiable compositeur or ex aequo
et bono only if the parties have expressly authorised the arbitral tribunal to do so and if the law
applicable to the arbitral procedure permits such arbitration."
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tribunal the power of amiable composition. Acting as amiable compositeurs, the
tribunal decided to rule on the case on the basis of equity according to the terms of Art.
19 para. 3 of the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration. As to the issue of the proper
law, the tribunal held that: "according to general principles, the arbitral tribunal is not
authorised to take a decision contrary to an absolutely constraining law, particularly
the rules concerning public order or morals."32
The power of amiable composition was, again, exercised in another case where the
general principle governing commercial international law was applied to decide the
substantive issues. In June 1976, a Saudi Arabian state entity entered into a
construction contract with a Belgian company, which, later, sub-contracted part of this
project to a Mexican company. However, due to the difficulties between the Belgian
(Claimant) and Mexican (Defendant) parties, the Belgian company terminated the sub¬
contract in 1977. The issue whether it was a legal termination was instituted in ICC.
In the arbitration agreement, no choice of law was mentioned. However, the claimant
submitted that the legal issues arising from the sub-contract should be resolved with
reference to general principles of commercial law, whereas the defendant did not
specify which law should be applied.
Based on the hint to a specific legal system contained in (Claimant's) initial brief
which refers to Belgian law in connection with the applicability of amiable
composition, the arbitral tribunal decided that they were empowered to act as amiable
compositeurs.33 Furthermore, as regarding the issue of the proper law, based upon
the power of amiable compositeurs the tribunal decided to apply the general principles
of international commercial law. It stated:
32ICC case no. 1677 (1975), reprinted in Collection ofICC Arbitral Awards 1974-1985, at p. 20.
33ICC case no. 3267 (1979), reprinted in Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 1974-1985, 76-87, at p.
78.
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"when the authority is granted to it [the tribunal] to act as amiable compositeur,
as specified in the Contract and in the Term of Reference, the Arbitral Tribunal
needs not to decide which specific law governs the contractual relationship
between the parties.
On the basis of foregoing, ... the Arbitral Tribunal will apply the widely
accepted general principle governing commercial international law with no
specific reference to a particular system of law."34
Moreover, on the issue of payments, the tribunal maintained that the agreement
between the parties should be taken into account. As the tribunal held:
"it is a generally accepted principle in international arbitration that the
paramount duty of the arbitrator, even as 'amiable compositeur', is to apply the
contract of the parties, unless it is shown that the provisions relied on are
clearly against the true intent of the parties, or violate a basic commonly
accepted principle of public policy. "35
Furthermore,
"In addition to the power to decide on the dispute before him on the basis of
generally accepted legal principles, without being deterred by the technicalities
of a particular legal system, the arbitrator sitting as 'amiable compositeur' is
entitled to disregard legal or contractual rights of party when the insistence on
such right amounts to an abuse thereof.36"
In another case, the disputes arose from a contract between an Italian (Claimant) and a
Syrian company (Defendant).37 The choice of law clause appeared in two individual
Articles of the contract. According to Article 19.6, "Arbitration shall be held at
Geneva (Switzerland) and shall judge according to the general principles of law and
justice" whereas Article 25 of the contract provided that "This Agreement shall be
subject to and constructed in accordance with the Law of Syria." The words "shall
judge according to the general principles of law and justice" were hand-written, and
replaced the printed words "ex aequo et bono".
3 4Ibid.
3 5Ibid, at p. 85.
36Ibid. at p. 86.
37ICC case no. 3380, November 29, 1980, reprinted in Collection of ICCArbitral Awards 1974-
1985, 96-100.
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According to the Claimant, the dispute should be resolved by the arbitrators acting as
amiable compositeurs. However, the Defendant argued that amiable composition
should not be allowed and the general principles referred to in Article 19.6 were legal
principles which should at least be common to the two systems involved, Syrian and
Italian. Faced with this complicated situation, the tribunal decided to take into account
both Articles 25 and 19.6. Finally, the arbitral tribunal decided that the power of
deciding ex aequo et bono should be exercised together with the application of Syrian
law. As the tribunal reasoned: "the contract is governed by and should be interpreted
in accordance with Syrian law in its entirety without any restrictions, under
reservations of the "general principles of law and justice", according to which the
arbitrators have to decide under article 19.6. "38
A dispute arising from a construction project in the USSR between a French enterprise
and a Yugoslavian enterprise was also submitted to ICC. According to the arbitration
agreement, arbitration was to take place in Geneva. The procedure was to be subject
to the law of the Canton of Geneva, that is, the Swiss Concordant on Arbitration,
subsidiary to the law of the Canton of Geneva for all matters not regulated in the
Arbitration Rules of the ICC. In relation to the proper law of the contract, the
arbitrators first of all exercised their power to act as amiable compositeurs according to
the ICC Arbitration Rules. Secondly, they tried to ascertain the proper law by means
of the choice of law rules. According to the principles of Swiss private international
law (the lex fori), Yugoslavian law would be applicable. On the other hand,
considering French private international law, Russian law, the lex rei sitae (the place
of the activity of the contractor) would be the governing law. However, neither party
invoked these two possibilities. Based on the power of amiable composition, and
acknowledging the ICC rules, the arbitrators decided to avoid the conflict of laws rules
3 8Ibid, at p. 100.
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of the forum and choose the new lex mercatoria as the proper law governing the
substantive disputes in this case.39
Arbitrators will rarely decide the dispute on the basis of equity without the parties'
authorisation. However, at times, arbitrators find grounds to act as amiable
compositeurs from the relevant applicable law. For instance, in the case of
Wintershall AG et al. v. The Government of Qatar,40 arbitrators decided to act as
amiable compositeurs on the basis of Article 49 of the Qatari Code, which provides
that a contract "shall not bind a contracting party to the contents thereof, but it shall
also extend to all its requirements in compliance with law, usage and equity depending
on the nature of the obligation." The arbitrators regarded this provision as a basis for
"an appropriate and equitable interpretation of the Government's obligations" in this
case. Therefore, the arbitrators, regardless of the fact that adaptation of the contract
without the parties' authorisation could constitute a ground for setting aside the award
for being outside the tribunal's mandate, believed that the application of the
relinquishment provision in relation to gas discoveries was equitable.
39ICC case no. 3540 (1980); reprinted in (1982) VII Y.B.C.A. 125-134. at p. 127.
4028 l.L.M. 795 (1989), at p. 823.
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While the general principles of law and the concept of amiable composition are
supported by Article 38(l)(c) and 38(2) of the International Court of Justice Statutes,
the new lex mercatoria developed during the Middle Ages has also been widely
applied in international arbitral awards. For instance, in the case of state contracts, the
general principles of law have been widely applied in order to reconcile the
disagreement between the parties on the applicable laws. The new lex mercatoria is
often chosen to govern the major international contracts. As well as applying the
general principles of law and the new lexmercatoria, arbitrators are also asked to act
as amiable compositeurs.
Nevertheless, all arbitral awards made on the basis of a-national principles fail to
provide clear indications regarding the content of a-national principles. As discussed
in this thesis, the arguments for and against the application of a-national principles to
govern the contract in dispute has concentrated on whether clear guidelines have been
provided for such a practice. Ironically, however, notwithstanding these arguments a-
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national principles have often been applied in international commercial arbitration as
shown in this part of the thesis.
It is frequently asserted that a-national principles, based on equity and the general
principles developed among the commercial community, are more or less uniform
throughout the world since the needs of commerce and the sense of justice and
propriety of business people are supposed to be the same everywhere. It would
certainly be beneficial if this were true; however, throughout the world a-national
principles are perceived in different ways by different jurisdictions. Generally
speaking, the notion of a-national principles has received wide support from the
countries which have a long history of arbitration; whereas, the countries which have
less developed arbitration frameworks are rather cautious about such a practice which
encourages arbitrators to deviate from national law regimes.
The different attitudes towards the application of a-national principles in different
jurisdictions lead to uncertainty about the validity of awards made on such a basis.
The validity of a-national awards depend on whether the laws of the relevant countries
permit such a practice. If such a practice is not permitted, a choice of a-national
principles clause will be regarded as invalid; moreover, the awards made on such a
basis will also be null and void.
For instance, whether or not the parties express a choice of a-national principles, in
some cases arbitrators are in a difficult position if the law of the place of arbitration
does not allow such a practice. If the arbitrators decide to apply the law specified by
the parties, and such an application is against the mandatory rules or public policy of
the place of arbitration, the losing party may successfully challenge the award. As a
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result, the awards will not be recognised or enforced and will be set aside under the
law of the place of the arbitration.1
However, sometimes the arbitrators will decide to ignore the parties' choice of law
because it is against the lex fori. As a result of this, the awards may be challenged
both in the courts of the place of arbitration and of the place where recognition or
enforcement is sought because the arbitrators fail to respect the principle of party
autonomy.2 Furthermore, even though the law of the place of arbitration allows such
a practice, the validity of the arbitral awards will be subject to the mandatory rules and
public policy of the enforcing courts.
It is recognised that such a conflicting situation can cause a significant distraction of
the purpose and design of international commercial arbitration; therefore, in the next
part of the study, focus will be brought to these conflicting attitudes among different
national j urisdictions.
1Article V (1) (e) of the New York Convention.
2Article V (1) (d) of the New York Convention.
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Introduction to Part Three
Introduction toPart Three
As outlined in Part One of this thesis, the traditional three-step choice of law rule in
contract has lost its dominant place in international commercial arbitration. Instead, in
the absence of the parties' choice, arbitrators tend to skip the implied choice of law
test, and determine the proper law according to the closest and most real relationship
test. However, it has been suggested that the national law regime cannot satisfy the
particular needs of international commercial activities. As a result, a modern trend has
developed which invokes the application of a-national principles as the proper law of
international commercial contracts and has attracted the attention of academics and
practitioners.
In accordance with this movement, a-national principles have frequently been chosen
either by parties or arbitrators as the proper law to govern the disputes arising from
international commercial contracts. For instance, as discussed in Chapter Four, the
general principles of law have become a preferable choice of law for state contracts
and the new lexmercatoria is also chosen as the substantive law of major international
contracts. Moreover, with the demands for fairness outside the scope of strict legal
rules, the notion of amiable composition has also become an alternative to govern the
substantive issues of the contract. A-national principles have been applied as the
proper law of the contract in a substantial number of international arbitral awards, as
outlined in Part Two of this thesis.
In this part, the investigation will focus on whether the application of a-national
principles in international commercial arbitration has been accepted by the national
courts. The study will concentrate on the attitudes of the courts of a number of
jurisdictions. In Europe, which has an extremely sophisticated arbitration system,
France and England will be chosen as representative examples. On the North
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American continent, transformed from having a historically hostile attitude to being
arbitration friendly, the attitude of the United States courts will be investigated.
Finally, looking at the Pacific Rim, which is regarded as the most fertile area for
international commercial activities in the next century, the attitudes of the Hong Kong,
Chinese and Taiwanese courts towards the issue of application of a-national
principles.
This part of the study is composed of four Chapters. Chapter Seven will be an
examination of the English courts' attitude towards awards based on a-national
principles. Chapter Eight will discuss the liberal attitude of the French courts on the
application of a-national principles in international arbitral awards. Chapter Nine will
discuss the attitude of the United States courts on this subject and their changing
views. Finally, in Chapter Ten, attention will be brought to the Pacific Rim countries,
which have been less familiar and enthusiastic about arbitration. In that chapter, the
attitudes of the Hong Kong, Chinese and Taiwanese courts towards awards made on




Whether the English courts accept the
application of a-national principles in
international commercial arbitral awards
This chapter contains an investigation into whether the English courts accept the
application of a-national principles in international arbitral awards. In England,
international commercial arbitration has long been accepted as an alternative dispute
settlement mechanism. However, compared with continental Europe, the English
courts hold a rather conservative attitude towards the application of a-national
principles. In English courts, the validity of awards made on the basis of the general
principles of law and the new lexmercatoria was not accepted until two decades ago.
Moreover, the validity of awards made on the basis of amiable composition or decided
ex aequo el bono was not certain until the enactment of Arbitration Act 1996.
This chapter is composed of two sections. In order to show the difference in choice of
law procedures between courts and arbitration, the first section provides a background
study on the English judge's power to choose the proper law of the contract and the
choice of law rules followed by them. Based on a case study, the second section of
this chapter will examine whether the English courts accept awards made on the basis
of a-national principles: including the application of the general principles of law, the
new lexrnercatoria and the notion of amiable composition.




Before 1990, in order to determine the validity, interpretation, effect and discharge of
a contract, English judges had to decide the proper law of the contract in accordance
with the common law rules. The judges were required to apply the English choice of
law rules to decide the proper law of the contract. The issue of the choice of law did
not attract juristic attention until the eighteenth century. As disclosed by Cheshire and
North:
"It is at first sight surprising to learn that English lawyers did not find it
necessary to deal with choice of law problems until a couple of centuries ago.
Yet such is the case. There was not even an awareness of the problem in this
country until the eighteenth century; it was not mentioned by Blackstone, and
the middle of the nineteenth century had been reached before a connected
treatise on private international law was written by an Englishman."1
Given that English traders began to extend their commercial activities over the seas in
the middle of the sixteenth century, with the expansion of the British Empire in the
eighteenth century and under the influence of several distinguished scholars (such as
Huber, Story, Westlake, Dicey and Cheshire), English courts started to notice the
importance of the choice of law rules. The development of the rules on choice of the
proper law was illustrated in the case of Robinson v. Bland.2 In this case, Lord
Mansfield dismissed the application of the "place of contract" and "place of
performance" tests and stated that the law to govern a contract is the law intended by
the parties:
"The general rule, established ex comitate et jure gentium, is that the place
where the contract is made, and not where the action is brought, is to be
considered in expounding and enforcing the contract. But this rule admits of an
exception when the parties at the time of making the contract had a view to a
different kingdom."3
And,
1Cheshire andNorth's on Private International Law, (11th ed.) at p. 23.
2(1760) 1 Wm B1 234, 2 Burr 1077.
3(1760) 1 Wm B1 234, at pp. 258-259.
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"The law of the place can never be the rule, where the transaction is entered
into with an express view to the law of another country, as the rule by which it
is to be governed."4
During the period from the eighteenth century to 1990, the common law rules had the
significant role in governing the issue of choice of the proper law. Accordingly,
judges had to follow the common law rules to decide the proper law. However, this
was altered in 1990 when most of the common law rules on choice of law in contract
were superseded by those contained in the E.E.C. Convention on the Law Applicable
to Contractual Obligations ("The Rome Convention") through the enactment of the
Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990 ("the 1990 Act").5
Following the general choice of law rules, the judges have first to examine whether
there is a choice of law clause expressed in the contract. If there is, and unless it
contradicts the mandatory rules or public policy, judges are required to apply the
express choice of law to decide the case in accordance with the theory of party
autonomy. This principle can also be seen in Article 3(1) of the Rome Convention,
which provides: "A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The
choice must be express or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of the
contract or the circumstances of the case. By their choice the parties can select the law
applicable to the whole or a part only of the contract."
According to Rule 175(1) of Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws, based on
party autonomy, "a contract is governed by the law chosen by the parties"6 before the
4(1760) 2 Burr 1077 at p. 1078.
5The Convention did not come into force in United Kingdom until April 1, 1991.




English courts. This principle displaces the old presumption that the parties intended a
contract to be governed by the law of the place where it was to be performed. Party
autonomy is confirmed in several leading cases. For instance, in the case of Vita Food
Products Inc. v. Units Shipping Co. Ltd.1 where it had been argued that a choice of
English law to govern a bill of lading was invalid because of lack of connection with
England, LordWright decided that it was a "fundamental principle of the English rule
of conflict of laws that intention is the general test of what law is to apply."8
Therefore, an expressed statement of the governing law of contract will be upheld,
"provided the intention expressed is bona fide and legal, and provided there is no
reason for avoiding the choice on the ground of public policy."9
The parties' freedom to choose the proper law was also endorsed by Lord Reid several
decades later. As he stated in the case of Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd.
v. JamesMiller and Partners Ltd.:10
"Parties are entitled to agree what is to be the proper law of their contract ...
There have been from time to time suggestions that parties ought not to be so
entitled, but in my view there is no doubt that they are entitled to make such
agreement, and I see no good reason why, subject it may be to some
limitations, they should not be so entitled."11
Although this principle has overwhelming support, a small minority of judges have
expressed their reservations. First, they have argued that an express choice of law
made by the parties should be regarded as one of the indications pointing to the proper
law of the contract.12 Furthermore, that judges should take the entire circumstances
7 [1939] AC 277, at p. 299.
8Ibid. at p. 299.
9Ibid, at p. 290.
^Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd. v. JamesMiller andPartners Ltd. [1970] AC 583.
11 Ibid, at p. 603.




into consideration before applying the parties' choice of the proper law of the
contract.13 Secondly, they have also argued that the choice of law should be invalid
if the transaction had no connection with the country whose law is chosen as the
proper law of the contract.
However, these arguments were dismissed by Lord Wright in the Vita Food case.14
Lord Wright said that "connection with English law is not as a matter of principle
essential".15 Such an attitude is adopted in the Rome Convention. As a commentary
on Article 3(3) of the Rome Convention states "When combined with Art. 3(1), it is
implicit in Article 3(3) that a very wide freedom of choice of law is given to the parties
to a contract. The law chosen need not in principle have any geographical or physical
connection with the contract. It also appears to be the case that the rules of the
Convention are brought into play if the only foreign element in the case is the choice of
foreign law to apply to what is otherwise an entirely domestic transaction."16
In the case where no express choice was made by the parties, the proper law of the
contract might be inferred according to the circumstances of the case and the terms and
nature of the contract in terms of Article 3(1) of the Rome Convention which provides
that the parties' choice can be "demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of
the contracts or the circumstances of the case." Where no express choice of law can
be found in the contract, and cannot be inferred from the relevant circumstances,
English judges are required to apply the so-called "most real and closest relationship"
test, which was adopted by the Privy Council in 1950 in Bonython v. Commonwealth
13 TheHollandia [1983] 1 AC 565, at p. 576 (Lord Denning); also, Re Helbert Wagg & Co. Ltd.
[1956] Ch. 323, at p. 340 (Upjohn J.); Anselme Dewavrin Fils et Cie v. Wilson and North-Eastern
Ry. Shipping Co. Ltd. (1931) 39 LI L R 289.
14Vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. Ltd. [1939] AC 277.
1 ^lbid. at p. 290.
1 ^'Scottish Current Law Statutes, Chapter 36, at p. 19.
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ofAustralia,11 to decide which national law should be the proper law of the contract.
This principle is also stipulated in Article 4(1) of the Convention, which states: "To the
extent that the law applicable to the contract has not been chosen in accordance with
Article 3, the contract shall be governed by the law of the country with which it is
most closely connected."
Generally speaking, under both the common law rules and the Convention, the choice
of law rules required to be followed by judges are similar to those applied by
arbitrators. Nevertheless, compared to international commercial arbitrators, English
judges are subject to more restrictions on the power to choose the proper law of
contract. These restrictions can be illustrated by examples of application of the foreign
laws and a-national principles.
7.1.1 Choice of the foreign law in the English courts
Generally speaking, the English courts are reluctant to reject the application of foreign
law,18 provided both parties' expert witnesses agree on the meaning and effect of the
foreign law19 and the evidence is not contradicted.20 However, it has been a long
established principle that foreign law is a matter of fact, rather than a matter of law,
before the English courts. In a case where parties claim that a foreign law should be
the proper law of the contract before the English courts the judge is required to treat
this issue as a matter of fact. In other words, as a matter of fact, the foreign law
17[1951] AC 201,219.
1 ^Sharif v. Azad [1967] 1 QB 605, 616 (CA) Koechlin & Cie. v. Kestenbaum [1927] 1 KB 616,
622, reversed on appeal but not on this point.
19Bumper Development Corp. v. Commissioner ofPolice of the Metropolis [1991] 1 WLR 1362
(CA).
20If the evidence of several expert witnesses conflicts as to the effect of foreign sources, the court is
entitled, and indeed bound, to look at those sources in order to decide between the conflicting evidence.
See Bumper Development Corp. v. Commissioner ofPolice of the Metropolis [1991] 1 WLR 1362
(CA) at p. 1371.
151
Chapter Seven: England
claimed by the parties has to be pleaded and proved. This requirement is expressed in
Rule 18(1) in Dicey andMorris on the Conflict ofLaws.21 Rule 18(1) provides: "In
any case to which foreign law applies, that law must be pleaded and proved as a fact to
the satisfaction of the judge by expert evidence or sometimes by certain other means."
According to Rule 18(1), a party who relies on a foreign law has to plead it in the
same way as other facts he claims.22 The party who based his claims on the basis of a
foreign law has the burden to prove it.23 Although there are different ways to prove
foreign law,24 generally speaking foreign law cannot be proved simply by putting the
text of a foreign legislation before the court, nor by citing foreign decisions or books
of authority.25 In fact, instead of conducting research on their own about the foreign
law claimed by the parties,26 the English judges will simply consider the foreign
statutes, decisions or books as referred to them by the expert witnesses.
In the cases where the parties fail to plead and prove the foreign law they claim, or
introduce little or insufficient evidence, the court will simply assume that foreign law
is identical to English law unless they are completely satisfied with the evidence placed
before them. Moreover, they will decide the case as if it were a purely English case
and apply English law to the case.27 This principle can be seen in Rule 18(2) of Dicey
21Dicey andMorris, (12th ed. 1993), Chapter 9.
22King ofSpain v. Machado (1827) 4 Russ. 225 239; Ascherberg, Hopwood & Crew Ltd. v. Casa
Musicale Sonzogno [1971] 1 WLR 173 (CA).
2^Dynamit A. G. v. Rio Tinto Co. [1918] AC 260, 295; Guaranty Trust Co. ofNew York v.
Hartnay [1918] 2 KB 623, 655.
24Dicey andMorris, (12th ed. 1993) Chapter 9 has a detailed discussion at pp. 230-23.
25Nelson v. Bridport (1845) Beav. 527, 542; Vol. 36 (1838-1866) English Report 48-55; Buergerv.
New York Life Assurance Co. (1927) 96 L.J. KB 930, at pp. 940, 942; Bumper Development Corp.
v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1991] 1 WLR 1362 (CA), at p. 1371.
26Di Sora v. Phillipps (1836) 10 H.L.C. 624, 640; Vol. 11 English report 1168; Bumper
Development Corp. v. Commissioner ofPolice of the Metropolis [1991] 1 WLR 1362 (CA), at p.
1369.
2^Male v. Roberts (1800) 3 Esp. 163; Vol. 6, (1793-1807) English Report 170; Dynamit A. G. v.
Rio Tinto Co. [1918] AC 260, at p. 295; The Parchim [1918] AC 157 (PC), at p. 161; The Colorado
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and Morris on the Conflict ofLaws, which provides: "in the absence of satisfactory
evidence of foreign law the court will apply English law to such a case."
Nevertheless, the issue of the pleading and proof of foreign law does not arise in
international commercial arbitration cases. Generally speaking, the parties to an
arbitration have the right to choose any law to govern their contract. With respect to
what the content of the chosen proper law is, the parties do not need to plead and
prove the applicable law as a matter of fact. In practice, it is the arbitrator's job to
conduct his own research to find out what the chosen foreign law stipulates as to the
relevant issues.
7.1.2 The application of a-national principles in the English courts
The second matter to be discussed is the different approaches towards the application
of a-national principles held by English judges and arbitrators. As has been seen in
previous chapters, in international commercial arbitrations the parties to a state contract
prefer to choose the "general principles of law" or even public international law as the
proper law of the contract. Meanwhile, a-national principles, such as the new lex
mercatoria and amiable composition, are becoming popular choices among the
international commercial community.
Nevertheless, this practice of applying a-national principles is not recognised by the
English courts. The English courts, in fact, do not allow the application of a-national
principles in the cases submitted to the courts. This approach is supported by Article
[1923] P. 102, 111. However, there is a statutory exception to this principle, if a case is governed by
the law of some Commonwealth country, the court may order that law to be ascertained under the
British Law Ascertainment Act 1859 if it regards such ascertainment as "necessary or expedient for the
proper disposal of the action."
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1(1) of the Rome Convention. Article 1(1) states that the reference to the parties'
choice of "law" to govern a contract means a reference to the law of a country.28
Moreover, Article 1(1) does not allow the choice or application of a-national
principles, such as the new lexmercatoria or the general principles of law.29 It is
suggested that a choice of a-national principles cannot be regarded as a valid express
choice of law under the Rome Convention.30 This suggestion has been strongly
supported by the English court. Thus, Lord Diplock said that the effect of contracts
and the obligations and rights arising thereunder have to be referred to some system of
private law since "contracts are incapable of existing in a legal vacuum".31
In relation to whether the English courts accept the application of a-national principles
in international arbitral awards, a detailed examination will be given in the following
section.
7.2 Acceptance of international commercial arbitral awards
made on the basis of a-national principles by the English
courts
As discussed in the previous chapters, a-national principles have been widely applied
by international arbitral tribunals to cases of international commerce. Being influenced
by literature and legislation which invoke liberal ideas about the operation of
international commercial arbitration, they frequently apply the general principles of
law, the new lex mercatoria or the concept of amiable composition to decide the
2%Dicey andMorris, (12th ed. 1993), Chapter 9 at pp. 1218-1219.
29Cf. Lagarde 1991 Rev.Crit. at 300-301.
3 °Dicey andMorris, (12th ed. 1993), Chapter 9 at pp. 1218-1219.
3 1Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp. v. Kuwait Insurance Co. [1984] AC 50, at p. 65, Per Lord Diplock;
E.I. du Pont de Nemours v. Agnew [1987] 2 LI L R 592 (CA), at p. 595.
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disputes submitted to them. Nevertheless, the issue which arises from this kind of
award is whether the different jurisdictions (both in countries with advanced
arbitration systems and in those with less developed systems), support the application
of a-national principles in international commercial arbitration. In this section,
attention will be focused on the English courts' attitude to the recognition and
enforcement of the awards made on the basis of a-national principles, such as the
general principles of law, the new lexmercatoria and amiable composition.
As briefly outlined in the last section, the choice of law rules did not attract attention
until the eighteenth century. Since England was a single nation with a single common
law, international conflicts were precluded by the rule that the common law courts
were unable to entertain foreign causes. Therefore, any complaints filed by foreigners
and the issue of whether he was entitled to his protection had to be decided by the
special courts established by the King.32 During that time, no question of application
of the foreign or even English law arose, since the law merchant which was regarded
as a universally binding system was applied to each of the cases involving
international trade disputes.
This special application ceased around the nineteenth century when the international
nature of this law had been incorporated into one of the branches of municipal English
law.33 Meanwhile, the application of foreign law to the cases has been accepted by
the English courts provided such an application was necessary.34 In other words, the
3 2Cheshire and North's on Private International Law, (11th ed.) at p. 23.
33Ibid. at p. 24.
34But the foreign law needed to be proved as discussed in the last section of this chapter.
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English courts changed their views and came to hold that the term "rules of law" could
not only be English law but also the law of any State.35
The English courts insisted on the need for arbitrators to apply the "rules of law". As
expressed in the early cases, in England "There is no doubt that an arbitrator is bound
by the rules of law like every other judge, and if it appears on the face of the record
that the arbitrator has acted contrary to law, his award may be set aside."36 The
principle was established that the common law had jurisdiction to set aside awards for
exfacie error of law in the nineteenth century and was strongly supported by the later
jurists and judges,37 such as Denning L.J. (as he then was) who said: "there is not
one law for arbitrators and another for the court. There is one law for all."38
Despite efforts to invoke a more liberal attitude towards international commercial
arbitration, an application of rules of law to arbitration cases was one of the
requirements to allow the English courts to enforce awards. Accordingly, it was noted
that not only did a close relationship between arbitration and the courts exist but also a
desire of the courts to supervise the arbitration procedures prevails in the English
courts. Mr. Thomas provided an explanation for this situation:
"The underlying policy probably emanates from the fact that arbitration, albeit
predominantly consensual and voluntary, is nonetheless perceived as a
fragment of the administration of civil justice and in common with all its other
component parts must function in accordance with legal principles. The
adoption of this principle ensures that arbitrations can be effectively
supervised; that the total arbitral decision-making process functions with at
35Bulk Oil (ZUG) A.G. v. Sun International Ltd., [1983] 1 LI L R 655. In this case, Bingham J.
upheld the arbitrator's decision to apply European Community law as the proper law of the contract.
36Aubert v. Maze (1801) 2 Bos. & Pul. 371, 375. See also Morgan v. Mather (1792) 2 Ves Jun. 15;
Kent v. Estob (1802) 3 East 18; Blennerhassetv. Day (1811) 2 Ball & B. 104; Hodgkinson v. Fernie
(1857) 3 C.B. (N.S.) 189.
37Thomas, The Law and Practice Relating to Appealsfrom Arbitration Awards, (1994).
3 David Taylor & Son Ltd. v. Barnett Trading Co. [1958] 1 WLR 562, at p. 570.
156
Chapter Seven: England
least a substantial degree of consistency; and that a fair balance is maintained
between arbitrating parties.39
This idea was not only supported by the academics but also by the judges from the
English courts, such as Lord Goddard C.J. who said that "primafacie the duty of an
arbitrator is to act in accordance with the law of the land."40 Unlike some countries in
continental Europe, such as Belgium and France, English courts did not go as far as
these countries did in expressly adopting the application of a-national principles in
international commercial arbitration. While a-national principles are frequently applied
to international commercial arbitration cases in practice, the request for recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards made on the basis of a-national principles caused a
great deal of controversy in the English courts.
7.2.1 The application of the general principles of international law
While English judges are not allowed to apply a-national principles to disputes
submitted to them, frequently arbitrators are empowered to decide the disputes on the
basis of legislation, common law, equity and the principles of public international law
with the parties' agreement.41 Among these, the general principles of international
law are frequently chosen as the proper law of the contract. This is especially so in the
case of state contracts. As mentioned in Chapter Four, it may be due to the fact that no
agreement is reached between the parties or neither party wants to have the contract
3 Thomas, The Law and Practice Relating to Appealsfrom Arbitration Awards, (1994); al so see
Czarnikow v. Roth, Schmidt & Co. [1922] 2 KB 478 (CA); Orion Cia. Espanola de Seguros v.
BelfortMaat. etc. [1962] 2 LI L R 257.
40Podar Lading Co. v. Tagher [1942] 2 KB 277, at p. 288. See also, Hooper & Co. v. Balfour,
Williamson & Co. (1890) 62 L.T. 646; Mitchell Gill v. Buchan, 1921 SC 390; N.V. Vulcaan v.
Mowinckels Rederi A/S [1938] 2 All E R 152; David Taylor & Son Ltd. v. Barnett Trading Co.
[1953] 1 W.L.R. 562; Techno-Impexv. Gebr. van Weelde Scheepvaartkantoor B.V. [1981] 2 All E R
669.
41Vulcaan (N.V. etc.) v. Mowinckels Rederi A/S [1938] 2 All. E.R. 152; Orion Cia. Espanola de
Seguros v. Belfort Maat. etc. [1962] 2 LI L R 257.
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governed by the national law of the other. This choice has been applied in a number
of well-known cases concerning oil concession contracts, such as the Sapphire,42
AMINOIL,43.ARAMCO,44 BP,45 LIAMCO,46 and TEXACO41arbitrations.
In England, traditionally, public international law was regarded as the law governing
relations between sovereign states, rather than between private parties. In accordance
with this concept, private parties could not properly be the subjects of public
international law. Consequently, this kind of choice could be challenged before the
English courts if private parties sought to have their contracts governed by public
international law.
Nevertheless, this hostile attitude towards the application of public international law
has been partially modified. In the last twenty years, a choice of the "general
principles of international law" which indicates public international law is only valid in
conjunction with the application of a municipal law. In other words, the choice of
public international law has been recognised as a valid choice provided that it is
incorporated into the English law. This idea can be observed in the judgment made by
Scarman L.J. in the case of Thai-Europe Ltd. v. Pakistan Government,48 concerning
the issue of sovereign immunity. As he observed:
42Sapphire International Petroleum Ltd. v. The National Iranian Oil Company, (1964) 13 I.C.L.Q.
1011.
43American Independent Oil Company Inc. v. The Government of the States ofKuwait, 21 l.L.M.
976(1982).
44Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company (1963) 27 l.L.R. 117.
4 ^British Petroleum (Libyan) Ltd. v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, (1979) 53 l.L.R.
297.
4^Libyan American Oil Company v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, (1982) 62 l.L.R.
140.
42Texas Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v. The Government of
the Libyan Arab Republic, 17 l.L.M. 3 (1978).
48[1975] 1 WLR 1485.
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"I think it is important to realise that a rule of international law, onee
incorporated into our law by decisions of a competent court, is not an inference
of fact but a rule of law. It therefore becomes part of our municipal law and the
doctrine of stare decisis applies as much to that as to a rule of law with a
strictly municipal provenance."49
This judgment was upheld in the case of Amin Rasheed Corp. v. Kuwait Insurance
Co.,50 where the House of Lords decided that a combination of national law and
international law as the proper law of a state contract could be a successful choice of
the proper law before the English courts.51 The House also stressed that public
international law cannot be applied alone, "except by reference to the system of law by
which the legal consequences ... [are] to be ascertained."52
This decision was also confirmed in a latter case of Dallal v. Bank Mellal 55 In this
case, relying on The Laconic case54 and Messina v. Petrococchino 55 Hobhouse J.
stated:
"If private law rights are to exist, they must exist as part of some municipal
legal system, and public international law is not such a system. If [it] is to play
a role in providing the governing law which gives an agreement between ...
individuals legal force, it has to do so by having been absorbed into some
system of municipal law.56
49Ibid. at p. 1495; also sec The Cristina [1938] AC 485, 497.
50[1984] AC 50; also see Dallal v. Bank Mellat [1986] QB 441; [1986] 2 WLR 745 and Trendtex
Trading Corp. v. Central Bank ofNigeria [1977] QB 529, 554.
51As to the issue of which system of law should be chosen to combine with public international law
as the proper law of a contract, following the traditional view the lex fori has always had a great
significance when the courts try to decide the issue. That is, with the belief that state contracts must
be governed by the national law, the application of the substantive law of the lexfori as the
governing law is usually presumed by the English courts and commentators. It is supported by the
case of Tzortzis v. Monarck Line A/B [1986] WLR 406 (CA) and Park, "The Lex Loci Arbitri and
International Commercial Arbitration: When andWhy Does It Matters" (1983) 32 I.C.L.Q. 21 at p.
24. Also as Dicey andMorris comments: "When the arbitration clause is part of a contract, there is a
very strong presumption that the proper law of the contract (including the arbitration clause) is the
law of the country in which the arbitration is to be held." (Dicey andMorris, Vol. 2 at p. 1127).
-,2A/m'« Rasheed Corp. v. Kuwait Insurance Co. [1984] 1 AC 50, at pp. 60-65.
53[1986] QB 441; [1986] 2 WLR 745.
54(1863) 2 Moore PC (NS) 161.
55(1872) L.R. 4 PC 144.
56[1986] QB 441; [1986] 2 WLR 745, at p. 759.
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In the cases involving international commercial arbitration, the courts sometimes tend
to interpret the term "general principles of international law" as the commercial
principles existing in international trade, rather than the rules governing the
relationship between states. These principles are under different names in different
legal literature, such as the new lex mercatoria, law merchant, international trade law
... and so on. Nevertheless, the application of the new lex mercatoria is also
controversial among the academics and judges. This long-running debate concerning
the validity of a choice of the new lex mercatoriaas the proper law of the contract
before the English courts will be discussed in the following section.
7.2.2 The application of the new lex mercatoria
While international arbitral tribunals frequently apply the new lex mercatoria to
disputes arising from international commerce, the English courts did not reach an
agreement on this issue until one decade ago. Generally speaking, before the Rakoil
case,57 the English courts held a rather negative attitude towards the enforcement of
awards made on the basis of the new lex mercatoria. Primarily, in England,
arbitrators are required to follow the rules of law regarding procedure and evidence, as
well as the rules of the substantive law. Apart from having no power to make an
award based on their personal feeling of justice58 as would be the case on the
continent, the attitude of the English courts towards the application of the new lex
mercatoria has been cautious.
57Deutsche-und Tiejbohrgesellshafl v. RasAl Khaimah National Oil Co. and Shell International
Petroleum Co. Ltd. (DST v. Rakoil) [1987] 3 WLR 1023.




In England, the new lex mercatoria was not regarded as law because it is lacking in
definition. Consequently, the awards decided on the basis of the new lex mercatoria
were not enforced before the English courts.59 This argument has been strongly
supported by Lord Mustill. He said that, first of all, arbitrators cannot apply the new
lexmercatoria on their own. Secondly, an agreement made by the parties to submit
their disputes to arbitration pursuant to the new lex mercatoria or its English
equivalent is void. Finally, an award rendered by arbitrators according to the new lex
mercatoria ought not to be enforced in the English courts, at least if the award is
required to be enforced by the New York Convention. He refused the application of
the new lex mercatoria because of its uncertainty and said:
"To my mind, the whole purpose of a contract being regarded as enforceable in
law is that the parties can ascertain their rights and duties by reference to some
external objective standard, before any dispute has risen, and can be confident
that if a dispute does arise those rights and duties will be enforced as they
stand. There cannot be a contract which is governed by no law at all."60
This hostile attitude towards the application of the new lexmercatoria can easily be
found in a number of English cases. For instance, as early as 1922, this notion can be
seen in the case of Czarnikow v. Roth Schmidt & Co.,61 where the disputes arose
from a contract for the sale of sugar. A choice of law clause was contained in article
19 of the contract, in the following terms:
"Neither buyer, seller, trustee in bankruptcy, nor any other person as aforesaid
shall require, nor shall they apply to the Court to require, any arbitrators to
state in the form of a special case of the opinion of the Court any question of
law arising in the reference, but such question of law shall be determined in the
arbitration in manner herein directed."
59Mustill, "Contemporary Problems in International Commercial Arbitration: A Response", (1989)
17 Int'l Bus. Law 161, at pp. 161-162.
66Ibid. at p. 161.
61 [1922] 2 KB 478.
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Bankes L.J. decided that the underlying agreement between the parties was contrary to
public policy and was invalid on the ground that the statutory jurisdiction of the Courts
under the Arbitration Act 1889 was ousted, and public policy required the arbitrators
to apply a fixed and recognisable system of law. He explained:
"Among commercial men what are commonly called commercial arbitrations
are undoubtedly and deservedly popular. That they will continue their present
popularity. I entertain no doubt, as long as the law retains sufficient hold over
them to prevent and redress any injustice on the part of the arbitrator to secure
that the law that is administered by the arbitrator is in substance the law of the
land, and not some home-made law of theparticular arbitratoror theparticular
association. To release real and effective control over commercial arbitration is
to allow the arbitrator or the arbitration tribunal to be the law unto himself or
themselves, to give him or them a free hand to decide according to law, or not
according to law as he or they think fit; in other words, to be outside the
law."62 (emphasis added)
However, following the fast development of international commercial arbitration, as
strongly suggested by the believers of the new lex mercatoria, the English courts have
been advised to enforce the awards based on the new lexmercatoria in order to keep
pace with the rapid development of international commercial arbitration.63 From an
historical perspective, the believers in the new lex mercatoria argue that the dominance
of the common law courts did not abolish the law merchant, as shown in a number of
cases which date back several centuries. Among the academics, in 1936 Mr. Philip
provided the evidence of the absorption of the law merchant into the municipal law of
England, when he said:
"With the accession of Coke as Chief Justice in 1606, began a period during
which the law merchant in England was absorbed gradually into the common
law. The King's judges, always jealous of the special tribunals of the
merchants, usurped their functions and took over their law ... If the process of
absorption thus resulted inevitably in the increasing desuetude of the purely
commercial courts, the consequences on the substantive side were likely to be
equally marked. The customary doctrines of the law merchant could not be
62[1922] 2 KB 478 at 484.




fitted in all cases into the more rigid framework of the common law without
distortion. In more than one direction that was bound to backgrounds
peculiarly English and divorced from any international influences. With the
conclusion of the period of absorption, therefore, the commercial law of
England still might be based fundamentally on the customs of merchants, and
to that extent might retain a cosmopolitan flavour as its chief distinction ..."64
The same opinion was maintained by Sir William Holdsworth who suggested that a
significant economic development had been reflected by a blurring of the lines between
merchant and non-merchant and a comparable merging of mercantile law with the
common law of England.65
From the point of view of practice, the believers in the new lex mercatoria took the
case of Woodward v. Rowe 66 as a starting point for their arguments. In this case, the
court not only dismissed the defendant's argument that the plaintiff relied on "only a
particular custom among merchants, and not common law",67 but also allowed the
application of the new lex mercatoria since "the law of merchants is the law of the
land, and the custom is good enough generally for any man, without naming him
merchant."
Also in the case of Hutton v. Warren68 the court was of the opinion that the new lex
mercatoria was playing an important role in international commercial disputes by
supplying the customary practices that would be used as a guideline in interpreting and
enforcing contractual obligations. It is a role similar to that played by customary
practices in domestic law. As the court stated:
64Thayer, "Comparative Law and the Law Merchants", 6 Brook.L.Rev. 139 (1936), at pp. 142-143.
65Holdsworth, History ofEnglish Law, (7th ed. 1956), at p. 572.
66(1666) 2 KB 132, 84 English Report 84.
67Ibid. 133.
68(1836) 1 M & W 466, 150 English Report 517.
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"It has long been settled, that, in commercial transactions, extrinsic evidence of
custom and usage is admissible to annex incidents to written contracts, in
matters with respect to which they are silent. The same rule has also been
applied to contracts in other transactions of life, in which known usages have
been established and prevailed; and this has been done upon the principle or
presumption that, in such transactions, the parties did not mean to express in
writing the whole of the contract by which they intended to be bound, but to
contract with reference to those known usages."69
Again, the court, relying on a custom of the country on cultivation and the terms of
quitting with respect to allowances for seed and labour, decided that the plaintiff and
defendant were bound by it even after the lease expired, since this custom was clearly
applicable to a tenancy from year to year, and, by implication, had been imported into
the lease.
Despite the objections to the application of the new lex mercatoria, in some recent
cases during last decade the application of the new lexmercatoria has been confirmed.
In the leading case of Deutsche-und Tiefbohrgesellshaft v. Ras Al Khaimah National
Oil Co. and Shell International Petroleum Co. Ltd. (DST v. Rakoil),70 an agreement
for the exploration of oil contained a clause providing for the settlement of all disputes
by three arbitrators appointed in Geneva under the rules of the I.C.C., and the
determination of the proper law to be applied to the contract was left to the arbitrators.
The arbitrators decided to choose "internationally accepted principles of law governing
contractual relations" as the proper law and made the final award in favour of the
plaintiffs. The losing party argued before the Court of Appeal that the enforcement of
the award would be against English public policy because the award was not decided
on the basis of any national law. The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendants'
69Ibid. 475, 150 English Report 517, at p. 521.
7®Deutsche-und Tiefbohrgesellshaft v. Ras Al Khaimah National Oil Co. and Shell International
Petroleum Co. Ltd. (DST v. Rakoil) [1987] 3 WLR 1023.
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appeal concerning the proper law and upheld the arbitrators' choice of "internationally
accepted principles of law" to govern contractual relations between the parties, since it
did not lead to the conclusion that the parties did not intend to create legally
enforceable rights and obligations. Accordingly, such a choice did not affect the
validity of the award under Swiss law which was the procedural law of the arbitration
and the law governing the arbitration agreement; moreover, the enforcement of the
award would not be contrary to English public policy. With regard to public policy,
Sir John Donaldson M.R. suggested that as long as the parties intended to create
legally enforceable rights and obligations, a request for enforcement of an arbitral
award made on the basis of a system of law which was not that of England or of any
other state or was a serious modification of such a law would be granted.71 As he
stated:
"Considerations of public policy can never be exhaustively defined, but they
should be approached with extreme caution. ... It has to be shown that there is
some element of illegality or that the enforcement of the award would be
clearly injurious to the public good or, possibly, that enforcement would be
wholly offensive to the ordinary reasonable and fully informed member of the
public on whose behalf the powers of the state are exercised.72
And,
"Asking myself these questions, I am left in no doubt that the parties intended
to create legally enforceable rights and liabilities and that the enforcement of the
award would not be contrary to public policy."73
Furthermore, it is followed by a discussion on the certainty of the clause of choice of
law:
"By choosing to arbitrate under the Rules of the ICC and, in particular, art.
13.3, the parties have left the proper law to be decided by the arbitrators and
have not in terms confined the choice to national systems of law. I can see no
basis for concluding that the arbitrators' choice of proper law, a common
denominator or principles underlying the laws of the various nations governing
llIbid. [1990] 1 AC 295, at pp. 315-316; [1987] 3. WLR 1023 at pp. 1035-1036.
^^ibid. at p. 1035.
73Ibid, at p. 1035.
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contractual relations, is outwith the scope of the choice which the parties left to
the arbitrators. "74
This case also provides a positive answer to the question of whether the English courts
hold a similar attitude towards the cases where the application of the new lex
mercatoriais on the arbitrators' own initiative rather than on the basis of the parties'
agreement.
Two years later, in an obiter dictum, a positive attitude was expressed by Lloyd L.J.
concerning the question of whether an award in the form issued in the DST v. Rakoil
case would equally be upheld if it had been issued in England.75 He emphasised that,
by insisting on the application of a fixed and recognised system of law, "no ICC
arbitration could ever be held with confidence in this country for fear that the
arbitrators might adopt the same governing law as they did in DST v. Rakoil. "76
Eurthermore, he stated: "If the English Courts will enforce a foreign award where the
contract is governed by 'a system of law which is not that of England or any other
state or is a serious modification of such a law,' why should it not enforce an English
award in like circumstances?"77
In addition, a friendly attitude towards the application of the new lexmercatoria in
arbitration can be observed in the Channel Tunnel Case.78 In this case, the plaintiffs
employed the defendants to construct a cooling system in a tunnel which was also
under construction under the English Channel between England and France.
74/Mf. at p. 1035.




^^Channel Tunnel Group v. Balfour Beatty Ltd. [1993] AC 334; [1993] 2 WLR 262.
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However, a dispute arose as to the amounts payable in respect of the work on the
cooling system. The House of Lords dismissed the appeal made by the plaintiffs and
stated that the court had an inherent power to stay proceedings brought before it in
breach of an agreement to decide disputes by an alternative method; especially, since
the procedure for resolving disputes had been agreed between the parties and fell
within section 1 of the Arbitration Act 1975. The judges did not challenge the choice
of law clause which contained an application of the new lexmercatoria to the contract
which stipulates:
"The construction, validity and performance of the contract shall in all respects
be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the principles common to
both English law French law, and in the absence of such common principles
by such general principles of international trade law as have been applied by
national and international tribunals."
In fact, Lord Mustill confirmed that it was by now firmly established that more than
one national system of law may bear upon an international arbitration to regulate the
substantive rights and duties of the parties.79
The most important message revealed from the Channel Tunnel case was that Lord
Mustill, who was regarded as the leading representative of the non-believers in the
new lex mercatoria, expressed a more understanding view about the application of a-
national principles. He said that, under the special circumstances and needs of the
Channel Tunnel venture, it may be the right choice for the parties to choose an
indeterminate "law" to govern their substantive rights. Also, he concluded that no
matter whether this choice of law was right or wrong, it was the choice which the
parties had made; moreover, he believed that ordering an injunction in this case would
be to act contrary both to the general tenor of the construction contract and to the spirit
79Ibid. [1993] AC 334, at p. 357.
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of international arbitration, though the courts could and should in the right case
provide reinforcement of the arbitral process.80 Furthermore, the court simply
directed the parties to resolve their disputes by means of arbitration without expressing
any objection about the potential application of the new lex mercatoria, that is, the
general principles of international trade law. Such a friendly attitude is also embodied
in section 46 of the 1996 Arbitration Act.
In comparison with the French Courts, the English Courts hold a more cautious, or
even hesitant, attitude towards the application of the new lex mercatoria in
international commercial arbitration cases. Nevertheless, from the evidence showing a
certain degree of relaxation of the resistance towards the application of the new lex
mercatoria in the cases, legislation and literature (especially after the Channel Tunnel
case and the 1996 Arbitration Act) it is believed that the application of the new lex
mercatoria is allowed in the English courts.
7.2.3 The application of the notion of amiable composition
Amiable composition, a device which originated and developed in France and other
civil law countries, is a less established concept in the common law countries.81
England is no exception to this. Especially, the enforcement of awards rendered on
the basis of amiable composition is a matter of disagreement among the English jurists
and judges. Generally speaking, in common law jurisdictions and in England, such
clauses are often called "equity clauses".82 Though the English courts have
S0Ibid. 1993] AC 334, at p. 363; [1993] 2 WLR 262, at p. 291.
8 1Boru, International commercial arbitration in the United States, (1994), at p. 135.
82Maccom, The Law ofInsurance, (1989), at pp. 16-17. However, Michael Kerr claims that amiable
composition, though a kind of equity clause, should be regarded as a contract between the parties. See




encountered the issue of amiable composition several times, they have failed to
provide a clear indication about the issue, and, the answers given have fluctuated.
The application of amiable composition can be traced back to a time two centuries ago.
At that time, it was the judges who explicitly acknowledged that arbitrators did not
need to apply the strict law if its application would have produced a harsh result. This
idea can be seen as early as 1791, in the case of Knox v. Symmonds,83 where the
Lord Chancellor expressed his opinion in these words: "the arbitrator has a greater
latitude than the court in order to do complete justice between the parties for instance
he may relieve against a right which bears hard upon one party, but which having been
acquired legally and without fraud, could not be resisted in a Court of Justice."84
Almost a century later, the case of Rolland v. Cassidy,85 a Canadian appeal
concerning a clause of amiable composition, was brought to the Privy Council. While
accepting the validity of the clause, the court also referred to the expression amiable
compositeurs under Article 1346 of the Code of Civil Procedure which stated:
"Arbitrators must hear the parties, and their respective proofs, or establish fault against
them, and decide according to the Rules of law, unless they are dispensed from doing
so by the terms of the submission, or unless they have been appointed as 'amiable
compositeursIn other words, amiable compositeurs were to be exempt from the
strictness of the obligations imposed by law. Moreover, the Earl of Selbourne
advised:
"Their Lordships would, no doubt, hesitate much before they held that to
entitle arbitrators named as amiables compositeurs to disregard all law, and to
be arbitrary in their dealings with the parties; but the distinction must have
83(1791) 1 Ves. Jun. 369, 30 English Report 390.
84Ibid. 370, 30 English Report 390, at p. 391.
85(1888) 13 AC 770.
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some reasonable effect given to it, and the least effect which can reasonably be
given to the words is, that they dispense with the strict observance of those
rules of law the non-observance of which, as applied to awards, results in no
more than irregularity."86
He also went on to say:
and being cimiablescompositeurs, and not bound to proceed with strict
form and regularity in everything, though they were, as their Lordships
assume, bound to proceed according to the substantial rules of justice."87
Such a liberal approach was followed in Jager v. Tolme and Runge.88 A phrase
"appeal to the council for a decision" was found in the contract and challenged by the
defendant on the ground that such language had given the council the powers to make
a new contract between the parties on the basis of what they thought was fair and
reasonable. Pickford L.J. neither agreed with the defendant's argument, nor disputed
the validity of the clause. He simply pointed out that such a clause ought to be
expressed in the clearest possible terms if it is to have such an effect.89 The same
opinion was also expressed by Lord Phillimore in a later case in which he determined
that arbitrators, provided no special directions are given limiting or conditioning their
functions, might be empowered to depart from the strict rules of the law.90
Nevertheless, about the same period, the admission of the amiable composition clause
was seriously questioned by Bankes L.J. in Czarnikow v. Roth Schmidt & Co.91 He
expressed doubts about amiable composition, saying:
"... I entertain no doubt, so long as the law retains sufficient hold over them to
prevent and redress any injustice on the part of the arbitrator, and to secure that
the law that is administered by an arbitrator is in substance the law of the land,
86Ibid. at pp. 772-773.
81Ibid, at p. 774.
88[1916] 1 KB 939.
89lbid. at p. 957.
90Board ofTrade v. Cayzer Irvine & Co. [1927] AC 610, at pp. 628-629.
91 [1922] 2 KB 478.
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and not some home-made law of the particular arbitrator or the particular
association. To release real and effective control over commercial arbitrations
is to allow the arbitrator, or the arbitration tribunal, to be a law unto himself, or
themselves, to give him or them a free hand to decide according to law or not
according to law as he or they think fit, in other words to be outside the
law."92
He also indicated that the courts "do not allow the agreement of private parties to oust
the jurisdiction of the King's Courts. Arbitrators, unless expressly otherwise
authorised, have to apply the laws of England. ... There must be no Alsatia in
England where the King's writ does not run."93
Scrutton L.J. also expressed certain doubts in this case. He believed that commercial
men would make a great mistake if they ignored the importance of administering
settled principles of law in commercial disputes,94 by putting their cases into the hands
of fellows businessmen who did not have the necessary legal knowledge, but were
prepared to decide the cases by departing from the principles of law.95
Furthermore, the judgment delivered by the Court of Appeal in David Taylor & Son
Ltd. v. Barnett Trading Co.96 was another example of hostility to the application of
amiable composition. In this case, a dispute which arose from an illegal contract for
the sale of Irish stewed steak was referred to arbitration. The umpire found in favour
of the plaintiff, but failed to give a reason for his award. The Court of Appeal decided
to set aside the award because of the umpire's misconduct in law. Denning L.J. (as he
9 2Ibid, at p. 484-485.
93Ibid. 488.
94The importance was also stressed by Atkin L.J. in this case, at p. 491.
95[1922] 2 KB 478, at p. 489.
96[1953] 1 WLR 562, at p. 568.
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then was) refused to enforce the contract and also postulated that "there is not one law
for arbitrators and another for the court. There is one law for all."97
In addition, Singleton L.J. supported Denning's opinions and stressed that, rather
than according to what an arbitrator may consider fair and reasonable in the
circumstances, the duty of an arbitrator was to decide the question submitted to him
according to the legal rights of the parties.98 Moreover, he suggested that "if an
arbitrator knows that a contract is illegal, and thereafter proceeds to make an award
upon a dispute arising under that contract, he is guilty of that which is in law
misconduct."99
With a great deal of support from his fellow judges, Megaw J. went further than the
case law in the Orion case.100 In this case, a dispute arising from a quota share non-
marine reinsurance treaty was referred to arbitration. An arbitration clause was
provided: "The Arbitrators and Umpire are relieved from all judicial formalities and
may abstain from following the strict rules of the law. They shall settle any dispute
under this Agreement according to an equitable rather than a strictly legal interpretation
of its terms and their decision shall be final and not subject to appeal." Megaw J.
explicitly ruled that, under English law, it would be against public policy for the
arbitrators not to apply to the case a fixed and recognisable system of law (English law
in his opinion), and stated:
"If the parties choose to provide in their contract that the rights and obligations
shall not be decided in accordance with law but in accordance with some other
criteria, such as what the arbitrators consider to be fair and reasonable,
91Ibid, at p. 570.
'"ibid. at p. 565.
"ibid, at p. 566.
100Orion Compania Espanola de Seguros v. Belfort Maatschappij Voor Algemene Verzekgringeen
[1962] 2 LI L R 257.
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whether or not in accordance with law, then, if that provision has any effect at
all, its effect, as I see it, would be that there would be no contract, because the
parties did not intend the contract to have legal effect - to affect their legal
relations. If there were no contract, there would be no legally binding
arbitration clause, and an 'award' would not be an award which the law would
recognise."101
Therefore,
"The conclusion which I draw from those judgements is that it is the policy of
the law of this country that, in the conduct of arbitrations, arbitrators must in
general apply a fixed and recognisable system of law, which primarily and
normally would be the law of England, and that they cannot be allowed to
supply some different criterion such as the view of the individual arbitrator or
umpire on abstract justice or equitable principles, which, of course, does not
mean "equity" in the legal sense of the word at all."102
Nevertheless, instead of being followed in later cases, Megaw J.'s judgment has been
criticised by some of these. For instance, Lord Denning M.R. argued that the
arbitrator's decision would be final and binding if the arbitrator was directed to
"interpret this agreement and the rights and duties of the parties rather as honourable
undertakings than by strict rules of law."103 Again, in the Eagle Star Insurance case,
where a dispute arose from a reinsurance treaty, he decided that a clause conferring
upon arbitrators the powers not to be bound by strict legal principles but to settle any
differences referred to them according to an equitable legal interpretation of the
provisions of the agreement was reasonable and valid. He observed:
"I do not believe that the presence of such a clause makes the whole contract
void or a nullity. It is a perfectly good contract. If there is anything wrong with
the provision, it can only be on the ground that it is contrary to public policy
for parties so to agree. I must say that I cannot see anything in public policy to
make this clause void. On the contrary the clause seems to me to be entirely
reasonable. It does not oust the jurisdiction of the courts. It only ousts
technicalities and strict constructions. That is what equity did in the old days.
And it is what arbitrators may properly do under such a clause as this."104
1017fc;<^. at p. 264.
1 °^Ibid.
103/?i'ver Thames Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Al Ahleia Insurance Co. S.A.K. [1973] 2 LI L R 2, at p. 7.




"So I am prepared to hold that this arbitration clause, in all its provisions, is
valid and of full effect, including the requirement that the arbitrators shall
decide on equitable grounds rather than as strict legal interpretation."105
In the matter of awarding interest, this positive attitude was also supported in a later
case where the issue was whether under common law interest could be claimed by
way of damages in respect of a late or withheld payment due under the contract.106
The Court upheld that an arbitrator has power to apply common sense to claims for
interest and is not debarred by the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934
from awarding damages by way of compound interest.107 As Lord Denning
concluded:
"In my opinion the arbitrators in the City of London are not bound by the strict
rules of the common law courts or of the statutes applicable to them, for this
simple reason: that those are rules of practice only which do not govern the
practice of arbitrators. Arbitrators have a wide discretion to award interest
whenever it is just and equitable to do so."108
The decision was followed by the case of Home Insurance Co.109 where the
defendants argued that due to lack of authority to make a contract, the agreement was
binding in honour only and not in law. On the contrary, the plaintiffs claimed that the
105Ibid. Considering the contradictory opinions in the Orion and Eagle Star cases, Donaldson MR in
the case of Dutsche Schachtbau-und TiefbohrgesellschaftM.B.H. v. Ras Al Khaimah National Oil
Co. and Shell International Petroleum Co. Ltd. [1988] 2 LI L R 293, provided three guidelines to
examine equity clauses. That is, the court had to be satisfied that the parties intended to create legally
enforceable rights and obligations, that the resulting agreement would constitute a sufficiently legally
enforceable contract and diat the enforcement of the award would not be contrary to public policy.
1 06Tehno-Impex v. Gebrvan Weelde Scheepvartkantoor B.V. [1982] 3 All ER 669.
107/i>/<f. The Master of the Rolls, Lord Denning, went further. He even held that arbitrators are not
bound by the strict rules of the Common law Courts and have "a wide discretion to award interest
whenever it is just and equitable to do so. This discretion covers the rate of interest and the period for
which it should be allowed, no matter whether the principal sum is paid before or after the arbitration
has started, of before or after the award is made."
108[1982] 3 All ER 669, at p. 678.
1 09Home Insurance Co. and St. PaulFire andMarine Insurance Co. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de
Stat [1983] 2 LI L R 674.
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agreement was valid. An arbitration clause was contained in the agreement between
the parties. The clause provided: "This treaty shall be interpreted as an honourable
engagement rather than as a legal obligation and the award shall be made with a view
to effecting the general purpose of this treaty rather than in accordance with a literal
interpretation of its language..." After considering the evidence, Parker J. dismissed
the defendant's contention that the agreement had no legal effect, and said that: "It is
plain that it was the common intention that there should be an enforceable obligation to
arbitrate and to abide by the award. All that was intended was to free the arbitrators to
some extent from strict rules and this, on the authority of the Eagle Star case, is
permissible."110
Following this new development, however, some judges disagree with the idea which
frees arbitrators from the strict rules of law without more cautious considerations. For
instance, in Overseas Union Insurance Ltd. v. A.A. Mutual Insurance Co. Ltd.in
Evans J. criticised the judgments made in the Eagle Star and Home Insurance cases.
Holding a more circumspect attitude towards the equity clause embodied in the
arbitration clause, he not only expressed his doubts, but also pointed out that the two
previous judgments mentioned above did not clarify how far an equity clause can go.
He observed:
"..., the effect of the equity clause is not clearly settled as a matter of law. ...
Although the clause may entitle the arbitrators "to view the matter more
leniently" sc. than a court would do, I am doubtful whether they can embark
on any other inquiry than what the law requires, namely finding the natural and
proper meaning of the words used, in the particular context."112
110Ibid, at p. 677.
111 [1988] 2 LI L R 63.
112Ibid. at p. 72.
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Further scepticism about the equity clause was added by the case of Home and
Overseas Insurance Co. v. Mentor Insurance.113 This case involved a dispute arising
from reinsurance contracts between the parties. Under clause 18 of the insurance
contracts, the arbitration clause mandated arbitrators to "make their award with a view
to effecting the general purpose of this reinsurance in a reasonable manner rather than
in accordance with a literal interpretation of the language." Parker L.J. dismissed the
appeal and directed the parties to go to arbitration. He expressed no hesitation in
accepting the argument that "a clause which purported to free arbitrators to decide
without regard to the law and according, for example, to their own notions of what
would be fair would not be a valid arbitration clause."114 Nevertheless, he did not
think that the arbitration clause in this case did any such thing.115 Furthermore, it
simply appeared to do no more than give the arbitrators liberty to do that which was
approved by the guidelines set by Lord Denning in the Antaios case which contained
the words "I take this opportunity of re-stating that if detailed semantic and syntactical
analysis of words in a commercial contract is going to lead to a conclusion that flouts
business common-sense, it must be made to yield to business common-sense."116
However, in an obiter dictum Lloyd L.J. expressed his approval of the equity clause.
He said: "I see no reason why the parties should not require the arbitrators to adopt, in
the words of Lord Justice Robert Goff, the more lenient view, even if a Court would
likely to adopt a stricter view."117 He went on to say: "I do not see why it should not
be open to arbitrators, when so required to determine the rights of the parties in
113Home and Overseas Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mentor Insurance Co. (UK) Ltd. [1989] 1 LI L R 473.
114Ibid. p. 485.
115Ibid. p. 485.
116Antaios Compania naviera S.A. v. Salen Rederierna A.B. [1984] AC 191 (HL).




accordance with the 'general purpose' of the reinsurance, in order to resolve a
contractual 'ambiguity' in the wider sense."118
While some foreign jurisdictions, such as France and the United States, have already
accepted or are prepared to accept the transnational arbitral decisions when an express
mandate to decide was authorised by the parties, English courts held a rather hesitant
or even hostile attitude towards this issue. As the remarks made by Megaw J.119
show, he believes that "it is the policy of the law in this country that, in the conduct of
arbitrations, arbitrators must in general apply a fixed and recognisable system of
law..."
Nevertheless, the confusion concerning the application of amiable composition was
eventually cleared by the enactment of the 1996 Arbitration Act. With the intention of
enhancing the competitiveness of the arbitration industry in England and Wales, the
Arbitration Act 1996 sweeps away the Arbitration Acts of 1950, 1975, and 1979. In
the new Act, section 46 provides provision for the rules applicable to the substance of
the dispute. In accordance with section 46(l)(b), "the arbitral tribunal shall decide the
dispute if the parties so agree, in accordance with such other considerations as are
agreed by them or determined by the tribunal." This section can be construed in
favour of the notion of "amiable composition". It is suggested that this section means
that "the parties might want their dispute decided not under a recognised system of law
but under what are often referred to as "equity clauses", which is not uncommon in
international commercial contracts."120 The reason why the term 'amiable
llsIbid. p. 488.
119Orion Cia. Espanola de Seguros v. BelfortMaat. etc. [1962] 2 LI L R 257, at p. 264. See also
Maritime Insurance Co. v. Assekuranz-Union von 1869 (1935) 52 LI L R 16; Home andOverseas
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mentor Insurance Co. (UK) Ltd. [1989] 1 LI L R 473 (CA).
120Rutlierford and Sims, Arbitration Act 1996: A Practice Guide, (1996), para. 46.4.
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composition' or deciding the case 'ex aequo et bono' is not used is because "the
expressions do not derive from English law or arbitration practice and it was felt
inappropriate to incorporate them into the Act, all the more so since Latin and French
phrases have been studiously avoided in the Act in the interests of simplicity and
understandability."121




Whether the French courts accept the application
of a-national principles in international
commercial arbitral awards
8.1 The hostile attitude in French legal history
The French courts have always tried to satisfy demands for a liberal framework of
international commercial arbitration. Nevertheless, similar to the hostility experienced
in the United States, arbitration was not always the favoured dispute settlement
mechanism in French legal history. For instance, in 1843, enthusiasm about
arbitration suffered a set-back in the case of Compagnie VAlliance v. Prunier,1 where
the dispute arose from a domestic fire insurance contract. An arbitration clause was
found in the contract. Nevertheless, the judgment rendered by the Cour de Cassation
proved to be a hindrance to the development of arbitration in France.
In the Prunier case, the language contained in Article 1006 of the French Code of Civil
Procedure, 1806 was the main issue. Article 1006 provided that "an agreement of
compromise that does not specify the matters in dispute and the names of the
arbitrators is void." In accordance with this provision, the agreement between parties
could only cover the disputes which had already arisen, rather than future disputes.
The court decided to ignore the parties' desire to have their dispute resolved by means
of arbitration. The court decided to apply Article 1006 to decide the validity of the
arbitration clause. Based on Article 1006, the arbitration clause was unenforceable on
1 Cass. civ. 10 July 1843, D. 1843.1.343, S. 1843.1 561. Discussed by von Mehren, "International
Commercial Arbitration: The Contribution of the French Jurisprudence", 46 Lou.L.R. 1046 (1986).
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the ground that the disputes did not exist when the clause was concluded.
Furthermore, the Cour de Cassation expressed its concern that individuals "would be
deprived of the guarantees that the courts afford"2 if an arbitration clause which failed
to specify the subject matter of a possible future dispute was enforced.
It was recognised that little room was left for arbitration under French law after the
Prunier case. The aim of speed and efficiency of arbitration could be never
guaranteed, since no binding arbitration clause could be made until disputes arose.
Consequently, the development of both domestic and international commercial
arbitration was seriously hindered.
Fortunately, this situation was changed after several decades. In the case of Mardele
v. Midler,3 where the disputes arose from a c.i.f. contract for 100 tons of Chilean
wheat between a French merchant and another French firm. The contract between the
parties provided for arbitration in London which was to be subject to the rules of the
London Corn Trade Association. According to Article 1006 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the Court of Appeal at Rennes determined that the arbitration clause was
void on the ground that the parties could not stipulate a foreign law to govern a
contract between French nationals.4
Nevertheless, the decision made by the Cour d'Appel was quashed by the Chambre
Civile of the Cour de Cassation. The Cour de Cassation had a rather liberal approach
which was different to the one applied in the Prunier case and held that the parties
2Cass. civ. 10 July 1843, D. 1843.1.344, S. 1843.1 568.
3Cass. civ. 19 Feb. 1930 S. 1933.1.41. Quoted by von Mehren, "International Commercial
Arbitration: The Contribution of the French Jurisprudence", 46 Lou.L.R. 1046 (1986).
4Ibid. The law of 30 December 1925, which had set aside the Prunier rule for commercial contracts -
domestic as well as international - did not apply to the cause, the decision in first instance having
been rendered prior to the law's effective date.
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should have the right to choose a foreign law to govern the contract as long as the
situation "involves the interest of international commerce." Moreover, it stated:
"the nullity of the arbitration clause provided for by article 1006 of the Code of
Civil Procedure not being of the ordrepublic in France, even if both parties are
French they can validly derogate in a contract, whether concluded abroad or in
France, from the provisions of this text and refer to a foreign law, such as
English law, which considers such clause valid."5
The Mardele case, in fact, released international commercial arbitration from the
constraints imposed by the Prunier rule. As Mr. von Mehren's comments about
Mardele indicated:
"The jurisprudence that culminated in Mardele also implied ideas and
techniques that were to continue to shape the French law's handling and
understanding of international commercial arbitration. In particular, this case
law strongly suggests that various aspects of the legal regime applicable to
domestic arbitrations do not apply to arbitrations which involve the interests of
international commerce. The jurisprudence further intimates that certain of the
rules and principles governing the regime applicable to international
commercial arbitrations need not flow from rules and principles found in a
national law. Particular rules and principles of a non-national character can be
developed to take into account the special qualities and requirements of
international commercial arbitration as a dispute-resolution process."6
After World War II, with more business people conducting international trade
activities, international commercial arbitration has frequently been chosen to settle
disputes. They demanded that fewer restrictions be imposed upon international
commercial arbitration. France was fully aware of this trend, and reacted in a positive
way by amending its arbitration law. After studying the numerous academic materials
and the decisions handed down by the French courts over the decades, the new French
arbitration law was codified in Section IV of the Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile
(Articles 1442-1507, added by the Decrees of 14 May 1980 and 12 May 1981,
referred to as the "1981 Decree" hereafter). Several important principles that




"implicate international commercial interests" are embodied in the 1981 Decree, for
instance: the distinction between domestic and international arbitration,7 limited
judicial interference and limited power to review international arbitration.
8.2 Article 1496 and 1497 of Section IV of the Nouveau
Code de Procedure Civile 1981
Generally speaking, France has been an arbitration friendly country. French courts
have adopted a liberal attitude towards international arbitral awards and arbitration held
within its territory. This liberal attitude also covers the issue of choice of law arising
from arbitration. The special status of international commercial arbitration has long
been recognised in French arbitration law, especially after the enactment of Section IV
of the 1981 Decree.
Due to the fact that some countries have dramatically reduced the restrictions on
arbitration held in their territories as well as the increasing concerns about the balance
between party autonomy in arbitral procedures and the need to ensure the integrity of
arbitral awards rendered in France, France decided to amend its arbitration law. This
was done especially because France was keen to foster a more friendly climate for
international arbitration proceedings held in France and to encourage Paris as a situs
for international commercial arbitration.
Compared to judges sitting in England and the United States, French judges have
shown a particular reluctance to interfere with arbitration procedures. This profoundly
7Carbonneau, "The Elaboration of a French Court Doctrine on International Arbitration: A Study in
Liberal Civilian Judicial Creativity", 55 Tul.L.Rev. 1 (1980).
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liberal attitude has traditionally been held by the French courts. As a result, France
has regarded herself as an ideal place for international commercial arbitration.
Believing the traditional lex fori rules were not well-fitted to the particularities and
needs of international trade8 and being encouraged by the wide acceptance of party
autonomy in the international commercial community, France recognised that
international commercial arbitration should be subject to different rules (including
choice of law rules) from those applicable to domestic arbitration held in France.
These changes can be seen in Articles 1496 and 1497 of the 1981 Decree, which
applies to all arbitral awards which claim to be governed by French law regardless of
the law or the agreement which they were connected with.9 The theoretical
propositions for these two provisions, and the whole framework of the French
arbitration law, are the concept of the non-jurisdictional nature of international
commercial arbitration and the principle of absolute party autonomy. In accordance
with these propositions, the arbitrator's authority and responsibilities derive from the
agreement between the parties, rather than from the State. As a result, unlike a
national judge, arbitrators are not required to follow the lex fori in order to choose the
procedural and substantive laws. In other words, in accordance with the 1981 Decree,
international commercial arbitration can be detached from any legal order.
In accordance with the 1981 Decree, the parties' choice of a particular national law
must be expressly stated and such a choice must conform to the requirements of
international public policy of the law applied to the disputes. In the absence of parties'
choice of law, Article 1496 gives arbitrators the authority to choose the governing law.
8David, Arbitration in International Trade, (1985), at p. 136.
9Robert, The French Law ofArbitration, (1983), at p. II-4-21.
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Instead of following the traditional idea which required arbitrators to apply the conflict
of laws rules of the country of the seat of arbitration, arbitrators are offered not only a
total discretion which allows them to select whatever legal rules they deems
appropriate, but also the authority to make a direct choice of the governing law.10
Following this change, arbitrators are no longer obliged to state or follow the precise
conflict of laws rules from which they ultimately determine the applicable law.
Moreover, arbitrators are allowed to apply rules of law other than national law regimes
if they deem it inappropriate to rule according to a national law. Conferring parties
with the power and arbitrators the discretion to designate "rules of law", Article 1496
provides:
"The arbitrator shall decide the dispute according to the rules of law chosen by
the parties; in the absence of such a choice, he shall decide according to rules
he deems appropriate.
In all cases he shall take into account trade usages."
This provision implies that arbitrators may be authorised to decide a dispute without
reference to any particular national law. In other words, the "rules of law" chosen by
the parties or arbitrators are not necessarily to be of a national origin. Compared to the
traditional method, this provision provides greater flexibility and freedom.
Consequently, with the flexibility offered by Article 1496, the formulation of "rules of
law" also includes general principles of law and the new lex mercatoria (which is also
known as the international law merchant). Furthermore, Article 1496(2), which
requires arbitrators to take commercial usage into account, also provides arbitrators a
chance to apply the rules borrowed from the new lex mercatoria, since some
commercial usages may be embodied in the new lexrnercatoria.11 Therefore, in the
I °Nevertheless, arbitrators do have the discretion to choose the substantive law through choice of
laws rules if they feel bound to do so.
IICommercial usage was distinguished from the lexmercatoria in that die former consists of practices
rather than rules restricted to a given branch of trade.
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case of international commercial arbitration, the traditional choice of a national law as
the proper law of the contract may be supplemented or even replaced by a reference to
the general principles of the law or the new lex mercatoria. As Jean Robert
commented: "the substance of Article 1496 requires the arbitral tribunal to take
commercial usages into account regardless of the rules which the parties or the tribunal
may have chosen. As a result, those commercial usages which make up the lex
mercatoria are incorporated into and given a full status in the French legislation on
international arbitration."12
In relation to the concept of amiable composition, Article 1497 confirms that the
arbitrator's power to act as an amiable compositeur will be upheld by the French
courts "if the parties' agreement conferred this authority upon him."13 Apart from the
cases where the strict rules of law are chosen, this provision allows the arbitrators to
decide the case ex aequo et bono provided they are empowered to do so.
Furthermore, in accordance with Article 1482, no appeal is allowed when the
arbitrator is offered the authority to act as an amiable compositeur unless the parties
expressly reserved the right to appeal in their Term of Reference.14 Accordingly,
amiable composition will not be a ground for either party to challenge the award before
the French courts, since the arbitrators have decided the case in accordance with the
power granted by the parties.
12Robert, The French Law ofArbitration, (1983), at p. II-4-23.
13Article 1497: 'The arbitrator shall decide as "amiable compositeur" if the parties' agreement
conferred this authority upon him."
14In domestic arbitrations expressly established under the powers of amiable composition, Article 42
of the 1981 Decree provides that, except in certain specific instances, the arbitral award is not subject




8.3 Acceptance of international commercial arbitral awards
made on the basis of a-national principles by the French
courts
As discussed in the last section, it is perfectly legitimate for a-national principles,
either supplementing or replacing a particular national law, to be chosen as the proper
law of an international contract in an international commercial arbitration. In this
section, the examination will be focused on the French courts' attitude towards the
application of a-national principles as the substantive law in the cases of international
commercial arbitration. The judgments which have considered the application of the
new lex mercatoria and amiable composition will be discussed separately in the
following parts of this section.
8.3.1 The application of the new lex mercatoria
Before the seventeenth century, the lexmercatoria (mercantile law or droit commercial)
was a body of law instituted and administered by merchants and concerning merchants
only. Decades after disappearing from the international commercial community, the
lex mercatoria was once again considered and widely discussed among jurists and
scholars. Some scholars named it the new "lex mercatoria" in order to distinguish it
from the old lex mercatoria.15 Although the new lex mercatoria had already lost most
of the original distinctive characteristics which had been applied in the 17th century,
we still can find its influence over the development of international commercial
arbitration in the French legal system.16
1ASee Chapter 5.
16See the decisions of the Cour d'Appeal de Versailles of May 19, 1988 and the Cour de Cassation,
February 5 , 1991, DMF 1991, 292, which held that seven Institute clauses (including the Institute
Cargo clauses, War clauses andWar Cancellation clause) in amarine cargo insurance were: "a
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In its present form the new lex mercatoria is made by the state, enforced by the courts
within the hierarchy of the ordinary state courts (which hierarchy is headed by the
Courde Cassation), and, rather than a law for merchants, it is the body of law which
covers all mercantile activities. A remarkable example of the lawmaker's acceptance
of the new lexmercatoria as an autonomous source of law is embodied in the 1981
Decree. Article 1496(1) of the 1981 Decree provides that in international commercial
arbitration: "the arbitrator shall settle the dispute in accordance with the rules of law
which the parties have chosen, and in the absence of such a choice, in accordance with
those rules of law which he considers to be appropriate" and that has been widely
applied in various French cases.
Judgments in favour of the application of the new lex mercatoria can be seen in a
number of French cases.17 For instance, the application of the new lexmercatoria
was discussed in a case where an agency contract was terminated by the principal.
The arbitral tribunal, without being authorised to act as amiable compositeurs, applied
the "general principles of obligation generally applicable in international trade"18 to the
case and granted partial remuneration for the service which had actually been
performed. The principal attempted to challenge the award on the ground that the
award was decided beyond the scope of the submission. Nevertheless, the challenge
was rejected by the judges of the Court d'Appel. They held that, based on rules of
law, the award was decided within the scope of submission, since the necessity of the
compilation of often ancient maritime usages, developed by the community ofmerchants without
distinction of nationality, a true lexmercatoria to which marine transportation professionals ordinarily
refer (Unreported) Discussed in Note by Achard, R.
17The translation of some French cases discussed in this chapter was with the help of Ms. B.
Cebrian, Lecturer of Department of Languages, Napier University and Dr. D. Leonardi.
18Decision of 12 June 1980; J.D.I. (1982), at p.231.
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reference to international trade usage was acknowledged by the arbitrators in the
reasoning of the award.
This judgment was also upheld by the Second Civil Chamber of the Cour de
Cassation, which determined "that in referring to 'general principles of obligation
generally applicable in international trade1 the arbitrators only conformed to the duty
imposed upon them by Article 8 of the Term of Reference to define the law applicable
to the agreement".19 As Professor Goldman commented, in France "the general
principles applicable in international commerce are part of the law; to conclude that this
decision signifies that lex mercatoria also is law, one need only recognise that lex
mercatoria encompasses these general principles."20
The application of the new lex mercatoria was extensively discussed in the case of
Societe Pabalk Ticaret Sirketi v. Soc. Anon. Norsolor.2] In this case, experiencing
difficulties in deciding the proper law between French and Turkish law, the arbitral
tribunal decided to apply the new lex mercatoria as the substantive law to resolve the
dispute. By applying the new lexmercatoria, the French company was held in breach
of contract against the Turkish company and was required to pay 800,000 francs in
damages. This award was set aside by the Court of Appeal in Vienna when the judge
indicated that the validity of the choice of the new lex mercatoria as the substantive
law of the contract was doubtful.22 Later on, a request to enforce the award and
appeals against the judgment made by the Court of Appeal of Austria were filed in
France and Austria separately. Ignoring the fact that the award was set aside by the
19Decisionof 9 December 1981; Rev.Arh. (1982), at p. 183.
20Discussed in Goldman, F'orumInternationale (Nov. 1983 No. 3) at p, 15.
2 decision of the Court of Appeal is discussed in the (1986) XI Y.B.C.A. p.484; decision of the
Supreme Court of Austria is discussed in (1984) IX Y.B.C.A. 159.
22(1986) XI Y.B.C.A. at p. 484.
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Austrian Court of Appeal, the French court issued a writ to enforce the award while
the appeal was still pending in the Supreme Court of Austria. The court stated that: "it
was appropriate, given the international nature of the agreement, to leave aside any
compelling reference to a specific legal system, be it Turkish or French, and to apply
the international lex mercaloria."
On the other hand, in Austria, the judgment made by the Court of Appeal was reversed
by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of Austria supported the arbitral tribunal's
decision in choosing the new lexmercatoria as the proper law of the contract.
Furthermore, the court upheld that the application of the new lex mercatoria was not
contrary to any mandatory rules of the relevant national laws which may have
applied.23
Support for the application of the new lex mercatoria can in particular be seen in cases
involving ICC arbitration, since the language used in Article 13 of the ICC Arbitration
which concerns the choice of law rules offers the arbitrators power to apply the new
lex mercatoria to disputes. For instance, in one case a dispute arising from a delivery
contract was referred to ICC. The parties had agreed to have their dispute arbitrated
under the ICC Rules. Nevertheless, the parties failed to agree on the proper law of the
contract, and did not expressly authorise the arbitrators to apply the new lex
mercatoria to resolve the dispute. In a partial award rendered by the arbitrator, the
dispute was resolved in accordance with the usage of international trade, that is, the
new lex mercatoria,24 The claimant sought to have the award set aside, but the Com
d'Appel of Paris rejected his petition. Furthermore, the enforcement of the award
23(1984) IX Y.B.C.A. at p. 159.
24It was decided on I September 1988.
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made under the new lex rnercatoria was granted by the court, which believed that the
arbitrator had properly fulfilled the terms of reference submitted to the ICC by
applying the general principles of the conflict of laws to choose the new lex
mercatoria as the proper law of the contract. The Cour d'Appel said:
"Art 13 of the ICC Arbitration Rules, to which the Terms of Reference refer,
provides that if the parties have not indicated the applicable law - as is the case
here - the arbitrator applies the law designated by the rule of conflict which he
deems appropriate, taking into account in all cases the provisions of the
contract and the usages of trade...
According to Art. 1496 New CCP, in the present case the arbitrator must
decide the dispute according to the rules which he deems appropriate, taking
into account in all cases the usages of trade."25
Furthermore, this judgment was affirmed by the Cour de Cassation in later appeal
proceedings.26
The judges in the case of Fougerolles v. Banque de Proche Orient which also involved
an ICC Arbitration, once again upheld the choice of the new lex mercatoriaas the
proper law of an international trade contract. The Cour de Cassation decided that it
was simply the arbitrator's duty which was imposed upon him by the terms of
reference to apply the "general principles of obligation generally applicable in
international trade" to the dispute.27 Therefore, as long as a minimum level of judicial
control over the arbitral proceedings is guaranteed, the French courts are very willing
25Compania Valenciana de Cementos Portland SA v. Primary Coal Inc. Cour d'Appel, 13 July 1989;
reprinted in (1991) XVI Y.B.C.A. pp. 142, at p. 143.
26Cour de Cassation decided it on 22 October 1991, and it was reprinted in (1993) XVI Y.B.C.A.
142, at p. 143.
27French courts have held, however, that the lexmercatoria is not merely equity, but is an authentic
source of law. Accordingly, it has "juridicite" (legal character), so that arbitrators who render awards
based on tire lexmercatoria are not deciding as amiables compositeurs. See the Fougerolles case,
Cour de Cassation, December 9 1981 in J.D.I. (1982), 931 (3e esp); discussed in Goldman, "The
Applicable Law: General Principles of Law - The Lex Mercatoria" in Lew (ed.) Contemporary
Problems in InternationalArbitration, (1986), 113 at pp. 119-120.
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to "provide a favourable legal environment for international arbitration" by restricting
re-examination of the substance of an award.28 The Cour d'Appel said:
"The agreement of the parties provides for the application of French law by the
arbitrators. Since this is an international arbitration, Art. 1496 New CCP
requires that even if the parties, as in the present case, have determined the
applicable law, the arbitrators must take into account international trade usages.
The norm is repeated in the ICC Rules, which apply to the present arbitration.
Hence, by referring to the international trade usages in order to apply the
notion of a group of companies to the case at issue, the arbitrators did not
violate the Terms of Reference."29
8.3.2 The application of the notion of amiable composition
Two kinds of arbitration exist in the French legal system - namely - arbitration at law
and arbitration according to equity, or amiable composition.30 In the former,
arbitrators are required to apply the law if parties do not expressly authorise them to
act as amiable compositeurs. In the latter, with the parties' authorisation, arbitrators
act as amiable compositeurs to decide the case, in accordance with equity or with their
knowledge and sense of propriety. In this section, the discussion will be mainly
focused on the second type of arbitration, that is, amiable composition and its
development in France.
In fact, the concept of amiable composition is a creature of French law. Its origin can
be dated back to the middle of the 13th century while the term "amiabilis compositor",
which means conciliator, proposing a solution for the parties to ratify, made its first
28 Pointon & Brown, "France: Resolving Disputes", Euromoney 13 (Supp. Sep. 1991).
2<jK/S France SA and KJS Photo Industrie SA v. SA Societe Generate and Sogelease Corporation,
Cour d'Appel, Paris, 31 October 1989; reprinted in (1991) XVIII Y.B.C.A. 137, at p. 139.
3 °The same distinction is drawn in Switzerland and the Netherlands, Romania and Yugoslavia,
Spanish and Portuguese speaking countries, the Lebanon, Iran, Indonesia , Malaysia. See David,
Arbitration in International Trade, (1985), p. 330.
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appearance in canon and civil law writings.31 An amiabilis compositor's decision had
not been enforceable until the line between the decisions of an amiabilis compositor
(with power only to propose a solution) and an arbiter (with power to make a binding
award) became blurred.32 By the eighteenth century, the line between amiable
composition and arbitration had become too blurred to be drawn. To reduce the
confusion arising between these two terms, France decided to empower arbitrators to
resolve the disputes in accordance with equity rather than only according to strict rules
of law. This status of amiable composition was eventually confirmed in the Code of
Civil Procedure 1806 which upheld that it was a form of arbitration and in accordance
with this power arbitrators were permitted to decide the case according to equity.
In modern French law, the concept of amiable composition is adopted in Article 1497
of the 1981 Decree. Article 1497 of the 1981 Decree states: "The arbitrator shall
decide as amiable compositeur if the parties' agreement conferred this authority upon
him." From this provision, amiable composition has a legal status in the French legal
system. The concept of amiable composition was defined by a commentator as
follows: "A dispute foreseen by the law itself, from strictly applying the rules of law,
joined with the faculty of applying various criteria of interpretation and judgment,
especially equity, commercial usages and the conscience of the arbitrator."33 The aim
of amiable composition was also discussed in a case where the Tribunal de Grande
Instance de Paris, acting in a case of judicial arbitration, was conferred with the power
of amiable composition. It said:
3 1 Loquin, Amiable Composition erDroit Compare et International (1980) 12-22; translation cited
from Christie, "Amiable Composition in French and English Law", (1992) 58(4) Journal ofthe
Chartered Institution ofArbitration, 259, at p. 263.
3 2David,Arbitration in International Trade, (1985), at p. 330. It could be overruled by the court if it
was iniqua (contrary to equity) but not if it was simply iniusta (contrary to law).
33De Boisseson and De Juglart, LeDroit Frangats de !Arbitrage (1983) at p. 295. Translation cited
from Christie, "Amiable Composition in French and English Law", (1992) 58(4) Journal ofthe
Chartered Institution ofArbitration, 259, at p. 259.
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"in conferring on the Tribunal the power of amiable composition, the parties
have manifested their wish to see their dispute decided not by the application of
the rules of law alone but also to obtain an equitable and acceptable solution by
an adaptation if appropriate, of the law to the totality (ensemble) of the factual
circumstances governing the relation of the parties."34
Nevertheless, not every French scholar agrees with the concept of amiable
composition. For instance, some critics have argued that amiable composition is
ambiguous and regard it as "a judicial puzzle, a sort of wager, the enfant terrible of the
law of arbitration." 35 One issue surrounding the concept of amiable composition is
whether an arbitrator should begin by considering what is equitable or by considering
the law and then departing from it only when equity so requires.
Of these different opinions, the French law seems to be in favour of the latter view.
Generally speaking, amiable composition does not only offer an arbitrator power to
depart from the law but also imposes on him a duty to seek equity. Nevertheless,
under French law36, the arbitrators' authority to act as amiable compositeurs has to be
conferred by the parties; as the 1981 Decree stipulates "The arbitrators decide
according to the law, unless the arbitration agreement entitled them to decide as
amiable compositeurs."31 Moreover, for the parties' benefit, an arbitrator must
indicate in his award the reasons which lead him to depart from the legal rules
normally applicable. In short, "Amiable composition is not an appeal to pure equity,
but an amiable compositeur should generally decide in accordance with the law,
34The decision of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, reported in (1987) Rev Arb 519 at 521.
This definition is welcomed by Flecheux and Rene David Arbitration in International Trade, at p. 334.
35Kassis cited by Christie, "Amiable Composition in French and English Law", (1992) 58(4) Journal
of the Chartered Institution ofArbitration, 259, at p. 264.
3 6Rubino-Sammartano, "Amiable Compositeur (Joint Mandate to Settle) and Ex Bono Et Aequo
(Discretional Authority to Mitigate Strict Law) - Apparent Synonyms Revisited", (1992) 9(1) J.LA.
5.
37Article 1474 of the 1981 Decree.
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making moderate and circumspect use of their equitable powers and giving reasons for
so doing."38
The application of the powers of amiable composition can be seen back as early as a
case in 1956, long before the amendment of the 1981 Decree. In this case, taking
equity into account, the arbitrator decided to compensate the winning party for the
devaluation of money.39 The same support has also been shown in the recent cases.
For instance, in the case of Societe Intrafor Coloret Subtec Middle East Co. M.M.
Gagnant Gialbert et al.40 the Paris Cour d'Appel had occasion to decide that
commercial arbitrators were entitled to avoid the strict application not only of the
provisions of law but also of a contractual clause, so long as they did not infringe
rules of public policy.
The same attitude was also applied in Najer v. Synthelabo, where it was held that:
"Granting to the arbitral tribunal the amiable composition authority, the parties have
expressed their intention that the dispute be decided not just by applying statutory
provisions but also to obtain an equitable solution by adjusting the law as needed to
the factual circumstances existing in the relationships between the parties."41 Also, in
Phoceenne de Depot v. Depots Patrollers de Fos, the court stated that" ... in principle,
the amiable compositeur may decide without having to strictly follow the law..."42
3 8David, Arbitration in International Trade, at pp. 335-336.
3 C)SEEE v. Republic]lie Populaire Federate de Yougoslavie, J.D.I. (1959) 1074, cited in Peter,
Arbitration andRenegotiation ofInternational Investment Agreements (1986) at p. 172; it would
seem that by the present standards in France, this award would still stand because the arbitrators were,
in fact, given the authority to rule as amiable compositeurs. Under Articles 12 and 58 of the Nouveau
Code de ProcedureCivile, even a judge can be given the power to decide as an amiable compositeur.
4GRev.Arb. (1985) no. 2 p.300.
41Court of Paris, 27 May 1987; Rev.Arb. 1987 519.
42Court of Appeal Paris, 28 April 1988; Rev.Arb. 1989, 280.
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The issue of whether arbitrators are required to apply the strict rules of law under the
New York Convention was also discussed before the French court. A dispute over
whether the arbitrators' power to act as amiable compositeurs failed to comply with the
terms of the Convention was referred to the Cour d'Appel. One party argued that the
award should be void because no amiable composition clause was specified in Art. I
(1), (3) and (4) of the New York Convention. The award was set aside by the Cour
d'Appel. Nevertheless, the Cour de Cassation reversed the judgment made by the
Cour d'Appel on two grounds. First, the language in the convention was clear and
unambiguous. Secondly, the parties understood that the arbitrators chosen by them
were to act as amiable compositeurs. Therefore, by acting as amiable compositeurs,
the arbitrators were not required to follow the rules of law since the terms of reference
did not specify that the arbitrators were obliged to apply the rules of law.43
In conclusion, from the cases discussed in this section, it is clear that the French
courts have confirmed that it is legitimate for arbitrators to decide a case in accordance
with the new lexmercatoria, or, with the parties' authorisation, to act as amiable
compositeurs to solve disputes according to equity. In other words, a spirit of almost
unlimited freedom permeating the provisions relating to the application of the new lex
mercatoria and amiable composition to decide the case can be clearly observed in both
the French 1981 Decree and the judgments handed down by the French courts.
43Pourvoi n. 89-20.629, 12 mai 1991, Arret n. 567, La Cour de Cassation, Deuxieme Chambre
Civile. Also see Pourvoi n. 86-16.031 10 mai 1988 Arret n. 481 I .a Cour de Cassation, Premiere
Chambre Civile.
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Chapter Nine
Whether the United States courts accept the
application of a-national principles in
international commercial arbitral awards
9.1 Background: the American judge's power to choose the
proper law of the contract
Compared to the English courts, the United States courts have a more friendly attitude
towards the application of a-national principles as the proper law of contract in
arbitration cases. In fact, this attitude can be observed from the choice of law rules
followed by judges to decide the proper law of contract - at both state and federal
levels, the issue of choice of the proper law is governed by the Restatement (2d) of
Conflict ofLaws (the "Restatement").
The Restatement was formulated by the American Law Institute in 1970 in order to
resolve the different regulations existing in different states in the conflict of laws.
Primarily, choice of the proper law of intrastate or interstate commercial contracts is
discussed in Chapter Eight of the Restatement. In this Chapter, §186, §187 and §188
which set out the general principles which have to be followed by the American judges
when determining the proper law of the contracts, will be examined.
First, §186 and §187 confirm the theory of party autonomy. Under these two
sections, it is stipulated that parties have the right to choose any laws they wish to
govern the contract between them. Secondly, in accordance with §187, subject to
certain limited restrictions, such as mandatory rules and public policy, the law chosen
by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be recognised and
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applied. In other words, as long as the choice of law made by the parties does not fall
foul of the restrictions mentioned above, the judges must apply the law chosen by the
parties according to § 187.
It is suggested that an express reference to the law of a specific state in a contract is
regarded as the best way of ensuring that the parties' wishes will be given effect.1 As
a result, the parties' reasonable expectations and desires of certainty and predictability
of their rights and liabilities under the contract can also be provided for; parties are free
to set out the terms of their contracts and have the power to decide the nature of their
contractual obligations under the theory of freedom of contract (with certain limited
restrictions). This is illustrated in the comment c on subsection (1) of §187, which
states:
"The parties, generally speaking, have power to determine the terms of their
contractual engagements. They may spell out these terms in the contract. In the
alternative, they may incorporate into the contract by reference extrinsic
material which may, among other things, be the provisions of some foreign
law. In such instances, the forum will apply the applicable provisions of the
law of the designated state in order to effectuate the intentions of the parties.
So much has never been doubted."2
In the absence of an express choice of law, in accordance with §188, the courts will
have to exercise a gap-filling function to choose the proper law by applying the
implied choice or the most significant relationship test to determine the applicable law
to settle the dispute between the parties.3 According to § 188(2), in the absence of an
effective choice of law by the parties, certain elements of the transaction can be an
indication pointing to the proper law of the contract (such as the place of contracting,
the place of negotiation of the contract, the place of performance, the location of the
Comment a of § 187.
2Comment c on subsection (1) of § 187; The Restatement (2d) ofConflict ofLaws (hereinafter the
"Restatement"), (1970) p. 563.
3§ 188(1), The Restatement, (1970).
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subject matter of the contract or even the domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation or place of business of the parties).4
The principle of party autonomy in the choice of the proper law is not only recognised
by the Restatement but also by the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."). Although
the U.C.C. is not a statute as such, it has a great deal of influence on the commercial
cases submitted to the United States courts, since it was been enacted by all the states
between 1957 and 1967. Nine Articles are embodied in the U.C.C.. Among these
Articles, Article 1 contains the general provisions applicable to all transactions
governed by the Code. Choice of the proper law of the contract is also dealt within
this Article.
The U.C.C. §1-105(1) confirmed the idea that it is the parties' right to choose the
proper law to govern the contract between them. In accordance with the first part of
§ 1-105( 1), the parties to an intrastate or interstate commercial contract5 have the power
to choose any law to govern their rights and duties. It states: "Except as provided
hereafter in this section, when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and
also to another state or nation the parties may agree that the law either of this state or of
such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties."6 The second part of
§1-105(1) deals with the situation where the parties fail to decide on the matter of
choice of the proper law. Accordingly, failing such an agreement between the parties,
this section will be applied to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to a particular
state.
4§ 188(2)-(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e), The Restatement, (1970). Furthermore, in accordance with this
section, the courts have to consider the relevant policies listed in § 6 while apply the most significant
relationship test to decide the proper law of the contract.
5According to Black Law Dictionary, (5th ed.): "intrastate commerce" means "Commerce within a
state, as opposed to commerce between states" (that is, intersate) at p. 738. "Intersate commerce"
means 'Traffic, intercourse, commercial trading, or the transportation of persons or property between
or among the several states of the Union, or from or between points in one state and points in another
state; commerce between two states, or between places lying in different states" at p. 735.
6U.C.C. § 1-105(1).
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To a certain extent, the choice of the proper law rules are not much different from
those applied by the English courts. Nevertheless, as far as the issue of a-national
principles is concerned, the American courts seem to hold a rather more liberal attitude
than the English courts. Generally speaking, the English judges are required to apply
national rules of laws to decide the cases submitted to them. In other words, the
possibility of the application of a-national principles to litigation is denied by the
English courts. In contrast, the American courts are more friendly towards this issue
as can be seen in the U.C.C. According to the U.C.C. §1-103, the general principles
of law, law merchant7 and equity can supplement its provisions; therefore, a-national
principles can be regarded as having a legal application to the commercial cases. This
idea is not only stated in §1-103, which provides that "Unless displaced by the
particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law
merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel,
fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or
invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions", but also observed from the
relevant provisions underlying the purposes and policies of the U.C.C..8
In this chapter, attention will be focused on whether the United States courts accept the
application of a-national principles in international commercial arbitral awards. As the
application of a-national principles has already been expressly stipulated in the U.C.C.
and the Restatement, only a limited number of disputes on this subject have been
decided by the American courts. As a result of this, in the first part of this study, the
7The U.C.C. also provides the definition of "usage of trade" in § 1-205, which provides: "A Usage of
Trade is any practice ormethod of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or
trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question.
The existence and scope of such a usage are to be proved as facts. If it is established that such a usage
is embodied in a written trade code or similar writing the interpretation of the writing is for the court."
8According to UCC § 1-102(1): "This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its
underlying purposes and policies". And, § 1-102(2) states that the underlying purposes and policies of
the Act are: "(a) to simplify, clarify and modernise die law governing commercial transactions; (b) to
pennit the continued expansion of commercial practice through custom, usage and agreement of the
parties and (c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions."
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Federal Arbitration Act 1924, which is regarded as an historical step in the
development of arbitration in the United States, will be examined. Secondly, the
influence of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), which not only reverses the
centuries of judicial hostility but also introduces a friendly attitude towards arbitration,
will be examined. Finally, the effect of this friendly attitude on the application of a-
national principles in international commercial arbitration will be discussed.
9.2 An historical step - the enactment of the Arbitration Act
1924
As a result of the federal system and the diversities existing between different state
laws, United States arbitration law was traditionally extremely complex. Before
World War I, United States arbitration law was largely found in the common law - the
English, federal, and state cases. With these diverse origins, uniformity of arbitration
laws was difficult among the fifty states. On the one hand, it was due to the fact that,
as far as the state level was concerned, the laws could be very different from each
other. On the other hand, due to the fact that "the federal law was largely decided in
accordance with the views commonly prevailing in the state courts and legislatures at
the time"9 the federal courts also failed to provide a body of federal arbitration law
substantively distinct from prevailing state law. During this period, not only did the
United States lack a uniform law governing arbitration matters, but a hostile attitude to
international commercial arbitration commonly existed in both state and federal courts.
This situation lasted for quite a long period, and the reform of arbitration law was not
invoked until the beginning of the twentieth century. Strictly speaking, the reform
movement started in New York, which was then regarded as the greatest commercial
and financial state of the United States. After a great deal of effort by the Chamber of
9MacNeil, American Arbitration Law, (1992), at pp. 21-22.
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Commerce of the State of New York since 176810, the New York Arbitration Act
1920 was enacted. It was generally regarded as the first step in moving towards the
reform and unification of the American arbitration system.
In fact, before the New York Arbitration Act 1920 passed, those in favour of the
reform of federal arbitration law, mostly from the American Bar Association, had
already started their national campaign for the enactment of a uniform federal
arbitration law. Following a powerful lobby conducted by business groups and
lawyers in 1922, a strong bias in favour of arbitration by Congressmen was shown by
the proposed for a United States Arbitration Act. After a four-year campaign, the
Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on the bill in 1923, followed by joint
congressional hearings in 1924; the House then unanimously passed the Act, which is
generally referred to as the Federal Arbitration Act 1924 ("FAA").11 The Act was re-
enacted and codified in 1947 as Title 9 of the United States Code.12
The Federal Arbitration Act 1924, which contains three chapters, is designed to
provide more support to arbitration. This Act confirms the idea that, for the parties to
an international commercial contract, arbitration can be a better way to settle their
disputes, compared to the expensive, slow and unreliable litigation process.13 It not
only allows the submission of future disputes to arbitration but also forbids unilateral
repudiation by one party to an arbitration agreement. Consequently, the federal courts
have to decline jurisdiction where a valid arbitration agreement exists between the
parties. Also, under this Act it is established that the parties have the right to choose
the law governing the contract between them.
1 °See Bloomfield, ed. "A Brief History of Commercial Arbitration in New York", in SelectedArticles
on Commercial Arbitration in New York, (1927) and MacNeil, American Arbitration Law, (1992), at
p. 25.
1 ' The State of New York, earlier than the Federal Government, enacted the New York Arbitration Act
in 1920. And, the United States Federal Arbitration Act 1924 was modelled on the New York
arbitration statute of 1920.
12Act of July 30, 1947, eh. 392, 61 Stat. 669.
13Born, International Commercial Arbitration in the United States, (1994), at p. 30.
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Furthermore, with the efforts to help the United States companies expand their
business into the global market,14 and the motive to develop an effective system of
dispute resolution for the international trade community, the United States government
finally ratified the New York Convention in 1970. This intention was disclosed in the
speech made by a Congressman, who said:
"It is important to note that arbitration is generally a less costly method of
resolving disputes than is full-scale litigation in the courts. To the extent that
arbitration agreements avoid litigation in the courts, they produce savings not
only with the parties to the agreement but also for the taxpayers - who must
bear the burden for maintaining our court system."15
Later, following its ratification, the Congress enacted amendments to the FAA in order
to include the New York Convention into federal arbitration law. A chapter (the
Second Chapter) implementing the Convention was added to the Arbitration Act.16
Clearly, the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was a turning point which
reversed the centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration and was a device to allow
parties to avoid the costliness and delays of litigation. The most important element is
that the FAA placed arbitration agreements "upon the same footing as other contracts
,.."17 Nevertheless, the judicial hostility did not completely disappear until a few
decades after the enactment of the FAA.
14S. Rep. no. 702, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1970); Aksen, American Arbitration Accession Arrives
in the Age ofAquarius, 3 Sw.U.L.Rev. 1 (1971).
15116 Congress Rec. 22, 732-733 (daily ed. July 24, 1970) (Hamilton Fish); see also 731 (Andrew
Jacobs); Fuller Co. v. Compagnie des Bauxites Guiness, 421 F. Supp. 938, 947 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
16Currently, the FAA consists of three chapters: (a) the domestic FAA 9 U.S.C. Articles 1-16,
applicable to agreements and awards affecting cither interstate or foreign commerce; (b) the New York
Convention implementing legislation, 9 U.S.C. Articles 201- 210, applicable only to awards and
agreements falling within the New York Convention; and (c) the Inter-American Arbitration
Convention's implementing legislation, 9 U.S.C. Articles 301-307, applicable only to the awards
falling under the Inter-American Convention.
17HR Rep. no. 96, 68th Cong. 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1924); cited in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 417 US
506(1974), 510-511.
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9.3 The hostile attitude before and after the enactment of the
FAA
Compared to the historically liberal attitude in France towards international commercial
arbitration, the liberal attitude held by the United States courts is rather recent.
Historically, the American courts had a very hostile attitude towards arbitration, even
as late as the early twentieth century. Before the FAA, the United States courts
frequently denounced the validity of arbitration agreements on jurisdiction and public
policy grounds. In fact, the ouster of jurisdiction argument was often applied by the
courts. For instance, in 1898, the judges in the case of Mitchell v. Dougherty18
refused the plaintiff's request to enforce the arbitration agreement between the parties
since it was illegal for the parties to oust the court's jurisdiction by means of an
arbitration agreement.
After the enactment of the FAA, this hostility still could be observed in a number of
cases. It was especially so in the cases concerning choice of the proper law. The
United States courts used to question the validity of the proper law chosen by the
parties themselves, even though the parties had powers to choose the governing laws
under the FAA. During this period, in fact, the American courts imposed a barrier
which disallowed the contractual choice of law agreed between the parties to be
applied to the dispute. For instance, in 1931, not long after the enactment of the Act,
Judge Learned Hand vigorously objected to the application of the parties' choice of
law: 19
"People cannot by agreement substitute the law of another place; they may of
course incorporate any provisions they wish into their agreements - a statute
like anything else - and when they do, courts will try to make sense out of the
whole, so far as they can. But an agreement is not a contract, except as the law
1890 Fed. 639 (3d Cir. 1898); also see Haskell v. McClintic-Marshall Co., 289 Fed. 405 (9th Cir.
1923); Rae v. Luzerne County, 58 F. 2d 829 (M.D. Pa. 1932); California Prune & Apricot Crowers'
Association v. Gatz American Co., 60 F. 2d. 788 (9th Cir. 1932).
l9E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 48 F. 2d. 115 (2d. Cir. 1931).
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says it shall be, and to try to make it one is to pull on one's bootstraps. Some
law must impose the obligation, and the parties have nothing whatever to do
with that; no more than with whether their acts are torts or crimes."20
This unfriendly attitude could also be seen in the cases dealing with the issue of
arbitrability.21 For instance, in the American Safety Equipment case, which was later
criticised in the Mitsubishi case, the Federal Court of Appeals held that the rights
conferred by the antitrust laws were of a character inappropriate for enforcement by
arbitration.22
Nevertheless, while international commercial arbitration developed at an enormous
speed in the United States, the United States courts gradually began to reconsider their
attitude towards arbitration. These changes included acceptance of the idea that it was
the parties' right to choose arbitration as an alternative way to settle their disputes and
that this choice must be honoured. Meanwhile, a more relaxed attitude towards the
issue of choice of the proper law was also adopted. The changes made to make
arbitration more desirable can not only be seen in several leading cases about
international commercial arbitration but also in § 18623 - § 188 of the Restatement24 and
the U.C.C. as discussed in the last section of this chapter.
9.4 A changing attitude towards international commercial
arbitration
After realising that arbitration has gained a great amount of support and popularity in
the international business community, the United States courts started to abandon their
2048 F. 2d. 115 (2d. Cir. 1931) at p. 117.
2 ' Sec the cases of Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Film Classics, Inc. 156 F.2d. 596 (2d. Cir. 1946);
B.M. Heede, Inc. v. West India Machinery & Supply Co. 272 F. Supp. 236, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
22American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F 2d 821 (1968).
23§ 186 provided: "Issues in contract are determined by the law chosen by the parties in accordance
with the mles of § 187 and otherwise by the law selected in accordance with the rule of § 188."
24The Restatement, (1970).
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hostile attitude and began to decide cases in favour of arbitration. Generally speaking,
at the present time, the United States courts are reluctant to set aside international
arbitral awards. Furthermore, it is suggested that arbitrators should have no less
freedom than the judges in the courts.25
This is illustrated in the case of Transpacific Transport Corp. v. Sirena Shipping Co.
S.A..26 In this case, the buyer, Transpacific, brought proceedings to compel the
seller, Sirena, to submit to arbitration the dispute which had arisen between them as to
alleged breaches by the seller of a written agreement to sell a vessel. The buyer
claimed breaches of warranty and misrepresentations as to the condition of the vessel.
In the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Breitel, J.P., held that where the arbitration
clause of the agreement to sell the steamship provided that all disputes arising out of
the agreement should be settled by arbitration the interpretation and application of the
agreement were exclusively for the arbitrators and not for the courts once it was found
that the dispute between the parties was a genuine one. Furthermore, Breitel J.P.
remarked:
"Nor are the courts endowed with a power of censorship of arbitration
proceedings to make certain that the arbitrators will resolve the facts and the
issues before them in the same manner that the courts believe they would have
done. Nor are the arbitrators bound to exercise their powers in the mold of the
fonns of action or in the tradition of a chancellor."27
And,
"Although judicial supervision of the deliberations and intermediate findings of
arbitrators is not available, the provisions of a contract present to arbitrators an
obligation only to interpret and apply the agreement and not to remake it. But
the sanction for the performance of such obligation rests, once there is a
genuine and arbitrable dispute, in the minds or breasts of the arbitrators ...
Only if the award given a valid submission, exceeds their powers as arbitrators
or goes beyond the matter submitted to them may there be corrective action in
the courts."28
25/n re CompoDyne Corp., D.C. Pa. 255 F. Supp. 1004; Arlington Towers Land Corp. v. John
McShain Inc. D.C. 150 F. Supp. 904 (1957).
26193 N.Y.S. 2d 277 (Nov. 24, 1959), 9 A.D. 2d 316, affirmed 170 N.E. 2d 391, 8 N.Y. 2d. 1048,
207 N.Y.S. 2d 70.
21Ibid, at p. 282.
28Ibid. at p. 283.
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This friendly attitude was also shown in the Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital and
Dean Writter Reynolds Inc. cases29 which contained an intensive discussion of a
series of leading cases concerning the issue of arbitrability decided since the 1970s.
For instance, in one of the leading cases, The Bremen case, where the dispute arose
from negligent towage and breach of contract, a forum choice clause which provided
that "any dispute arising must be treated before the London Court of Justice" was
rejected by the Federal District Court and the Court of Appeals; as a result, Bremen's
motion to stay the action was denied. Nevertheless, this judgment made by the Court
of Appeals was vacated by the United States Supreme Court, which decided in favour
of the forum choice clause agreed between the parties.30 According to Chief Justice
Berger, the forum choice clause should be specifically enforced, since Zapata failed to
show that the enforcement of this forum choice clause would be unreasonable and
unjust or that the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching.
Moreover, he discussed this issue from the economic and business points of view and
said:
"For at least two decades we have witnessed an expansion of overseas
commercial activities by business enterprises based in the United States. The
barrier of distance that once tended to confine a business concern to a modest
territory no longer does so. Here we see an American company with special
expertise contracting with a foreign company to tow a complex machine
thousands of miles across land and oceans. The expansion of American
business and industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn
contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved
under our laws and in our courts. Absent a contract forum, the considerations
relied on by the Court of Appeals would be persuasive reasons for holding an
American forum convenient in the traditional sense, but in an era of expanding
world trade and commerce, the absolute aspects of the doctrine of the Carbon
Black case have little place and would be a heavy hand indeed on the future
development of international commercial dealings by Americans. We cannot
have trade and commerce in world market and international waters exclusively
on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts."31
2C)Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. 460 US 1 (1983), 24, 74 L.Ed
2d 765, 103 S.Ct. 927 and Dean Writter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 US 213 (1985), 84 L.Ed 2d 158,
105 S.Ct. 1238.
3 °M/S Bremen and Unterweser Reederei GMBH v. Zapata off-Shore Co. 407 US 1 (1972), 32 L.Ed.
2d 513, 92 S.Ct. 1907.
3 lIbid. at pp. 8-9.
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The willingness to accept the forum choice clause expressed in the case of M/S
Bremen v. Zapata brought a significant influence on the later cases involving
international commercial arbitration matters. Its influence is shown in the case of Fritz
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.32, where the disputes arose from a possible violation of
the federal security laws. In this case, Albert - Culver (the buyer), a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois, contracted to buy the stocks
and trademarks of two European subsidiaries of Scherk, a company organised under
the laws of Germany and Liechtenstein. A clause which provided that "any
controversy or claim arising under the contract would be referred to arbitration before
the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, France ... the laws of the State of
Illinois, U.S.A. shall apply to and govern this agreement, its interpretation and
performance" was contained in the arbitration agreement between the parties.
However, ignoring the arbitration agreement, Alberto-Culver brought a suit in the
federal court claiming that Scherk (the seller) had violated § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of
the Securities Exchange Act (15 U.S.C.S. §78j) by fraudulently misrepresenting its
trademark rights. Relying on the case of Wilko v. Swan33 the District Court denied
Scherk's motion to dismiss the action, but granted a preliminary order enjoining
Scherk from proceeding with arbitration. This judgment was affirmed on the same
ground by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
When this case reached the United States Supreme Court, the Court reversed the
judgment made by the Court of Appeals and returned the case to the District Court. In
the judgment, Stewart J. decided that the agreement between the parties to arbitrate any
dispute arising out of their international commercial transaction must be respected and
32417 US 506 (1974), 41 L. Ed 2d 270, 94 S Ct. 2449.
33346 US 427 (1953), 98 L. Ed 168, 74 S.Ct. 182.
207
Chapter Nine: The United States
enforced by the federal courts in accordance with the provisions of the FAA.
Believing predictability would be essential to international business transactions, he
continued:
"A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes
shall be litigated and the law to be applied is, therefore, an almost
indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability
essential to any international business transaction. Furthermore, such a
revision obviates the danger that a dispute under the agreement might be
submitted to a forum hostile to the interests of one of the parties or unfamiliar
with the problem area involved.
And,
A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an international
arbitration agreement would not only frustrate these purposes, but would invite
unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure tactical
litigation advantages."34
Agreeing with the speech made by Chief Justice Burger in M/S Bremen v. Zapata,35
Justice Stewart expressed his view that to insist on the idea that American standards of
fairness must govern the question of enforceability of an international arbitration
agreement would demean standards of justice elsewhere in the world and
unnecessarily exalt the primacy of United States law over the laws of other
countries.36 Finally, he decided that the underlying arbitration agreement must be
enforced regardless of the allegation of the violation of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.
A decade later, the United States Supreme Court, though with three judges dissenting,
confirmed the strong presumption in favour of the enforcement of freely negotiated
contractual choice-of-forum provisions stated in both the Bremen and Scherk cases.37
In the Mitsubishi Case,38 Soler, a car dealership in Puerto Rico, had distribution and
sales agreements with a Swiss corporation and a Japanese corporation. An arbitration
34417 US 506 (1974), 516-517.
35407 US 1 (1972), 32 L.Ed. 2d 513, 92 S.Ct. 1907.
36417 US 519 (1974).
37Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473 US 614 (1985), 87 L.Ed. 2d
444, 105 S Ct. 3346.
3 8Ibid.
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clause was found in the contract which contained a clause specifying arbitration in
Japan under Swiss law. When a dispute arose under the contract between the parties
at a later stage, the parties failed to resolve the dispute arising from a slackening in the
sale of the automobiles themselves. Mitsubishi brought an action to compel Soler to
settle the dispute by means of arbitration. Meanwhile, Soler filed a counter claim
against Mitsubishi under the Sherman Act.
The Supreme Court decided that, with a valid arbitration clause embodied in an
international commercial contract between the parties, claims arising under the
Sherman Act were arbitrable pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. Relying on the
case Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v Mercury Construction Corp.,39 Justice
Blackmun stated that "the liberal federal policy favouring arbitration agreements
manifested by this provision and the Act as a whole, is at bottom a policy guaranteeing
the enforcement of private contractual arrangements: the Act simply "creates a body of
federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to
arbitrate.""40 Moreover, "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should
be resolved in favour of arbitration."41
Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun also stressed that this friendly policy did not mean
that all controversies involving statutory rights were suitable for arbitration.42 As far
as the issue of arbitrability was concerned, he supported the "two step inquiry" test
39460 US 1 (1983), 24, 74 L. Ed 2d 765, 103 S Ct. 927; Also see Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v.
Byrd 470 US 213 (1985), 221, 84 L. Ed. 2d 158, 105 S Ct. 1238; Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co. 388 US 395 (1967), 400-404, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1270, 87 S.Ct. 1801; Southland Corp.
v. Keating 465 US 1 (1984), 12, 79 L.Ed. 2d 1, 104 S.Ct. 852; Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co. 363 US 574 (1960), 582-583, 4 L.Ed 2d 1409, 80 S.Ct. 1347.
40460 US 1 (1983), 25, n. 32, 74 L Ed. 2d 765, 103 S.Ct. 927; also cited in Mitsubishi Motors
Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473 US 614 (1985), 87 L.Ed. 2d 444, 105 S Ct. 3346,
at p. 625.
41Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473 US 614 (1985), 87 L.Ed. 2d
444, 105 S Ct. 3346, at p. 625. Also see Moses H. Cones Memorial Hospital, 460 US 1 (1983), 24-
25, 74 L Ed. 2d 765, 103 S.Ct. 927.
42Ibid. 473 US 627 (1985).
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applied by the Court of Appeal.43 Though applying the same test, Justice Blackmun
reached a different conclusion from the judgment made by the Court of Appeals. First
of all, he was convinced that the American courts were "well past the time judicial
suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals
inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute
resolution".44 Therefore: "that question of arbitrability must be addressed with a
healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration ... The Arbitration Act
establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favouring arbitration."45
Moreover, he also ruled out the argument about the incompetence of arbitrators dealing
with antitrust matters. As he explained:
"The anticipated subjectmatter of the dispute may be taken into account when
the arbitrators are appointed, and the arbitral rules typically provide for the
participation of experts either employed by the parties or appointed by the
tribunal. Moreover, it is often a judgment that streamlined proceedings and
expeditious results will best serve their needs that causes parties to agree to
arbitrate their disputes; it is typically a desire to keep the effort and expense
required to resolve a dispute within manageable bounds that prompts them
mutually to forgo access to judicial remedies. In sum, the factor of potential
complexity alone does not persuade us that an arbitral tribunal could not
properly handle an antitrust matter."46
Accordingly, in this case, supporting the policy favouring arbitration and believing in
arbitrators' ability, the Supreme Court ruled out the possibility that an arbitration
agreement involving an antitrust dispute would invalidate the forum selection clause
and the possibility that arbitrators might not be able to deal with complicated antitrust
cases. Believing streamlined proceedings and expeditious results would best serve the
43The two step inquiry is, first, to determine whether the parties' agreement to arbitrate reached the
statutory issues, and then, upon finding that it did to consider whether legal constraints external to the
parties' agreement foreclosed the arbitration of those claims. See 473 US 628 (1985).
44Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473 US 614 (1985), 87 L.Ed. 2d
444, 105 S Ct. 3346, at pp. 627-628.
45Moses H. Cones Memorial Hospital case 460 US 1 (1983) at pp. 24-25 , 74 L.Ed. 2d 765, 103
S.Ct 927, cited in 473 US 626.
46Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473 US 614 (1985), 87 L.Ed. 2d
444, 105 S.Ct. 3346, at 473 US 634..
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parties' needs, they concluded that "concerns of international comity, respect for the
capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the
international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require
that we enforce the parties' agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would be
forthcoming in a domestic context."47
Although arising from a domestic arbitration, a speech delivered by the Supreme Court
in Shearson/ American Express Inc. v. Eugene MaMahon,48 may provide another
piece of evidence about the friendly attitude towards international commercial
arbitration in the United States. In this case, a dispute arose from a contract between
two customers and a brokerage firm which was registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Despite the existence of an arbitration clause, the customers
filed a complaint with the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, alleging that the brokerage firm and its representative violated the anti-fraud
provisions of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC (Securities and
Exchange Commission) Rule 10b-5. O'Connor J., following the previous cases, and
decided that the claims under the Securities Exchange Act were arbitrable under the
provisions of the Arbitration Act. Since the Securities and Exchange Commission had
been granted an expansive power to ensure the adequacy of arbitration procedures
employed by the SROs (Self-Regulatory Organisations) since the 1975 amendments to
§ 19 of the Exchange Act,49 O'Connor J. stated:
"the mistrust of arbitration that formed the basis for the Wilko opinion in 1953
is difficult to square with the assessment of arbitration that has prevailed since
that time. This is especially so in light of the intervening changes in the
regulatory structure of the securities laws. Even if Wilko's assumptions
regarding arbitration were valid at the time Wilko was decided, most certainly
47Ibid. at 473 US 629. However, Stevens J. Brennan J. and Marshall J. dissented on the grounds that
an arbitration clause should not normally be construed to cover a statutory remedy that it does not
expressly identify and Congress did not intend § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act to apply to anti-trust
claims, 473 US 641-666..
48482 US 220 (1987), 96 L. Ed 2d 185, 107 S.Ct. 2332.
49Ibid. at p. 233.
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they do not hold true today for arbitration procedures subject to the SEC's
oversight authority."50
A more recent case, concerning punitive damages, handed down by the United States
Supreme Court also applies this liberal attitude towards a domestic arbitration case. In
Maslrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,51 the arbitration panel, convened
under the arbitration provision in the parties' standard-form contract and under the
Federal Arbitration Act, awarded the petitioners punitive damages and other relief.
The petitioners filed an action in the Federal District Court, alleging that their securities
trading account had been mishandled by the respondent broker, Shearson, and tried to
enforce this award. The District Court and the Court of Appeals rejected the punitive
damages award on the ground that the contract's choice-of-law provision specified that
"the law of the State of New York" should govern the dispute and New York law
allows only the courts, not arbitrators, to award punitive damages.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, with one dissenting opinion,52 the Court
reversed the judgment made by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the Court of
Appeals misinterpreted the parties' contract by concluding that the choice-of-law
provision and the arbitration provision were in conflict. Relying on the case of Allied
Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson,53 the Supreme Court stated that "if contracting parties
agree to include claims for punitive damages within the issues to be arbitrated, the
FAA ensures that the agreement will be enforced according to its terms even if a rule
of state law would otherwise exclude such claims from arbitration."54 Consequently,
50Ibid. Also see the case of Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson / American Express, Inc. (490 US 477
(1989) concerning a dispute arose under section 12 (2) of the 1933 Securities Act. The court criticised
the Wilko case as "falling far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes
favouring arbitration as a method of resolving disputes," at p. 483.
51Antonio Mastrobuono and Diana G. Mastrobuono, Petitioners v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,
(March 7, 1995) 63 LW 4195; The United States Law Week, Vol.63 no.33.
52Justice Thomas dissented; 63 LW 4199- 4201.
53115 S.Ct. 834 (1995).
54Antonio Mastrobuono and Diana G. Mastrobuono, Petitioners v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,
(March 7, 1995) 63 LW 4195; The United States Law Week, Vol.63 no.33., at p. 63 LW 4198,
4199, 115 S.Ct. 1212(1995), at p. 1216.
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it ruled that, though the agreement contained no express reference to punitive damages
claims, an intention to include such claims was demonstrated by considering the
impact of each of the two provisions separately and then inquiring into their meaning
taken together. In other words, arbitrators may award punitive damages in arbitration
proceedings conducted pursuant to an arbitration agreement that incorporates a self-
regulatory organisation's rules permitting such awards, even though the agreement
also contained choice-of-law provisions stating that the agreement was governed by
laws of a state that empowered courts, not arbitrators, to award punitive damages.
Moreover, delivering the Court's opinion, Justice Stevens illustrated that due regard
must be given to the federal policy favouring arbitration, and that ambiguities as to the
scope of the arbitration clause itself should be resolved in favour of arbitration.55
Furthermore, in accordance with the Restatement (2d) ofContracts §206 (1979), it is
the common law rule of interpretation in contract that a court should construe
ambiguous language against the interest of the party that drafted it;56 consequently, a
document should be read to give effect to all its provisions and to render them
consistent with each other.57 Finally, facing this ambiguous situation, he concluded:
"We think the best way to harmonize the choice-of-law provision with the
arbitration provision is to read "the laws of the State of New York" to
encompass substantive principles that New York courts would apply, but not
to include special rules limiting the authority of arbitrators. Thus, the choice-
of-law provision covers the rights and duties of the parties, while the
arbitration clause covers arbitration; neither sentence intrudes upon the other.
... The arbitral award should have been enforced as within the scope of the
contract"58
5$Ibid. at p. 4198; Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board ofTrustees ofLeland Stanford Junior
Univ. 489 US 468 (1989), at p. 476; see also Moses H.. Cone Memorial Hospital case 460 US 1
(1983), at pp. 24-25, 74 L.Ed. 2d 765, 103 S.Ct. 927.
5®Ibid. at p. 4198; See also United States v. Seckinger, 397 US 203 (1970), 210; United States Fire
Ins. Co. v. Schnackenberg, 88 111. 2d 1,4, 429 N.E. 2d 1203 (1981), 1205; Graffv. Billet, 64 N.Y.
2d 899, 902, 477 N. E. 2d 212 (1984), 213-214.
57Ibid. The Restatement §203(a) and comment b.
5&Ibid. at p. 4199.
213
Chapter Nine: The United States
A recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reaffirmed the view of no interference with the resolution of the United States statutory
claims in pending international arbitration proceedings.59 In accordance with a
licensing agreement between Hottinger, a German Company, and Fischer, an
American company, Fischer would become the exclusive manufacturer and seller of
Hottinger core machines in North America and Fischer would gradually cease
manufacturing and marketing of its own core machines. Nevertheless, after several
years, Fischer decided that it could not sell the Hottinger machines and sought to
renegotiate the agreement so that it could continue to sell its own core machines.
Hottinger refused Fischer's suggestion and referred the dispute to arbitration after
Fischer terminated the agreement. Fischer argued in the arbitration that the portion of
the Agreement requiring to terminate the production and marketing of its own core
machines violated the United States antitrust laws; consequently, it filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, to seek a declaration
that the arbitration agreement was void. The District Court dismissed Fischer's
lawsuit. Relying on a portion of footnote 19 in the Mitsubishi case,60 Fischer
appealed to the Sixth Circuit Federal Court. The Court of Appeals refused Fischer's
petition and stated:
"Footnote 19 and the cases cited therein stand for the proposition that if any
part of a contract, including a choice-of-law provision, waives a party's right
to collect damages for antitrust violations, the provision is void for public
policy reasons. We do not have such a case here because it is not clear what
law the Zurich tribunal will apply.
Contrary to Fischer's contention, Mitsubishi stands for the proposition that
arbitration should go forward even if there is a chance the United States
antitrust statutory rights will not be fully recognized, because, should that
occur, the aggrieved litigant may request a Federal Court, at the award-
enforcement stage, to determine whether the arbitration award violates public
59George Fisher Foundry Systems, Inc. v. Adolph H. Hottinger Maschinenbau GmbH 55 F. 3d.
1206 (6th Cir. 1995).
60Footnote 19 stated:
"In die even the choice-of-law clause [of an arbitration agreement] operated in tandem as a prospective
waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little
hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy."
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policy. Here, because the Zurich tribunal has yet to decide what law it will
apply, this case is not ripe for review."61
It is another example of the pro-arbitration tendency of the United States courts in their
narrow construction of public policy arguments in international commercial arbitration.
9.5 Acceptance of international commercial arbitral awards
made on the basis of a-national principles by the American
courts
Compared to the debate among the English judges and scholars, the issue of the
application of a-national principles, such as the general principles of law, the new lex
mercatoria (trade usages)62 and amiable composition, does not seem to have caused a
serious problem in the American courts. Although some scholars63 have suggested
that the concept of a-national principles is foreign to the American courts, the
application of a-national principles as the proper law of contract is recognised as legal
by the courts.64 Perhaps because the United States view of arbitration is closer to the
French view; as a result, the United States courts tend to restrict the judicial review of
arbitral awards in much the same way as in France.65 According to the arbitration
law, arbitrators are not required to apply strict rules of law to the disputes submitted to
them. Furthermore, an arbitrator's error in findings of law or fact cannot constitute a
61George Fisher Foundry Systems, Inc. v. Adolph H. HottingerMaschinenbau GmbH 55 F. 3d.
1206 (6th Cir. 1995), at p. 1210.
62§ 1-205 (2) (3) of the UCC provide the definition of trade usage. According to, §1-205 (2) of the
UCC, a usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a
place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the
transaction in question. The existence and scope of such usages are to be proved as facts. If it is
established that such a usage is embodied in a written trade code or similar writing the interpretation
of the writing is for the court. In terms of §1-205 (3) of the UCC a course of dealing between parties
and any usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which they are engaged or of which they are or
should be aware give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an agreement.
63Such as Lando, "The LexMercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration" (1985) 341.C.L.Q.
747.
64See Ministry ofDefense v. Gould Inc., 887 F.2d. 1357 (9th Cir. 1989).
65Weinberg, "Equity in International Arbitration: How Fair is "Fair"?", 12 B.U.lnt'l L.J. 227 (1994).
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ground to set aside the award, because "the interpretation of the law made by the
arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to
judicial review for error in interpretation."66
Moreover, the awards rendered on the basis of a-national principles are not subject to
judicial review by the American courts. The willingness to accept the application of a-
national principles in international commercial arbitration cases is also expressly stated
in the legal literature. For instance, §70 of the Corpus Juris Secundum provided:
"Generally, arbitrators are not obliged to follow strict rules of law in the matter at hand
and they are privileged to apply broad principles of justice." The similar idea can also
be seen in §. 1-103 of the U.C.C..67 It provides:
"Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law
and equity, including law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract,
principle and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion,
mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement
its provisions."68 (Italicsadded)
This positive attitude dates back as early as 1842. In the case of Swift v. Tyson,69
where the dispute arose from an acceptance of a bill received as the payment of a pre¬
existing debt, while one party claimed the acceptance was bona fide, relying on the
case of Brush v. Seribner,10 Justice Story made a historical statement as following:
66San Martine Compania de Navegacion SA v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd. 293 F. 2d 796 (1961);
Wilko v. Swam 346 US 427 (1953), 436 and Bernhardt v. Polygraphia Co. 350 US 198 203.
67See In re Barton, Bkrtcy Wash. 37 B.R. 545 (1984); Bigger v. Fremont Nat. Bank & Trust Co.
340 N.W. 2d 142 (1983), 215 Neb. 580; S.S Kresge Co. v. Port of Longview 572 P. 2d 1336
(1977), 18 Wash App. 805; Metty Shurfine Cent. Corp., Mo. App. 736 S.W. 2d. 527 (1987); R.C.
Durr Co., Inc. v. Bennett Industries, Inc. Ky. App. 590 S.W. 2d 338 (1979).
68In fact, the authors of the Code proclaimed that it is the modern lexmercatoria mentioned in the
text. See Juerger, "The LexMercatoria and the Conflict of Laws", in LexMercatoria andArbitration,
(Carbonneau ed. 1990) (citing U.C.C. §1-105, cmt 3 (1992). It must be noted, however, that
opponents of the U.C.C. point to this very fact as one of the U.C.C.'s greatest weaknesses. What
certainty can there be, they argue, in a system which promotes such gapfilling, which gives such
discretion to those who interpret it? by Professor Maureen O'Rourke, Lecture to a Boston University
School ofLaw Class on the Uniform Commercial Code (Jan. 10, 1994).
6941 US (16 Pet) 1 (1842).
7011 Conn. R. 388 which held upon general principles of commercial law, that a pre-existing debt
was a valuable consideration, sufficient to convey a valid title to a bona fide holder against all the
antecedent parties to a negotiable note.
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"The law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly declared in the
language of Cicero, adopted by Lord Mansfield in Luke v. Lyde, (2 Burr. R.
883, 887) to be in a great measure, not the law of a single country only, but of
the commercial world."71
Following this decision and taking the relevant rules in the U.C.C. and the Corpus
Juris Secundum into consideration, this favourable attitude has been applied in several
recent cases which confirm the idea that "arbitrators are not bound by rules of law and
their decisions are essentially final."72 Furthermore, some judges support the idea that
the U.C.C. "shall be supplemented by existing principles of law and equity,"73
provided the general principles of law are not displaced or conflict with certain
particular provisions in this Code.74 Furthermore, in the case of Starcraft Co. A. Div.
ofBangor Operations Inc. v. C.J. Heck Co. of Texas, Inc.,15 by taking § 1-103 of the
U.C.C. into consideration, the court decided:
"Although Texas statute establishing liability of bank for failure to return
demand item prior to midnight deadline does not expressly grant a right of
subrogation in the drawee bank to assert maker's equities and defences to
extinguish payee's claims, such a right is available through statute providing
that principles of law and equity supply the provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code."
This decision is also supported by the judges in the case of Ministry of Defense v.
Gould Inc.,16 which concerned the application of international law. In this case,
Gould asserted that the defensive provisions listed in the New York Convention
contained an implicit requirement that the convention applied only to arbitral awards
made in accordance with the national arbitration law of a Party State. This claim was
made on the basis of Article V(l)(e), which provides that enforcement should not be
granted if it can show that "the award has not yet become binding on the parties, or
7141 US (16 Pet) 1, 19 (1842).
12ln reAimcee Wholesale Corp. & Tomar Prods. 21 N.Y. 2d. 621, 626-627, 237 N.E. 2d. 223, 225,
289 N.Y.S. 2d. 968, 971 (1968).
15Chicago Roller Skate Mfg. Co. v. Sokol Mfg. Co. 177 N.W. 2d 25 185 Neb. 515 (1970); Gold
Kist, Inc. v. Pillow, Tenn. App. 582 S.W. 2d 77 (1979).
14Arcon Const. Co., Inc. v. South Dakota Cement Plant, S.D. 349 N.W. 2d 407 (1984).
75784 F.2d. 982 (1984), rehearing denied 753 F.2d. 1075, rehearing denied 755 F.2d. 173.
76887 F.2d. 1357 (9th Cir. 1989).
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has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or
under the law of which, that award was made." Gould argued that because the
Tribunal's award in favour of Iran was a creature of international law, and not national
law, it did not "fall under" the Convention pursuant to U.S.C. §203; consequently,
the recognition of awards which were not made under a foreign municipal law should
not be granted. Nevertheless, Judge O'Scannlain disagreed with Gould's argument
and decided:
"Section 203 (9 U.S.C.) does not contain a separate jurisdictional requirement
that the award be rendered subject to a "national law." Language pertaining to
the "choice of law" issue is not mentioned, or even alluded to, in Article I,
which lays out the convention scope of applicability. In addition, although it is
a close question, the fairest reading of Convention itself appears to be that it
applies to the enforcement of non-national awards. Indeed, a Dutch court has
so held."77
Furthermore, in relation of the language laid out in Article V (l)(d), he said:
"Although this language seems to be at loggerheads with that of Article V
(l)(e) concerning "the country ... under the law of which, [the] award was
made," it is possible to reconcile the two provisions in accordance with an
interpretation that holds that the Convention applies to "non-national law"
awards, that is, if the parties choose not to have their arbitration governed by a
"national law," then the losing party simply cannot avail itself of certain of the
defenses in subparagraphs (a) and (e)."78
Finally, the court concluded that an award did not require to be made under a national
law for a court to entertain jurisdiction over its enforcement pursuant to the
Convention.
77Ministry ofDefense v. Gould, Inc. 887 F.2d. 1357 (9th Cir. 1989) at p. 1365. Also see Societe
Europeenne dlEtudes et d'Enterprises v. Socialist Federal Republic ofYugoslavia, HR (Hoge Raad der
Nederlanden) NJ 74,361 (1974). In this case, the Hoge Raad , the highest court of the Netherlands,
reversed the Court of the Hague, which had ruled that the Dutch trial court erred in recognising an
arbitral award that was not issued according to the law of Switzerland. The Hoge Raad held that the
strictures of Article V did not come into effect unless and until "die party against whom the award is
invoked furnishes proof of the existence of one of the impediments specified under (a) to (e) in Article
V. The relationship between the award and the law of a particular country need only be examined in
the framework of an investigation to be carried following a plea that the impediments mentioned in
Article V (1) exist... in respect of a particular country."
78Ministry ofDefense v. Gould, Inc. 887 F.2d. 1357 (9th Cir. 1989) at p. 1365.
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In fact, arbitrators are required to decide the proper law by following the choice of law
rules, either applying the parties' expressed choice, or in the absence of the parties'
choice, deciding it according to the relevant circumstances. Yet, no matter which
method is applied to decide the substantive law, they are not required to apply strict
rules of law to the dispute. Arbitrators are allowed to adopt a solution which they
regard as the best for the case, such as applying the broad principles of justice and
good conscience and deciding the case according to their concept or notion of justice,
"even though from a strictly legal point of view it may not be absolutely correct."79 A
similar comment is also mentioned by Mr. Born, who said: "Historically, arbitration in
the United States bore many resemblance to arbitration ex aequo et bono or amiable
compositeur. Arbitrators were not required to give reasoned awards, not to apply
statutory protections and their decisions were not reviewable for errors of law (or
fact)."80
Although the American statutory provisions or case law never expressly recognise that
arbitrators are allowed to act as amiable compositeurs, some scholars suggest that this
concept has been used in practice perhaps more frequently by the United States
arbitrators than by French arbitrators.81 They believe that it may be because equity is
regarded as an undivided part of "law", therefore, they "do not think of themselves as
doing anything special in so acting"82 as amiable compositeurs. In other words, when
acting as amiable compositeurs, arbitrators are expected to make equitable
79David, Arbitration in International Trade, (1985), at p. 335.
80Born, International Commercial Arbitration in the United States, (1994), at p. 136. Also see
Domke on Commercial Arbitration, (1993), §§ 1.01 - 1.03. Also see In re Aimcee Wholesale Corp.
& Tomar Prods. 21 N.Y. 2d. 621, 626-627, 237 N.E. 2d. 223, 225, 289 N.Y.S. 2d. 968, 971 (1968),
where the court said: "Arbitrators are not bound by rules of law and their decisions are essentially
final. Certainly the awards may not be set aside for misapplication of the law ... More important,
arbitrators arc not obliged to give reasons for their rulings or awards. Thus our courts may be called
upon to enforce arbitration awards which are directly at variance with statutory law and judicial
decision interpreting that law."
81Craig, Park and Paulsson, International Chamber ofCommerceArbitration, (1991), at p. 137;
Stein & Wotman "International Commercial Arbitration in the 1980s: A Comparison of the Major
Arbitral Systems and Rules", 38 Bus.Law. 1714 (1983).
82Craig, Park and Paulsson, International Chamber ofCommerceArbitration, (1991), at p. 137.
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considerations part of the law to reach their decision and to place greater emphasis in
their decision-making on their own notions of fairness and justice.83
This conclusion is not only evidenced by a survey conducted by Mr. Mentschikoll but
also by some jurists and judges. According to Mentschikoll, although 90% of the
arbitrators involved in the survey declared that as a matter of principle they would
apply the law, they would not regard themselves as bound to do so if they believed
that departure from such principle would give a better solution.84 On the other hand,
this idea is also supported by some jurists and judges who are in favour of the concept
of amiable composition.85 They contended that, by waving the strict application of
non-mandatory rules of procedural or substantive law, arbitrators, in the United
States, can be empowered by the parties to act as amiable compositeurs who are not
bound by rules of law and their decisions are essentially final.
This concept was also accepted by the federal court in the case of International
Standard Electric Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Industrial Y
Commercial.86 In this case, an international business subsidiary of an American
telecommunications company (ISEC) filed a petition seeking to vacate a foreign
arbitration award, whereas the Argentinean company involved in the arbitration
proceedings filed a petition to enforce the award. The issue argued before the court
was whether the arbitral panel decided matters beyond the scope of the submission to
it, and as a result contrary to the public policy of the United States under Article V
(2)(b) of the 1958 New York Convention, and whether the arbitrators "exceeded their
authority by awarding damages based on equitable norms, rather than on law".
83As the definitions given by Black's Law Dictionary show: "arbitrators deciding as amiables
compositeursmay rely on "justice and fairness," they may decide "according to what is just and good,
according to equity and conscience." When deciding ex aequo et bono, they may "abate something of
the strictness of the law in favour of natural equity."
84Mentschikoff, Sona, "Commercial Arbitration" 61 Colum.L.R. 846 (1961), at p. 860.
85Crane, "Arbitral Freedom from Substantive Law", 14 Arb.J. 163 (1959). Sanders, International
Arbitration Liber Amicorurn forMartin Domke, (1967),.at pp. 301-312.
86745 F. Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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In the award, the arbitral panel decided: "All in all, the combined guidance of the
relevant legal principles, applied in the context of the equitable nature of the norms
which govern our task, lead us to conclude that Bridas is entitled to the "restitution" of
its May 1979 investment of $ 7.5 million...."87 The arbitral panel carried on
awarding the Argentinean company an interest rate of 12% per annum. The ISEC
disputed this factual finding because the arbitrators acted as amiable compositeurs.
Judge Conboy said that the 1958 New York Convention would not allow the court to
refuse enforcement of the arbitral award even if the arbitrators were acting as amiable
compositeurs without authority and in "manifest disregard of the law", since the
Convention said nothing about this issue.88 Furthermore, the court believed that the
purpose of the New York Convention to assure consistency in the enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards would be frustrated "if judges sitting in each of the many
jurisdictions where enforcement may be obtained, were authorized by the Convention
to undertake a de novo inquiry into whether the law the arbitrators said they were
using was or was not properly applied by them."89
A century after the case of Swift v. Tyson,90 with the efforts made by the United
States Supreme Court in a series of leading cases as discussed in this chapter, the idea
that "the international arbitral tribunal owes no prior allegiance to the legal norms of
particular states"91 was finally confirmed in the American judicial system. Generally
speaking, though famous for the issue of arbitrability, the Mitsubishi case was in
addition regarded as a demonstration of the arbitrator's function in applying public
law. In other words, arbitrators are allowed to render private international justice on
87Ibid. at p. 181.
88Ibid.
89Ibid. at p. 182.
9041 US (16 Pet) 1, (1842).
91473 US 614(1985), at 636.
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certain subjects, even though it is against American domestic public policy. The
contribution made by these cases is a kind of recognition of the justice provided by a
transnational private judicial system. From Swift v. Tyson92 to the International
Standard Electric Corp. case,93 the issues surrounding the arbitrator's freedom to
decide cases on the basis of a-national principles are no longer a debatable topic in the
United States courts.
9241 US (16 Pet) 1, (1842).
93745 F. Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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Chapter Ten: Hong Kong, China and Taiwan
Whether the Hong Kong, Chinese and Taiwanese
courts accept the application of a-national
principles in international commercial arbitral
awards
The rapid pace of growth in the economies of South East Asia has attracted the
attention of international economic observers. It is believed that the economy in this
area will keep growing for the next century. Many international business people have
built up or are going to build up their businesses in this region. They especially focus
on the economic development in Hong Kong, China and Taiwan. However, they are
also conscious of the growing difficulty in penetrating the emerging Asian market.
From the viewpoint of international commercial operators, in the foreseeable future
international commercial arbitration will be used as an alternative dispute settlement
mechanism to avoid any potential complicated judicial procedures in these countries.
It is therefore desirable to evaluate how the national courts of Hong Kong, China and
Taiwan treat international arbitral awards made on the basis of a-national principles.
Although there is a very close tie among Hong Kong, China and Taiwan, both
historically and geographically, nevertheless they do not belong to the same family of
legal systems. Being a colony of the United Kingdom over a century, the legal system
of Hong Kong is under a great deal of influence from the common law system, which
is totally different from the civil law systems adopted in China and Taiwan. Despite
the political disputes over sovereignty, Taiwan neither shares the same law applied in
China nor belongs to the Chinese judicial system. In fact, Taiwan has its own
independent judicial system. Under these circumstances, a-national principles awards
in these three jurisdictions have to be treated individually.
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The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether the concept of a-national principles
is accepted in the newly developing economic states, or it is simply an idea prevailing
in Western Europe and in the United States. This chapter is composed of three
sections. The first section, under two individual headings, will contain a background
of the Arbitration Act 1990 and an investigation into the attitude of the Hong Kong
courts on this subject. It will be followed, in the second section, by a discussion of
the development of arbitration law in China and the status of awards made under a-
national principles before the Chinese courts. Finally, in the third section, the attitude
of the Taiwanese courts towards the application of a-national principles in arbitral
awards will be examined.
10.1 Hong Kong
10.1.1 Background study
Having been a colony of the United Kingdom for over a century, Hong Kong's legal
system has been influenced by Britain. In 1841, when the Chin Dynasty lost a war to
the United Kingdom, the British flag was raised in the island. Since then, Hong
Kong has imported the English common law system along with its existing statutes by
local Ordinances and the Chinese customary law into its legal system.1 Consequently,
Hong Kong legislation is usually modelled on the English legal system. This is also
the case for Hong Kong's arbitration laws. The development of international
commercial arbitration law in Hong Kong is largely influenced by English law.
As far as international commercial arbitration laws are concerned, statutes modelled on
English laws, international conventions acceded by the British Government on behalf
of Hong Kong, and precedents established by the English courts are the main sources
1 Simmonds and Hill, Commercial Arbitration Law in Asia andPacific, (1987), at p. 21.
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of the law relating to international commercial arbitration in Hong Kong. The relevant
statutes can be observed in the Arbitration Ordinance, Chapter 341 of the Laws of
Hong Kong which are modelled on the English Arbitration Acts 1850, 1950, 1975
and 1979.2 As for international conventions, by the reason of the United Kingdom's
accession on behalf of Hong Kong, Hong Kong is bound by the Geneva Protocol on
Arbitration Clauses 1923,3 the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, 1927,4 and the New York Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958.5 Furthermore, the Hong Kong
courts decide cases in accordance with precedents of the English courts.
Due to the influence of the English legal system, compared to other Eastern Asian
countries, Hong Kong's arbitration law is regarded as more sophisticated by Western
scholars. They also believe that fewer barriers exist in the arbitration laws adopted by
Hong Kong and Western countries. Because of this advantage, Hong Kong has
always tried to promote itself as an excellent forum for international commercial
arbitrations held in Asia. With this intention, Hong Kong decided to incorporate the
UNCITRAL Model Law into its existing arbitration framework. As explained by Mr.
MacNaughton, several other reasons also contribute to Hong Kong's special status in
international arbitration:
"First, there is a supportive statutory scheme. In fact, effective April 6, 1990,
Hong Kong adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law for all international
commercial arbitrations that take place in the territory. Second, there exists in
Hong Kong a strong network of experienced lawyers, judges and expert
witnesses. The judiciary in particular is sophisticated in arbitration matters and
is sensitive to what it takes to promote Hong Kong as a regional arbitration
centre. A third factor is the widespread use of English language. Fourth, there
are relatively few restraints on the direct participation of foreign lawyers in
arbitration proceedings. Fifth is the applicability of English common law, most
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importantly with regard to the law of contracts. And sixth, Hong Kong offers
convenient facilities for arbitration."6
In fact, Hong Kong went beyond the regime set by the United Kingdom and adopted
the UNCITRAL Model Law in its statutes concerning international commercial
arbitration. Eight years after the 1982 amendment, Hong Kong decided to substitute
its existing international commercial arbitration framework with the whole of the
UNCITRAL Model Law. In November 1989, in order to bring the Model law into
effect, further amendments to the Arbitration Ordinance were made. The Arbitration
Ordinance formally adopted the Model to regulate international arbitrations held in the
territory of Hong Kong.7 The new regime came into force on April 6, 1990.8
Following this change, Hong Kong has, six years on, become a very popular place
for arbitration in the Pacific Rim.
10.1.2 Acceptance of international commercial arbitral awards made on
the basis of a-national principles by the Hong Kong courts
Being the most sophisticated and popular forum for international commercial
arbitration held in Asia, the concept of a-national principles has frequently been
applied by international commercial arbitrators in Hong Kong. In order to decide
whether the application of the general principles of law, the new lexmercatoria or
amiable composition as the substantive law of the contract in international arbitration is
allowed before the Hong Kong courts, three issues have to be considered. First, what
attitude do the Hong Kong courts hold towards the principle of party autonomy in
choice of the substantive law? Secondly, what attitude do the Hong Kong courts hold
6MacNaughton, "Arbitration and Dispute Settlement Procedures in Hong Kong", in Private Investor
Abroad, (1990), Chapter 10, at p. 10-5.
Arbitration (Amendment) (No. 2) Ordinance 1989.
8Since then, a dual statutory system has been adopted for arbitrations held in Hong Kong. On the one
hand, domestic arbitration is governed by the previous law modelled on the English Arbitration Acts
1950-1979. On the other hand, the UNCITRAL Model Law applies to international arbitration held
in Hong Kong.
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towards the application of the new lex mercatoria as the substantive law in
international commercial arbitration? Thirdly, what attitude do the Hong Kong courts
hold towards awards decided on the basis of equity?
Firstly, as far as the principle of party autonomy in choice of law is concerned, the
Hong Kong courts follow the decisions handed down by English courts before and
after the adoption of the Model Law. According to the English precedents, the parties'
freedom to choose both procedural and substantive laws is subject to the public policy
and mandatory rules of the country where the arbitration is held. As far as the
municipal procedural law is concerned, the parties can choose either Hong Kong or a
foreign law to govern the procedural matters. In the absence of such agreement, the
Hong Kong Ordinance will govern the procedural matters of the arbitration when the
parties agree to arbitrate in Hong Kong.
Following the principle set by English courts that "a contract is governed by the law
chosen by the parties",9 the parties' freedom to choose the substantive law applicable
to the merits of the disputes is also recognised before the Hong Kong courts,
"provided the intention expressed is bona fide and legal, and provided there is no
reason for avoiding the choice on the ground of public policy."10 If they failed to do
so, the arbitrators must determine which law governs the underlying contract. Before
the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model law, the substantive law to be applied to the
merits of the dispute would be decided on the basis of the "implied choice test" or the
system of law which had the closest connection to the contract, the so-called the "most
real and closest relationship" test.11
9Dicey and Morris on The Conflict ofLaws, (12th ed. 1993), p. 1211.
10Vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. Ltd. [19391 AC 277, 299; Whitworth Street Estates
(Manchester) Ltd. v. JamesMiller and Partners Ltd. [1970] AC 583, 603. Simminds and Hill,
Commercial Arbitration Law in Asia and Pacific, (1987), at p. 24.
11Bonython v. Commonwealth ofAustralia [1951] AC 201, 209.
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Nevertheless, after the UNCITRAL Model Law came into force, arbitrators sitting in
Hong Kong are no longer required to apply the choice of law rules of the lex fori in
order to decide the substantive law of the contract. According to Article 28(2), in the
absence of the parties' express choice of the substantive law, arbitrators can apply any
system of the conflict of laws which they consider appropriate to determine the law
governing the substantive issues of the cases.
While a choice of the "general principles of international law" in conjunction with the
application of a municipal law is regarded as a valid choice of law,12 the application of
the new lex mercatoria as the substantive law in international commercial arbitration,
and the attitude held by the Hong Kong courts, have to be discussed from the point of
view of both the decisions handed down by English courts and the New Arbitration
Ordinance which brought the UNCITRAL Model Law into effect in Hong Kong.
Examining the cases decided by the English courts, a positive answer is given to the
issue whether the application of the new lexmercatoria is allowed before the English
courts.
The most famous case is Deutsche-und Tiefbohrgesellshaft v. Ras Al Khaimah
National Oil Co. and Shell International Petroleum Co. Ltd. (DST v. Rakoil)13, where
the arbitrators applied the so called "internationally accepted principles of law" to
decide the dispute arising from the contract. The Court was convinced that the parties
did have the intention to create legally enforceable rights and liabilities.14 It stated that
the decision about the choice of law was left with the arbitrators, and that their
decision to choose "internationally accepted principles of law" to govern contractual
relations between the parties did not lead to the conclusion that the parties did not
12See Thai-Europe Ltd. v. Pakistan Government [1975] 1 WLR 1485; Anun Rasheed Corp. v.
Kuwait Insurance Co. [1984] AC 50; and Dallal v. BankMellat [1986] QB 441; [1986] 2 WLR 745.
A detailed discussion on this subject can be seen in Chapter Seven.
13Deutsche-und Tiefbohrgesellshaft v. Ras Al Khaimah National Oil Co. and Shell International
Petroleum Co. Ltd. (DST v. Rakoil) [1987] 3 WLR 1023.
14Ibid. at p. 1035.
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intend to create legally enforceable rights and obligations, nor was it void for
uncertainty or contrary to public policy. This decision was followed by the case of
Channel Tunnel Group v. Balfour Beatty Ltd.,15 where the House of Lords simply
left the choice of law clause alone without further discussion.
From the viewpoint of the New Arbitration Ordinance which brought the UNCITRAL
Model Law into effect in Hong Kong, not surprisingly the same conclusion can also
be drawn from a reading of Article 28 of the Model Law:
"1. The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with such rules
of law as are chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of the
dispute...
2. Failing any designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the
law determined by the conflict of law rules which it considers appropriate.
4. In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of
the contract and shall take into account the usages of the trade applicable to the
transaction."
Therefore, it can be concluded that the application of the new lexmercatoria as the
substantive law of the contract in international arbitration is recognised before the
Hong Kong courts, both before and after the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law
in 1990.
Nevertheless, the application of the notion of amiable composition in international
commercial arbitration in Hong Kong used to be more complicated than the issue of
the new lex mercatoria. From the decisions handed down by the English courts, both
negative16 and positive17 attitudes have been observed as outlined in Chapter Seven.
15[1993] AC 334; [1993] 2 WLR 262.
16Orion Compania Espanola de Seguros v. Belfort Maatschappij Voor Algemene Verzekgringeen
[1962] 2 LI L R 257, 264; David Taylor & Son Ltd. v. Barneet Trading Co. [1953] 1 WLR 562, at
pp. 568 and 570; Overseas Union Insurance Ltd. v. A.A. Mutual Insurance Co. Ltd. [1988] 2 LI L R
63, 72.
17Rolland v. Cassidy (1888) 13 AC 770., at pp. 772-773, 774; Jager v. Tolme and Runge [1916] 1
KB 939, 953; BoardofTrade v. Cayzer Irvine & Co. [1927] AC 610, at pp. 628-629; Eagle Star
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Yuval Insurance Co. Ltd. [1978] 1 LI L R 357, at pp. 361-362; Home
Insurance Co. and St. Paul Fire andMarine Insurance Co. v. AdministratiaAsigurarilor de Stat (1983)
2 LI L R 674, 677.
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For instance, in the Eagle Star Insurance1* and Home Insurance Co.19 cases, both
Lord Denning and Park J. regarded a clause conferring upon arbitrators the powers
not to be bound by strict legal principles as entirely reasonable, whereas Evan J. in the
case of Overseas Union Insurance Ltd. v. A.A. Mutual Insurance Co. Ltd.,20
criticised the judgments made in the Eagle Star Insurance21 and Home Insurance
Co 22 cases by saying:
"
, the effect of the equity clause is not clearly settled as a matter of law.
Although the clause may entitle the arbitrators "to view the matter more
leniently" than a court would do, I am doubtful whether they can embark on
any other inquiry than what the law requires, namely finding the natural and
proper meaning of the words used, in the particular context."23
Nevertheless, the application of the notion of amiable composition has no longer been
a controversial issue in Hong Kong courts since April 1, 1990, the date when the
Model Law came into force in Hong Kong. The concept of amiable composition is
expressly permitted in Article 28(3) of the Model Law which stipulates that, "The
arbitral tribunal shall decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur only if the
parties have expressly authorised it to do so." In other words, with parties' express
authorisation, arbitrators will have the powers to decide the case as amiable
compositeurs or decide the cases in accordance with equity. Consequently, in the case
of international commercial arbitration, with the parties' express authorisation (subject
to the restrictions on public policy and mandatory rules), any awards made on the
basis of amiable composition under these circumstances can no longer be challenged
before the Hong Kong courts.
1 *Eagle Star Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Yuval Insurance Co. Ltd. [1978] 1 LI L R 357, at pp. 361-362.
19Home Insurance Co. and St. Paul Fire andMarine Insurance Co. v. Administrate Asigurarilor de
Stat [1983] 2 LI L R 674, 677.
20[1988] 2 LI L R 63, 72.
2 *Eagle Star Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Yuval Insurance Co. Ltd. [1978] 1 LI L R 357, at pp. 361-362.
2 2Home Insurance Co. and St. Paul Fire andMarine Insurance Co. v. AdministrateAsigurarilor de
Stat [1983] 2 LI L R 674, 677.
23[1988] 2 LI L R 63, 72.
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In fact, Article 28(3) is intended to confirm the parties' rights to offer international
arbitrators the power to decide the case as amiable compositeurs while sitting in Hong
Kong; however, an issue arising in this instance is whether Hong Kong courts
recognise international awards decided on such a basis, but made in a foreign
jurisdiction. It is suggested by the present writer that the answer to this question is
"yes". A petition of recognition or enforcement of an international arbitral award made
on the basis of amiable composition will only be refused by a national court on the
grounds of mandatory rules and public policy. With respect to the courts in Hong
Kong, the arguments about mandatory rules and public policy can no longer to be
sustained because the notion of amiable composition is recognised in the new
Arbitration Act. As a result, if in an international commercial arbitration held in Hong
Kong arbitrators are allowed to decide the case on the basis of amiable composition, it
would appear to be illogical to conclude that Hong Kong courts would refuse to
recognise or enforce a foreign arbitral award which was also decided on the basis of
amiable composition, since the mandatory rules and public policy exceptions can no
longer be argued on this basis before Hong Kong courts.
10.2 China
10.2.1 Background study
International commercial arbitration plays a significant role in international commercial
and economic activities conducted between Chinese enterprises and Western investors.
From the Western investor's point of view, given their lack of confidence in the
litigation procedures in Chinese courts, arbitration appears a more desirable way to
settle the disputes between them and the Chinese counterparts. From the Chinese
Government's viewpoint, attracting foreign investment in order to strengthen its
economic system has been the most important policy of the past twenty years. The
Chinese Government will consider any method which helps to achieve this goal. As
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far as the international commercial dispute resolution mechanism is concerned, the
Chinese Government has decided to have international commercial and economic
disputes resolved by means of arbitration, after recognising that compulsory litigation
was a factor stopping foreign investors investing in China.
Nowadays, in fact, Chinese authorities not only approve but also encourage the use of
arbitration as an alternative way to settle the disputes arising from international
commercial and economic activities (such as joint ventures, the processing of
materials, construction, transfer of technology, leasing and maritime disputes).24
Two arbitration institutions are in the main dealing with the various disputes submitted
to arbitration. One is the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commission (CIETAC)25 which annually receives more than 300 international
cases.26 The other one is the China Maritime Arbitration Commission (CMAC) which
normally receives 14-15 cases every year.27 Although ad hoc arbitration is allowed in
the Chinese arbitration system, most parties prefer to have disputes submitted to the
CIETAC. Because of the importance of CIETAC in international commercial
arbitration, in this research the discussion will mainly be focused on the rules of the
CIETAC and the relevant arbitration laws.
A few decades ago, the development of international commercial arbitration was not a
great priority in the Chinese legal system. Between 1949 and 1978, China was
against the concept of capitalism which prevailed in the West. As a result,
24Certain disputes relating to marriage, adoption, maintenance, succession, and administration are not
arbitrable under the Arbitration Law 1994. Chi, Shaojie, "Arbitration Mechanism to be Updated in
China", (1995), InfI Bus.Lawyer 16, at p. 16.
25CIETAC was formerly known as the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission (FTAC). In 1989 it
was renamed the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC).
26Sanders, International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration, (2nd. ed., 1994), Chapter on China at
p. 3.
27Ibid, at p. 4. According to Moser, "China and the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards", (1995)
Arbitration, 46, which stated: "the number of cases handled by CIETAC and CMAC has grown
dramatically. At present, nearly 400 cases are pending before CIETAC and CMAC tribunals; the cases
involve parties from more than 25 different countries." (Data provided by the Secretariats of CIETAC
and CMAC), at p. 47 in February 1995.
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international trade between China and foreign states was limited to Communist
countries, such as the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Cuba. At that time,
there was no need for China to develop its arbitration system because the international
arbitration system in those communist countries was also under-developed. During
this period, China only had the Arbitration Act 1956 to deal with both domestic and
foreign related arbitration. Compared to the arbitration laws which were in force in
some major arbitration countries at that time, such as the English Arbitration Act 1950,
the Chinese Arbitration Act 1956 was regarded as outdated on the ground that too
many restrictions were imposed on arbitration.
After experiencing economic difficulties and poverty which had existed in the country
for more than three decades, in 1978 China decided to modify its economic policies
from a highly centralised planned economy to a market economy. The "open-door
policy" was adopted in order to achieve this goal. Following this policy, China started
to attract foreign investors. Nevertheless, unstable political and judicial systems in
China upset the plan to attract Western investors. In order to carry out its policy
successfully, on the one hand China created the so-called Economic Special Zones
which were designed to open to the outside world, and on the other hand, promoted
arbitration as an alternative method to settle international disputes between Chinese and
foreign investors. This change in the Chinese economic framework gave international
commercial arbitration a great chance to develop and flourish in the Chinese legal
system.
Between 1978 and today, China has enacted a number of laws regulating international
arbitration to carry out its open-door policy and fulfil its economic development aims.
For instance, the Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity
Joint Venture, 1979;28 the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Exploitation
28See Sit, (ed.) Commercial Laws and Business Regulations of the P.R. ofChina, Hong Kong,
(1983), at pp. 326-328.
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of Off-Shorc Petroleum Resources in Co-operation with Foreign Enterprises, 1982;
the Law of the People's Republic of China on Civil Procedure 1982;29 the Law of the
People's Republic of China on Economic Contracts Involving Foreign Interests
1985;30 the Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Loreign Contractual
Joint Ventures 1988; the Law of the People's Republic of China on Wholly Foreign-
owned Enterprises 1986; the Law of the People's Republic of China on Civil
Procedure, amended in 1991, and the Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of
China 1994.31
While China attempted to create a more friendly atmosphere for the development of
international commercial arbitration, the CIETAC also enacted new rules in order to
administer international arbitration held in China. First of all, replacing the
Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Foreign Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commission which were enacted in 1956, the CIETAC amended its Arbitration Rules
on 12 September 1988.32 Not long after this amendment, the CIETAC decided to
amend the Arbitration Rules 1988 once again. This time, they decided to amend the
1988 Rules by following the UNCITRAL Model Law as a guideline. The new
Arbitration Rules of the CIETAC were adopted on March 17, 1994, and came into
force on 1 June 1994. The 1994 Rules were designed to improve the deficiencies of
the 1988 Rules. It is regarded as a big step for China to keep up with the liberal trend
prevailing in international commercial arbitration.33 Among the laws and rules
regulating international arbitration in China, the CIETAC Arbitration Rules 1994 and
the Arbitration Law 1994 are regarded as the most important legal documents. Both of
29 It is for trial implementation.
30For English Translation, Consult with China Economic News, Beijing, 1 April 1985.
31Several regulations were also promulgated. For instance, the Decision of the Government
Administration Council of the Central People's Government Concerning the Establishment of a
Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission within the China Council for the Promotion of International
Trade, 6 May 1954; The Regulations for the implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of
China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 1983.
32The Arbitration Rules came into force in January 1, 1989.
33Chi, "Arbitration Mechanism to be Updated in China", (1995) Int'l Bus.Lawyer 16, at p. 16.
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them adopt the important theories accepted by the major arbitration countries, such as,
party autonomy, independence of arbitration agreements and "competence and
competence".
As far as the choice of the substantive law is concerned, apart from the cases where
the application of Chinese law is mandatory,34 party autonomy is respected. The
parties' freedom to choose the substantive law is embodied in Article 145 of the Civil
Code35 and Article 5 of the Foreign Economic Contract Law.36 This principle was
reaffirmed in an opinion issued by the Supreme People's Court, which stated that the
choice of law may be made by the parties either at the time of signing of the contract or
later after a dispute has arisen and in either case the courts will be bound by the
decision of the parties.37 Although the inclusion of a foreign governing law clause in
contract between Chinese and foreign enterprises has been the exception rather than
the rule,38 international arbitrators are obliged to apply such foreign law to determine
the disputes providing the parties agree.
In the case where the contract is silent as to the substantive law, arbitrators are
required to apply the law which has the closest connection with the contract, such as
the law of the place where the contract was concluded, or the law of the place where
the contract was or is to be performed, or the law of the place of arbitration. Thirteen
34Article 5 of the Foreign Economic Contract Law specifically provides that contracts for the
establishment or operation of Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures, Chinese- foreign contractual or
co-operative joint ventures, and Chinese- foreign co-operative exploration and development of natural
resources shall be governed by the laws of China. See Chang, "Comparative Survey of the Rules of
the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce and the Arbitration Rules of the
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission", (1992) 9(4) J.I.A. 93, at p. 105.
35It stipulates: "Except where the law provides otherwise, the parties to a contract involving foreign
interests may choose the law applicable to the resolution of their contractual disputes."
36It provides: "The parties to a contract may choose the law to be applied to the settlement of the
dispute arising from the contract."
37Para. 2(2) of the Response of the Supreme People's Court to Certain Questions Concerning the
Application of the Foreign Economic Contract Law. Also see Cheng, Moser, and Wang,
International Arbitration in the People's Republic ofChina, Commentary, Cases and Materials,
(1995), at p. 37-38.
38Kaplan, Spruce and Moser, Hong Kong and China Arbitration — Cases and Materials, (1994) p.
319.
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guidelines were issued by the Supreme People's Court to assist arbitrators to
determine the law which has the closest connection to the case. The guidelines cover
disputes arising from international commodity trade contracts, loan and guarantee
contracts, insurance contracts, processing contracts, technology transfer contracts,
contractual projects, consultancy and design contracts, labour contracts, sale of
complete sets of equipment, agency contracts, real estate contracts, movable properties
and storage and custody contracts.39 These guidelines are also followed by the
CIETAC and CMAC arbitrations.
10.2.2 Acceptance of international commercial arbitral awards made on
the basis of a-national principles by the Chinese courts
After an intensive literature search, few cases which discussed the application of the
general principles of law, the new lexmercatorici or amiable composition as the
substantive law of the contract in international commercial arbitration have been
discovered. One reason may be that the issue was never raised before the courts
because no such choice of law was exercised; alternatively, it may have been chosen
but the parties did not dispute the validity of the application.
In order to ascertain whether the Chinese courts accept the notion of a-national
principles, examining the CIETAC Arbitration Rules 1994 and the Arbitration Law
1994 is an alternative way to discover whether the application of the general principles
of law, the new lex mercatoria or the notion of amiable composition is allowed before
the Chinese courts . Unfortunately, both the CIETAC Arbitration Rules 1994 and the
Arbitration Law 1994 are silent on this issue. Only Article 53 of the CIETAC
Arbitration Rules seems to provide (indirect) evidence. It reads:
39For a full list in English, see, Ibid, at pp. 319-320; and Cheng, Moser, andWang, International
Arbitration in the People's Republic ofChina, Commentary/, Cases and Materials, (1995), at pp. 40-
42.
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"The arbitration tribunal shall independently and impartially make its arbitral
award in accordance with the facts of the case, the law and the terms of the
contracts, international practice and the principle of fairness and
reasonableness."
Mr Tang, the author of the Chapter on Chinese arbitration in the International
Handbook on Commercial Arbitration, is convinced that the term "the principles of
fairness and reasonableness" in this rule relates to amiable composition. It is designed
"in accordance with the Chinese tradition,"40 therefore, "the tribunal may decide the
case as amiable compositeurs, even if the parties have not so authorised it."41 In other
words, arbitrators can decide to act as amiable compositeurs on their own initiative
even though no such powers are offered in the arbitration agreement. Furthermore, he
went on to say that the arbitrator's power to act as an amiable compositeur cannot be
excluded by the parties agreement because "it is unclear whether Article 53 of the 1994
Rules is regarded as peremptory."42
In fact, the concept of amiable composition was applied in an award concerning a
dispute arising from the sale of station wagons between a Chinese party (the claimant)
and a Japanese company (the respondent).43 Failing to receive the additional payment
outside of the contract promised by the claimant, the respondent refused to deliver the
wagons and returned the letter of credit back to the claimant. The claimant claimed
compensation before the tribunal. The tribunal decided in the respondent's favour and
held:
"This transaction was negotiated between the principal and the respondent
before the principal authorised the claimant to sign the contract with the
respondent. The claimant could not deny the above-mentioned payment,
promised by the principal, and require the respondent to deliver the goods
upon the contract, because it was contrary to the principles of seeking truth
from the facts and ex aequo et bono.
40Tang, "The People's Republic of China" in van dcr Berg & Sanders (eds.) InternationalHandbook
on Commercial Arbitration, (1994), at p. 12.
41 Ibid.
42Ibid.
43Selected Works ofChina International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Awards (1963-
1988) Updated to 1993 (1995), at pp. 163-165.
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Based on the above-mentioned facts, and the principle of ex aequo et bono, the
claimant's claim should be dismissed."44
With respect to the new lex mercatoria, Mr Tang neither suggested that the application
of the new lexmercatoria is also regarded as "peremptory" in accordance with Article
53 of the CIETAC Arbitration Rules, nor discussed whether the term "international
practice" meant the new lexmercatoria. Nevertheless, this gap was filled by another
jurist, Guiguo Wang, who claimed that international custom has long been applied in
international arbitration held in China. Using CIETAC as an example, he stated:
"CIETAC has a tradition of adopting international practices and customs in
determining the rights and obligations of disputing parties. This is so because
China's commercial laws are relatively new. By relying on international
practice and customs, the gaps in Chinese law can be filled. It also gives the
parties concerned some certainty. With Chinese law covering various aspects
of commercial transactions being adopted, CIETAC arbitral awards have
begun to make reference to Chinese law. International practice and customs,
however, still play an important role in the CIETAC arbitration process. Very
often, they are relied upon as evidence of international commercial law."45
He, furthermore, took the Wulhan jute bag case as evidence of his statement. In this
case, issues concerning letters of credit were raised. According to Mr. Wang, the
arbitral tribunal frequently made reference to international practice and customs, such
as the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, to determine the
underlying issues.46
Nevertheless, this case only confirmed that international practice and customs could
fill the gap left by the municipal laws. It does not provide a satisfactory answer to the
question whether the new lexmercatoria is recognised as a valid choice of substantive
law before the Chinese courts. Although the Chinese jurists claim that the notion of a-
44Ibid. p. 165.
45Wang, "The Unification of the Dispute Resolution System in China", (1996) 13(2) J.l.A. 5, at pp.
35-36.
4^Ibid. at pp. 36-37.
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national principles exists in the Chinese arbitration framework, and indeed, has been
applied by the CIETAC, no court cases on this subject have been reported. Under
these circumstances, it would be premature to conclude that the Chinese courts fully
accept the application of a-national principles in international arbitral awards.
10.3 Taiwan47
10.3.1 Background study
In theory, a foreign arbitral award can be recognised and enforced before the
Taiwanese courts under multilateral conventions, bilateral treaties and relevant
domestic legislation. Nevertheless, due to its special political status in international
society, the Taiwanese Government has had very few chances to access international
conventions or bilateral treaties for the recognition or enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards. As far as multilateral arbitration conventions are concerned, the Taiwanese
Government has only ratified the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of other States. In the case of bilateral treaties, the Sino-
American Friendship, Commerce, Navigation Treaties 1948, which provide full faith
and credit for arbitration agreements and arbitral awards, is the only bilateral treaty
between the Taiwanese Government and a foreign state.48 With respect to its
legislation, the Arbitration Act 1961 contains the only domestic rules regulating
commercial arbitration activities and the procedures for recognition or enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards. Although the Arbitration Act 1961 was amended in 1982 and
1986, it still failed to keep up with the modern trend in international commercial
arbitration because too many restrictions were imposed on procedural matters. In fact,
47In this part of the study, in case of confusion between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China,
Taiwan will be used to represent the independent political and legal system in the Republic of China
(Taiwan). However, the Taiwanese Government still insists on using "Republic of China" on the
official legal texts. Therefore, the term "Republic of China" will be used when the legal Acts are
cited.
48This treaty was signed between Taiwan and the United States before 1979.
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international commercial arbitration has made very little progress in Taiwan between
then and today.
After the promulgation of the 1961 Arbitration Act, arbitration has been accepted as an
alternative method to settle disputes arising from international commercial activities in
the Taiwanese legal system; however, arbitration has only been known and attracted
the attention of the academics and business communities since 1993. This was the
time when the Matra Transport case was decided against the Department of Metro
Construction of the City of Taipei. The arbitral tribunal awarded the French Matra
Transport Company the amount of 25 millions pounds sterling. Due to unfamiliarity
in Taiwan with the mechanism of arbitration, this award caused a great deal of
controversy. Among jurists and judges, a debate concerning the kind of attitude
towards international commercial arbitration the Taiwanese legal system should adopt
has arisen. Following the debate, both the negative and positive opinions expressed
affected the development of arbitration in Taiwan. According to the negative opinions,
and based on the ground that no channel for appeal existed in the arbitration
mechanism, the Taiwanese Government was advised by a group of lawyers that no
arbitration clause should be inserted into the contracts concluded between foreign
companies and any branches of the Government in the future.
Such a hostile attitude could be observed in the earlier cases decided in the 1980s. For
instance, the Taiwanese Supreme Court ruled that an arbitration agreement between the
parties was invalid because the bill of lading of the main contract only had one party's
signature.49 In another case, the Taipei District Court of Taiwan decided that an
arbitration agreement between two Taiwanese nationals to have their dispute arbitrated
in New York was invalid. The court simply stated that, at that time, American arbitral
awards were not recognised before the Taiwanese courts. Therefore, considering
4967-Tai-Shang-Tze 3762 ROC Supreme Court 1978.
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public policy, there would be no point in the parties having their arbitration conducted
in New York.50
In contrast, after the Matra Transport case, another group of lawyers believed that it
was time to amend the Arbitration Act in order to keep pace with the trend in
international commercial arbitration. Recognising the fact that the outdated and strict
approach adopted in the Arbitration Act obstructs the development of international
commercial arbitration in Taiwan and will deter the plan to promote Taiwan as the
Pacific Financial Centre, the Commercial Arbitration Act Reforming Committee was
set up in 1994 under the supervision of the Judicial Department to amend the existing
Arbitration Act. So far, the Committee has produced a draft of the new Arbitration Act
which will be introduced to the Parliament.
In fact, it is the third attempt to have the Arbitration Act amended. On June 11, 1982,
in order to cope with the increasing volume of international trade and economic
activities connected with Taiwanese companies, the Arbitration Act 1961 was amended
for the first time. Four years later, it was amended again in 1986. After two
amendments, the Arbitration Act not only failed to simplify the procedures for the
recognition or enforcement of foreign arbitral awards but also to follow the trend in
international commercial arbitration.
With the intention of promoting Taiwan as a substitute for Hong Kong as the financial
centre of the Pacific Rim once Hong Kong returns to China, the proponents of the
amendment of the Arbitration Act have urged that a more liberal approach should be
adopted in the new amendment. Several points were suggested in a departmental
meeting about the reform of the Arbitration Act held by the Judicial Department in June
5070 Su-TZE-2359, Taipei District Court, 1981. However, this judgment was widely criticised
because, on the basis of the Sino-American Friendship, Commerce Navigation Treaties 1948,
American arbitral awards may be enforced in the Taiwanese courts.
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1994:51 such as using precedents as the best source of arbitration law, following the
trends in international commercial arbitration, for example, the unification of
arbitration laws, encouraging the parties to choose a sole arbitrator (instead of arbitral
tribunals), distinguishing domestic and international arbitration, publishing arbitral
awards, allowing a wider scope of arbitrability and less intervention from the national
courts, offering arbitrators powers in choosing the applicable laws and granting
interim measures, and adopting the principles of separability of the arbitration clause,
and party autonomy.52
In relation to the choice of law rules, party autonomy is respected. As far as the
arbitrator's power in choosing the substantive law is concerned, it is stipulated that, in
the absence of the parties' expressed choice of law, the arbitrators are offered a power
to choose the substantive law governing the merits in accordance with the Taiwanese
conflict of laws rules. In the draft of the new Arbitration Act, however, it is suggested
that arbitrators should be released from the obligation of choosing the substantive law
in accordance with the Taiwanese conflict of laws rules.
10.3.2 Acceptance of international commercial arbitral awards made on
the basis of a-national principles by the Taiwanese courts
Under the 1986 Amendment, neither the conflict of laws rules nor the concept of a-
national principles is discussed; therefore, the application of the general principles of
law, the new lexmercatoria or amiable composition is an arguable issue among
Taiwanese jurists and lawyers. Dr. Chen,53 a leading Taiwanese lawyer, believes that
arbitrators do have the power to apply a-national principles to decide the disputes
51A confidential paper prepared for the Judicial Departmental meeting in June 1994 (not published).
52pp. 30-41 of the confidential paper prepared for the Judicial Departmental meeting in June 1994
(not published).
53Chen, "The Legal Status of Transnational Commercial Arbitration in the Republic of China on
Taiwan", in Private InvestorsAbroad, (1992), Chapter 13.
242
Chapter Ten: Hong Kong, China and Taiwan
submitted to them, even though this power is not expressed in the Arbitration Act. He
found his argument in Article 1 of the ROC Civil Code, which reads:
"In civil matters, is there is no provision of law applicable to a case, the case
shall be decided according to custom. If there no such custom, the case shall
be decided in accordance with the general principles of law."
He maintains that the application of a-national principles should be allowed, since the
national judges of the Taiwanese courts have the power to apply custom or the general
principles of law when no provision of law applicable to the issues exists.
Furthermore, the application should only be subject to two exceptions: "(1) the
administrative or judicial ruling upon which a transnational award has required the
party to perform an illegal act; or (2) a foreign award [has] violated the ROC's
imperative or prohibitive legal provisions, public orders, or good morality."54 As he
said: "the Commercial Arbitration Act ("CAA") has not singled out or penalised private
denationalisation efforts under which the international trade usages or general legal
principles, rather than a national legal order, may be chosen as the governing law for
an arbitration."55
This opinion is suggested in Article 28 of the Draft of the Amendment 1997, which
states: "The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with law and take
into account the usages of trade and equity, unless otherwise agreed by the parties."
However, opinions strongly opposing the adoption of the new lex mercatoria and
amiable composition can be seen in several symposia published in September and
October 1994.56 Among them, the Taiwanese High Court plays a leading role in this
debate. The Taiwanese High Court, in fact, suggested that Article 28 should be taken
out of the Draft. They argue that arbitrators may abuse their powers when they are
allowed to disregard the application of law and apply the new lexmercatoria and
54/bid. at pp. 13-24.
55Ibid.
56p. 48 of the symposium of September, 1994; and p. 66 of the symposium of October, 1994.
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amiable composition. Furthermore, they criticised the fact that, by applying this
provision, arbitrators will have greater powers than national judges. Unfortunately,
no precedents concerning the new lexmercatoria exist to provide an indication of the
Taiwanese courts' attitude on this matter. Therefore, the application of the new lex
mercatoria as the substantive law of the contract can be seriously questioned.
As for the notion of amiable composition, it was applied in an award made in
Taiwan.57 In this case, the parties agreed to have the arbitration held in Taipei
(Taiwan) and the substantive law was the relevant domestic laws of Taiwan.
Nevertheless, in this award the arbitrators stated that in order to achieve the desirable
justice they had decided to apply the principles of equity to decide the dispute after
considering both the provisions of the positive law and the underlying contract.
Without the parties' express authorisation, the arbitrators justified their decision by
asserting that the Arbitration Act 1986 does not require that the power to act as amiable
compositeurs or decide the case according to amiable composition be expressly
authorised by the parties. In addition, in the arbitrators' opinion, equity is equivalent
to the general principles of law. Therefore, they believed that arbitrators had the
power to act as amiable compositeurs providing national judges can decide the case
according to custom or the general principles of law and no provision of law is
applicable to the case.58
Nevertheless, an appeal to set aside this award was allowed by the Taiwanese
Supreme Court on the ground that the arbitrators acted outside the scope of their
power to decide the case in accordance with equity since this power was never
expressly offered by the parties.59 The Supreme Court stated that the arbitrator's
powers were based on the arbitration agreement between the parties and arbitrators
57Award No. 1043 Shang Jong Thin Tze.
58Article 1 of the Civil Code.
59no. 1265 Tai-Shang, The Supreme Court, 1994.
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should not decide the dispute by exercising more powers than they were offered.
Instead of deciding the case on the basis of amiable composition, the arbitrators should
have taken the parties' agreement on the choice of law into account and applied the
Taiwanese domestic laws to the dispute submitted to them. As a result, this award
was set aside. However, the Taiwanese courts have never provided a clear answer to
the questions of whether the application of a-national principles is allowed in the
Taiwanese courts and whether, with the parties' authorisation, the Taiwanese courts
will recognise the notion of amiable composition as a valid choice of proper law.
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As outlined in the examination carried out in Part Three of this thesis, it is evident that
the degree and process of acceptance of the application of a-national principles in
international commercial arbitration varies from country to country. Among the six
jurisdictions examined in this part of study, France has historically been significant for
being arbitration friendly; whereas, during different periods, both the United States,
Hong Kong and England have displayed similar hostility towards this issue during the
development of arbitration in their legal systems. While the notion of a-national
principles has been developed or applied in the Western arbitration community, it is
still an unfamiliar phenomenon in China and Taiwan with their rather short history of
international commercial arbitration.
Compared to the development of English arbitration laws, France and the United
States seemed to reach a stage of development in international commercial arbitration
twenty years ahead of their English counterpart. This is reflected in the French 1981
Decree and the American Federal Arbitration Act which are more flexible and liberal
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towards international commercial arbitration (particularly the issues of choice of the
proper law).
A century after the case of Swift v. Tyson,1 with the efforts made by the United States
Supreme Court in a series of leading cases (as discussed in Chapter Nine), the idea
that "the international arbitral tribunal owes no prior allegiance to the legal norms of
particular states"2 was confirmed in the American judicial system. Generally
speaking, though famous for the issue of arbitrability, the Mitsubishi case was in
addition regarded as a demonstration of the arbitrator's function in applying public
law. In other words, arbitrators are allowed to render private international justice on
certain subjects, even though it is against American domestic public policy. The
contribution made by these cases is a formal recognition of the justice provided by
what is in effect a transnational private judicial system. Throughout the development
from Swift v. Tyson3 to the International StandardElectric Corp. case,4 the validity of
awards made on the basis of a-national principles has been recognised by the
American courts.
Influenced by the statements made by Denning L.J. (as he was) who said: "there is not
one law for arbitrators and another for the court. There is one law for all,"5 for
decades, arbitration, instead of being a substitute for litigation, has had a
comparatively close connection with the courts in England. As Mustill and Boyd
stated: "The law of private arbitration is concerned with the relationship between the
courts and the arbitral process."6 Consequently, both the judges and the legislators
*41 US (16 Pet) 1, (1842)
2473 US 614 (1985) at 636.
341 US (16 Pet) 1, (1842).
4745 F. Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
5David Taylor & Son Ltd. v. Barnett Trading Co. (1958] 1 W.L.R. 562, 570.




have been rather conservative in reacting to the development of international
commercial arbitration.
However, there has been gradual development in the leading case of Deutsche-und
Tiefbohrgesellshaft v. Ras Al Khaimah National Oil Co. and Shell International
Petroleum Co. Ltd. (DST v. Rakoit),1 English courts recognised the application of the
new lex mercatoria as a valid choice of law governing the substance of a dispute.
With the very recent efforts to catch up with continental systems, the notion of amiable
composition has been officially confirmed in section 46(1) of the Arbitration Act 1996,
which provides "the tribunal shall decide the dispute, if the parties agree, in
accordance with such other considerations as are agreed by them or determined by the
tribunal."
Nevertheless, the acceptance in China and Taiwan of the concept of amiable
composition has come even later than in England. While the debate concerning
whether a-national principles shall be adopted in the new Arbitration Act continues
among Taiwanese jurists and scholars, Chinese judges have produced no cases on this
subject. Although it has been suggested by a number of scholars that, theoretically,
both the new lexmercatoria and amiable composition can be applied by arbitrators and
will be recognised by the courts, without the evidence handed down by the judge,
such a suggestion does not provide a convincing ground for such a view.
7Deutsche-und Tiefbohrgesellshaft v. RasAl Khaimah National Oil Co. and Shell International
Petroleum Co. Ltd. (DST v. Rakoil) [1987] 3 WLR 1023.
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Introduction to Part Four
While the application of a-national principles in international commercial arbitration
may contradict mandatory rules or public policy of certain jurisdictions, the validity of
a choice of a-national principles is uncertain. In this part of this thesis, the issue of
awards based on a-national principles will be examined from a different angle. Instead
of following the traditional arguments over the benefits or deficiencies of the concept
of a-national principles, this part will examine whether any existing theories provide
justification for the present arbitration framework and the application of a-national
principles in international commercial arbitration. First, Chapter Eleven is an
examination of the various theories which have been suggested by jurists throughout
the development of international commercial arbitration. They include the
jurisdictional, contractual, hybrid and autonomous theories. An evaluation of these
theories is also provided in this chapter. Finally, in Chapter Twelve, a more
appropriate approach to illustrate the existing arbitration framework will be suggested;
it will also contain an examination of whether this new theory can also provide a
satisfactory justification to the application of a-national principles in international
commercial arbitration.
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Chapter Eleven
A study of the nature of international commercial
arbitration and an evaluation of the theories
From Part Three, it has been seen that different attitudes towards the application of a-
national principles, such as the general principles of law, the new lexmercatoria or
amiable composition, as the proper law to decide the merits of a dispute in
international commercial arbitration have been held by different national courts. One
explanation of this is the fact that different national courts adopt different theories in
relation to international commercial arbitration. Generally speaking, the various
commentaries about the nature of arbitration have been collected into four different
theories: the jurisdictional theory, the contractual theory, the hybrid theory (or the
mixed theory) and the autonomous theory.
Among them, the jurisdictional theory is based on the complete supervisory powers of
states to regulate any international commercial arbitrations within their jurisdiction,
whereas the contractual theory argues that international commercial arbitration
originates from a valid arbitration agreement between the parties and that, therefore,
arbitration should be conducted according to the parties' wishes. The hybrid theory
stands as a compromise between the jurisdictional and contractual theories. It
maintains that international commercial arbitration has both a contractual and a
jurisdictional character. The autonomous theory, which has been developed more
recently, dismisses the traditional approach and places emphasis on the purpose of
international commercial arbitration. Instead of fitting arbitration into the existing legal
framework, the autonomous theory defines arbitration as an autonomous institution,
which should not be restrained by the law of the place of arbitration. As a result,
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parties should have unlimited autonomy to decide how the arbitration shall be
conducted.
Since the theory a national court applies in respect of international commercial
arbitration also affects its attitude towards the choice of the proper law, in this Chapter
a detailed discussion of the four theories will be presented by studying their effect on
several different aspects of international commercial arbitration. Both the arguments
and evaluation of each of the four theories will be discussed by, first, looking into the
nature of international commercial arbitration to see how each theory defines the
mechanism of international commercial arbitration and the kind of relationship that
should exist between arbitration and national courts. Secondly, the nature and scope
of the arbitrator's power will be discussed from the viewpoint of the relationship
between the arbitrators and the parties. Thirdly, the status of arbitral awards under the
different theories will be studied in order to examine the conflicts arising at the
enforcement stage. Finally, the issue of the choice of the proper law will be
discussed.
11.1 The jurisdictional theory
The jurisdictional theory invokes the significance of the supervisory powers of states,
especially those of the place of arbitration. Although the jurisdictional theory does not
dispute the idea that an arbitration has its origin in the parties' arbitration agreement, it
maintains that the validity of arbitration agreements and arbitration procedures needs to
be regulated by national laws and the validity of an arbitral award is decided by the
laws of the seat and the country where the recognition or enforcement is sought.
Proponents of the jurisdictional theory maintain that all arbitration procedures have to
be regulated by the rules of law chosen by the parties if there are any and those rules
of law in force in the place of arbitration. They also believe that arbitrators resemble
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judges of national courts because the arbitrators' powers are drawn from the states by
means of the rules of law. As with judges, arbitrators are required to apply the rules
of law of a specific state to settle the disputes submitted to them. Moreover, the
awards made by the arbitrators are regarded as having the same status and effect as a
judgment handed down by judges sitting in a national court. As a result, they maintain
that the awards will be enforced by the court where the recognition or enforcement is
sought in the same way as judgments made by the courts.
Proponents of the jurisdictional theory stress, in particular, the significance of the seat
of arbitration. For instance, Dr. Mann1 emphasized the significance of the laws of
relevant states to an arbitration, especially the law of the place where the arbitration
takes place, that is, the lex fori. The premise of Dr. Mann's argument is that every
sovereign state is entitled to approve or disapprove the activities carried out within its
territory.2 Following this premise, consequently, every arbitration is subject to the
law where it takes place. Moreover, an arbitrator is required to carry out the
arbitration proceedings in accordance with the will of the parties' to the extent that the
lexfori allows. Any acts of arbitrators that contradict the mandatory rules and public
policy of the place of arbitration are regarded as judicially unjustified.3 In other
words, the various issues arising from international commercial arbitration, such as
the validity of the arbitration agreement, the arbitral procedures, the arbitrator's power,
the scope of submission and the enforceability of arbitral awards, have to be decided
within the mandatory rules and public policy of the lex fori. Failing to do so, the
awards may be set aside by the court of the place of arbitration; furthermore,
recognition or enforcement of the awards may be refused by the courts of the
enforcing states.
1 Mann, "Lex Facit Arbitrum", reprinted in (1983) 2(3) Arbitration Int. 245; also see Mustill,
"Transnational Arbitration in English Law", (1984) 37 Curr.L.Pr. 133, p. 142.
2 Ibid.
3Mann, F., "State Contracts and International Arbitration", (1967) 42 Brit.Yrbk.Intl.L. 10, at pp. 14
and 16.
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Regarding the relationship between arbitration and the national courts where the
arbitration takes place or the courts where recognition or enforcement of the arbitral
awards is sought, the jurisdictional theory provides a strong basis for the national
courts exercising supervisory powers over the arbitration.4 Such supervisory powers
are also confirmed in the New York Convention 1958. For instance, in accordance
with Article V, in the absence of the express choice of law, the validity of arbitration
agreements,5 arbitral awards,6 the composition of the arbitral authority and the arbitral
procedures7 have to be decided in accordance with the law of the country where the
arbitration takes place. Also, the supervisory powers over the validity of arbitral
awards can be exercised by the courts where recognition or enforcement is sought, if
the subjectmatter of the difference is not arbitrable under the law,8 or the enforcement
of such an award would be against its public policy.9
In relation to the supervisory powers of the national courts where the arbitration takes
place, the jurisdiction over the arbitration, which might have no connection with this
country, is based on three theoretical arguments, namely, the arbitrator's right to make
binding adjudications is derived from a delegation by the state of its exclusive powers
in this field, that every act is subject to the law in force where it occurred, and the
application of the lex fori and the use of its courts are sometimes more efficient than
any other system.10 In practice, such supervisory powers can be conferred by law;11
for instance, in Scotland, subject to the exceptions of consumer matters, exclusive
jurisdictions and prorogation, the jurisdiction of Scottish courts over the parties to an
4With the exception of Belgium.
5Art. V (1) (a) of the New York Convention.
6Art. V (1) (e) of the New York Convention.
7Art. V (1) (d) of the New York Convention.
8Art. V (2) (a) of the New York Convention.
9Art. V (2) (b) of the New York Convention.
I °Samuel, Jurisdictional Problems in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study ofBelgian,
Dutch, English, French, Swedish, Swiss, US, and West German Law, (1989), at p. 63 (hereinafter
Samuel, JurisdictionalProblems).
IIModel law countries provide a basis for such supervisory powers for non-citizens.
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arbitration held in Scotland is granted in rule 2(13) in Schedule 8 to the 1982 Act,
which states that a person may be sued: "In proceedings concerning an arbitration
which is conducted in Scotland or in which the procedure is governed by Scots law, in
the Court of Session."12
Arbitrability is a good example to illustrate the issue of jurisdiction over the arbitration
proceedings and arbitral awards. In relation to supervisory powers over the arbitration
proceedings, arbitrators can only deal with a dispute to the extent that the law to which
the parties have subjected to it allows;13 however, such a choice cannot overrule the
mandatory rules of the lex fori. In the absence of the parties' express choice of law,
the issue of arbitrability will be governed by the law of the place where the arbitration
takes place. An arbitral award may be challenged before the courts if the arbitrator
deals with disputes that are outside the scope of arbitrability under the applicable laws,
for example, the lex arbitri or the lex loci contractus, chosen by the parties, and
possibly under the lexfori if the arbitration is running under the concurrent procedural
rules of law in the place of arbitration.
In addition, under the jurisdictional theory, the courts in the country where recognition
or enforcement is sought also have a supervisory power over the issue of arbitrability
at the stage of recognition or enforcement. Accordingly, under Article V (2) the courts
have the discretion to refuse to recognise or enforce an arbitral award if it finds that
"The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under
the law of that country"14 or "recognition or enforcement of the award would be
contrary to the public policy of that country."15 The same approach has also been
adopted by the United States Supreme Court, which confirmed the federal policy
12It is also discussed in Anton and Beaumont, Private International Law - A Treatise from the
Standpoint ofScots Law, (2nd ed. 1990), at pp. 356-359.
13Article V 1 (a) of the New York Convention.
14Article V (2) (a) of the New York Convention.
15Article V (2) (b) of the New York Convention.
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favouring arbitration in the Mitsubishi case.16 The Mitsubishi case involved an anti¬
trust dispute which was prohibited from being resolved by means of arbitration in a
domestic case. The United States Supreme Court enforced the parties' arbitration
agreement involving an anti-trust dispute, even assuming that a contrary result would
be forthcoming in a domestic context;17 as Justice Blackmun pointed out - "the
national courts of the United States will have the opportunity at the award-enforcement
stage to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the anti-trust laws has
been addressed."18 It is because that "The convention reserves to each signatory
country the right to refuse enforcement of an award where the recognition or
enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country."19
Based on this argument, one may be able to say that the relationship between the
courts and arbitration is of a supervisory nature in accordance with the jurisdictional
theory.
In relation to the status of arbitrators, the jurisdictional theory mainly follows the
approach of the delegation theory. According to the delegation theory, in order to
settle disputes between parties, an arbitrator must possess a delegated authority given
by a state in which he sits to conduct an arbitration. An award made by an arbitrator
lacking this authority will be void and can be challenged. Due to this delegated power,
the proponents of the jurisdictional theory deny that the arbitrator's power is originated
from the parties' arbitration agreement. They maintain that the arbitrator's power is
drawn from the state by means of the local law on the ground that it is in the public
interest to permit private individuals to decide disputes when the parties have agreed.
This is the argument supported by Mr. Moutulsky, who said that "Arbitrators are
individuals whom the legal system permits to perform a function that is in principle
16Mitsubishi Motors Co. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473 US 614 (1984), 87 L.Ed. 2d 444,
105 S.Ct. 3346.
17Ibid, at p. 629.
1 %lbid. at p. 638.
19Ibid, at p. 638.
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reserved to the state";20 furthermore, arbitration is regarded as an exception granted by
the state to its monopoly over the administration of justice in its jurisdiction.21
Because of the special status granted by the states, arbitrators are regarded as
resembling judges of national courts. The only difference between them, as illustrated
by Niboyet, is that a judge "derives his nomination and authority directly from the
sovereign," whilst an arbitrator "derives his authority from the sovereign but his
nomination is a matter for the parties."22 Following this argument, an arbitrator,
similar to a judge, is also required to follow the law and observe the mandatory rules
and public policy of the lexfori to settle the dispute between the parties.
Indeed, the jurisdictional theory provides a strong argument about the status of
arbitrators and the origins of their powers; nevertheless, from the present writer's own
observations, the statement that arbitrators inherit power from the state appears to be
incomplete to describe the present arbitration framework. Not only do the arbitrators
but also the mechanism of international commercial arbitration inherit judicial power
from the state. It is difficult to deny that the arbitration mechanism would be crippled
and the arbitral procedures and awards would be regarded as unlawful or void without
authorisation from the states. By means of legislation, within certain limits, the states
allow parties to choose arbitration as an alternative method of settlement outside the
traditional court systems. Furthermore, after recommending or legalising arbitration
as an alternative means of dispute settlement, the states offer the arbitrators a quasi-
judicial status which allows them to act as arbitrators and settle the disputes between
the two parties. Because of this quasi-judicial status, arbitrators are granted certain
powers and immunities with the intention of safeguarding the public interest and the
20Moutulsky, Ecrits, Dalloz, Paris, (1974) at p. 14; translation from Samuel, Jurisdictional
Problems, (1989), at p. 55.
21 Ibid.
22Niboyet, Traite deDroit InternationalPrive Frangais, Paris, (1950), para. 1985, at p. 137; cited
from Lew, The Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration, (1978), at p. 53 (hereinafter
Lew, Applicable Law).
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efficiency of arbitration procedures; furthermore, they are given the power to avoid
unreasonable obstacles or deliberate delays made by the parties during the arbitration
procedures. Finally, the decisions made by the arbitrators are regarded as binding on
the parties, provided no irregularities listed in Article V of the New York Convention
can be established. In accordance with this argument, in order to provide a complete
picture of arbitration, it would be more appropriate to stress that not only the
arbitrators but also the mechanism of international commercial arbitration inherit the
judicial powers from the states.
The nature of arbitral awards is also examined under the jurisdictional theory. In
accordance with this theory, an arbitral award should be granted the same status and
effect as a judgment made by a national court judge since arbitrators are regarded as
resembling judges. Because of a similar status to judgments, in the absence of the
voluntary performance of the award by the losing party, the awards will have to be
enforced (in the same way as a judgment) by the court where the recognition or
enforcement is sought.
This idea corresponds with the viewpoint of Laine', who invokes the idea that the
arbitral awards have a similar effect to judgments.23 Laine agreed that no arbitration
can legally exist or be performed without the parties' agreement; however he denied
that the parties' arbitration agreement constitutes the jurisdiction of the arbitration.
Laine's view is also agreed to by Pillet, who went a step further and argued that the
arbitration agreement was irrelevant once the arbitrator has been appointed. He stated:
"The arbitration agreement is necessary to give the arbitrators their authority,
but once that authority has been conferred on them, provided they keep within
the limits of the task given to them, their freedom is absolute and the arbitration
23Laine, "De L'execution en France des Sentences Arbitrales Etrangeres", J.D.I. 26 (1899), 641 at p.
650; translation from Samuel, Jurisdictional Problems, (1989), at p. 36.
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agreement has no influence on their award which is based on quite different
matters."24
The same opinion can also be found in Klein's work:
"... the State alone has the right to administer justice, so that if the law allows
the parties to submit to arbitration, this institution could be exercising a public
function, from which logically it must be concluded that the award is a
judgement in the same sense as the decisions rendered by the judges of the
State."25
Regarding the choice of the proper law, in most jurisdictions judges of national courts,
while dealing with an international commercial disputes submitted to them, are only
allowed to apply the law of their own country or the national laws of other states if the
parties so choose. Alternatively, in the absence of the parties' express choice of the
proper law, they have to choose the substantive law in accordance with the choice of
law rules of the place where they sit. In other words, for the judges of national
courts, in respect of the choice of law issue, they are not allowed to go beyond the
scope of national laws to decide the merits of the disputes.
Based on the same territoriality principle which leads to a close relationship between
the place of arbitration and the procedural rules to be applied to international
commercial arbitration, under the jurisdictional theory arbitrators are only allowed to
choose the proper law of the contract in accordance with the procedural law chosen by
the parties if there is any, and the lex fori. As a scholar stated: "The effect of this
theory is to allow arbitrators no greater freedom in the application of substantive law
than judges have."26
24Pillet, TraitePratique deDroit InternationalPrive, Vol. 2 at p. 537; translation from Samuel,
JurisdictionalProblems, (1989), at p. 52.
25Klein, Considerations sur L'arbitrage enDroit InternationalPrive, para. 105, at pp. 181-2; cited in
Lew, Applicable Law, (1978), p. 52-53.
26Ibid. at p. 53.
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In addition, adopting the territoriality principle, arbitrators are required to decide the
issues arising from international commercial arbitration according to municipal laws,
which also include the choice of law rules of the place where the arbitration is held.
Some scholars who have a more liberal attitude maintain that, under the jurisdictional
theory, the power to choose a-national principles or decide ex aequo et bono or
according to the rules of professional bodies, may be given by the parties to the
arbitrators "only if the law of the place of seat of the arbitral tribunal so authorises
them."27
However, this liberal idea was not shared by Dr. Mann. He not only highlighted the
importance of the lex fori, but also went a step further to deny the existence of
"international" commercial arbitration. First of all, he said that no definition of
international commercial arbitration has been provided despite that "Numerous
attempts have been made in recent years to define an "international commercial
arbitration". They have failed to produce any clear formula, nor is it certain whether
an effective formula, if it were to be found, would constitute a useful contribution
rather than a sterile exercise."28
Dr. Mann asserted that, in accordance with a strict interpretation, every arbitration is a
national one and it should be governed by the municipal laws of the country where it is
held. The so-called "international" arbitration is, in fact, a fallacy,29 since no
arbitration can exist in a legal vacuum. Dr. Mann strongly criticised the delocalisation
theory and the autonomous theory30 which maintained that international commercial
arbitration should be free from the restraints of the lex fori. He argued: "In the legal
sense no international commercial arbitration exists. Just as, notwithstanding its
27Luzzatto, "International Commercial Arbitration and the Municipal Law of States", (1977) IV
Rec.des Cours 9, at p. 52.
28Mami, "Lex FacitArbitrum", reprinted in (1986) 2(3) Arbitration Int. 245, at p. 244.
29Ibid.
30It will be discussed in a later section of this chapter.
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notoriously misleading name, every system of private international law is a system of
national law, every arbitration is a national arbitration, that is to say, subject to a
specific system of national law."31
As well as the procedural matters, in Dr. Mann's opinion the substantive issues of the
dispute are also governed by the municipal laws. He stated:
"No one has ever or anywhere been able to point to any provision or legal
principle which permit individuals to act outside the confines of a system of
municipal law; even the idea of the autonomy of the parties exists only by
virtue of a given system of municipal law and in different systems may have
different characteristics and effects. Similarly, every arbitration is necessarily
subject to the law of a given State. No private person has the right or the
power to act on any level other than that of municipal law. Every right or
power a private person enjoys is inexorably conferred by or derives from a
system of municipal law which may conveniently and in accordance with
tradition be called the lex fori, though it would be more exact to speak of the
lex arbitri or in French la loi de Varbitrage. "32
In Dr. Mann's opinion, any arbitration procedures, the composition of arbitral
tribunals and the structure of arbitration procedures have to be subject to a national law
of a specific country. Within the framework of international commercial arbitration,
only the lex fori can provide such a complete and effective control over the arbitration
procedures to decide the relevant issues arising from an arbitration. Finally, he
concluded that "it would be intolerable if the country of the seat could not override
whatever arrangements the parties may have made. The local sovereign does not yield
to them except as a result of freedom granted by himself."33
Although the jurisdictional theory and Dr. Mann's arguments accurately reflect the
very fundamental aspect of the existing arbitration framework, it is frequently
criticised for the lack of consideration paid to the significance of arbitration agreements
3 'Mann, "Lex Facit Arbitrum", reprinted in (1986) 2(3) Arbitration Int. 245, at p. 245.
32Ibid.
33Ibid, at p. 246.
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in the commercial world.34 Apart from this common criticism, the present writer is of
the opinion that the jurisdictional theory fails to keep pace with the current
developments in international commercial arbitration. This can be illustrated in two
ways: one is the ignorance of the impact of the delocalisation theory, the other is the
lack of an explanation for the frequent application of a-national principles as the
substantive law in international commercial arbitration.
The jurisdictional theory, which is frequently criticised, places too much influence on
the lex fori.35 Due to the overemphasis on the importance of lexfori, the jurisdictional
theory ignores the importance of party autonomy and the parties' aims in seeking a
more speedy and flexible method to settle their disputes outside of the court systems.
By conflicting with the mandatory rules of the lex fori, the arrangements made
between the parties for the arbitration procedures can frequently be invalidated or
superseded by such mandatory rules. Because of the different restrictions which
would be imposed upon arbitration by the mandatory application of the lex fori, this
would result in uncertainty in arbitration and distortion of the purpose of international
arbitration which aims to provide businessmen with an alternative way to reduce
troublesome court procedures to a minimum level.
Because of the insistence on the application of the lex fori to arbitration procedures,
the proponents of the jurisdictional theory tend to ignore the development of the
delocalisation theory, which has attracted practitioners' attention since the 1960s.36
The delocalisation theory invokes total freedom of international commercial arbitration.
Accordingly, arbitration should not be bound by any laws and, especially, should not
be restricted under the mandatory rules of the place of arbitration, that is, the lex fori.
34A detailed discussion will be carried out in the next section.
33Lew, Applicable Law, (1978), at pp. 245-255.
3 6For details, see Paulsson, "Arbitration Unbound: Award Detached from the Law of Its Country of
Origin", (1981) 30 I.C.L.Q. 358, and "Delocalisation of International Commercial Arbitration: When
andWhy It Matters?", (1983) 32 I.C.L.Q. 53.
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Although the delocalisation theory has failed to gain wide acceptance among
jurisdictions, a certain impact on practice has still been made through its development.
First of all, in some arbitral awards, instead of confining themselves to the restrictions
imposed by the lexfori, arbitrators apply the law designated by the parties, and in the
absence of this choice, they simply apply the rules of laws they believe are
appropriate.37 Secondly, influenced by the liberal concept of the delocalisation
theory, some major arbitration states have adopted a more relaxed and flexible attitude
towards international commercial arbitration held in their jurisdictions.38
These liberal ideas can be observed in the French Code of Civil Procedure 1981.39
Instead of putting international arbitral awards under the scrutiny of the domestic law,
first of all, the concept of "international public policy" has been brought into the
French Code of Civil Procedure in order to reduce the connection between arbitration
and the law of the country where the enforcement is sought. Secondly, the terms used
in the New York Convention 1958 that place arbitration on a national law level, such
as "under the law of the country where the award was made",40 "under the law of the
country where the arbitration took place",41 "under the law applicable to them",42 or
"under the law to which the parties have subjected it" 43 have been removed from the
legislation.
Finally, the legislation limits the grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement of
arbitral awards to internationally required criteria:44 for instance, the parly seeking
37Such as the arbitral awards made under Article 13.4 of the ICC Arbitration Rules.
38Such as Belgium and France; details see below.
39Book IV 4 Arbitration, from Article 1442 to 1507. Decree Law No 81-500 of May 12, 1981.




44Article 1502 of the French Code of Civil Procedure stipulates: "An appeal against a decision
recognition or enforcementmay be brought only in the following cases:
1. If the arbitrator decide in the absence of an arbitration agreement on the basis of a void or
expiredagreement;
2. If the arbitral tribunal was irregularly composed or the sole arbitrator irregularly appointed;
262
Chapter Eleven: Theories andAn Evaluation
recognition or enforcement of the award no longer needs to fulfil the requirements of
national mandatory rules and public policy of the country where recognition or
enforcement is sought.45 In other words, in order to enforce an award before the
French courts, the winning party only needs to prove that internationally recognised
due process and public policy have been respected during the arbitral procedures.
This concept has also been applied to the choice of the proper law procedures. In
accordance with the new legislation, in cases where the parties fail to choose the law
applied to the substantive matters, the arbitrators can instead of following the
traditional method of conflict of laws rules choose the applicable law they deem
appropriate. 46 Meanwhile, Article 1502 of the French Code of Civil Procedure also
tries to free arbitration procedures from the scrutiny of the lex fori by taking out terms
which tend to localise arbitration, such as "under the law of the country where the
award was made"47 or "not in accordance with the law of the country where the
arbitration took place".48
Apart from ignoring the trend of reducing the importance of the lex fori, the
jurisdictional theory also ignores the increasing application of a-national principles as
the proper law in international commercial arbitration. In accordance with the
jurisdictional theory, arbitrators inherit the powers from the states to resolve the
disputes between the parties and so, like the judges of the national courts, they are not
only required to apply the conflict of laws rules of the lex fori to determine the
substantive law but also required to determine the merits of the disputes on the basis of
3. If the arbitrator decide in a manner incompatible with the mission conferred upon him;
4. Whenever due process has not been respected;
5. If the recognition or enforcement is contrary to international public policy (ordrepublic)".
45Article V(2) of the New York Convention.
46Article 1496 of the French Code ofCivil Procedure stipulates: "The arbitrator shall decide the
dispute according to the rules of law chosen by the parties; in the absence of such a choice, he shall
decide according to the rules he deems appropriate."
47Article V (1) (a) (e) of the New York Convention.
4SIbid. Article V(l)(d).
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the rules of law of a specific nation. However, as has been seen in Part Two of this
study, the compulsory application of national laws to arbitration is no longer the
golden rule in international commercial arbitration. In a number of international
arbitral awards, the general principles of laws, the new lex mercatoria and amiable
composition have replaced national laws and have been applied in international trade
disputes.49 Sometimes such applications are designated by the parties, failing which,
they are often chosen by the arbitrators since they may appear to be more appropriate
in the circumstances.
Apart from frequently being applied in arbitral awards, the study carried out in Part
Three shows that more and more legal systems take a more liberal attitude towards the
application of a-national principles.50 The arbitration laws of these countries51
expressly allow the arbitrators to apply a-national principles to decide the disputes.52
Moreover, arbitrators are sometimes required to take trade usages into account, or,
with the parties' consent, decide the cases ex aequo et bono or under amiable
composition.53
The jurisdictional theory does provide a strong argument for the judicial elements of
international commercial arbitration, such as the issues concerning the nature of
arbitration, the powers and immunity of arbitrators and the recognition or enforcement
of arbitral awards. However, the criticisms discussed in this section highlight the
incompleteness of the jurisdictional theory against the background of the current
development of international commercial arbitration.
49See chapters 3,4 and 5.
50Kerr, "Equity Arbitration in England", 2 The American Review ofInternational Arbitration, 377
(1993).
5 'For example, France, the United States and England.
52Article 1496 (2) and 1497 of the French Code of Civil Procedure.
53Article 13.4 of the ICC Rules 1988.
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11.2 The contractual theory
Rejecting the significance of the lexfori, proponents of the contractual theory54 argue
that arbitration is based on the agreement between the parties. They deny that any
strong links exist between the arbitration proceedings and the law of the place in which
the arbitration takes place. They maintain that parties have the freedom to decide the
relevant issues concerning the arbitration procedures and this freedom should
generally not be interfered with by the powers of any states.
The contractual theory, different from the jurisdictional theory, explores the nature of
arbitration from a contractual viewpoint. Although the contractualists admit the fact
that arbitration proceedings and arbitration agreements can be influenced by the
relevant national laws, they argue that arbitration has a contractual character that
originates in the parties' arbitration agreement. Accordingly, an arbitration agreement
between the parties is regarded as a contract which expressly states the parties' wish to
have their disputes resolved by means of international commercial arbitration. This
kind of contract is voluntarily made between the parties, and allows them to determine
the time and place of arbitration, select the arbitrators to hear their case and choose the
laws governing both procedural and substantive matters.
The proponents of the contractual theory believe that the settlement of the dispute in
arbitration should not be influenced by the power of any states and that the concept of
54Such as Merlin, Foelix, Balladore-Pallieri, Bernard and Klein in France and Kellor, Domke and
Kitagawa outside France. See Frances Kellor, Arbitration in Action, quoted by Stone in "A Paradox
in the Theory of Commercial Arbitration", 21 Arb.J. 156 (1966). Domke, CommercialArbitration,
(1965), at p. 31, who stated that "the express intent of both parties to enter into the arbitration
agreement is essential existence." Kitagawa, "Contractual Autonomy in International Commercial
Arbitration", in Liber Amicorumfor Martin Domke 133 at p. 138, who believes that "the binding
force of the arbitration agreement comes from 'pactasuntservanda1 as well as other ordinary contracts
without any state authorisation".
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pacta sunt servanda55 should prevail, binding the parties to perform the arbitration
agreement made between them without state's pressure. As illustrated by Kellor:
"arbitration is wholly voluntary in character. The contract of which the
arbitration clause is a part is a voluntary agreement. No law requires the
parties to make such a contract, nor does it give one party power to impose it
on another. When such an arbitration agreement is made part of the principal
contract, the parties voluntarily forgo established rights in favour of what they
deem to be the greater advantages of arbitration."56
Accordingly, with the exceptions of arbitrability and public policy which are reserved
for the lex fori, the lex fori has very little influence over the procedures and outcome
of the arbitration. Moreover, it has been concluded that "national arbitration laws are
only to supplement and fill lacunae in the parties' agreement as to the arbitration
proceedings and to provide a code capable of regulating the conduct of an
arbitration."57
In most jurisdictions, the mechanism of international commercial arbitration is
undeniably designed on the basis of the contractual theory. Recognising the business
people's desires to have a more flexible and informal method of dispute settlement,
most courts tend to follow the contractual theory and interpret the relationship between
the parties and the arbitrators as a contract. Taking the relationship between parties
and arbitrators as an example, the contractual theory prevails in most jurisdictions.
For instance, in England, in the case of Cereals S.A. v. Tradax Export S.A.,58 where
the court, first of all, held that a contractual relationship existed between the parties
and the arbitrators. Secondly, the court stated that the arbitrators became parties to the
arbitration agreement as soon as they accepted the appointment. The court observed:
"It is the arbitration contract that the arbitrators become parties to by accepting
55"pactasuntservanda" represents the idea that agreements should be observed.
56Frances Kellor, Arbitration in Action, quoted by Stone in "A Paradox in the Theory of Commercial
Arbitration", 21 Arb.J. 156 (1966); and Lew, Applicable Law, (1978), at p. 55.
57Klein, Considerations at p. 182, Discussed in Lew, Applicable Law, (1978), at p. 56.
58[1986] 2 LI LR 301.
266
Chapter Eleven: Theories andAn Evaluation
appointments under it. All parties to the arbitration are, as a matter of contract (subject
always to the various statutory provisions), bound by the terms of the arbitration
contract. "59
A similar idea was also upheld in a recent case60 in relation to the issue of
remuneration. The court decided that the arbitrators were entitled to reasonable
remuneration. This entitlement was based on a trilateral contract between the two
parties and the arbitrators.61 The implied terms of this kind of trilateral contract
require arbitrators to "conduct the arbitration with due diligence and at a reasonable
fee,"62 by using all reasonable means in entering on and proceeding with the
reference.63
Apart from cases of arbitrability and compulsory arbitration, the present writer's view
is that, to a certain extent, it is correct to portray the relationship between parties and
arbitrators as a contract. Moreover, the contractual relationship discussed here is, in
fact, comprised of two contracts: one is the contract between the parties, that is, the
arbitration agreement, while the other is the appointment agreement between the parties
and the arbitrators. As far as the contract between the parties is concerned, subject to
the statutory exceptions, to start an arbitration there must be a valid arbitration
agreement existing between the parties. On the other hand, in relation to the contract
between the parties and the arbitrators, consent from both the parties and the
arbitrators is essential to form a valid appointment of the arbitrators, since the
3 9An injunction was granted in this case where a breach of the arbitration agreement had been
committed by the arbitrators who were regarded as one of the parties to the arbitration agreement.
60A75 Norjarl A/S v. Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. Ltd. [1991] 1 LI L Rep 524 (CA).
6 lIbid. p. 537, the court said: "So far as the parties are concerned, their obligations under the trilateral
contract include the liability to pay remuneration for the service of the arbitrators ... The contractual
obligation on Hyundai and Norjarl to pay such remuneration could not be altered without the consent
of both." Also at p. 531: "Once the arbitrator has accepted an appointment, no term can be implied
that entided him to a commitment fee, and tire arbitration agreement cannot be varied in that way
without the consent of all parties."
62Ibid. p. 532.
63See s. 13(3) of the Arbitration Act 1950.
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appointment of arbitrators cannot be carried out by one party's unilateral decision. In
accordance with these contracts, the disputes between the parties are submitted to the
arbitrators, the arbitrators carry out the arbitration and have the parties' disputes
settled, and the parties then pay the arbitrators a reasonable remuneration in return for
their service, that is, providing the arbitral award.
Nevertheless, the present writer cannot totally agree with the proponents of the
contractual theory who claim that all arbitration is based on the arbitration agreement
between the parties and that, without such an agreement, no arbitration can be
operated. In the opinion of the present writer, the argument of the proponents of the
contractual theory only reflects part of the present arbitration framework. The basis of
their argument is that states will allow the parties to have all kinds of disputes
submitted to arbitration and, moreover, an arbitration cannot exist without an
arbitration agreement. As far as both premises are concerned, they can only be
sustained in the case of voluntary arbitration where no non-arbitrable disputes are
involved. Moreover, one question which has to be raised is the basis on which the
arbitrators decide the validity of the arbitration agreements. Unfortunately, the answer
can only be found in the jurisdictional theory, since, within the present arbitration
framework, the validity of arbitration agreements is usually decided by the laws of the
relevant countries, such as the lex loci contractus, the lex fori or the law of the
recognising or enforcing states.
Proponents of the contractual theory also ignore the fact that, within the existing
framework, most states do exercise powers to supervise the arbitration held in their
territories and the awards brought to their national courts seeking recognition or
enforcement. For instance, the issue of arbitrability displays the weakness of the
contractual theory. Generally speaking, issues concerning public interests are
prohibited from submission to arbitration - such as human rights, criminal cases,
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family law issues, anti-trust, security disputes64 and competition cases. Some
matters, such as human rights and criminal cases, are of a public law nature and as
such are reserved for the national courts to decide. Other matters, such as anti-trust,
security disputes and competition cases, may relate to public interests and appear to be
too complicated to be settled by means of arbitration.65 As Redfern and Hunter point
out, to safeguard the public interest, the legislators of each state may decide which
matters may or may not be settled by arbitration according to their own economic and
social policy.66 Considering the different interests which exist in individual states,
different states impose different restrictions on arbitrability. In other words, a dispute
is only allowed to be submitted to arbitration if it is arbitrable under the laws of the
states which have connections with the arbitration. Consequently, the argument made
by the contractualists is inadequate to explain the case of non-arbitrable disputes since
an arbitration would be invalid, with or without an arbitration agreement, if the subject
matter was not "arbitrable" under the applicable laws.
Again, the contractual theory fails to cover the case of compulsory arbitration. In most
jurisdictions, recognising the public interest, the need to cut litigation costs and to have
public money better spent, compulsory arbitration is usually designed to be a cheap
and informal dispute settlement method for particular types of disputes,67 such as
those arising from labour relationships and agricultural holdings. Accordingly,
legislation expressly stipulates that certain kinds of disputes must be submitted to
64After Mitsubishi case, the United States Supreme Court decided that antitrust issues arising out of
international contracts were arbitrable pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act.
65In relation to these matters, the American courts have adopted a more liberal attitude and allow
disputes related to these matters to be referred to arbitration. For a detailed discussion, see Chapter 9.
66Redfern andHunter, International Commercial Arbitration, (2nded. 1991), at pp. 137-147
(hereinafterRedfern andHunter (1991)).
67See Section 84 of the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986, which states:
"Any matter by or by virtue of this Act or regulations made under this Act is required to be determined
by arbitration under this Act shall, notwithstanding any agreement (under a contract of tenancy or
otherwise) providing for a differentmethod of arbitration, be determined by the arbitration of a single
arbitrator in accordance with the provisions of any order under this section, together with the
provisions of Schedule 11 to this Act (as for the time being in force); and the Arbitration Act 1950
shall not apply to any such arbitration."
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arbitration. For instance, in Scotland, the disputes between landlords and tenants of
agricultural holdings must be submitted to arbitration in accordance with section 84 of
the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986. Although most compulsory arbitrations are
confined to domestic disputes, some disputes of an international nature may also be
compelled to be settled by means of arbitration. For instance, in some cases where
major international construction disputes are involved some jurisdictions, such as
Hong Kong and New York, give their judges the power to send the parties to
arbitration.
In the case of a compulsory arbitration, no consent of the parties or arbitration
agreement is required. The basis of compulsory arbitration is the state's mandatory
power to send the parties to arbitration when the dispute between them falls into a
category reserved for compulsory arbitration. Because of this mandatory power, no
matter whether there is an arbitration agreement between the parties or not, the parties
must submit their dispute to arbitration. As we can see, the case of compulsory
arbitration does not fit in well with the contractual theory.
Apart from the issues of arbitrability and compulsory arbitration, the premises of the
contractual theory also fail to cover the case of multi-party arbitration. A multi-party
arbitration usually occurs in international construction projects which have many
parties involved, such as the employers, the main contractors, the sub-contractors and
the suppliers. Although the idea of multi-party arbitration has caused a great deal of
controversy and has not been adopted by many countries,68 in certain jurisdictions,
68Itmay offend the consensual elements of arbitral procedures.
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for example, New York,69 Hong Kong,70 British Columbia71 and the Netherlands72,
with different amendments, the courts are permitted to make orders for consolidation
of arbitration. In other words, if it is shown to be necessary, the courts in these
jurisdictions are empowered to order a third party to join existing arbitral proceedings,
even though no arbitration agreement legally existed between them and the original
parties.73 From the arguments suggested above which highlight the failings of the
contractual theory in the areas of non-arbitrable disputes, compulsory arbitration and
multi-party arbitration, the universality of the contractual theory must be in doubt.
In respect of the status of arbitrators, the contractualists reject the delegation theory
which holds that arbitrators resemble judges of national courts. Among them different
opinions have been expressed about whether arbitrators are the agents of the parties;
however, they have failed to reach any agreement on this issue. The agent theory was
invoked by Merlin,74 who believed that arbitrators were, in fact, the agents of the
parties. He dismissed the idea that arbitrators closely resemble judges of national
courts and their powers and authority were drawn from the local law. He was of the
opinion that, due to the fact that arbitrators did not perform any public function,
arbitrators obtained their powers and authority from the parties' agreement when they
69The Courts of the New York allow consolidation of arbitration where common questions of law or
fact are involved. See Cable Belt Conveyors, Inc. v. Paul Howard Co. v. Alumina Partners of
Jamaica 857 F. 2d 1461 (2nd Cir.); however the decision was denied by the United States Supreme
Court reported at 484 US 855 (1987).
70The Ilong Kong Arbitration Act of 1982 s. 6B provides for judicially ordered consolidation in
domestic arbitration. However no such provision is set in the Arbitration Ordinance (Chapter 341)
1990, which adopts the UNCITRAL Model Law for international arbitration.
71Section 27(2) of the International Commercial Arbitration Act of British Columbia, which allows
for judicially ordered consolidation on terms the court considers just and necessary where parties to
two or more arbitration agreements have agreed to consolidation in their respective agreements or
otherwise. See Redfem and Hunter, (1991), at p. 189.
72Article 1046(1) of the Netherlands Arbitration Act 1986 provides for court consolidation of
arbitration in both domestic and international cases taking place there unless the parties contract out of
that provision.
73Although Messer Redfem and Hunter point out that it is theoretically "possible for states to confer
such powers of compulsion upon arbitral tribunals" to bring the relevant third party to join the same
arbitral proceedings, to the present writer's knowledge, so far, no jurisdictions offer such a power to
the tribunal. See Redfern and Hunter, (1991), at p. 186.
74Merlin, RecueilAlphabetique de Questions deDroit, (4th ed.) Tarlier Brussels 1829 Vol. 9 at pp.
144; translation from Samuel, JurisdictionalProblems, (1989), at p. 34.
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were appointed. In short, arbitrators were appointed as the agents of the parties to
resolve the disputes on the parties' behalf.75 Being the agents of the parties,
arbitrators represent the parties who appoint them to resolve the dispute according to
the parties' instructions; moreover, any decisions, that is, arbitral awards, made by the
agents have a binding effect on the parties.76
Believing that the decision-making process was wholly dependent on the arbitration
agreement between the parties,77 Foelix agreed with Merlin's argument that arbitral
awards were made by the arbitrators who were regarded as the agents of the parties.78
He claimed that the relationship between the parties and the arbitrators had a private,
rather than a public, nature, - that is, a relationship of principal and agent. As a result,
in this relationship no court intervention can be exercised because the sole basis of the
power of the arbitrator is the arbitration agreement.
Although upholding the contractual nature of arbitration, a number of contractualists
disagreed with Merlin and Foelix and claimed that arbitrators were not the agents of
the parties.79 Bernard is representative of this group. He believed that the power of
the arbitrators was drawn from the parties' arbitration agreement which allowed the
arbitrators to judge. However, he denied that the arbitrators were the agents of the
parties. In fact, he maintained that the agreement between the arbitrators and the parties
did not fit into any of the established categories of contracts;80 furthermore, "it is a
15Ibid. at p. 144. See Lew, Applicable Law, (1978), pp. 54.
76Accordingly, in some commodities arbitration, in the case of price disputes oversmen appointed by
the parties to put a reasonable price forward are regarded as the agents of the parties.
77Botli Merlin and Foehx regarded compulsory arbitration as outside their definition. See Merlin,
RecueilAlphabetique de Questions deDroit, (4th ed.) Tarlier Brussels 1829 Vol. 9atp. 144;
translation from Samuel, Jurisdictional Problems, (1989), at p. 34.
78Foelix, J., Traite duDroit InternationalPrive, (2nd ed. 1847) at p. 461; translation from Samuel,
Jurisdictional Problems, (1989), at p. 35.
79Balladore-Pallieri, G., "L'Arbitrage Prive dans les Rapports Internationaux", 51 Recueil des Cour,
285, Bernard, A., L'Arbitrage Volontaire enDroit Prive, (1937) 28, Klein, F-F., "Autonomic de la
Volonte et Arbitrage" 47 (1958) Rev. Crit. 255; discussed in Samuel, Jurisdictional Problems,
(1989).
80Bemard, A., L'Arbitrage Volontaire en DroitPrive, (1937) 28 at p. 152; translation from Samuel,
Jurisdictional Problems, (1989), at p. 41.
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contract sui generis, governed by rules appropriate to it and which must be dealt with
by taking into account both the principles governing contracts in general and the
particular nature of the function exercised by the arbitrator."81 Bernard's argument
was supported by Klein, who stated that "The arbitral agreement is the work of the
parties alone. The award is the work of the arbitrators. The appointment of the
arbitrators is the work of the parties and the arbitrators together."82
Not only do the contractualists fail to reach an agreement on the agent theory, Merlin's
agent theory is strongly criticised by Laine.83 As Laine points out, the functions of
arbitrators are contradictory to the agent theory. With respect to the relationship
between principal and agent, the agent works on the principal's behalf in their best
interest. However, according to Laine, this does not apply to the relationship between
arbitrators and the parties within the present arbitration framework. Three reasons
have been given by him. First, unlike agents, arbitrators are appointed to resolve the
dispute between the parties independently and impartially, rather than being appointed
to fight for the best interests of the party who appointed them. In fact, arbitrators are
obliged to determine the rights of the parties in an impartial manner since they owe an
equal obligation of fairness to both sides.84 Following this logic, it is impossible for
arbitrators, acting as agents, to fight for the best interests of the parties who appointed
them since it is against the underlying fundamental duties of the arbitrators.
Secondly, arbitrators are required to be financially independent from the parties who
appoint them.85 Under these circumstances, the same questions are raised. How can
81 Ibid.
82Klein, F-F., "Autonomic de la Volonte et Arbitrage" 47 (1958) Rev. Crit. 255, at p. 260;
translation from Samuel, JurisdictionalProblems, (1989), at pp. 43-44.
83Laine, "De L'execution en France des Sentences Arbitrales Etrangeres", 26 J.D.I. 641; discussed in
Lew, Applicable Law, (1978), at pp. 52-61.
84Mustill & Boyd, CommercialArbitration, (2nded. 1989), at p. 43.
85Some commentators criticise the contractual theory on the basis that it fails to explain the nature of
the duty of the arbitrator to give the parties an impartial and fair hearing - commentators such as
Weiss, Balladore-Pallieri, Bernard and Klein.
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arbitrators work for the parties' best interests when they are supposed to act
impartially and independently? And how can arbitrators work for the parties' best
interests when both parties' interests are in conflict?
Thirdly, the agent theory is also criticised over the different scope of the agent's and
the arbitrator's powers. In accordance with the agent theory, agents represent the
principals within the scope of the authorisation. Agents can only decide on the matters
authorised by the principals. The decision made by the agent is regarded as a contract
which has a binding effect on the principal. However, this description does not fit
into the relationship between the parties and the arbitrators. In fact, the agent theory
contradicts reality since arbitrators can perform functions which can never be
performed by the parties, such as the power to summon witnesses in certain countries
or order security of costs against one of the parties
The contractual theory also fails to provide a satisfactory answer about the arbitrator's
immunity. Arbitrator's immunity is designed to avoid proceedings being brought
against arbitrators by a dissatisfied party during or after the arbitration procedures.
Though different scopes of immunity are granted by different jurisdictions, generally
speaking arbitrators enjoy a quasi-judicial immunity from suit for any errors or
omissions. For instance, in France, though no legal texts governing the issue of
arbitrator's immunity exist in the French law, generally it is recognised that the party
in question should file an appeal against the award for annulment before raising a
claim of liability against the arbitrators. In England, an absolute immunity is granted
to arbitrators as the House of Lords indicated in the cases of Sutcliffe v. Thackratfi6
and Arenson v. Arenson:sl
86[1974] AC 727. In this case, Lord Reid stated: "There is nothing judicial about an architect's
function in determining whether certain work is defective. There is no dispute. He is not jointly
engaged by the parties. They do not submit evidence as contentions to him. He makes his own
investigations and comes to a decision." at pp. 737-738.
87[1977] AC 405. Similar to the case of Sutcliffe v. Thackrah, the House of Lords also refused to
grant accountants immunity for the errors they made while valuing the shares in a private company.
274
Chapter Eleven: Theories andAn Evaluation
"It is well settled that judges, barristers, solicitors, jurors and witnesses enjoy
an absolute immunity from any form of civil action being brought against them
in respect of anything they say or do in court during the course of a trial. This
is not because the law regards any of these with special tenderness but because
the law recognises that, on balance of convenience, public policy demands that
they shall all have such an immunity. It is of great public importance that they
shall all perform their respective functions free from fear that disgruntled and
possibly impecunious persons who have lost their cause or been convicted
may subsequently harass them with litigation."88
And,
"Since arbitrators are in much the same position as judges, in that they carry
out more or less the same functions, the law has for generations recognised
that public policy requires that they too shall be accorded the immunity to
which I have referred."89
The courts in the United States have gone further than the English courts on the issue
of immunity. The United States courts not only offer immunity to arbitrators but also
to arbitration institutions90. The common law doctrine of judicial immunity was first
recognised in the case of Bradley v. Fisher91 on the ground that: "If civil actions could
be maintained in such cases against the judges, because the losing party should see fit
to allege in his complaint that the acts of the judge were done with partiality or
maliciously or corruptly, the protection essential to judicial independence would be
entirely swept away."92 The same immunity is also extended to arbitrators whose
jobs have traditionally been construed to be quasi-judicial in nature,93 since the United
States courts have been convinced that arbitrators usually do not have any interest in
the outcome of the awards. Arbitrators are simply appointed to perform a functionally
88[1974] AC 727, at p. 757.
89Ibid, at p. 758.
90Corey v. New York Stock Exchange 691 F. 2d. 1205. The court said: "Extension of arbitral
immunity to encompass boards which sponsor arbitration is a natural and necessary product of die
policies underlying arbitral immunity; otherwise the immunity extended to arbitrators is illusionary.
It would be of little value to the whole arbitral procedure to merely shift the liability to die
sponsoring association." (at p. 1211).
9 *80 US (13 Wall) 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872).
9 21hid. at pp. 649-650.
98Gahn v. International Union Ladies' Garment Workers Union 311 F. 2d. 113, 114-115 (3rd Cir.
1962).
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judicial job; therefore, they are protected from civil suit under the doctrine of arbitral
immunity.94
In accordance with these judgments delivered by the courts, it can be concluded that
arbitrators' immunity has been granted by means of case law or, indeed, by
legislation. Because of the involvement of the state's powers on this matter, the
judicial immunity is granted to arbitrators regardless of the parties' agreement.
Furthermore, due to the considerations of general public interest and the welfare of the
arbitrators as quasi-judicial officers, a negative answer can be provided to the
questions whether the arbitrator's immunity can be contracted out of the arbitration
agreement (under the contractual theory) and whether an arbitration agreement which
expressly excludes the arbitrator's immunity is valid. In addition to the criticisms of
the agent theory discussed above, this is another example of the deficiencies of the
contractual theory.
Although the contractualists intend to create a more liberal arbitration framework by
reducing the significance of the judicial elements of arbitration, their statement that
arbitral awards should be enforced as contracts in any states attracts some doubt.
First, not every contract can be enforced in any country. The court which is asked to
enforce a contract usually checks whether it has jurisdiction over the case or whether
such an enforcement would contradict the mandatory rules or public policy of the
country before enforcing the contract. Secondly, this statement ignores the existing
judicial review system in international commercial arbitration. Within the present
arbitration framework, as discussed in section on the jurisdictional theory, not only the
courts of the place of arbitration but also those where the recognition or enforcement
of the award is sought can exercise their supervisory powers to determine the validity
94See Hoosack Tunnel, Dock and Elevator Co. v. O'Brien 137 Mass 424,426 (1984).
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of the arbitral awards. In fact, apart from the Belgian courts,95 most national courts
do exercise a supervisory power to ensure that no ground listed in Article V of the
New York Convention exists in the awards submitted to them before granting
recognition or enforcement.
However, the next question is what is the basis of the recognition or enforcement of
arbitral awards if this is not done on a contractual basis? In the opinion of the present
writer, it is more logical to hold that arbitral awards are enforced on the basis of public
interest and the obligation imposed upon the signatory countries of the New York
Convention. In the case of convention awards,96 the courts of the signatory countries
are obliged to recognise or enforce awards made in other signatory countries providing
no ground listed in Article V of the New York Convention is established. In the case
of non-conventional awards, the basis for a court to enforce a foreign award can be
said to be public interest. This interest may include the public demand for an
alternative way of resolving disputes, popularity of arbitration in the international trade
community or the intention to reduce the caseload of the national courts. Following
this argument, it is illogical to conclude that an award is or should be regarded as a
contract between the parties.
The arguments surrounding the agent theory also extend to the issue of the nature of
arbitral awards. Based on the agent theory, Merlin and Foelix maintain that an arbitral
award is a contract. Under the agent theory, arbitral awards are regarded as contracts
made by the arbitrators who act as agents of the parties. As a result of this principal
and agent relationship, the contract made by the agents, that is, the arbitral award, has
a binding effect on the principals, that is, the parties. The parties have to accept the
arbitrators' award as "having binding contractual force and to voluntarily give effect to
95In cases where one or both of the parties to the awards are non-Belgians.
96A conventional award means an award made within the territory of a signatory country of the New
York Convention 1958.
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it."97 Because of its contractual nature, an arbitral award should be enforced
anywhere in the world. As Merlin maintains:
"An arbitral decision rendered in a foreign country, is it anything other than a
contract? Is it not the consequence of the agreement to arbitrate, as a result of
which the arbitrators have rendered it? Is it not tied essentially to this
arbitration agreement? Does it not form with this arbitration agreement a single
entity? What would it be without this arbitration agreement? It would only be a
useless piece of paper, it would be nothing. It is the arbitration agreement that
gives it its existence; it is from the arbitration agreement that it derives all its
substance; it has, then, like the arbitration agreement, the character of a
contract; and the precise truth is that it is only the performance of the mandate
that the parties have entrusted to the arbitrators; it is even, to put it precisely,
only an agreement to which the parties have bound themselves by the hands of
the latter (the arbitrators)."98
Merlin also contends that no question of territoriality will arise and the awards shall be
recognised and enforced as contracts in any national court because no state power and
authority is involved in the decision-making procedures. His argument has had certain
influence on the development of the French and English arbitration laws. For
instance, in 1937, the French Courde Cassation ruled that the enforcement procedures
for the arbitral awards could be less cumbersome than those for a foreign judgment,
because "... arbitral awards, which have, as their basis, an arbitration agreement, form
one entity with it and share its contractual character."99 In a passage in Vynior's case,
the Chief Justice (Coke) stated that the arbitrator's power and authority may be
revoked like a number of engagements, such as making a letter of attorney to make
livery or assign auditors to take an account, or submitting to an arbitration, and so
97Lew, Applicable Law, (1978) at p. 54.
98Merlin, RecueilAlphabetique de Questions de Droit (4th ed.) Tarlier Brussels 1829 Vol. 9 at p.
144; translation from Samuel, JurisdictionalProblems, (1989) at p. 34.
99The Roses case, 27 July 1937 [1938] I Dalloz 25. The court held that the awards can be enforced by
the President of the Tribunal Civil; translation from Samuel, JurisdictionalProblems, (1989), at p.
36.
1008 Co. Rep. 81b at 82 a (1609). See Samuel, Jurisdictional Problems, (1989), at p. 36.
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However, Balladore-Pallieri, Bernard and Klein have tried to challenge Merlin's
argument that an award is a contract made by the parties, acting through their agents
(the arbitrators). To Balladore-Pallieri, fitting arbitral awards into any particular
juridical category is not entirely necessary.101 However, Bernard and Klein believe
that an arbitral award is a direct consequence of the contractual relationship between
the parties and arbitrators and "the award is the work of the arbitrators".102 Based on
this agreement, the parties promise that the arbitral award will have a binding effect on
them, and the national courts simply enforce the award as an obligation agreed by the
parties.
Though, there has been disagreement on the issue of the agent theory, the contractual
nature of arbitration and arbitral awards has never been disputed among the
proponents of the contractual theory. As observed by Niboyet:
"Arbitration awards have a contractual nature, as the arbitrators do not hold
their power from the law or the judicial authorities, but from the parties'
agreement (arbitration agreement, submission to arbitration). The arbitrator
decides just as the parties could have done by agreement; [the parties] give the
arbitrators a real mandate to decide in their place. The award is thus
impregnated with a contractual character, and [according] to the law, it appears
to be the work of the parties, it must have, as with all agreements, lawful
effect, and [it must] possess the authority of a final judgement."103
With respect to the choice of the proper law, under the contractual theory the parties
are offered an unlimited autonomy in choosing both the procedural law governing the
arbitration and the proper law governing the main contract. The arbitrators are
required to apply the law specified by the parties. As far as the issue of the choice of
the procedural law is concerned, in order to fill the gap, the lex fori relating to
arbitration proceedings is only applied in the absence of any express choice of law
101 Balladore-Pallieri, G., "L'Arbitrage Prive dans les Rapports Internationaux", 51 Recueil des Cour
285, at p. 311, discussed in Samuel, JurisdictionalProblems, (1989), at p. 40.
102Klein, F-F., "Autonomic de la Volonte et Arbitrage" 47 Rev.Crit. 255 at p. 260 (1958), discussed
in Samuel, JurisdictionalProblems, (1989), at pp. 43-44.
103Niboyet, Traite, para. 1284 at 136. It is translated in Lew, Applicable Law, (1978), at p. 54.
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made by the parties. When a choice of the proper law issue arises, the arbitrators will
have to look to the contract or the arbitration agreement to find the applicable
substantive law according to the parties' expressed or implied wishes. Failing to find
an express choice of law, they may have to follow the conflict of laws rules of the lex
fori to determine the proper law. However, because of the contractual nature of
arbitration, and distinct from the jurisdictional theory, the parties are thought to have
freedom to choose any laws, including a-national principles, as the substantive law.
11.3 The hybrid theory
The jurisdictional theory and the contractual theory both have considerable support at
opposite ends of the arbitration spectrum. However, to some jurists,104 neither the
jurisdictional theory nor the contractual theory provides a satisfactory and logical
explanation of the modern framework of international commercial arbitration. Under
these circumstances, as Dr. Lew pointed out, it is not surprising that a compromise
theory with a mixed or hybrid character has developed.105 The group of jurists which
has developed the hybrid theory is convinced that the perfect operation of international
commercial arbitration relies on both jurisdictional and contractual elements. The
hybrid theory, in fact, is a compromise theory which is mixed between the contractual
theory and jurisdictional theory.
The hybrid theory was created by Professor Surville,106 and developed by Professor
Sauser-Hall. Suggesting that international commercial arbitration is a mechanism with
a dual character, Professor Sauser-Hall maintained, on the one hand that a contractual
104For example, Surville, F. and Sauser-Hall. For Surville, see Surville, F. and Arthuys, F. Cours
Elementaire deDroit InternationalPrive (7th ed.) 1925 pp. 634-635; discussed in Samuel,
Jurisdictional Problems, (1989), at p. 60.
105Lew, Applicable Law, (1978), at p. 57.
106For Surville, see footnote 104. This theory was developed by Professor Sauser-Hall in 1952, in
"L'arbitrage en Droit International Prive", (1952) 44-1 Ann.Inst.Dr.Intern. 469, and (1957) 47-11
Ann.Inst.Dr.Intern. 394; see Lew, Applicable Law, (1978), at p. 57.
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element in arbitration is reflected in the argument that arbitration has its origins in a
private contract, where the parties have the power to choose the arbitrators and the
rules to govern the arbitration procedures and substantive matters. On the other hand,
he agreed with the jurisdictional theory that an arbitration has to be conducted within
national legal regimes in order to determine powers of the parties, the validity of the
arbitration agreement and the enforceability of the awards.
Accordingly, arbitration has been defined as "a mixed juridical institution, sui generis,
which has its origin in the [parties'] agreement and draws its jurisdictional effects from
the civil law."107 In short, arbitration has a jurisdictional nature involving the
application of the rules of procedure while it derives its effectiveness from the
arbitration agreement between the parties.108 Professor Sauser-Hall's argument is
accepted by some practitioners, such as Messrs Redfern and Hunter, who expressly
state:
"International commercial arbitration is a hybrid. It begins as a private
agreement between the parties. It continues by way of private proceedings, in
which the wishes of the parties are of great importance. Yet it ends with an
award which has binding legal force and effect and which, on appropriate
conditions being met, the courts of most countries of the world will be
prepared to recognise and enforce. The private process has a public effect,
implemented by the support of the public authorities of each state expressed
through its national law."109
In accordance with the hybrid theory, on the one hand the parties' freedom to contract
an arbitration agreement, select arbitrators and choose the governing laws is based on
the contractual nature of arbitration. On the other hand, the jurisdictional character of
arbitration requires the issues relating to arbitral proceedings and the validity of
arbitration agreements to be subject to the mandatory rules and public policy of the lex
107(1957) 47-11 Ann.Inst.Dr.Intern. 394 at pp. 398-399; cited in Lew, Applicable Law, (1978), at p.
57.
108Sauser-Hall, G., "L'arbitrage en Droit International Prive", (1952) 44-1, Ann.Inst.Dr.Intern. 469 at
p. 471; discussed in Sanders, "Trends in the Field of International Commercial Arbitration", (1975) II
Recueil Des Cours 233-234.
109Redfern and Hunter, InternationalCommercialArbitration, (2nd ed. 1991), at p. 8.
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fori. Also, in relation to the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards, the validity
of arbitral awards will be scrutinised according to the mandatory rules and public
policy of the country in which the recognition or enforcement is sought.
Robert Hunter also suggests that it is inappropriate to deny the dual character of
arbitration:
"the arbiter is required to decide the whole matters submitted to him or her by
means of a 'decree arbitral' or 'award', and in so doing must not merely
adhere to some rule, principle, criterion or standard; he or she must not
contravene the law. Though the power of the arbiters over the submitters is
based on contract, there is thus a jurisdictional as well as a contractual element
in arbitration."110
The fundamental dual character of arbitration is also stressed by Ancel, who believes
that the dual nature of arbitration is a concept "at the same time both contractual,
because of its origin (the agreement binding the parties) and jurisdictional, because of
the way in which it is expressed (arbitral award, decision on jurisdictional issues and
decision by private judicial authority)."111
Professor Sanders also believes that the hybrid theory appears to be more complete
than the contractual or jurisdictional theories to explain the issues arising from
arbitration. He maintains that it would be inadequate if the emphasis was only based
on one element of arbitration, either contractual or jurisdictional, because:
"On the one hand arbitration must be based on an agreement of the parties to
arbitrate; no arbitration can take place when there is not valid agreement of the
parties to submit their difference to arbitration. If emphasis is laid upon this
starting point and the line is drawn further, covering as well arbitral procedure
and the award, it leads to the contractual theory on the nature of arbitration. On
the other hand emphasis may be put upon the quasi-judicial character of
arbitration, arbitration is ajudicial process, the arbitrators, once appointed, act
as judges. Their function is to give a final decision on the differences
submitted to them, their decision has, in principle, the same effects as a
judgement of a court. The dualistic character of arbitration has lead to the
110Hunter, The Law ofArbitration in Scotland, (1987), at p. 3.
111Ancel, "French Judicial Attitudes towards International Arbitration", (1993) 9(2) Arbitration Int.
121-129, at p. 121.
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intermediary view taken by those who adhere to what may be called the mixed
arbitration theory: the character of arbitrator is influenced both by its
contractual origin and by thejudicial process it involves."112
Supporting the dual character of arbitration, Jean Robert points out a close link
between the arbitration procedures and the forum of arbitration. He explains that the
constitution of arbitration and the powers of the arbitrator are based on the parties'
agreement while the validity of the agreement and enforcement of awards have to be
decided in conformity with public policy or mandatory rules of the relevant laws, for
example, the lexfori and the law of the country where the enforcement is sought.113
Under the hybrid theory, the relationship between the arbitrators and the parties is
regarded as contractual in nature. This contractual nature reflects the arbitration
agreement made between the parties. Under the arbitration agreement, the parties
submit their disputes to arbitration and select the arbitrators who are regarded as
suitable to resolve the disputes between them. As a result, arbitrators obtain their
powers from the parties' authorisation and they are allowed to act on behalf of the
parties within the scope of authorisation. Nevertheless, unlike the contractual theory,
the extent of the arbitrator's power is subject to the scrutiny of the mandatory rules of
the lex fori and the public policy rules of the enforcing states. As far as the nature of
the arbitral awards is concerned, distinct from both the jurisdictional and contractual
theories, the hybrid theory defines the nature of arbitral awards as half way between a
judgment and a contract.114
112Sanders, "Trends in the Field of International Commercial Arbitration", (1975) II Rec.des Cours
233-234.
113Robert, "De la Place de la Loi dans L'Arbitrage", discussed in Sanders, (ed.) International
Arbitration: Liber Amicorum forMartin Domke, (1967), 157, at pp. 227-229, and Samuel,
JurisdictionalProblems, (1989), at p. 62.
114Surville, "Jurisprudence Francaise en Matiere de Droit International", (1990) 29 Revue Critique de
Legislation et de Jurisprudence, 129 at p. 148; see also, Surville, F., & Arthuys, F., Cours
Elementaire deDroit InternationalPrive, (7th ed. 1925) at pp. 634-635.
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Similar to the jurisdictional theory, the hybrid theory recognises the significance of the
supervisory powers of the national courts of the place of arbitration and the enforcing
states. It maintains that, in the absence of any express agreement between the parties,
the law of the seat will be applied to govern the arbitration. Arbitrators are required to
decide the proper law of the contract in accordance with the conflict of laws rules of
the lexfori. In other words, arbitrators have to apply the law expressly chosen by the
parties to the dispute; however, in the case where no expressed choice of law can be
found, they have to resort to the conflict of laws rules of the place of arbitration in
order to decide the law governing the substantive issues.115 The jurisdictional nature
has a stronger influence of the choice of the proper law. Since the conflict of laws
rules of the lexfori are important in deciding the proper law of the contract under the
hybrid theory, therefore, the validity of a choice of a-national principles and the
application of a-national principles as the proper law of the contract will have to be
decided by the mandatory rules of the lex fori and those of the countries where the
recognition or enforcement is sought.
Although the hybrid theory receives support from both academics and practitioners,
like other theories, it has still been criticised. One criticism is in relation to the
inadequacy of the separation of the contractual and jurisdictional elements. The critics
agree with Professor Sauser-Hall's arguments that both jurisdictional and contractual
elements are found in arbitration, that an arbitration is originated in a private
agreement, and that the place of arbitration may have a legitimate interest in controlling
arbitration held in its territory. Nevertheless, they also point out that Professor
Sauser-Hall never specifies the scope of both elements. As a result of this failure, in
their opinion, the hybrid theory cannot be used to fill gaps existing in arbitration law
and provide suggestions to reform arbitration laws.116
115Lew, Applicable Law, (1978), at p. 58.
1 16Bernard, L'Arbitrage Volontaire enDroit Prive, (1937) at p. 284; translation from Samuel,
JurisdictionalProblems, (1989), at p. 63.
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Secondly, Professor Sauser-Hall's ignorance of the importance of other possible
relevant applicable laws is also criticised. Professor Sauser-Hall only stresses the
importance of the lexfori. He points out that the arbitration proceedings are regulated
in accordance with the parties' agreement, at least to the extent allowed by the law of
the place of arbitration. He maintains that it is the arbitrator's responsibility to
reconcile the difference between the parties' wishes and the lex fori. Nevertheless, he
ignores the fact that the lex fori may not be the only law regulating arbitration
procedures and the validity of arbitral awards. In fact, the laws which can influence
the outcome of arbitration include the law of the place where the arbitration agreement
is made, the law of the place where the contract is carried out, the law of the parties'
domiciles and the law of the place where the recognition or enforcement is sought.
The validity of an award made without thoroughly taking these possible applicable
laws into account is likely to be questioned in proceedings for setting aside the award
and when recognition or enforcement is sought.
Over and above the criticisms already outlined, the present writer would add two
further criticisms of the hybrid theory that are worthwhile discussing. One concerns
the procedures to choose the proper law. The other concerns the origin of arbitration.
As far as the former issue is concerned, in accordance with the hybrid theory,
arbitrators are required to respect and apply the law chosen by the parties to the extent
allowed by the lex fori. In the absence of such a choice, the arbitrators will resort
directly to the conflict of laws rules of the lex fori to determine the proper law of the
contract. The question which has to be raised is whether, within the present
arbitration framework, the lex fori and the conflict of laws rules of the place of
arbitration have the same significance in the choice of law procedures.
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As far as the importance of the lexfori is concerned, some major arbitration countries,
such as France, influenced by the delocalisation theory, no longer require the
compulsory application of the mandatory rules and public policy of the lex fori in
international commercial arbitration. With regard to the application of conflict of laws
rules of the place of arbitration, observations from some recent international arbitral
awards and the reform of national arbitration laws indicate that the significance of
conflict of laws rules seems to have been reduced to a minimum. According to the
new trend, it is no longer compulsory for the arbitrators to decide the proper law by
following the traditional three steps stipulated in some conflict of laws rules. In a case
where no proper law is chosen, arbitrators are allowed to choose the law they deem
appropriate or resort to a-national principles to decide the substantive disputes. This
change can be observed in some recently reformed arbitration laws where the term
"according to the private international law" has been replaced by "according to the
rules the arbitrator deems appropriate." For instance, the French Code of Civil
Procedure 1981 stipulates: "The arbitrators shall decide the dispute according to the
rules of law chosen by the parties; in the absence of such a choice, he shall decide
according to the rules he deems appropriate."117
With respect to the origin of arbitration, the hybrid theory follows the arguments set
by the contractual theory and maintains that an arbitration has its origin in a private
contract, that is, the arbitration agreement between the parties. However, in the
present writer's opinion, it is a fallacious argument. Two reasons for this will be
given in the following paragraphs.
First of all, instead of being the origin of arbitration, an arbitration agreement made
between the parties is simply one of the conditions which may have to be fulfilled in
117Article 1496 of the New French Code of Civil Procedure.
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order to start an arbitration.118 For instance, as argued in the previous section,119 the
issues of arbitrability and compulsory arbitrations rebut the argument that an
arbitration agreement is the origin of arbitration. The real origin of arbitration is the
state's power that allows private parties to submit certain kinds of disputes to
arbitration, since any agreements to submit the disputes to arbitration would be invalid
without permission of the states. Based on this argument, in the present writer's
opinion, arbitration does not owe its origin to the parties' arbitration agreement, but to
the state's authorisation.
The second criticism is that the hybrid theory fails to explain the case of compulsory
arbitration when it expresses that an arbitration has its origin in a private contract
between the parties. It is a similar mistake to the one observed in the discussion of
contractual theory in the last section. Compulsory arbitration is designed, on the
grounds of state interest and of reducing the court's caseload, to have certain fields of
legal disputes compulsorily submitted to arbitration. Accordingly, compulsory
arbitration requiring no consent of the parties originates from the power of states.120
Therefore, the statement that an arbitration has its origin in the private contract can be
rebutted in the case of compulsory arbitration.
Although the hybrid theory intends to encompass both the jurisdictional and
contractual characters of international commercial arbitration, it is criticised over the
lack of clarity in distinguishing between the jurisdictional and contractual elements, the
undue emphasis on the lex fori and national conflict of laws rules in relation to the
choice of law process and its support for the contract-based theory of the origin of
arbitration. Therefore, despite the effort to reconcile the jurisdictional and contractual
118Compulsory arbitration is the exception.
119For details, see the section concerning the criticisms of the jurisdictional theory in Chapter 12.
12°A detailed discussion is presented in the last section concerning the contractual theory.
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theories, the hybrid theory still fails to cover every aspect of international commercial
arbitration.
11.4 The autonomous theory
Instead of trying to define arbitration within the scale of the spectrum between the
jurisdictional and contractual theories, Rubellin-Devichi looked into the practical
aspects of arbitration and developed an autonomous theory. Believing that the merit of
international commercial arbitration was the speedy and flexible character of the
proceedings, she argued that an appropriate theory should be established by examining
the use and purpose of arbitration. With an intention to create a friendly atmosphere
for arbitration in the international commercial community, Rubellin-Devichi argued
that the autonomous character of international commercial arbitration should be
recognised.121 She rejected the traditional jurisdictional and contractual theories on
the grounds that both theories failed to correspond with reality and contradicted each
other. She also rejected the hybrid theory because of its indefinite scope of
application.
Instead of following the traditional debates over the jurisdictional and contractual
characters of arbitration, Rubellin-Devichi maintained that the real character of
arbitration had to be decided on the basis of its use and purpose by placing arbitration
on a "supra-national" level and recognising its autonomous nature. Having studied the
social and economic demands for international commercial arbitration, she suggests
that "In order to allow arbitration to enjoy the expansion it deserves, while all along
121L'arbitrage:Nature Juridique, Droit Interne etDroit International Prive\ see Lew, Applicable Law,
(1978), at pp. 59-61.
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keeping it within its appropriate limits, one must accept, I believe, that its nature is
neither contractual, nor jurisdictional, nor hybrid, but autonomous."122
Rubellin-Devichi did not argue about the dual nature of arbitration, but she disagreed
with the efforts involved in trying to distinguish the jurisdictional and contractual
characters of arbitration. In her opinion, it is difficult or even impossible to draw a
line between the jurisdictional and contractual features of arbitration. An undesirable
distortion of the development of international commercial arbitration may be caused by
insisting on this kind of segregation. She did not classify arbitration as purely
contractual or jurisdictional because both characters have been "so inextricably
intertwined that they have become impossible to separate."123 As she stated:
"It is out of the question to apply the law of contract to the arbitral agreement
and that relating to judgements to the award. The award is not a judgement
and the arbitral agreement is not a contract like any other."124
Moreover,
"The question is to know whether the arbitration does not extend beyond its
two components to establish an autonomous institution, the nature of which
should not be defined by reference to the contract or to jurisdiction, but whose
legal authority is to be justified both by its purpose and by the guarantee
necessary for those parties who do not bring their disputes before the official
courts."125
She also believed that the existence and continuing development of international
commercial arbitration corresponded with the demands from the international trade
community. Business people have realised that arbitration meets their demands for a
more flexible and easily-controlled method to settle the disputes between them. In
order to satisfy the development and expansion of the arbitration industry, she argued
122Rubellin-Devichi, Varbitrag: Nature Juridique:Droit Interne etDroit InternationalPrive, Librairie
GeneratedeDroitetdeJurisprudence, Paris (1965) at p. 365; translation from Samuel, Jurisdictional
Problems, (1989), at p. 67.
123Ibid. Rubellin-Devichi, at p. 363; cited from Lew, Applicable Law, (1978), at p. 60.
124Ibid. Rubellin-Devichi, at p. 17; translation from Samuel, Jurisdictional Problems, (1989), at p.
68.
^23Ibid, at p. 59.
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that complete party autonomy should be offered to the parties. In accordance with this
idea, parties enjoy the full autonomy in deciding the arbitration procedures, such as the
law governing the procedural matters and the time and place of arbitration as well as
the ability to choose the law to govern the substantive matters.
Furthermore, Rubellin-Devichi maintained that, based on the autonomous theory,
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards were enforceable in any country. She also
saw the necessity of having an international dispute settlement institution established in
order to provide perfectly functional arbitrations for the international business
community. Therefore, she concluded that "only an original system, free from both
the contractual and jurisdictional notions, would permit the necessary speed and
guarantees which the parties legally claim to be brought together."126
While acknowledging full party autonomy in determining every detail of arbitration,
the proponents of the autonomous theory deny the controlling or supervisory powers
of the lex fori over arbitration. They invoke the idea of delocalisation theory and the
idea of a supra-national arbitration and this can be observed in the discussion of the
validity of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards and in choice of the proper law.
With respect to the issue of the validity of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards,
in accordance with the delocalisation theory, the proponents of the autonomous theory
maintain that an arbitration should be free from restraints imposed by the laws of the
relevant states. They also argue that the national laws of the place of arbitration or the
place where the recognition or enforcement is sought should not have a supervisory
role to play in an arbitration. Furthermore, because of the parties' wishes to arbitrate
and the supra-national nature of arbitration, arbitration agreements and arbitral awards
should be enforceable in any country.
1 26/fe/. at p. 60.
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As far as the choice of the proper law is concerned, instead of confining arbitration
within the national or international legal framework, the autonomous theory invokes
the creation of a real "supra-national" law for international commercial arbitration.
Under this truly supra-national arbitration, parties are entitled to choose any rules of
law, a national system of law, international law, the new lex mercatoria, the general
principles of law or even amiable composition to govern their relationship.
Furthermore, they believe that the international commercial community should create
its own law to be applied to international commercial disputes.
The idea of having total freedom in the choice of the proper law has been supported by
Goldman,127 Lando128 and Lew.129 The most revolutionary idea invoked by the
autonomists is to create a supra-national character for international commercial
arbitration. To achieve this goal, they maintain that business people should not
confine themselves within a framework of national systems of law. The international
business community is quite capable, they argue, of developing its own set of rules to
resolve international commercial disputes. Based on this idea, it is argued that in
international commercial arbitration the arbitrator's power to choose the proper law
should not be restricted within the scope of national laws. They should be free to
decide the dispute on the basis of either a municipal system of law or the general
principles of international law, custom, usages of trade, good sense, fairness or
justice.
Goldman supports the idea that the lexrnercatoria is a legal system which is designed
to govern certain types of international commercial dispute, while municipal law
127Goldman, "La Nouvelle Reglementation Francaise de L'arbitrage International", in The Art of
Arbitration: Liber Amicorum Pieter Sanders, (1982), 153, 164; discussed in Berman, Harold and
Sasser, Felix, "The New Law Merchant and the Old Sources, Content, and Legitimacy" in
Carbonneau. (ed.) LexMercatoria andArbitration, (1990) at p. 31.
128Lando, "The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration" 34 (1985) I.C.L.Q. 747.
129Lew, Applicable Law, (1978), at pp. 112-118.
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appears to be insufficient in certain aspects.130 Lew expresses his belief in the party
autonomy doctrine and the existence of an autonomous legal order that does not
belong to any particular national legal system.131 Goldman's idea is also accepted by
Lando. He is convinced that the lex niercatoria, instead of being made and
promulgated by state authorities, is recognised as an autonomous system by the
business community and by state authorities.132 As Lando states:
"By choosing the lexmercatoria the parties oust the technicalities of national
legal systems and they avoid rules which are unfit for international contracts.
Thus they escape peculiar formalities, brief cut-off periods, and some of the
difficulties created by domestic laws which are unknown in other countries
such as the common law rules on consideration and privity of contract.
Furthermore, those involved in the proceedings - parties, counsel and
arbitrators - plead and argue on an equal footing, nobody has the advantage of
having the case pleaded and decided by his own law and nobody has the
handicap of seeing it governed by a foreign law."133
The application of a-national principles is also upheld by Mr. Tallon, who states that
"The autonomy of the parties, so it is said, may produce a contract without law, a
contract subject to undroitanational, so that arbitrators are not called upon to apply
any fixed rules of a specific system of law, but may have resort to a law of their own
creation."134
The autonomists are convinced that it is necessary for international commercial
arbitration to be free from the controls of the lex fori. In addition, they believe that
developing a set of laws to apply to international commercial relations is the only way
to achieve the ideal of self-regulation for international commercial arbitration. Once
these ideas are widely accepted, a truly international commercial arbitration will be
130Goldman, "La Nouvelle ReglementationFran§aise de L'arbitrage International", in The Art of
Arbitration: LiberAmicorum Pieter Sanders, 153, at p. 164 (1982), discussed in Bennan, Harold and
Sasser, Felix, "The New Law Merchant and the Old Sources, Content, mid Legitimacy" in
Carbomieau(ed.), LexMercatoriaandArbitration, (1990), at p. 31.
131Lcw, Applicable Law, (1978), at pp. 112-118.
132Lando, "The LexMercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration" (1985) 341.C.L.Q. 747, at
p. 752.
133Ibid, at 748.
134Tallon, in Schmitthoff (ed.) The Sources of the Law ofInternational Trade (1964), at p. 157. It is
also supported by Professor Goldman and Professor Fragistas.
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created. A passage written by Luzzatto can serve as a concluding remark for the
autonomy theory:
"The detachment of the arbitral procedure from any municipal legal system and
its organisation according to the free will of the parties to the dispute require
therefore, that the operation of the said autonomy is recognised by means of an
international convention, which also makes this aspect of international
commercial arbitration relevant with regard to national laws. When the parties'
autonomy becomes able to regulate the whole of the arbitration procedure
without any connection with municipal laws, and when international
regulations provide the parties with the machinery and facilities which may
enable arbitration proceedings to fulfil their purposes without any resort to
municipal courts, then it can be said that international commercial arbitration is
recognised as such, in its truly international character, by the legal systems of
the States which are parties to the convention."135
However, the autonomous theory was strongly criticized by Dr. Mann. He
questioned whether such autonomous arbitration, which is not bound to any national
legal system, is what every user of arbitration wants. Dr. Mann refused to accept the
autonomous theory and stated that an arbitration has to be rooted in a national legal
system. Furthermore, he suggested that most international traders would prefer to
have their disputes resolved in accordance with municipal laws as opposed to
transnational law.136
The other criticism of the autonomous theory is its lack of a clear framework.
Although Rubellin-Dcvichi strongly believes that maximum freedom should be offered
to the parties to an arbitration, she never provides clear guidance on how an
autonomous arbitration should be conducted and to what extent the autonomy can be
exercised if it conflicts with the public policy of certain states. Undeniably, compared
with the previous three theories, the autonomous theory is very ambiguous in this
aspect.
135Luzzatto, "International Commercial Arbitration and the Municipal Law of States", (1977) IV
Recueil Des Cour, 52.
136Mann, "Lex Facit Arbitrum", reprinted in (1986) 2(3) Arbitration Int. 245-246.
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In addition, the present writer would add three further criticisms of the autonomous
theory. First, denying the jurisdictional element of arbitration, the autonomous theory
over-stresses the significance of the arbitration agreement. As discussed in the
previous sections, an arbitration agreement is not the only condition controlling the
validity of arbitration. In fact, a successful arbitration relies on whether the arbitration
agreement is valid and whether the arbitral award can be recognised and enforced in
the place where the losing party has assets. To decide these matters, in most
jurisdiction, the validity of the arbitration agreement and the arbitral award is subject to
the scrutiny of a national law. This is a fact that the proponents of the autonomous
theory tend to ignore. As discussed before, arbitrability and compulsory arbitration
are two good examples to illustrate the deficiencies of this theory.
A second criticism of the autonomous theory is its invocation of world-wide
recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards. A difficulty may arise in a case where
the award is decided on the basis of the a-national principles, such as the general
principles of law, the new lexmercatoria or amiable composition. Although the
application of a-national principles in arbitration can be observed in some international
arbitral awards and is accepted in some major arbitration countries, not every country
accepts such an application. For instance, countries opposed to the application of the
new lex mercatoria include Finland, Korea, Portugal and Thailand, while the
application of amiable composition is not allowed in Bulgaria, Korea, Romania and
Thailand.137 In other words, the validity of awards made on the basis of a-national
principles will be questioned in countries where such application is not allowed; as a
result, recognition or enforcement of such awards will not be granted and,
furthermore, the purpose of arbitration will also be frustrated.
137For details, see The Handbook on International CommercialArbitration, (2nd ed. 1994).
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A final criticism focuses on the idealistic feature of the autonomous theory. The
autonomous theory is based on the ideal of a supra-national arbitration which is free
from any municipal laws. However, one thing which cannot be denied is that, within
the present international arbitration framework, arbitration is subject to the laws of a
nation or several nations. For instance, before the arbitration proceeds, the validity of
the arbitration agreement may have to be decided by the law the parties specified, the
lex fori, or the law of the country where the agreement is made. During the
arbitration, apart from the parties' choice of law, the procedures may have to be
regulated by the lex fori. Besides, the law of the country where the recognition or
enforcement is sought will have a supervisory power to decide the validity of the
award at the stage when recognition or enforcement is sought. In fact, most countries
do exercise certain levels of supervisory control over the arbitration procedures and
arbitral awards.138 Hence, it is illogical for the proponents of the autonomous theory
to claim that every state has a responsibility to enforce every arbitration agreement and
arbitral awards regardless of the individual state's interest.
In conclusion, compared to the jurisdictional, contractual and hybrid theories, the
autonomous theory has gone beyond the reality of modern international commercial
arbitration. In reality, the result of arbitration lies in the successful enforcement of an
arbitral award. Within the present arbitration framework, the criteria determining
whether the award can be enforced are controlled by the relevant national laws. The
autonomous theory, instead of resolving the conflicts between the jurisdictional and
contractual characters, simply tries to structure arbitration on an unrealistic basis. This
may be the reason why the spirit of the autonomous theory has only been applied in
Belgian arbitration law.
138Belgium may be the only exception.
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Summary and development
12.1 Summary
12.1.1 The changing face of arbitration
Arbitration, unlike national court systems, is a commercially-oriented product that
flourishes on the basis of market forces. To avoid fading away, the popularity of this
product depends on whether the demands of customers are satisfied. However,
excessive interference exercised by state courts can result in dissatisfaction of the
customers. Within the present framework of international commercial arbitration,
states are the bodies which have significant power to determine how this market
should be developed since they are regarded as having a proper and beneficial part to
play in the grant of supervisory and supportive measures over arbitrations subject to
their jurisdiction and the arbitral awards brought before them seeking recognition or
enforcement. In sum, states are the most effective and direct controlling power to
determine how arbitration should operate in an international market.
The controlling powers of states can be exercised at various stages of arbitration. For
instance, arbitration can only be operated validly and legally on the basis of a state's
endorsement. Accordingly, states have power to decide whether to recognise
arbitration as a legal dispute settlement mechanism or not. Considering the public
interest in having public money better spent on important projects and the demands for
an alternative dispute settlement method outside national court systems in order to
reduce the costs of litigation, states choose to recognise arbitration as a legal means of
dispute settlement between private parties. Over and above recognising arbitration as
an alternative dispute settlement mechanism, individual states have their own criteria to
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decide which types of disputes between private parties can be submitted to arbitration
and how the arbitration mechanism will operate, all based on their own traditions of
arbitration and their own traditions of the relationship between arbitration and the
courts. Furthermore, states have power to decide the validity of arbitral awards at the
stage of recognition or enforcement.
With the increasing popularity of arbitration and the receptive environment created by
both the international commercial world and national judicial systems, arbitration has
had a fast growth and development fuelled by the expectations and the needs of the
international business community. Since the 1960s, a number of famous international
arbitration institutions have been widely used among international business people; as
a result, it became apparent that many arbitrations conducted under international
arbitration rules were not as closely linked to the place of arbitration as domestic
arbitrations, either because of the nationality of the parties or the international nature of
the transaction. States, considering their own particular interests and needs, also
encouraged the private parties to use arbitration to resolve their disputes by enacting
more liberal arbitration laws.
This favourable attitude towards arbitration is evident in the international community.
As Sir Michael Kerr pointed out in one of his recent speeches: "What matters is that
international arbitration has in general given rise to an internationally accepted
harmonised procedural jurisprudence. ... It is establishing a generally accepted
procedure for the resolution of disputes which cuts right across past and present
barriers between different procedural philosophies and legal systems."1 It is also
apparent by the enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration.2 As stated in a recent explanatory note from the UNCITRAL Secretariat:
' Kerr, ConcordandConflict in International Arbitration (The Keating Lecture), (1996), at p. 7.
2De Ly, "The Place of Arbitration in the Conflict of Laws of International Commercial Arbitration:
An Exercise in Arbitration Planning", 12 Northwest.]..Int'l.Law & Bus. 48 (1991), at p. 49.
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"As evidenced by recent amendments to arbitration laws, there exists a trend in
favour of limiting court involvement in international commercial arbitration.
This seems justified in view of the fact that the parties to an arbitration
agreement make a conscious decision to exclude court jurisdiction and, in
particular in commercial cases, prefer expediency and finality to protracted
battles in court."3
At the national level, the trend to offer special freedom for international arbitration has
recently been reinforced by court decisions in the United States, and by recent
legislation in the UK, France, Belgium and other European countries. In accordance
with these recent changes offered to arbitrations that involves foreign elements, the
courts of the arbitral seat or the place where recognition or enforcement is sought will
not usually examine international awards to the same standard as that applied to
domestic disputes.
For instance, while the United States Supreme Court has reduced the restrictions on
anti-trust and security disputes which are allowed to be submitted to international
commercial arbitration,4 England initiated the process of modernisation with the
Arbitration Act 1979 which included "exclusion agreements" designed to eliminate
most, but not all, judicial review of arbitration awards rendered in England and Wales
in international disputes.5 Furthermore, such process continues with the recent
enactment of the Arbitration Act 1996 which comprises a thorough restatement and
reform of the law.
In France, the amendment of the Decree 1981 provides arbitration with more freedom
than ever before. It was intended to ensure that procedural regularity was respected;
3Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the Model I nw on International Commercial
Arbitration, UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law 18 para. 14.
4Scherk v. Alberto-CulverAll US 506 (1974), where the court said: A parochial refusal by the courts
of one country to enforce an international arbitration agreement would frustrate these purposes 9 of
orderliness and predictability in international business transactions.
5Section 3 of the Arbitration Act 1979 allows arbitrations to exclude appeals on points of law, see
Schmitthoff "The United Kingdom Arbitration Act 1979", (1980) V Y.B.C.A. 231.
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moreover, no matters of law or fact can be reviewed by the courts. This liberal
approach was applied in the Gotaverken case where the Paris Court of Appeal refused
to hear a challenge of an ICC award between Swedish and Libyan parties6 on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
A clause excluding appeal or setting aside procedures also appears in recent Swiss
legislation. Under the Swiss Loi Federate sur leDroit InternationalPrive, parties to an
international commercial arbitration are allowed to have a clause excluding any court
challenges to awards when all parties involved are non-Swiss nationals.7 In
accordance with these amended statutes, parties to international arbitration in
Switzerland will have a choice between three regimes: (1) broad review for arbitration,
including violation of law or equity, under the International Arbitration Concordat,8
(2) complete autonomy, if all parties are non-Swiss and have concluded an explicit
agreement to exclude court challenge entirely9 or (3) limited court review for matters
of procedural fairness.10
Belgium has exceeded other countries in denying any right to have an award set aside,
if no Belgian nationals are involved in the dispute.11 This principle also applies to
issues of fraud and excess of authority by arbitrators. As stipulated in the Belgian
Code Judiciare 1985: "The Court of Belgium may be seized of a request for annulment
only if at least one of the parties to the dispute decided by the arbitral award is either a
6GeneralNationalMaritime Transport Co. v. Societe Gotaverken AidenalA.B. Judgment February 21
1980, dAppeldeParis.
7Article 192 of Loi Federate sur leDroit International Prive, 18 Dec. 1987.
8Art. 36 (f) of the Concordat Suisse sur VArbitrage.
9Art. 192.
1 °Art. 190(2).
1 however, the nationality criteria applied in Article 1717 of the Belgian Code Judiciare 1985 causes
controversy over whether this article is in breach of Article 7 of the Treaty of Rome which prohibits
any discrimination on nationality. As it provides: "Within the scope of application of this Treaty,
and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of
nationality shall be prohibited. The Council may, on a proposal from the Commission and after
consulting the Assembly, adopt, by a qualified majority, rules designed to prohibit such
discrimination."
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physical person having Belgian nationality or residence, or a legal entity created in
Belgium or having a branch or any other establishment in Belgium."12 This change in
the Belgian law has caused one commentator to suggest that Belgium has become an
arbitration paradise.13
In addition, for the last twenty years, a pattern of trade and investment between newly
growing economic powers and the western countries has formed. With the fast
growth of arbitration and new patterns of trade, demands for arbitration conducted
outside the traditional European arbitration locations have been suggested. According
to the economic and trade flows of international business in the past twenty years,
some new areas of arbitration and economic growth can be seen in the non-traditional
arbitration regions of the world, such as South East Asia and China, where modern
arbitration has a comparatively short history. Compared to the traditional arbitration
sites in the United States and Europe, these newly developing arbitration sites perceive
arbitration in a more cautious way while trying to keep pace with their western
counterparts.14
As well as European countries, Pacific Rim countries, such as China and Taiwan,
have endeavoured to update their arbitration laws, especially those regulating
international commercial arbitration. In Taiwan, the reform of arbitration law started
in 1994 when the jurists realised that too many restrictions had been imposed on
international commercial arbitration under the outdated Arbitration Act 1982 and that
this reform might promote the Government's ambition to compete for the status of
Asian Financial Centre. In China, the CIETAC Arbitration Rules 1994 and the
Arbitration Law 1994 are the latest rules and legislation which incorporate the ideas of
12Article 1717 of the Belgian Code Judiciare, Law ofMarch 27,1985.
13Storme, "Belgium: A Paradise for International Commercial Arbitration", (1986) Int'l Bus.Lawyer
294-295.
14A detailed discussion can be found in Chapter Ten.
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party autonomy, independence of arbitration agreements and "competence and
competence". Though these two pieces of legislation do not adopt the same liberal
attitude as those prevailing in the major western arbitration states, they are still
regarded as a giant step forward compared to their predecessors.
12.1.2 Different levels of acceptance of the application of a-national
principles among jurisdictions
In accordance with the examination carried out in Part One of this thesis, it can be seen
that in a number of countries the traditional three-step choice of law rule in contract has
been abandoned or modified into a two-step test. Moreover, observing the changes in
French law, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the UNCITRAL Model Law,
Mayer commented: "more "advanced" arbitrators have, since the mid-1970s, adopted
the so-called "direct approach", which consists of selecting the applicable law without
applying the conflict of law rules of any specific State."15 Two main factors
contributed to this change: on the one hand, it has been caused by the ambiguous
distinctions between the "implied choice" test and the "closest and most real
relationship" test, while, on the other hand, it has been caused by the fact that, instead
of following the three-step choice of law rules, international arbitrators frequently
directly refer the choice of law issue to the "closest and most real relationship" test to
ascertain the proper law of the contract.
While international commercial activities have increasingly been conducted on a global
scale, international business people and their legal advisers have been conscious about
the deficiencies of national laws to regulate international transactions. Consequently,
as was outlined in Chapter Three, due to the changes in the choice of law rules and
15Mayer, "The Trend Towards Delocalisation in the Last 100 Years" in Hunter, Marriott
and Veeder(eds.) The Internationalisation ofInternationalArbitration, (1995), at p. 42
(hereinafterHunter,Marriott and Veeder (eds.) Internationalisation.)
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lack of confidence in national law regimes, a-national principles have become an
alternative choice of law to govern the substantive disputes between the parties to an
international commercial arbitration.
The application of a-national principles as the proper law of contract in international
commercial arbitration was examined in Part Two of this thesis. In accordance with a
number of international arbitration cases examined in this thesis it has been observed
that the application of the general principles of law has been widely used to resolve
disputes arising from state contracts. Also, the new lexmercatoria has frequently been
chosen as the substantive law to govern major international contracts. In addition,
outwith the application of strict laws, arbitrators have been requested to apply the
notion of amiable composition to decide the cases according to their personal sense of
fairness and equity.
However, as the extensive study conducted and reported in Part Three of this thesis
suggests, the difference between the liberal attitudes of the western countries and the
cautious and less liberal attitudes adopted by the newly emerged economic states has
been evident in relation to the same issues in different aspects of arbitration, especially
those concerning the extent of supervisory powers to be exercised by the national
courts. The different levels of supervisory powers exercised by national courts also
affects the issue of the choice of a-national principles as the proper law of the contract.
In fact, despite a world-wide effort in reforming arbitration laws, as outlined in this
thesis a universal acceptance of the application of a-national principles has never been
reached. On the one hand, some jurisdictions take the position that, on the basis of
party autonomy, arbitrators should be permitted to apply the general principles of law,
the new lexmercatoria or act as amiable compositeurs to decide the disputes, provided
the rules applied are not inconsistent with public policy. On the other hand, some
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countries have shown a less favourable attitude towards such an application.
Consequently, the validity of international arbitral awards made on the basis of a-
national principles depends on which countries where recognition or enforcement is
sought. In other words, national courts which do not adopt the notion of a-national
principles have the power to pronounce such awards void, even although such awards
are valid under other jurisdictions.
Following on from the examination of the application of a-national principles in
international arbitral awards, the different attitudes of the English, French, US, Hong
Kong, Chinese, and Taiwanese courts towards the application of a-national principles
were explored in Part Three. The levels of acceptance of the application of a-national
principles in these countries vary. The courts of France, the United States and Hong
Kong have little hesitation in accepting a-national awards made both in their territories
and in foreign countries. In England, while the new lexmercatoria and the general
principles of law in conjunction with a specific national law have eventually been
recognised as a valid choice of law, the concept of amiable composition, which allows
arbitrators to decide the dispute according to their personal sense of fairness, instead
of under strict rules of law, was denied as a valid choice of the proper law until the
enactment of the Arbitration Act 1996. In relation to the developing economic states,
the concept of a-national principles appears to be uncertain in the courts of China and
Taiwan, even though it has been suggested that this concept should be supported from
a theoretical point of view.
Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, the concept of a-national principles exists and is
widely applied in international arbitral awards. As far as the choice of a-national
principles is concerned, as Professor Lalive correctly pointed out that:
"it matters little to the modern commercial arbitrator ... that the principles he
states or relies upon are, or are not, part and parcel of a "complete legal
system". What matters is that an arbitral award, which is based on the lex
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mercatoria or transnational law, is in fact accepted by the parties themselves or,
as the case may be, by national courts, as was the case in the famous Norsolor
arbitration, which recognised the validity of a Geneva award based on such
general principles."16
Nevertheless, the same evolution has not been observed in every country, and
hesitations are perceivable. As for today, there is no unanimous position on this
issue. As a result, a choice of a-national principles can be pronounced void on the
ground that it contradicts the public policy of countries where the application of a-
national principles is not recognised. As a result of this uncertainty, the purpose of
arbitration to provide the parties with an enforceable award will also be frustrated
when an award made on the basis of a-national law principles cannot be recognised or
enforced in the jurisdictions where the concept of a-national principles is not
acknowledged.
Following on from the discussion carried out in Chapter Eleven, it is evident that, no
matter which theory is applied to an arbitration system, unless national courts accept
the idea of truly international arbitration, any decisions made on a basis detached from
national law regimes will be criticised and challenged on the grounds of mandatory
rules and public policy restraints of national courts that exist within the present
arbitration framework. This tension is also observed by Lord Mustill, who stated:
"On the one hand the concept of arbitration as a consensual process, reinforced
by the ideal of transnationalism, leans always against the involvement of the
mechanisms of state through the medium of a municipal court. On the other
side there is the plain fact, palatable or not, that it is only a court possessing
coercive powers which can rescue the arbitration if it is in danger of
foundering, and that the only court which possesses these powers is the
municipal court of an individual state."17
Such diverse attitudes cause uncertainty in arbitral awards, since the application of a-
national principles to determine the merits of the case has become a common practice
16Lalive, "The Internationalisation of International Arbitration: Some Observations" in
Hunter, Marriott and Veeder (eds.) Internationalisation (1995), at p. 58.
^^Coppee-Lavalin v. Ken Ren Chemicals Ltd. [1994] 2 All ER 449, at pp. 459-460.
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in international commercial arbitration. As discussed in Part Two of this thesis, there
is evidence that numerous arbitral awards have been decided on the basis of a-national
principles, such as the general principles of laws, the new lex niercatoria or amiable
composition. Such conflicts between the practice of arbitration and the negative
attitude of some national courts has caused uncertainty over the validity of arbitral
awards and the whole mechanism of international commercial arbitration. Moreover,
unless the national courts of each state accept a-national principles as a valid choice of
the proper law, the application of a-national principles will be attacked on the ground
that it is contrary to mandatory rules or public policy and awards made on that basis
may be set aside or refused recognition or enforcement.
Given this apparent contradiction, does it mean that we have little choice but to wait
for the results of the enforcement of such awards made on the basis of a-national
principles? Or, can we take a positive step to examine whether the existing four
theories illustrating international commercial arbitration are correctly structured in
order to explain such awards in modern international commercial arbitration?
With the belief that the application of a-national principles is one of the keys which
will lead us to truly international commercial arbitration, in this concluding chapter, the
present writer will go beyond the present framework to see whether such a
contradiction between practice and different national courts' attitudes towards the
application of a-national principles can be settled by other means. Before doing so,
whether the application of a-national principles in international arbitral awards satisfies
the expectations of the parties and states will be examined. If it does, based on the
conclusion in the previous chapter that the deficiencies of the four theories cannot
accommodate and provide a satisfactory answer to the conflicts caused by the
application of a-national principles, a more appropriate approach to illustrate the
present framework of international commercial arbitration and the application of a-
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national principles will be suggested. Finally, a more desirable working system will
be recommended.
12.1.3 The application of a-national principles satisfies the
expectations of the parties and states
The issue of whether the application of a-national principles as the proper law of the
contract can satisfy the expectations of the parties and the states will be discussed from
two aspects. First, the issue will be explored by looking into the parties' intention in
having their dispute resolved by means of arbitration. Secondly, from the viewpoint
of states, there will be a discussion of the issue of whether the application of a-national
principles will frustrate the intention of the national judicial systems to have the
caseloads reduced when arbitration is adopted as an alternative dispute settlement
mechanism.
The traditional complicated court procedures have become increasingly undesirable
among business people engaging in international commerce. In contrast, more and
more business people conducting international commerce choose international
commercial arbitration as an alternative dispute settlement mechanism. This may be
due to its more predictable and speedy design, which meets the nature and needs of
international business in a rapidly changing environment. Given the intention of
avoiding complicated court procedures by submitting disputes to arbitration, it is not
surprising to learn that some parties are reluctant to have their arbitration and disputes
governed by national laws, especially when national laws are frequently criticised for
their inadequacy in coping with the disputes arising from complicated international
commerce.
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For instance, in accordance with parties' explicit choice of a-national principles,
arbitrators are required to apply a-national principles to decide the merits of the case,
whereas, in the absence of parties' choice, arbitrators sometimes apply a-national
principles on their own initiative, such as in the TEXACO18 and Norsolor cases.19
As the Governing Working Group of UNIDROIT pointed out: "there is a growing
tendency to permit the parties to choose 'rules of law' other than national laws on
which the arbitrators are to base their decisions."20 With the intention of resolving
disputes outside national law regimes, a-national principles, such as the new lex
mercatoria or amiable composition, have become an alternative choice of the proper
law regulating the disputes arising from international contracts.
As suggested by a number of scholars, a-national principles incorporate the most basic
legal principles and notions which have been absorbed into the various legal systems,
such as bona fides, pacta sunt servanda, force majeure, equity, and so on.21 The
main strength of a-national principles is their flexibility which allows them to change
with the development of international commerce. The flexibility of a-national
principles enables arbitrators to meet the expectations of the parties and apply the
"most up to date" and "economically most efficient" rules to resolve the various
disputes in international commerce.22 For international business people who have lost
confidence in national laws, a-national principles which appear to embody the most
up-to-date international commercial laws seem to satisfy the parties' demands in
having their disputes resolved outside the national law regime.
18Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. / California Asiatic Co. v. Government of the Libyan Arab
Republic, 17 l.L.M. 3 (1978) (Award on the merits, Jan. 19, 1977; R. Depury was the sole
arbitrator).
1 '^The decision of the Court of Appeal is discussed in (1986) XI Y.B.C.A. 484 and the decision
of the Supreme Court of Austria is discussed in (1984) IX Y.B.C.A. 159.
20The GoverningWorking Group of UNIDROIT, Principles ofInternational Commercial Contracts,
(1994), at p. 3 (hereinafter UNIDROIT, Principles.)
21 For a detailed list of principles, see Berger, InternationalEconomicArbitration, Vol. 9 (1993) at
pp. 543-553.
22Ibid. at p. 554.
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Secondly, as discussed in Chapter Eleven, there are two main factors contributing to
the rapid development of international commercial arbitration. One is the demands and
needs of the international business community to have an alternative disputes-
settlement mechanism established. The other is the wish of states to have the caseload
of national courts reduced by encouraging international business people to submit their
international commercial disputes to arbitration. While concluding that a-national
principles are adequate to satisfy the parties' demands to have their disputes resolved
outside the national law regime, a second question is whether such an application
would frustrate the intention of national judicial systems to have heavy caseloads
reduced by adopting arbitration as an alternative dispute-settlement mechanism.
In order to decide this issue, first, we can take advantage of a chart published by the
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC Arbitration).23 In
accordance with the statistics in this chart, the average number of cases filed with the
SCC every year has increased from 15 cases during the 1970s, to 35 cases during the
1980s and then to over 110 cases during the 1990s. From these figures, we can see
that, in the 1990s, the caseload of the SCC has increased ten-fold since the 1970s.
Similar figures in caseload growth have been claimed by other arbitration institutions,
such as the ICC and the CIETAC. As pointed out in Part Two, arbitral awards made
on the basis of a-national principles also contribute to these statistics. While more and
more business people adopt arbitration as their dispute settlement mechanism, fewer
cases will be submitted to courts. In other words, the heavy caseload of national
courts will be reduced.
Secondly, one question which needs to be raised is whether the awards made on the
basis of a-national principles but later submitted to the national courts by an unsatisfied
party will distort the intention to reduce the court's workload. It is submitted here that
23SCC Arbitration: Facts and Figures, published in May 1996.
308
Chapter Twelve: Summary and Development
this will not be the case. Submitting disputes concerning the validity of the final
arbitral awards made on the basis of a-national principles to the national courts only
artificially increases the caseload. In most jurisdictions, the national court judges are
only permitted to examine procedural matters in accordance with limited grounds,
refusing recognition or enforcement of awards, set out in the arbitration laws. The
substance or the merits of the case decided by arbitrators cannot be reviewed by the
national courts. In other words, the national courts can only examine whether
arbitrators have gone beyond their authority in apply a-national principles to the
substantive issues of the case, or whether such an application is against the mandatory
rules or public policy of the courts. Given this argument, the present writer would
suggest that the intention to reduce the court's caseload by means of arbitration will
not be distorted because the more time spent in arbitration the less time will be spent in
court.
Finally, after recognising that the application of a-national principles can satisfy the
parties' demands to have their disputes resolved, and that the awards made on such a
basis will not increase the burdens on the national courts, it would be logical to
conclude that both the needs and expectations of the parties and national judicial
systems will not be distorted by the application of the a-national principles as the
proper law of the contract in international commercial arbitration.
12.1.4 The failure of the existing theories in resolving the conflict
between arbitration practice and reactions of national courts in relation
to the application of a-national principles
In Chapter Eleven, the evaluation of the jurisdictional, contractual, hybrid and
autonomous theories revealed both strengths and weaknesses in the interpretation of
the operation of international commercial arbitration. Generally speaking, all the
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theories fail to provide a satisfactory explanation covering all of the different aspects of
the operation of international commercial arbitration.
The jurisdictional theory provides the most logical explanation on the issue of the
arbitrator's immunity, powers, duties, public policy and the state control over
arbitration. However, it is criticised in respect of its failure to respond to current
developments and the need for a more liberal environment for international commercial
arbitration, especially in terms of the delocalisation theory and the application of a-
national principles as the proper law.
Contrary to the jurisdictional theory, the contractual theory proposes a comprehensive
explanation of the contractual relationship between the parties and the arbitrators.
However, because it overlooks the issues of arbitrability and compulsory arbitration,
the contractual theory fails to observe the fact that an arbitration agreement is not the
only basis on which one can have a valid arbitration. In addition, the contractual
theory fails to provide a satisfactory explanation of the arbitrator's immunity, powers,
duties and the state control of arbitration.
In an effort to reconcile the deficiencies of both the jurisdictional theory and the
contractual theory, the hybrid theory was developed; however, the hybrid theory is
criticised for the inadequacy of the separation of the contractual and jurisdictional
elements and the over-emphasis on the importance of the lex fori. As with the first
three theories, the autonomous theory is also criticised for its idealistic approach and
the lack of a clear framework for the operation of international commercial arbitration.
As to the issue of the application of a-national principles, the autonomous theory
supports unlimited freedom in the choice of substantive law. Nevertheless, with the
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exception of Belgium,24 in reality, no states have granted arbitration total freedom.
Most states set up certain criteria to decide the validity of arbitral awards in order to
safeguard their own judicial interests. For instance, both the contractual theory and
the hybrid theory, on the one hand, uphold the concept of party autonomy which
includes the choice of a-national principles, while on the other hand, they claim that
any choices based on party autonomy cannot contradict the mandatory rules and public
policy of the relevant countries.
In fact, no matter which theory both traditional arbitration countries and newly
developing arbitration countries adopt, it is undeniable that the jurisdictional elements
of arbitration play a significant role at different stages of arbitration procedures. As
outlined above, national courts have the power to examine whether the arbitration
subjected to their jurisdiction meets their standards of fairness and justice. If they fail
to comply with such standards, the courts of the place of arbitration, with the
exception of Belgium,25 may at the party's request set aside the award. Alternatively,
the enforcing courts may refuse to recognise or enforce the awards at the stage of
recognition or enforcement. Such conflict and discord "become apparent and almost
inevitable as soon as the process of international arbitration comes into contact with
national legislation and national courts."26 In other words, despite the parties'
intention to avoid the national court system, the procedures involved in recognition or
enforcement of arbitral awards will submit the awards to the scrutiny of a national
regime27 and, in the case of convention awards, Article V of the New York
Convention.28 In addition, similar criteria of scrutiny are also operated in the
UNCITRAL Model Law countries.
24No appeal on international arbitral awards is allowed if the arbitration is held in Belgium between
non-Belgian nationals.
25The liberal attitude held by the Belgian courts, in fact, creates a loophole for the arbitration
mechanism since a non-Belgian unsatisfied party can go to other countries to challenge the awards.
26Kerr, Concord andConflict in International Arbitration (The Keating Lecture), (1996), at p. 9.
27If the enforcement is sought in a non-signatory country of the New York Convention.
28If the enforcement is sought in a signatory country of the New York Convention.
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The power of national courts to scrutinise the validity of arbitral awards also covers
the issue of the application of a-national principles as the proper law of the contract.
Influenced by the autonomous theory and the idea of liberating arbitration from the
restraints of national laws, some arbitrators believe that national laws are inadequate to
resolve the complicated disputes arising from international trade. As a result, instead
of following the traditional choice of national law as the substantive law, arbitrators
tend to decide disputes between the parties on the basis of a-national principles, either
based on the parties' express choice or the arbitrators' own initiative.
Nevertheless, regardless of how liberal attitude arbitrators have on the subject of
choice of law, an award made on the basis of a-national principles has to be examined
under the relevant national laws, such as the lex loci contractus, the lex fori or the law
of the country where the recognition or enforcement is sought. In accordance with the
different court judgments examined in Part Three,29 it is impractical to deny the fact
that the validity of awards made on the basis of a-national principles will ultimately
depend on whether the laws of the relevant countries allow such an application since
national courts have the power to exercise supervisory control over arbitration held in
their territories and to examine awards submitted to them. If such an application is not
permitted, then the awards may be set aside or rendered unenforceable on the ground
that such an application contradicts the mandatory rules or public policy of that
country.
Under these circumstances, the status of an award made on the basis of a-national
principles is in an uncertain position, since its validity depends on the lex fori and the
law of the country where the winning party seeks recognition or enforcement.
Moreover, the enforcing country will not be known until the winning party
29Chapters Seven, Eight, Nine and Ten.
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commences his action to enforce the award. This situation may indirectly cause
further uncertainty within the mechanism of international commercial arbitration.
While confirming that the validity of awards made on the basis of a-national principles
exists in an uncertain state, since it depends on the lex fori or the law of the country
where the winning party seeks recognition or enforcement, in order to resolve such
conflicts it is necessary to decide whether during the arbitration procedures or at the
stage of recognition or enforcement the supervisory powers of the national courts in
relation to the application of a-national principles have caused unnecessary uncertainty.
In the opinion of the present writer, such uncertainty should never have developed, for
the following reasons. First, by choosing arbitration and a-national principles as the
proper law of the underlying contract, parties' expectations to have their business
disputes resolved outside the national laws regime can be successfully achieved.
Secondly, as pointed out in the last section, the application of a-national principles will
not hinder the state's aim to reduce the workload of national courts, even when the
issue of the validity of such awards are questioned in the courts. Finally, the purpose
of arbitration, as a commercial service, will not be accomplished unless the
expectations of the parties and the aims and interests of states are satisfied.
Accordingly, since the demands of the parties and states can be satisfied, it can be
concluded that the purpose of arbitration to have disputes resolved efficiently will not
be frustrated by the application of a-national principles.
As indicated in Part Two, a-national principles are frequently applied in international
commercial arbitration. However, due to the strong influence of the jurisdictional
elements in arbitration, the application of a-national principles as the proper law of
contract is deadlocked. In other words, despite the practice of deciding the substantive
merits on the basis of a-national principles, the validity of the awards made on that
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basis still depends on whether the countries where the arbitration is held or where
recognition or enforcement is sought recognise and accept such an application. Under
these circumstances, in order to resolve such a conflict, it will be necessary to develop
a new approach which can accommodate the use of a-national principles in the present
arbitration framework.
12.2 Development
12.2.1 A new approach
The aim of this part of the study is to search for a more logical approach which not
only provides a satisfactory answer to various aspects of arbitration, but also
corresponds better with the current developments in international commercial
arbitration, with a special emphasis on the application of a-national principles.
From the discussion above, we have observed that the application of a-national
principles does not appear to cause any damage to the interests of the parties and states
since the aim of the parties to have their disputes resolved by an alternative dispute
settlement mechanism and the states' intention to reduce the caseload in national courts
can both be accommodated. Nevertheless, both the needs and expectations of the
parties and national judicial systems can be distorted because of the different levels of
supervisory powers exercised by national courts. As highlighted in this study, this is
particularly relevant in cases where awards made on the basis of a-national principles
can be overturned by the courts of some jurisdictions where the application of a-
national principles is regarded as illegal or being contrary to public policy.
In view of this disagreement over the application of a-national principles between the
arbitration practice and the judgments of national courts, it will be necessary to see
whether the jurisdictional, contractual, hybrid and autonomous theories which are
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conventionally used to illustrate the present arbitration framework are appropriately
structured and can provide a solution. Nevertheless, as pointed out in Chapter Eleven
and the preceding section of this chapter, none of the theories provide a satisfactory
answer to this conflict which leads to the uncertainty in the arbitration mechanism
generally and in arbitral awards, perhaps it is time for the states to reconsider the
theoretical aspects of arbitration. Instead of arbitration continuing to tangle with the
existing judicial systems, it is more logical for the states to consider a new approach
which not only offers the states a chance to keep pace with the development of
international commercial arbitration but also eliminates the blind spots caused by the
application of the existing four theories.
In the view of the present writer, as the hybrid theory correctly points out,
international commercial arbitration is a mechanism containing both contractual and
jurisdictional elements. Different aspects of arbitration, such as the triangular
relationship between parties, arbitrators and states, can only be satisfactorily explained
by a theory that comprises both contractual and jurisdictional elements. However, the
present writer disagrees with the argument made by the proponents of the hybrid
theory that an arbitration agreement between the parties is the basis of arbitration, and
holds the view that the jurisdictional elements constitute the most fundamental
elements of international commercial arbitration. In other words, the contractual
elements of arbitration only have a role to play within the limits of the jurisdictional
elements, which are more compelling as the foundation of the arbitration framework.
The details of this new approach will be suggested in the following paragraphs.
Recognising the supervisory powers ofstates
In accordance with the jurisdictional elements, the state's supervisory and controlling
powers are recognised under the new approach. Primarily, a strong indication of the
jurisdictional elements of arbitration can also be observed in the fact that international
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commercial arbitration operates in different countries. As discussed above, the
expectations of business people to have an alternative commercial dispute-settlement
mechanism and the support of states are the main factors in the development of
international commercial arbitration. Perceiving arbitration as a possible method to
relieve the heavy caseload of national courts and to respond to the demands for an
alternative mechanism from the international commercial community, states decide to
support arbitration as an alternative means to settle disputes between the parties.
Furthermore, states have powers to regulate any activities, including arbitration,
conducted within their boundaries. For instance, in relation to the issue of
arbitrability, parties are only permitted to submit their disputes to arbitration to the
extent the states allow. The states have power to control the duties and powers of
arbitrators and how the arbitral procedures should be carried out. Furthermore,
national courts have power to review the validity of the arbitral awards made or which
seek recognition or enforcement in their jurisdiction.
The existence ofan arbitration agreement should be defined as one ofthe conditions
which may have to be fulfilled
As well as the other theories, party autonomy is also recognised under this new
approach. Within the limits imposed by the states, the parties have freedom to decide
for themselves how the arbitration should be carried out. As far as the status of
arbitration agreements is concerned, the present writer is in partial agreement with the
contractual elements suggested in the four theories discussed above. It is not disputed
here that a valid arbitration agreement is a contract between parties wishing to have
their disputes resolved by means of arbitration.
However, it is the present writer's firm belief that, instead of being interpreted as the
origin of an arbitration as the four conventional theories suggest, an arbitration
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agreement should be defined as merely one of the conditions which may have to be
fulfilled to start arbitration procedures. This is because the jurisdictional power of
states is the origin of arbitration. Without endorsement from states, the validity of an
arbitration agreement is questionable. This point has been extensively explored in the
discussion on the issues of arbitrability and compulsory arbitration in Chapter
Eleven.30
Responding to the demandsfor truly international commercial arbitration
With the establishment of ajudicial framework for arbitration, the third step is to look
at the current development of international commercial arbitration. In general,
resolving disputes outside the national court system and obtaining an enforceable
arbitral award are the main aims of parties when they choose arbitration as an
alternative dispute-settlement mechanism. In order to obtain a stake in the market that
has developed in international commercial arbitration, states must respond to the
demands of the customers. In other words, states should not only consistently remind
themselves of the purpose of arbitration but also be aware of the development in the
arbitration industry.
The current development in arbitration indicates an increasing demand for truly
international commercial arbitration.31 This demand can be observed from various
aspects, such as the recent amendments in legislation, the application of a-national
principles in international arbitral awards and the enactment of international arbitration
rules. For instance, in order to compete with other countries in the arbitration market,
a number of countries, such as France, England, Hong Kong, China and Taiwan,
have loosened their controls over arbitration through the amendment of their arbitration
laws in order to meet the needs of international commerce and investment. These
30See Chapter Eleven.
31Laurence, "International Ambition and National Restraints in ICC Arbitration", (1985) 1(1)
Arbitration Int. 49, at p. 70; also see UNIDROIT, Principles, (1994), Preamble; and Kerr, Concord
and Conflict in International Arbitration (The Keating Lecture), (1996).
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changes correspond with Dr. Wetter's observation that a trend of globalisation has
already been in process, as he stated:
"Russia and the many emerging new nations which forms parts of the former
USSR, judging from admittedly scant available indications, seem to continue
to adhere to a policy of providing for international arbitral resolution of
contractual dispute, as does China; it is believed that Japan is moving slowly in
the same direction. Assuming that the business and legal community attitudes
favouring the international arbitral process continue to prevail in the US and
the traditional arbitral jurisdictions in Europe as well as the Eastern European
States and that the nations in the current economic growth areas in South-East
Asia will follow the same course, it is fairly safe to predict that the next decade
will bring increasing globalisation."32
Apart from the amendments of national legislation, a liberal attitude is also observed in
practice where the new lexmercatoria or amiable composition have been applied in
international arbitration.33 The creation of a group of rules on international
commercial arbitration by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(the UNCITRAL) to harmonise and unify the law of international arbitration34 is
another attempt to eliminate the barriers to arbitration caused by the different levels of
state controls and arbitration laws.
As well as the UNCITRAL Model law, the Governing Working Group of UNIDROIT
has produced general rules for international commercial contracts, the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts. In the preamble of the Principles, it
is suggested that the principles should be one of the sources when a-national
principles, such as the general principles of law, the new lexmercatoria or amiable
composition are chosen to decide the substance of the disputes. The application of the
principles has been suggested in a survey conducted by the UNIDROIT Secretariat in
September 1996. The survey indicates that 19.95% of the people replying to the
32Wetter, 'The Internationalisation of International Arbitration: Looking Ahead to the
NextTen Years" in Hunter, Marriott and Veeder(eds.)Internationalisation, (1995), at p.
88.
33See Chapters Three, Four and Five.
34UNCITRAL adopted Arbitration Rules in 1976, Conciliation Rules in 1980, the Guideline for
Administering Arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in 1982 and Article 28 (1) of the
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration in 1985.
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questionnaires have experience in applying the UNIDROIT Principles in arbitration
proceedings.35
Support for international commercial arbitration can also be noted with "a worldwide
tendency to limit the extent of judicial intervention in respect of arbitration, both during
its course and after the making of an award, with a view to preserving the integrity of
the arbitral process and the finality of the arbitral award."36 Supporting evidence of
this idea can be observed in legislations and in a number of cases. In respect of
legislation, this idea has been embodied in the Swiss International Concordat, which
only provides review for violation of public policy and the possibility of opting out of
this limited review by means of an "exclusion agreement".37 As well as this
development in Switzerland, Belgium provides for no judicial review at all when no
Belgian citizens are involved.
In England, Steyn J. expressed his support for arbitration in the case of K/S A/S Bill
Biakh v. Hyundai Co.,38 where the disputes arose from contracts for the construction
of two vessels in Korea for Norwegian purchasers. He stated:
"In the interests of expedition and finality of arbitration proceedings, it is of the
first importance that judicial intrusion in the arbitral process should be kept to a
minimum. A judicial power to correct during the course of the reference
procedural rulings of an arbitrator which are within his jurisdiction is unknown
in advanced arbitration systems, ... and the creation of such a power by
judicial precedent in this case would constitute a most serious reproach to the
ability of our system of arbitration to serve the needs of users of the arbitral
process.39
35Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles in Practice: The Experience ofthe First Two Years, (1997), at
p. 35.
36Murray, "Letting Arbiters Get On with the Job", (1997) SLT 64, at pp. 65-66.
37Article 190(2) of PIL.
38K/S AJS Bill Biakh v. Hyundai Co. [1988] 1 LI L R 187.
39Ibid, at p. 189.
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A similar attitude was also noted in the judgment delivered by Lord Mustill in the Ken
Ren case.40 Lord Mustill dismissed the application for security for costs and believed
that the foreign parties to a contract governed by a foreign law and entirely performed
abroad had, by choosing an ICC arbitration, given an unmistakable signal of their
intentions.41 As he explained:
"they (the parties) have signified that although the arbitration must perforce, be
physically located somewhere, it is the invariable framework of the ICC rather
than the diverse local laws and practices which is to form the context within
which the dispute is resolved. I would go further, and assert that the choice of
ICC arbitration is an indication that the parties are looking for a relationship
which particular national courts which is less closely coupled than would
otherwise be the case."42
Turning to Scotland, a recent judgment43 of the Lord President (Hope) also delivered
the similar message, as he said:
"The guiding principle, ever since Regulation 25 of the Article of Regulation
concerning the Session, dated 29 April 1695, was enacted three hundred years
ago, is that the Court should detach itself as far as possible from the process of
arbitration before a private arbiter. Throughout the development of the law of
arbitration during the past three centuries the Court has been careful to insist
that questions of fact and law and matters of procedure are for the arbiter alone
and not for the Court. The aim has been to secure for the Arbiter's award
under Scots law the conclusive finality which it was the object of the parties to
confer upon it when they agreed in their contract to this procedure.44
If Arbiters are to have the confidence which they require to simplify and
accelerate procedure in such cases, they ought not to be exposed to the risk of
challenge to their decisions by means of the cumbersome and time-consuming
procedure of a stated case."45
States' supervisory powers shall be transferred to a well-designed supranational body
40Coppee-Lavalin v. Ken Ren Chemicals Ltd. [1994] 2 All ER 449. However, this was a minority
judgment.
4lIbid. at p. 468.
42Ibid. at p. 469.
4^ERDC Construction Limited v. H. M. Love & Company and others Court of Session, 26 July,
1996 (1997) SLT 175.
44lbid. at p. 10.
4 4Ibid. at p. 11.
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Although the demand for a truly international commercial arbitration has been noticed,
the totally delocalised Belgian arbitration reform does not seem to receive full support
from the arbitration community. As one commentator noted:
"It has been rightly criticised, by pointing out that the victim of a serious
irregularity has no opportunity to challenge the defective award, and is
required, when he is the defendant, to defend against enforcement in every
country in which he has substantial assets. The situation worsens when the
victim of the irregularity is the claimant: the award which unjustly denies his
claim stands forever, unless the claimant commences litigation and denies the
award's resjudicata effect when the defendant raises it as an exception."46
To remedy this defect, while stressing the jurisdictional elements of arbitration, in this
new approach, the present writer would propose going one step further than the
jurisdictional theory. That is, to have an ideal arbitration framework which
corresponds with the fast development of arbitration and the existing level of judicial
intervention, states must be prepared to give away the supervisory powers over
arbitration to a well-designed supranational body while allowing the parties to submit
their commercial disputes to a private judge, that is arbitrator.
On the first level of this new approach, states would recognise arbitration as a valid
means of settling commercial disputes between parties outside of national court
system. Secondly, recognising the autonomous jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals, states
would uphold the binding force of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards;
moreover, they would provide any necessary supportive measures the arbitrators may
need during the arbitration procedure. Thirdly, to encourage more professionals to be
arbitrators, states should offer them similar protections to those enjoyed by judges.
This would include immunity and the power to conduct arbitration efficiently. Finally,
on the ground of public policy, some duties should be imposed upon arbitrators, such
46Mayer, "The Trend Towards Delocalisation in the Last 100 Years" in Hunter, Marriott
andVeeder(eds.) Internationalisation, (1995), at p. 45.
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as due diligence and acting independently and impartially during arbitration
procedures.
Furthermore, following the liberal trend observed in practice and recent national and
international legislation and responding to the demands for a truly international
arbitration framework, it is the present writer's opinion that it would be logical for
states to convert their supervisory role to a supporting role by shifting the supervisory
powers to a well-organised international establishment, which will be designed to have
exclusive jurisdiction over arbitration in order to control the legality of arbitration
procedures and arbitral awards. Ideally, after states have submitted their supervisory
powers over arbitration to this supranational establishment, international commercial
arbitration can be truly international and can be operated under the same rules
throughout the trading world. Furthermore, within the limits of the international
mandatory rules and public policy set by this institution, the parties' decision to submit
their disputes to arbitration should be regarded as a contract which must be enforced.
Within this new framework, the present writer envisages that states shall ensure that
all necessary supportive measures, such as interim measures of relief and compelling
the attendance of witnesses, are quickly available during the arbitration procedures.
Regarding disputes over the validity of arbitral awards, they shall be determined by
this supranational establishment to ensure that no procedural irregularities occur during
the proceedings. After the decisions on enforceability of arbitral awards have been
handed down by this establishment, states shall have an obligation and common
understanding to execute such decisions regarding persons and property within their
territories.
The suggestion on validity of arbitral awards, to certain extent, corresponds with
Judge Howard Holtzmann and Judge Stephen Schwebel's proposal for a "new
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International Court of Arbitral Awards",47 which is welcomed by Nariman,48
Hunter,49 H.E. Judge Ajibola,50 and Professor van Houtte.51 In their proposal, they
proposed to create a new International Court of Arbitral Awards which is designed to
remove the risks inherent in the present regime of the New York Convention by taking
the place of municipal courts in resolving disputes concerning the enforceability of
international commercial arbitral awards. Judge Holtzmann suggested that, by means
of an international convention, "applications to set aside or enforce awards would be
within the sole jurisdiction of the new international court,"52 consequently, "execution
of judgments of the new international court will not be subject to interference or delay
by municipal courts."53 Accordingly, each state that adheres to the new convention
would have "their appropriate ministerial officials promptly execute judgments, or
orders, of the new international court, just as those officials now execute decisions of
the State's municipal courts."54 If states failed to comply with their convention
obligations, penalties will be imposed upon them by the international court.55
Although the scope of jurisdiction defined in Judge Holtzmann and Judge Schwebel's
proposal differs from the new approach suggested by the present writer; the former
invokes exclusive jurisdiction only over the questions of enforceability of arbitral
47H.E. Judge Howard M. Holtzmaiui "A Task for the 21 Century: Creating a New International Court
for Resolving Disputes on Enforceability of Arbitral Awards", in Hunter, Marriott and Veeder (eds.)
Internationalisation, (1995), 109-114; H.E. Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, "The Creation and Operation
of an International Court of Arbitral Awards", in Hunter, Marriott and Veeder (eds.)
Internationalisation, (1995), 115-123.
48Nariman, F.S. "Intervention" in Hunter, Marriott and Veeder (eds.) Internationalisation,
(1995), at pp. 155-156.
49Hunter, Martin, "Intervention" in Hunter, Marriott and Veeder (eds.)
Internationalisation, (1995), at pp. 157-158.
50H.E. Judge Ajibola, "Intervention" in Hunter, Marriott and Veeder (eds.)
Internationalisation, (1995), at pp. 159-160.
5 Nan Houtte, "Intervention" in The InternationalisationofInternationalArbitration,
(1995), at pp. 161-163.
52H.E. Judge Howard M. Holtzmann "A Task for the 21 Century: Creating a New International Court
for Resolving Disputes on Enforceability of Arbitral Awards", in The Internationalisation of
InternationalArbitration, (1995), 109-114, at p. 112.
53Ibid, at p. 113.
54Ibid.
55Hunter, Martin, "Intervention" in Hunter, Marriott and Veeder {eds.) Internationalisation, (1995), at
pp. 157-158, at p. 157.
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awards, whereas the latter proposes not only exclusive jurisdiction over arbitration
mechanism but also separation of arbitration and national court system, the present
writer is in a total agreement with Judge Holtzmann and Judge Schwebel that such
changes would facilitate international contract negotiations by removing a difficulty the
parlies often face in reaching agreement on the choice of the place of arbitration of any
future disputes,56 furthermore:
"Such a court would promote uniform standards and predictability. Further, a
new court would be better positioned to avoid the delays that are often
experienced in crowded municipal courts where it can take years to reach a
final judgment. And most significantly, such a court would ... facilitate
international trade and investment by reducing the risks and uncertainties that
business people fear when they must submit their affairs to the court of a
foreign country."57
Allowing the application ofa-nationalprinciples
As outlined above, the concept of party autonomy is adopted in this new approach.
With respect to choice of law, parties have freedom to choose any national laws they
desire to govern their disputes. Besides the choice of national laws, parties also have
freedom to choose a-national principles as the proper law of their contract. Without
any express choice, a-national principles may be applied to the merits of the dispute in
order to fill the gap. This proposal is not a radical one, since the business and legal
community of the United States and the traditional arbitral jurisdictions in Europe
already follow the practice of applying a-national principles in cases involving
international commercial arbitration. Furthermore, the research has also shown that
the nations in the current economic growth areas in China and South-East Asia are
moving slowly in the same direction.
56H.E. Judge Howard M. Holtzmann "A Task for the 21 Century: Creating a New International Court
for Resolving Disputes on Enforceability of Arbitral Awards", in Hunter, Marriott and Veeder (eds.)
Internationalisation, (1995), 109-114, at p. 112.
57Ibid. at p. 114.
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For instance, recently, a friendly attitude towards the application of a-national
principles was observed in the Channel Tunnel case in England,58 where Lord Mustill
did not explicitly object to the application of a-national principles contained in clause
67 of the contract between the parties. As he indicated:
"I have no doubt that the dispute-resolution mechanisms of clause 67 were the
subject of careful thought and negotiation. The parties chose an indeterminate
'law' to govern their substantive rights; an elaborate process for ascertaining
those rights; and a location for that process outside the territories of the
participants. This conspicuously neutral, 'anational' and extra judicial
structure may well have been the right choice for the special needs of the
Channel Tunnel venture"59
With the endorsement by states of this new approach and of the status of a-national
principles, the application of a-national principles to resolve the substantive disputes of
the contract will be adopted world-wide. Based on this acceptance, the awards made
under the supervision of this supra-national controlling body will be recognised and
enforced world-wide.
However, one thing which needs to be borne in mind is that a number of states treat a-
national principles as suspicious unknown norms because the content of the rules has
never been specified. Therefore, the present writer does not deny that there may be
many obstacles ahead for such an idea. This idea will not be fulfilled in the short
term, nor will the elimination of the hostile attitude of states towards a-national
principles be an easy task. In order to gain the total confidence of the states and
achieve an absolute separation of arbitration from the present national judicial
framework, it will be necessary to consider the possibility of developing well designed
a-national principles to regulate international commercial activities (as suggested by the
proponents of the autonomous theory).
58Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. v. Balfour Beatty Ltd. [1993] AC 334, 363; [1993] 2 WLR 262, 291.
59Ibid, at p. 291.
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Regarding the unification process of a-national principles, as Mr. Graveson correctly
pointed out that "What in substance is being unified is not law but various functions,
purposes or policies and that law, as a secondary or auxiliary science, plays its
essential and indispensable part in carrying out those policies on which unification has
been agreed",60 the present writer believes that a careful preparation on a comparative
basis of legal principles is the key to achieve such a task. Fortunately, for
international business people involved in the arbitration industry, the creation of the
UN1DROIT Principles of International CommercialContracts provides clear guidance
for the parties who have agreed to have their contracts governed by a-national
principles. As expressed in the Preamble of the Principles, the seven chapters set out
in the Principles "may be applied when the parties have agreed that their contract be
governed by 'general principles of law', the 'lexmercatoria' or the like,"61 since the
principles are common to existing national legal systems and are adapted to the special
requirements of international commercial transactions.62 A reference to the Principles,
a systematic and well-defined set of rules, can avoid, or at least considerably reduce,
the uncertainty accompanying the use of a-national principles.63
12.2.2 Concerns in regard to the new approach
Throughout the development of arbitration over the past two centuries, the regulation
of international commercial arbitration has been left entirely to national jurisdictions.
Nowadays, however, with the development of travel, communications and the
increasing complexity of international trade and commerce, domestically cultivated
arbitration laws have shown their deficiencies in the regulation of international
commercial arbitration. Perhaps it is time for us to stop pretending that the present
60Graveson, R.H., One Law - On Jurisprudence and the Unification of J .aw Vol. II
(1977) at p. 215.
61UNIDROIT, Principles, (1994), Preamble.
62UNIDROIT, Principles, (1994), at p. 3.
63Ibid. at p. 4.
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arbitration framework is completely satisfactory and turning a blind eye to the
uncertainty and conflict that present exists. It is the present writer's firm belief that
there is a need for an effective international regime that will not only unify the laws
regulating international arbitration but also develop appropriate international rules for
international commercial arbitration.
The new approach suggested in the last section has the aim of reconciling the different
attitudes of states towards the many aspects of arbitration, with a special emphasis on
the application of a-national principles as the proper law. It is inspired by the demand
for a truly international commercial arbitration that has not, as yet, been discussed or
accepted by any country. Nevertheless, as with most theories, there might be certain
concerns with the new framework of international commercial arbitration outlined
above. Criticisms may include idealism, the potential hostility of states, practicality,
time scale and problems with diversity of culture. It is vital to meet head-on
unjustified criticism to avoid it clouding the opportunity of developing a new
approach.
Is the new approach too idealistic?
As with the autonomous theory, one of the concerns about the new approach is the
idealistic character of the framework. Nevertheless, in the present writer's opinion,
the criticisms of over idealism directed at the autonomous theory do not apply to the
suggested new framework. Unlike the autonomous theory, which believes that the
origin of arbitration is a contract, the new framework suggests that arbitration is based
on jurisdictional elements. In fact, the new framework is neither against the lex fori
nor disputes the state's supervisory power over arbitration procedures and arbitral
awards. On the contrary, the new approach agrees with the significance of the
jurisdictional elements of arbitration. One point distinguishing the new approach from
the autonomous theory is its plea to states to submit their supervisory power to a well-
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designed independent controlling body in order to facilitate a truly international
arbitration framework. Therefore, the issue of idealism over alleged ignorance of the
state's supervisory power does not apply to the new approach.
Furthermore, as discussed in the previous section, the new approach suggested by the
present writer corresponds with Judge Holtzmann and Judge Schwebel's proposal of
internationalisation of international commercial arbitration. Therefore, aiming to
resolve the existing issues of arbitration and achieve "a truly universal system of
international commercial justice",64 the new approach which reflects the expectation
and need of the arbitration community shall not be criticised as idealistic.
Potential resistance ofstates
The greatest threat to the opportunities presented by the new approach is the issue of
whether states are willing to submit their existing powers to a central body. In this
new framework, voluntary submission is the key to success, since this approach
cannot get off the ground without the co-operation of the states. In order to avoid
hostility, states have to be made aware of the needs and benefits of a truly international
arbitration framework in the international commercial community.
An immediate question arising is how states can be persuaded to give up the
supervisory powers over arbitration. Two steps can be undertaken. The first step is
to persuade states that a total change of the present arbitration framework appears to be
necessary. Secondly, states will have to be convinced that it is in their interests to
adopt the new approach.
64H.E. Judge Howard M. Holtzmann "A Task for the 21 Century: Creating a New International Court
for Resolving Disputes on Enforceability of Arbitral Awards", in Hunter, Marriott and Veeder (eds.)
Internationalisation, (1995), 109-114, at p. 110.
328
Chapter Twelve: Summary and Development
In relation to the first step, the need for a total change of the present arbitration
framework can be seen, on the one hand, from the deficiencies of the four theories in
explaining the various aspects of arbitration, and on the other hand, from the appeal
for a truly international commercial arbitration revealed in recent national legislative
changes. While competing for the arbitration market and attempting to satisfy the
demands of the international business community and the interests of states, many
countries have followed a liberal trend which invokes the idea of internationalised
arbitration to revise their arbitration laws. The intention to liberate and internationalise
arbitration is evident, since no nation would knowingly enact legislation which would
be detrimental to its own interests or to the interests of its nationals.
Another piece of supportive evidence of the need for a truly international commercial
arbitration is the increasing application of a-national principles. The deficiencies of the
four conventional theories become more obvious when they fail to explain the conflict
between such applications and the state's jurisdictional power. In these
circumstances, instead of staying in the present framework, it is in the state's interests
to consider adopting a new approach which can provide a satisfactory solution to this
conflict. In addition, in accordance with the current developments in relaxing
arbitration legislation, delocalising arbitration and application of a-national principles
as the substantive laws, a trend towards a truly international commercial arbitration has
been obvious in the arbitration industry and states. It would be in the state's best
interests to recognise such a trend as early as possible and reduce the restraints to a
minimum level, and eventually to eliminate the excessive supervisory powers. By
doing this they would achieve a leading role in designing the new arbitration
framework and a reputation as a favourable place for arbitration. Once their reputation
has been established, it will be easier for such states to gain leading positions in their
regions; as a result, they may gain an advantage by founding regional headquarters of
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arbitration centres. Furthermore, with this advantage, states may produce more
revenue receipts.
Secondly, should we prove successful in persuading states that it is in their best
interests to give up their supervisory powers, the next task is to identify what kind of
mechanism should be substituted for the existing national framework and will be
accepted by the practitioners and academics. After studying the criticisms of the
theories discussed in the last chapter, in the opinion of the present writer the answer
might lie in having a well-designed supervisory body which would be responsible for
regulating both the procedural and the substantive aspects of arbitration. The existence
of a supra-national controlling body can not only avoid conflicting decisions among
different states but can also be identified as the exclusive forum for challenge.
Ideally, this organisation would be established under the supervision of an
independent body which has an international role, such as the United Nations
Economic and Social Council or the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law. The main remit of this body would be to create a well designed arbitration
framework to convince the states to submit their supervisory powers to the
organisation. Under this institution, different branches would also be founded on a
regional basis. In order to achieve the goal of truly international commercial
arbitration, instead of creating new sets of rules, based on the regions, the institutions
would co-ordinate, harmonise and unify the existing national and international
arbitration laws to regulate the issues arising from arbitration and international trade.
Hopefully, with the realisation of the need for a truly international arbitration
framework and the persuasion of a well designed central institution the states can be
convinced that it is in their best interests to take part in organising and developing the
new framework.
330
Chapter Twelve: Summary and Development
With the creation of this supra-national body, the interpretation of a-national principles
will also be unified. The present situation, where laws are interpreted differently in
each state, will be dramatically improved. Hopefully, with every effort made to create
a trustworthy and effective arbitration framework, the states would be willing to
submit their powers to this supervisory organisation.
When states transfer their supervisory powers to this body, international commercial
arbitration would be completely separated from the national judicial systems.
However, this does not mean that states simply pass the responsibility to the
organisation and then stand by and make no further contribution themselves. As
emphasised in the previous chapter, arbitration will be impractical without the support
and co-operation of the states. Therefore, according to this framework, states will
play a significant supporting role as enforcing bodies. Furthermore, under the new
approach, the states would enforce valid awards made under the supervision of the
central body which would be established with the states' support.
Achieving unification of law
Certainty of legal relations is an essential element in the commercial world, as
elsewhere. However, within the present arbitration framework, the validity of arbitral
awards exists in an uncertain position which undoubtedly results from the differences
in municipal laws. Such uncertainty has deterred the development of both
international commercial arbitration and international commerce. Consequently, in
order to escape from the restrictions of municipal law, a growing trend of unifying
international commercial practice with rules of law has been observed in the field of
international commerce. Three main reasons have been highlighted by a commentator,
they are:
"1. Great differences in the various legal systems and national laws are, as
such, a factor unfavourable to the existence of an international market.
2. Municipal laws are becoming inadequate for the problems of international
law.
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3. The Municipal courts which apply municipal systems of law are not suited
to satisfy the needs of international business."65
In order to resolve the problems arising from the lack of reliable and uniform
regulation in the arbitration mechanism, both academics and practitioners will need to
invoke the idea of the unification of law in order to overcome the conflicts created by
the divergence of national laws. In relation to the laws applying to international
commercial arbitration, efforts have been made to unify both procedural and
substantive rules of law. The unification of the procedural rules of law can be seen in
the enactment of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the UNCITRAL Model Law and
the New York Convention. The subject of substantive rules of law has been mainly
explored in the ICC's INCOTERMS, the Uniform Customs and Practice for
Documentary Credits, the United Nations (Vienna) Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale ofGoods" ("CISG") and the UNIDROITPrinciples ofInternational
Commercial Contracts which incorporate the customary law merchant and the practice
applied in international commerce.
As far as the procedural rules that would regulate arbitration operated under the
supervision of the supra-national controlling body are concerned, under the new
approach, instead of adding more sets of new rules to the market this supra-national
body could adopt the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or the Model Law as the
procedural law which will be applied to arbitration conducted under its supervision.
With respect to the issue of a-national principles which is examined in this thesis,
where no express choice is made, the supra-national body would co-ordinate the
existing sources which incorporate the customary law merchant and the practice
65Goldstajn, "International Conventions and Standard Contracts as Means of Escaping from the
Application of Municipal Law", in Schmitthoff, (ed.) The Sources ofthe Law ofInternational Trade -
with Special Reference to East - West Trade, (1964), at pp. 111-112.
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applied in international commerce, such as the ICC's 1NCOTERMS, the Uniform
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, the "CISG" and the UNIDROIT
Principles ofInternational Commercial Contracts. Then, the international legislators
from the suggested supra-national body would produce unified substantive rules of
law by studying all the unified rules which have been promulgated by the different
institutions.
Among the unified rules mentioned above, the UNIDROIT Principles can be a
valuable source to be taken into account in defining the contents of a-national
principles as they are designed to be applied "when the parties have agreed that their
contract be governed by general principles of law, the lexmercatoria or the like."66
Also the flexibility of a-national principles in coping with changing circumstances in
the future can also be ensured under the UNIDROIT Principles, as it is stated that
while ensuring fairness in international commercial relations:
"The objective of the UNIDROIT Principles is to establish a balanced set of
rules designed for use throughout the world irrespective of the legal traditions
and the economic and political conditions of the countries in which they are to
be applied ... [the UNIDROIT Principles] are sufficiently flexible to take
account of the constantly changing circumstances brought about by the
technological and economic developments affecting cross border trade
practice"67
At last, while developing the concept of a-national principles within this new
framework, one thing that needs to be borne in mind is that such transnational
commercial norms can only be properly and effectively applied by a truly transnational
judicial control mechanism to ensure the unified interpretation of the rules. This is
also observed by Professor Bonell, who said that "As regards the interpretation and
application of the uniform law, it should be borne in mind that in the absence of a
66The Preamble of the UNIDROITPrinciples ofInternational Commercial Contract.
67UNIDROIT - International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Principles of International
Commercial Contracts (Rome 1994) at viii. At Bonell, M. J., "The UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts: Why? What? How?" 69 Tul.L.Rev. 1121 (1995), at p. 1134.
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supranational organ capable of ensuring its uniform interpretation there is always the
risk that it will be interpreted differently in each state."68
Therefore, the present writer would propose a further suggestion that, apart from
redefining the arbitration mechanism, the supra-national controlling body is also
designed to produce uniform a-national principles on arbitration and international
commerce in order to ensure to the greatest possible extent that both procedural and
substantive rules are applied in a uniform manner. Moreover, this controlling body
shall also hold regular consultations to keep continuous review of interpretation of a-
national principles which will be always open to expansion and amendment in order to
keep pace with the globalisation of international commerce.
Regional unification as a means ofinternational integration
After building up the basic framework, the immediate question is how we can create a
truly international arbitration mechanism and have every arbitration held in different
locations of the world governed by the same set of rules, both procedural and
substantive? A comparative study which provides a systematically analysis on the
different national arbitration and commercial laws may lead us the answer.
Nevertheless, an over-ambitious study on a world-wide scale may frustrate the
implementation of the new approach due to the involvement of a large number of states
and possible complications that may be created as a result.
In order to avoid frustrating the purpose of the new approach, regional unification
would be a means of achieving a world-wide integration. We could consider the
possibility of conducting unification on a regional basis among a small number of
states, such as the movement in Europe. With a smaller number of states involved
68Bonell, M.J., "International Uniform Law in Practice - OrWhere the Real Trouble
Begins" 38 Am.J.Comp.L. 865 (1990), at p. 867.
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which share similar cultures, backgrounds and interests, fewer difficulties may be
encountered during the unification process. Through a comparative study, the goal of
regional unification of the arbitration mechanism, arbitration law and international
commercial law will be achieved. After collecting the arbitration and commercial laws
codified in the different regions, the same process can be applied to create a truly
international arbitration and commercial law on a world-wide scale in the future. For
instance, ideally, one supervisory body should be established in each region and this
supervisory body will report its progress to the supra-national controlling body.
To sum up, with the giving up of the supervisory powers by the states and the creation
of truly international arbitration and commercial laws, international commercial
arbitration would be supervised by the same central organisation, conducted under the
same procedural rules, resolved by the unified substantive law and, finally,
enforceable in every country of the world. If this suggested new approach and
framework can be accepted and carried out step-by-step through co-operation between
the states and practitioners, not only will the notion of a-national principles have a
chance to flourish, but also the dream of truly international commercial arbitration will
be achievable in a reasonable length of time.
In fact, as pointed by Professor Goldstajn, regional unification is already in progress
and has been based on very practical needs,69 such as the achievement of the
European Economic Community, the European Free Trade Association and the efforts
of the League of Arab States,70 the United States of America,71 Canada,72 and so on.
Economic integration and the reform of municipal laws were the objectives of this
movement. It is evident that large-scale modifications in municipal laws have also
69Goldstajn, "International Conventions and Standard Contracts as Means of Escaping from the
Application of Municipal Law", in Schmitthoff, The Sources of the Law of International Trade - with
Special Reference to East - West Trade, (1964), at pp. 114-115.
70Mustafa, Draft of Unification of Laws of the League of Arab States, UNIDROIT, Year Book, 1958.
7 1Dezendrof, Uniform Laws in the US, UNIDROIT, Year Book 1958.
72UNIDROIT, Year Book 1957.
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been carried out, such as the European Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration73 and the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Convention.74 Learning
from such experience, with effort from each state and region a new set of arbitration
rules and commercial laws which take account of the differences in the arbitration and
commercial laws of the particular region can be formulated.
Practicalityofthis new approach -financial and temporal implications
The final concern with the suggested framework is the issue of practicality. The
financial implications and the time factor in the implementation of a truly international
arbitration framework will be important. In fact, in proposing this new approach, due
to the number of parties and volume of work involved the present writer does not
expect this goal to be achieved overnight. Instead, because the success of this new
framework depends on the co-operation of states, the present writer believes that it
will need a great length of time and a tremendous amount of effort and resources to
complete this task. With these foreseeable difficulties which need to be overcome, it
might be asked whether it is worthwhile spending this amount of money and time
implementing this project. After reviewing the uncertainty of arbitration and arbitral
awards caused by the different restrictions in municipal laws, the present writer is
convinced that it is worthy of support.
The approach proposed is a reaction to the deficiencies of the four theories examined
in the previous chapter and the conflict between arbitration practice and the restrictions
imposed by municipal laws. The consequences of the conflict between the practice of
arbitration and the attitudes of national courts have caused uncertainty for the operation
of arbitration and the validity of arbitral awards. Because of the uncertainty caused by
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arbitration laws, but also parties will have to spend a great amount of money to engage
lawyers and experts to deal with such complications; in any case, they may risk a
finding that the arbitral awards are invalid if the awards are contrary to the public
policy and mandatory rules of the relevant countries.
The need to invest time and energy to develop the unification of the arbitration
mechanism and arbitration laws is obvious. The UNCITRAL, established in 1966
with the object of harmonising and unifying the law of international trade, took ten
years (1966-1976) to produce the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and nine years
(1977-1985) to adopt the Model law on International Commercial Arbitration. Also,
fifteen years (1980-1995) were invested to produce the UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts, which was created to remedy the deficiencies
encountered in international trade law. Moreover, it has taken the New York
Convention almost four decades, from its formation in 1966 to 1996, to have 114
states ratify that Convention.
All these prove that harmonising and unifying the law of arbitration, international trade
and the arbitration mechanism will be a large-scale operation, both in terms of finance
and time scale. However, this long process has its merits. The result of this long
process should produce a unification of arbitration systems and arbitration laws which
will reduce the uncertainty suffered at present by parities to a minimum level, or even
eliminate them completely; as a result, both the time and money of international
business people will be saved in the long term. Hence, the practicality of this new
approach cannot be denied.
In conclusion, when the states are ready to transfer their supervisory powers to a
supra-national controlling body, when this controlling body can successfully provide
sufficient independent machinery and facilities to conduct arbitration proceedings, and
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when it develops both procedural and substantive rules to regulate the whole of the
arbitration operation without any connection to states, then the truly international
character of international commercial arbitration will have been recognised and adopted
by domestic legal systems to the benefit of the international business community.
12.3 Concluding remark
Three decades ago, the application of a-national principles was "To Dream the
Impossible Dream"75 for the arbitration community. However, as this thesis has
highlighted, during this thirty-year period this dream has been pursued. A-national
principles have been applied in the practice of international commercial arbitration, of
varying levels of acceptance from country to country. The conflicts existing within the
present framework as well as other conflicts arising from a variety of aspects of
arbitration, such as the issues of arbitrability, interim measures, mandatory rules,
public policy, and so on, has been the source of inspiration for the approach presented
in this thesis. The present writer is of the opinion that it is essential for those involved
in international commercial arbitration to consider this new approach in order to take
steps to eliminate the conflicts between arbitration practice and the hostile attitudes of
national courts; enabling clearer communication of current developments within
international commercial arbitration. Perhaps, it is also a time to sing for the concept
of "internationalisation of international commercial arbitration."
75H.E. Judge Howard M. Holtzmann "A Task for the 21 Century: Creating a New International Court
for Resolving Disputes on Enforceability of Arbitral Awards", in Hunter, M;irriott and Veeder (eds.)
Internationalisation, (1995), 109-114, at p. 109.
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